07/30/2010
The Theory of Morality Ch 1 (The Concept of a Theory of Morality), University of Chicago Press, 1979
Author beings his book by tracing the history of moral principles aside from social mores, that is a separation between a societies laws (and customs) and moral principles. Author begins the discussion with the Stoics, who talked about a division between living in accordance with 'Nature', and 'Reason'-- a divine law that was above the social mores. (pg2) Author sees this tradition continuing with Judiasm and then Christianity. (pg4-5) Author consider the core agreement to be "That there is a set of rules of precepts of conduct constituting a divine law, which is binding upon all rational creatures as such, and which in principle can be ascertained by human reason." (pg6) Problem one: are there such principles? Studies of the religious traditions are confused by the fact that each religion also set down a system of religious rules that constituted piety according to that tradition, which was super-morality (that is, went beyond the call of 'common morality') The difficulty here is separating which precepts are specifically religious and which are part of the common morality(pg6-7) Another difficulty is in determining whether the moral principles passed by the traditions are the right ones.
Author takes as his first issue the problem of elucidating the principles of morality for rational agents, not just those within a specific religious tradition. Author considers the philosophers in the German tradition, specifically as they became synthesized and triumphed in Kant, to be the modern form of a rational moral theory. This theory was strongly criticized by Hegel, who considered the theory devoid of content, or at least of most content-- it was too abstract and required only 'duty', which was relatively empty. Kant's theory, according to Hegel, failed to capture what most consider to be the content of the right and wrong decisions they make since it was so abstract-- it failed to capture the 'concrete ethical life' (pg9-11), the content of social mores. Hegel charged Kant with reducing a language to its 'gramaticality', too abstract to be meaningful. (pg13) The problem for Hegel (as given by the author) was one of examining the men of principles who lived in a society whose mores were contrary. The case here taken is the Stoics who repudiated the institution of slavery. This meant, according to author, that they had another basis for moral content other than the mores of their society, in effect the 'abstract' morality had some content. (pg14) The risk of there being no good alternative to a society's mores is brought out when author describes the case of an Austrian who piously subscribed to the Catholic Just War theory and therefore rejected service to the Nazis during WWII. He consulted his priest and bishop, who tried to dissuade him but failed to do so-- and was beheaded. Author considered this the scandalous degeneration of a moral tradition that had fallen to the social mores of the time. (pg14-16)
Author then surveys the English-speaking moral theories, specifically a brand called Intuitionism. Intuitionism is the study of the principles of morality from which moral precepts proceed on a deductive basis. The core of the system are intuitions, which cannot be doubted by those who encounter them, and, supposedly, spring from the nature of reason. (pg17-8) Author discusses this model as being one for mathematical and scientific truths as well, but fell under attack from utilitarianism, and strongly from Sidgwick. Sidgwick criticized intuitionism because it lacked the precision of its principles, and yet as precision was pursued, it would fail to be undoubtable by those studying it. Sidgwick laid out four conditions on intuitionism's precepts: (pg20)
1)That it is clearly and precisely formulated
2) That its self-evidence is ascertained by careful reflection
3) That it is consistent with other propositions received as intuitively evident
4) That experts in the subject do not dissent from it
As 1-3 seemed to emerge, precepts failed on 4.
Author claims that Sidgwick's attack on intuitionism misses the mark, especially on Sidgwick's claim that the experts in the field of intuitionism should agree upon a well-formulated moral precept. Author instead claims that "Intuitionism was a method to be followed, but no more than any other could it assure those who followed it of success. ... since their results did not diverge haphazardly and unsystematically, they could be interpreted as approximating, in different degrees, to the true system that was sought." (pg20)
Author gives more history of the intuitionist project, turning to a 'new' intuitionism advocated separately by Ross and Broad, regarding a system of prima facie intuitive moral precepts that must we compiled in a certain circumstance and then 'balanced' according not to intuition but instead using an analogy to perceptual judgment. (pg22-3) This system was rejected for being too lax, and failing to give a method of balancing or weighing. Author further discusses the breakdown of intuitionism as being, at root, the belief that because we are unable to be perfectly rational and attentive, we cannot reach the indisputable precepts. Author refutes that logic by claiming that we can reach indisputable precepts even if we do not fully know them to be so. (pg25)
Author turns to his positive approach: to examine the Hebrew-Christian traditions to find the fundamental principles of morality (and the metaphysical assumptions grounding them) that are apart from the theistic and religious requirements. (pg26) Interestingly, author does not expect that the metaphysical assumptions about the world, man, and human action will subscribed to by all cultures or all metaphysical systems. "In constructing a moral theory no more is necessary than to identify and state any controversial metaphysical presuppositions that distinguish it from its rivals" (pg28)
7/9/10
Krugman, Paul - Building a Green Economy
07/09/2010
The New York Times Magazine, April 6 2010
This popular article discusses the basics of environmental economics and the major approaches to legislation for the environment. Author focuses on the threat of global warming, coal burning and carbon emissions in examples of how legislation might work. Author first reviews the core of environmental economics, which is another factor in the basics of economics. The basics of economics involves the mutual benefit from transactions between agents. The problem is when the byproducts of those transactions create costs that aren't factored in, called "negative externalities".
One solution is a restriction on that kind of transaction, or a very high price assessed to the agents for it. This is considered like a ban or strict limit, like for instance emissions standards on cars; those intended for sale in the US cannot go above a certain level of emissions. A major problem with outright bans or high standards is with having to retrofit, or in general the levels of compliance that the status quo (doesn't) enjoy. Author turns to Arthur Pigou's 1920s book The Economics of Welfare (Pigovian tax). The analysis here was that a 'market based' approach that limited production of a certain negative effect, perhaps carbon emissions or sulfur from coal burning on the whole, would allow the polluters to "buy" pollution from the non-polluters, all staying below the legislated cap. This kind of cap & trade system worked for sulfur dioxide into the air from coal producers in the 1990s, author claims.
A number of times, author discusses the state of the debate on climate change and tries to clarify it. While there is uncertainty with how the climate change will take place, and at what level, the vast consensus is that our current levels of carbon production will change the planet over the next 100 years. However, for author, the justification for action is that there is a non-negligible chance that there will be a calamitous result. Thus most uncertainty about the numbers isn't as much of a concern as the real possibility (non-negligible) of 'apocalyptic' conditions.
Author lays out how the cap and trade system might work, and what the (likely) overestimated constraints on economic growth would be, roughly 0.03-0.09 of GDP per annum, and perhaps at a cost of 1-3% of the world's gross product. Author also criticizes the critics of a cap and trade plan as disingenuous, simultaneously arguing that the magic of private innovation can do wonders for efficiency, but that private enterprise would be unable to cope with a cap and trade system. (Author also favors some outright bans or limits on coal burning, acknowledging that much of our pollution comes from that source.)
Author reviews two ways-- carrots and sticks-- of coaxing developing nations (read: China) into a similar system. The carrot is by incorporating them into the global emissions-rights-sales system that would allow China to sell the US (and other developed world) permits to pollute, effectively taking advantage of the fact they are still developing. The stick could be a tariff on imports that takes into account the carbon emissions used to produce it.
Author discusses two possible ways to enact this kind of legislation: the ramp up, or the 'big-bang'. The ramp up suggests that the costs of emissions rise slowly over the next century, the 'big-bang' is much more aggressive about legislating caps upfront. Author is more partial to the 'big-bang', since the ramp-up method seems to place bets that large limits late in the game will have the same effect that good limits now would. What if the game is already lost by the third quarter?
The last discussion is the possible way legislation like this could wind its way through Congress. Good luck.
The New York Times Magazine, April 6 2010
This popular article discusses the basics of environmental economics and the major approaches to legislation for the environment. Author focuses on the threat of global warming, coal burning and carbon emissions in examples of how legislation might work. Author first reviews the core of environmental economics, which is another factor in the basics of economics. The basics of economics involves the mutual benefit from transactions between agents. The problem is when the byproducts of those transactions create costs that aren't factored in, called "negative externalities".
One solution is a restriction on that kind of transaction, or a very high price assessed to the agents for it. This is considered like a ban or strict limit, like for instance emissions standards on cars; those intended for sale in the US cannot go above a certain level of emissions. A major problem with outright bans or high standards is with having to retrofit, or in general the levels of compliance that the status quo (doesn't) enjoy. Author turns to Arthur Pigou's 1920s book The Economics of Welfare (Pigovian tax). The analysis here was that a 'market based' approach that limited production of a certain negative effect, perhaps carbon emissions or sulfur from coal burning on the whole, would allow the polluters to "buy" pollution from the non-polluters, all staying below the legislated cap. This kind of cap & trade system worked for sulfur dioxide into the air from coal producers in the 1990s, author claims.
A number of times, author discusses the state of the debate on climate change and tries to clarify it. While there is uncertainty with how the climate change will take place, and at what level, the vast consensus is that our current levels of carbon production will change the planet over the next 100 years. However, for author, the justification for action is that there is a non-negligible chance that there will be a calamitous result. Thus most uncertainty about the numbers isn't as much of a concern as the real possibility (non-negligible) of 'apocalyptic' conditions.
Author lays out how the cap and trade system might work, and what the (likely) overestimated constraints on economic growth would be, roughly 0.03-0.09 of GDP per annum, and perhaps at a cost of 1-3% of the world's gross product. Author also criticizes the critics of a cap and trade plan as disingenuous, simultaneously arguing that the magic of private innovation can do wonders for efficiency, but that private enterprise would be unable to cope with a cap and trade system. (Author also favors some outright bans or limits on coal burning, acknowledging that much of our pollution comes from that source.)
Author reviews two ways-- carrots and sticks-- of coaxing developing nations (read: China) into a similar system. The carrot is by incorporating them into the global emissions-rights-sales system that would allow China to sell the US (and other developed world) permits to pollute, effectively taking advantage of the fact they are still developing. The stick could be a tariff on imports that takes into account the carbon emissions used to produce it.
Author discusses two possible ways to enact this kind of legislation: the ramp up, or the 'big-bang'. The ramp up suggests that the costs of emissions rise slowly over the next century, the 'big-bang' is much more aggressive about legislating caps upfront. Author is more partial to the 'big-bang', since the ramp-up method seems to place bets that large limits late in the game will have the same effect that good limits now would. What if the game is already lost by the third quarter?
The last discussion is the possible way legislation like this could wind its way through Congress. Good luck.
6/25/10
Sussman, David - For Badness' Sake
06/25/2010
The Journal of Philosophy, November 2009
This clearly written article takes on an old problem in philosophy: the trouble with perversity and human will. Author starts with a discussion of Kant's conception that it wasn't possible for a human to have a wicked will, that is, something that has a 'clear-eyed opposition' to moral law. Yet this is countered by St Augustine, who claims to have stolen pears from a tree for no sake other than the sake of being wicked, that is, not for profit, vengeance, or other reasons. The real trouble here is metaphysical-- human subjects take their actions to be intentional in that they aim at what they consider to be a 'good', not a 'bad'. (pg614) (Yet it is important to remember that "the good" is widely viewed to be different according to different perspectives.) This is considered by the author to be the 'Classical View', which considers intentional action essentially rational, a joining of beliefs and desires.
Author makes a case of perverse actions as an actual category of action, not just a case that can be finessed by the Classical View. (pg616-7) The thought here is that pure malice, spite, callousness and so on are intelligible to us, yet given the Classical View they should be more foreign than they are. But they are not, they are not insane actions but sensible-- but not according to the Classical View. Author's thesis is this: the Classical View must be reformed to be true broadly speaking but not necessarily true of any one particular action. (617-8)
Author review the Davidsonian conception of intentional actions, that they are a special joining of Beliefs and Desires such that there is a a rational connection between the desire and the set of beliefs that enable its fulfillment. (pg618) The problem for Davidson is that there can be a causal relationship that has all the right beliefs and desires but somehow fail to be intentional action. Take the case of the climber who, unnerved by the thought of releasing himself of his companion, releases his companion, though he does so unintentionally.
Author tries to mend this by suggesting that what is missing is an overall goal, a kind of guidance according to a concern. This overall guidance toward a final destination is considered invaluable when entering into the feedback loop of making actions in the world and adjusting to the effects such actions produce-- the guidance is required to make adjustments in the belief and desire framework that underwrites the overall end. Interestingly, author suggests we have immediate true knowledge about our intentions since they are action-oriented rather than introspective knowledge (pg619). "The distinctively intentional character of an action depends on the way its performance is informed by a sensitivity to the world construed in terms of some distinctive array of resources and dangers, relative to which our action may be done in a better or worse manner." (pg620) Author also considers this requirement one that allows the actor to consider herself as accomplishing the 'same thing' even as her route to it changes according to changing circumstances.
The addition to intentional action author offers is that it must have a 'point' or 'guiding concern' that 'orients' the actor in an 'open-ended way'. Author then reviews the case for perverse action, taking on (in opposition) Joseph Raz's attempts to subsume perversity under the standard CV. Raz offers a high bar for cases of genuine perversity: the actor must justify it without any reference to evaluative judgments. (Interpreting all evaluative judgments as aiming toward a 'good' rather than a 'bad'.) Author denies this high bar, instead suggesting that it is possible to take a 'rich-textured', 'structured' approach to a perverse activity like eating excrement. (pg624) Notice however that this is under the author's newly reformed CV, which includes an overall concern or goal that reacts to changing environmental conditions to effectively complete the project of excrement eating. (pg623-4)
The requirement of overall concerns or basic pointedness in one intentional action can, presumably, accommodate cases of genuine perversity. However, author argues that once such values become the standard norm for an actor, it seems the actor has subsumed perversity for her own particular understanding of the 'good'. (pg626) The trouble for the perverse here is one of justification-- the lack of justification that can be provided in a social, or linguistic context. Author scaffolds a claim that the pointedness or guidance in intentional action should be 'two-dimensional', that is, have the responsiveness both to physical challenges but also to social challenges (for justification, assistance, etc) as well. The perverse cannot justify their concerns socially, in that their actions cannot be well-formulated into a 'long-term resolve'. And if it lacks justification, then the actor who wants to be perverse as a general norm will soon lose sight of her own goals. (pg627). This fatal flaw to perversity as a general principle upholds the reformed Classical View, though it admits to singularities.
The Journal of Philosophy, November 2009
This clearly written article takes on an old problem in philosophy: the trouble with perversity and human will. Author starts with a discussion of Kant's conception that it wasn't possible for a human to have a wicked will, that is, something that has a 'clear-eyed opposition' to moral law. Yet this is countered by St Augustine, who claims to have stolen pears from a tree for no sake other than the sake of being wicked, that is, not for profit, vengeance, or other reasons. The real trouble here is metaphysical-- human subjects take their actions to be intentional in that they aim at what they consider to be a 'good', not a 'bad'. (pg614) (Yet it is important to remember that "the good" is widely viewed to be different according to different perspectives.) This is considered by the author to be the 'Classical View', which considers intentional action essentially rational, a joining of beliefs and desires.
Author makes a case of perverse actions as an actual category of action, not just a case that can be finessed by the Classical View. (pg616-7) The thought here is that pure malice, spite, callousness and so on are intelligible to us, yet given the Classical View they should be more foreign than they are. But they are not, they are not insane actions but sensible-- but not according to the Classical View. Author's thesis is this: the Classical View must be reformed to be true broadly speaking but not necessarily true of any one particular action. (617-8)
Author review the Davidsonian conception of intentional actions, that they are a special joining of Beliefs and Desires such that there is a a rational connection between the desire and the set of beliefs that enable its fulfillment. (pg618) The problem for Davidson is that there can be a causal relationship that has all the right beliefs and desires but somehow fail to be intentional action. Take the case of the climber who, unnerved by the thought of releasing himself of his companion, releases his companion, though he does so unintentionally.
Author tries to mend this by suggesting that what is missing is an overall goal, a kind of guidance according to a concern. This overall guidance toward a final destination is considered invaluable when entering into the feedback loop of making actions in the world and adjusting to the effects such actions produce-- the guidance is required to make adjustments in the belief and desire framework that underwrites the overall end. Interestingly, author suggests we have immediate true knowledge about our intentions since they are action-oriented rather than introspective knowledge (pg619). "The distinctively intentional character of an action depends on the way its performance is informed by a sensitivity to the world construed in terms of some distinctive array of resources and dangers, relative to which our action may be done in a better or worse manner." (pg620) Author also considers this requirement one that allows the actor to consider herself as accomplishing the 'same thing' even as her route to it changes according to changing circumstances.
The addition to intentional action author offers is that it must have a 'point' or 'guiding concern' that 'orients' the actor in an 'open-ended way'. Author then reviews the case for perverse action, taking on (in opposition) Joseph Raz's attempts to subsume perversity under the standard CV. Raz offers a high bar for cases of genuine perversity: the actor must justify it without any reference to evaluative judgments. (Interpreting all evaluative judgments as aiming toward a 'good' rather than a 'bad'.) Author denies this high bar, instead suggesting that it is possible to take a 'rich-textured', 'structured' approach to a perverse activity like eating excrement. (pg624) Notice however that this is under the author's newly reformed CV, which includes an overall concern or goal that reacts to changing environmental conditions to effectively complete the project of excrement eating. (pg623-4)
The requirement of overall concerns or basic pointedness in one intentional action can, presumably, accommodate cases of genuine perversity. However, author argues that once such values become the standard norm for an actor, it seems the actor has subsumed perversity for her own particular understanding of the 'good'. (pg626) The trouble for the perverse here is one of justification-- the lack of justification that can be provided in a social, or linguistic context. Author scaffolds a claim that the pointedness or guidance in intentional action should be 'two-dimensional', that is, have the responsiveness both to physical challenges but also to social challenges (for justification, assistance, etc) as well. The perverse cannot justify their concerns socially, in that their actions cannot be well-formulated into a 'long-term resolve'. And if it lacks justification, then the actor who wants to be perverse as a general norm will soon lose sight of her own goals. (pg627). This fatal flaw to perversity as a general principle upholds the reformed Classical View, though it admits to singularities.
6/18/10
Dworkin, Ronald - A Decision That Threatens Democracy
06/18/2010
The New York Review, May 13 2010
This is a relatively scholarly article written by a well-known constitutional democracy philosopher regarding the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States by a 5-4 decision in January 2010. The decision in the case generally reversed a longstanding tradition of restricting or barring non-media corporate entities (and other non-natural persons like unions) from most forms of campaigning during an election. Author gives some background for the case in part 1. Most importantly, the majority opinion considered this a free speech issue, using the First Amendment of the US Constitution as the basis for granting corporations and unions the right to directly advertise their opinions prior to an election.
In part 2, author uses his familiar argument about the language in the US Constitution: it tries to capture abstract concepts in political morality, and as such the principles behind the language-- the concepts of appropriate political morality-- are the ultimate appeal that judges should rely on. Thus there should be a theory, or number of different theories, that give reasons to underwrite the First Amendment. Author considers them:
1-The need for an informed electorate
2-The desire to 'protect the status, dignity, and moral development of individual citizens as equal partners in the political process'.
3-The desire to maintain honesty and transparency in government, e.g. not allowing the government to restrict speech
In each case, author considers the Citizens decision not only to fail to satisfy these desidirata, but to work in opposition to them.
In the case of 1, the need for an informed electorate, the idea here might be that we would hope that including corporations in the political process will uncover new ideas. Except that author declares that corporations can't think. Instead, it will be the ideas of the managers of the corporations, who can contribute to PACs on their own and therefore will just be adding to the volume of ideas, not new ones. It could also lead to a kind of double counting, or at least the impression of greater support for an idea than there is, due to the flow of money that corporations could level into the marketplace of ideas. (pg63) More importantly, at the root of campaign finance reform isn't the idea of "equality" in elections for their own sake. Instead, equality is encouraged for the sake of creating a marketplace of ideas where many can be heard. This is important to protect the "integrity of political debate"; author likens it to having a debate where time speaking is auctioned to the highest bidder. (pg64)
In the case of 2, the desire to respect the dignity and moral development of citizens-- the idea of protecting self-expression-- author claims there isn't a way the Citizens decision could support this since corporations aren't the kinds of things that have dignity or moral development.
In the case of 3, the desire to limit tyranny or corruption in government, author believes there aren't any positives to the Citizens decision, and it opens the door for more corruption, not less. For instance, it allows corporations whose interests are threatened by legislation to in turn threaten legislators by suggesting a flood of negative campaigning at the next election cycle. (pg64)
In section 3, author discusses the previous cases that had supposedly built a precedent for restricting corporate speech, Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell v Federal Election Commission, specifically taking apart the argument from the majority opinion's author, Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy had used two other cases to argue there was conflicting precedent, for instance in Buckley v Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti.
In section 4, author suggests some legislative fixes that might be within the scope of the Citizens decision, for instance by restricting corporations that are foreign-owned (or foreign-owned subsidiaries), or recipients of TARP monies. [What about corporations that receive any government contracts?]
The New York Review, May 13 2010
This is a relatively scholarly article written by a well-known constitutional democracy philosopher regarding the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States by a 5-4 decision in January 2010. The decision in the case generally reversed a longstanding tradition of restricting or barring non-media corporate entities (and other non-natural persons like unions) from most forms of campaigning during an election. Author gives some background for the case in part 1. Most importantly, the majority opinion considered this a free speech issue, using the First Amendment of the US Constitution as the basis for granting corporations and unions the right to directly advertise their opinions prior to an election.
In part 2, author uses his familiar argument about the language in the US Constitution: it tries to capture abstract concepts in political morality, and as such the principles behind the language-- the concepts of appropriate political morality-- are the ultimate appeal that judges should rely on. Thus there should be a theory, or number of different theories, that give reasons to underwrite the First Amendment. Author considers them:
1-The need for an informed electorate
2-The desire to 'protect the status, dignity, and moral development of individual citizens as equal partners in the political process'.
3-The desire to maintain honesty and transparency in government, e.g. not allowing the government to restrict speech
In each case, author considers the Citizens decision not only to fail to satisfy these desidirata, but to work in opposition to them.
In the case of 1, the need for an informed electorate, the idea here might be that we would hope that including corporations in the political process will uncover new ideas. Except that author declares that corporations can't think. Instead, it will be the ideas of the managers of the corporations, who can contribute to PACs on their own and therefore will just be adding to the volume of ideas, not new ones. It could also lead to a kind of double counting, or at least the impression of greater support for an idea than there is, due to the flow of money that corporations could level into the marketplace of ideas. (pg63) More importantly, at the root of campaign finance reform isn't the idea of "equality" in elections for their own sake. Instead, equality is encouraged for the sake of creating a marketplace of ideas where many can be heard. This is important to protect the "integrity of political debate"; author likens it to having a debate where time speaking is auctioned to the highest bidder. (pg64)
In the case of 2, the desire to respect the dignity and moral development of citizens-- the idea of protecting self-expression-- author claims there isn't a way the Citizens decision could support this since corporations aren't the kinds of things that have dignity or moral development.
In the case of 3, the desire to limit tyranny or corruption in government, author believes there aren't any positives to the Citizens decision, and it opens the door for more corruption, not less. For instance, it allows corporations whose interests are threatened by legislation to in turn threaten legislators by suggesting a flood of negative campaigning at the next election cycle. (pg64)
In section 3, author discusses the previous cases that had supposedly built a precedent for restricting corporate speech, Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell v Federal Election Commission, specifically taking apart the argument from the majority opinion's author, Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy had used two other cases to argue there was conflicting precedent, for instance in Buckley v Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti.
In section 4, author suggests some legislative fixes that might be within the scope of the Citizens decision, for instance by restricting corporations that are foreign-owned (or foreign-owned subsidiaries), or recipients of TARP monies. [What about corporations that receive any government contracts?]
6/11/10
Toulmin, Stephen - The Tyranny of Principles
06/11/2010
The Hastings Center Report, Vol 11, No 6 Dec 1981
This article may be dated but is still relevant today. It discusses the phenomenon of mistrust for the government, or specifically for administration and for benefit dispensaries, and also focuses on the traditional divide between equality and equity, which author argues people have begun to see as the same social concept.
Author begins by decrying the level of debate that takes place on matters of public policy, especially the use of hard-lined 'principles' in an effort to combat profligate relativism. Author claims that for many difficult questions, there is a need for case-by-case discussion and a weighing of relative merits. Author especially targets as a problem the 'revival of tyrannical absolutism' (pg31) and tries to trace the social origins of our current legal system. Author believes that they underlie the problems that large, unrelated modern societies face regarding the law as a system of rules. Author first draws on three observations:
1) Author took part in a US Congress task force for determining the ethical treatment of human test subjects in medical research, along with scientists and other moral leaders. He was struck with how much agreement they could reach, yet when asked about the principles that underwrote their conclusions, each member gave different reasons. Conclusion: principles have to do with non-moral commitments.
2) Author notices the abortion debate is usually portrayed in the public sphere as a fight between pro-choice and pro-life principles, without the more 'temperate' approach that these are tough issues which may require compromises and weighing.
3) Author noticed the distribution of social benefits, in this case ones for the poor and needy, have become increasingly bureaucratic and allow for little variation on a case-by-case basis. What seems to be worse is the poor understanding by the public about the alternative to this problem-- the solution suggested by the TV reporter is to create an even deeper system of rules, rather than the (perhaps forgotten?) alternative of allowing for more discretion and judgment in the dispensation. (pg31-2)
Author goes back to the cradle of the rule of law, the Roman civil society. In Rome's first 300 years or so, disputes were handled by pontiffs in an arbitration manner, not administrators in a rule-application manner. This was possible due mostly to the shared culture, tradition, and small-scale aspects of the society. As Rome grew so did the disputes, which was taxing on the pontiffs-- they hired junior ones and charged them with more rule-like guidance. Further conquest and governance of peoples with different traditions and concepts of fairness meant the need to create more rule-like laws. Author considers this the beginning of the separation between equitable results, which may have been reached through pontification, consideration, wisdom and taking the particulars of a case into account, and equal results, which relied on the (semi) uniform application of rules and legal procedures. (pg33)
Author brings out a distinction in settling disputes:
-An Equitable outcome: often done with care and under the assumption of a continuing relationship that should be preserved. Tolstoy (author uses examples from Anna Karenina) considered this the only system of ethics worth having.
-An Equal outcome: used to support the rights of 'strangers' (pg34-5), and exemplified by our current level of rules and regulations in administration. Author also points to the legal concept of the adversarial system, used in procedural justice to come to a fair outcome but can be so psychologically traumatic that afterwards neither party wants to engage the other, and has 'no stake in one another's future' (pg35).
Author does acknowledge the potential for abuse in the 'equitable' system, and also takes some time considering the merits of the large-scale nationalizing of charitable causes like welfare, that used to be instituted primarily by parochial institutions.
Author's theory is that 'a system of law consisting wholly of rules would treat all parties coming before it in the ways appropriate to strangers. By contrast, in legal issues that arise between parties who wish to continue as close associates on an intimate or familiar level, the demands of equality and rule conformity lose their central place.' (pg36)
The Hastings Center Report, Vol 11, No 6 Dec 1981
This article may be dated but is still relevant today. It discusses the phenomenon of mistrust for the government, or specifically for administration and for benefit dispensaries, and also focuses on the traditional divide between equality and equity, which author argues people have begun to see as the same social concept.
Author begins by decrying the level of debate that takes place on matters of public policy, especially the use of hard-lined 'principles' in an effort to combat profligate relativism. Author claims that for many difficult questions, there is a need for case-by-case discussion and a weighing of relative merits. Author especially targets as a problem the 'revival of tyrannical absolutism' (pg31) and tries to trace the social origins of our current legal system. Author believes that they underlie the problems that large, unrelated modern societies face regarding the law as a system of rules. Author first draws on three observations:
1) Author took part in a US Congress task force for determining the ethical treatment of human test subjects in medical research, along with scientists and other moral leaders. He was struck with how much agreement they could reach, yet when asked about the principles that underwrote their conclusions, each member gave different reasons. Conclusion: principles have to do with non-moral commitments.
2) Author notices the abortion debate is usually portrayed in the public sphere as a fight between pro-choice and pro-life principles, without the more 'temperate' approach that these are tough issues which may require compromises and weighing.
3) Author noticed the distribution of social benefits, in this case ones for the poor and needy, have become increasingly bureaucratic and allow for little variation on a case-by-case basis. What seems to be worse is the poor understanding by the public about the alternative to this problem-- the solution suggested by the TV reporter is to create an even deeper system of rules, rather than the (perhaps forgotten?) alternative of allowing for more discretion and judgment in the dispensation. (pg31-2)
Author goes back to the cradle of the rule of law, the Roman civil society. In Rome's first 300 years or so, disputes were handled by pontiffs in an arbitration manner, not administrators in a rule-application manner. This was possible due mostly to the shared culture, tradition, and small-scale aspects of the society. As Rome grew so did the disputes, which was taxing on the pontiffs-- they hired junior ones and charged them with more rule-like guidance. Further conquest and governance of peoples with different traditions and concepts of fairness meant the need to create more rule-like laws. Author considers this the beginning of the separation between equitable results, which may have been reached through pontification, consideration, wisdom and taking the particulars of a case into account, and equal results, which relied on the (semi) uniform application of rules and legal procedures. (pg33)
Author brings out a distinction in settling disputes:
-An Equitable outcome: often done with care and under the assumption of a continuing relationship that should be preserved. Tolstoy (author uses examples from Anna Karenina) considered this the only system of ethics worth having.
-An Equal outcome: used to support the rights of 'strangers' (pg34-5), and exemplified by our current level of rules and regulations in administration. Author also points to the legal concept of the adversarial system, used in procedural justice to come to a fair outcome but can be so psychologically traumatic that afterwards neither party wants to engage the other, and has 'no stake in one another's future' (pg35).
Author does acknowledge the potential for abuse in the 'equitable' system, and also takes some time considering the merits of the large-scale nationalizing of charitable causes like welfare, that used to be instituted primarily by parochial institutions.
Author's theory is that 'a system of law consisting wholly of rules would treat all parties coming before it in the ways appropriate to strangers. By contrast, in legal issues that arise between parties who wish to continue as close associates on an intimate or familiar level, the demands of equality and rule conformity lose their central place.' (pg36)
5/28/10
Westphal, Jonathan - Review of Roy Sorenson's Seeing Dark Things
05/28/2010
Paper delivered for panel discussion
This is a review of the Roy Sorenson book Seeing Dark Things, which is a book that espouses the causal theory of perception and the nature of shadows and silhouettes. Author takes the opportunity to discuss Sorenson's main points, but also disagrees with them and elaborates his own position in the review.
The first example author discusses is the example of "Near" and "Far", two planets that completely occlude the sun at the exact same time (from the point of view of the Earth). What happens is that the far planet "Far" occludes the sun, and, simultaneously, a closer planet, "Near" also moves into the same exact position that Far occupies in our field of vision. The closest thing to us is the near side of Near. Nevertheless, Sorenson argues that when we see the big black blot in front of the sun, we are seeing the thing that actually causally stops the sun's rays, which is the far side of Far. Author agrees-- though he explains it not as bolstering the causal theory but instead as part of a theory of shade and in describing celestial bodies in 'purely astronomical terms'. Author also worries about what this kind of example might underwrite for the causal theory, that, somehow, we can 'see' the far (obscured) sides of things.
The next discussion can be brought out by the example of a bird flying (and landing) onto the near side of a barn, but coming to rest somewhere in the barn's shadow. The light source is on the other side of the barn and when the bird flies into the shadow it disappears. From this simple case it seems there is an inconsistent triad:
1) If X causes a shadow, then some light is falling directly on X
2) X cannot cast a shadow through an opaque object
3) All shadow is shadow of something
With the bird/barn case, it seems the barn is casting a shadow through the opaque object of the bird, a violation of 2. But then it is clear that the shadow is in the shape of the barn, upholding (sort of) 3. But if we say the barn isn't casting a shadow through the bird, then 1 saddles us with the absurdity that some light is hitting the bird in order to keep the barn-shape of the shadow.
Author makes a comment on the ungrammatical aspects of 3, but first goes about denying the sense of 2 that generates the inconsistency. Author argues for a distinction between the concept of shade and that of shadow. Shade is the lack of illumination, whether partial or complete. Shadow is shade with shape. Shade can be cast through opaque objects, since 'through' isn't being used as a physical-causal term. With this distinction, author examines 3 and concludes that confusing these concepts also contributes to the inconsistency: All shadow is shadow of something: true. All shade is shade of something: true. All shade is the shadow of something: false.
The next matter of consideration is that of silhouettes. Sorenson's example is of a church steeple that is at a distance, set high in the sky against a low sun or other light source. Here all you make out is the silhouette of the steeple. Here author examines Sorenson's argument is that when you see the silhouette, you see the steeple. Author's problem is one of equivocation. Surely the outline of the shape of the steeple is 'seeing' the steeple, but the dark interior is just the shade of the far side of the steeple, which you don't see. Sorenson would argue (given his Near/Far discussion), that you do see the far side of the steeple. Here author and he part ways and it leads to the next example, this time created by the author: the wall. Author argues that a wall that casts a shadow onto the near side of a road is revealing to you a shaded near side, not a causally-efficacious far side. If, for instance, you dropped something valuable on the near side, you would look there for it, not on the other side, where you might 'see' it!
The last part of the review discusses Sorenson's odd claim that shadows can only be dark, not colored. Sorenson creates the concept of "Filtows" to represent colored light. Author is just comfortable saying that shadows can be colored. (Sorenson is worried that things like cathedrals will end up being illuminated by shadow.)
Paper delivered for panel discussion
This is a review of the Roy Sorenson book Seeing Dark Things, which is a book that espouses the causal theory of perception and the nature of shadows and silhouettes. Author takes the opportunity to discuss Sorenson's main points, but also disagrees with them and elaborates his own position in the review.
The first example author discusses is the example of "Near" and "Far", two planets that completely occlude the sun at the exact same time (from the point of view of the Earth). What happens is that the far planet "Far" occludes the sun, and, simultaneously, a closer planet, "Near" also moves into the same exact position that Far occupies in our field of vision. The closest thing to us is the near side of Near. Nevertheless, Sorenson argues that when we see the big black blot in front of the sun, we are seeing the thing that actually causally stops the sun's rays, which is the far side of Far. Author agrees-- though he explains it not as bolstering the causal theory but instead as part of a theory of shade and in describing celestial bodies in 'purely astronomical terms'. Author also worries about what this kind of example might underwrite for the causal theory, that, somehow, we can 'see' the far (obscured) sides of things.
The next discussion can be brought out by the example of a bird flying (and landing) onto the near side of a barn, but coming to rest somewhere in the barn's shadow. The light source is on the other side of the barn and when the bird flies into the shadow it disappears. From this simple case it seems there is an inconsistent triad:
1) If X causes a shadow, then some light is falling directly on X
2) X cannot cast a shadow through an opaque object
3) All shadow is shadow of something
With the bird/barn case, it seems the barn is casting a shadow through the opaque object of the bird, a violation of 2. But then it is clear that the shadow is in the shape of the barn, upholding (sort of) 3. But if we say the barn isn't casting a shadow through the bird, then 1 saddles us with the absurdity that some light is hitting the bird in order to keep the barn-shape of the shadow.
Author makes a comment on the ungrammatical aspects of 3, but first goes about denying the sense of 2 that generates the inconsistency. Author argues for a distinction between the concept of shade and that of shadow. Shade is the lack of illumination, whether partial or complete. Shadow is shade with shape. Shade can be cast through opaque objects, since 'through' isn't being used as a physical-causal term. With this distinction, author examines 3 and concludes that confusing these concepts also contributes to the inconsistency: All shadow is shadow of something: true. All shade is shade of something: true. All shade is the shadow of something: false.
The next matter of consideration is that of silhouettes. Sorenson's example is of a church steeple that is at a distance, set high in the sky against a low sun or other light source. Here all you make out is the silhouette of the steeple. Here author examines Sorenson's argument is that when you see the silhouette, you see the steeple. Author's problem is one of equivocation. Surely the outline of the shape of the steeple is 'seeing' the steeple, but the dark interior is just the shade of the far side of the steeple, which you don't see. Sorenson would argue (given his Near/Far discussion), that you do see the far side of the steeple. Here author and he part ways and it leads to the next example, this time created by the author: the wall. Author argues that a wall that casts a shadow onto the near side of a road is revealing to you a shaded near side, not a causally-efficacious far side. If, for instance, you dropped something valuable on the near side, you would look there for it, not on the other side, where you might 'see' it!
The last part of the review discusses Sorenson's odd claim that shadows can only be dark, not colored. Sorenson creates the concept of "Filtows" to represent colored light. Author is just comfortable saying that shadows can be colored. (Sorenson is worried that things like cathedrals will end up being illuminated by shadow.)
5/21/10
Wilson, Margaret - Objects, Ideas and "Minds": Comments on Spinoza's Theory of Mind
05/21/2010
Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy Ch 9, Princeton University Press
This paper attempts to show that Spinoza's theory of a human mind isn't close to what we understand a human mind to be, especially something considered in Descartes as a thing capable of conscious representation of objects, real or imaginary. Author begins by contrasting Spinoza's conception of minds with Leibniz's 'complete concept' and Descartes' 'res cognitantes' (thinking things).
The first is Leibniz, who gives metaphysical space between God's ideas of objects and the objects themselves. The complete ideas exist within God, but the objects themselves are God creatures. Further, they could be different, as God could have created a different world. So it is likely that for Leibniz, God has complete ideas of even non-existent entities. (pg127) Spinoza seems at odds with both of these positions: objects are attributes of God, and it is unclear if God has ideas of non-existent objects (of extension). (pg127-8)
Author secondly examines Descartes, acknowledging the common problems with the Cartesian picture. However, some of the intuitions are shared by most: anything that occurs in the mind is, by definition, conscious. Secondly, the mind has the ability to have ideas of many different things, whether imaginary or right-in-front-of-your-eyes (formal). Lastly, the mind is supposed to be a marker for rationality, giving mind-substance to some creatures and not to others. On most of these positions it seems Spinoza also disagrees. Spinoza doesn't exactly have an explicit account of consciousness, but for him the mind has an idea of everything-- everything-- that occurs in its body. Spinoza's mental ideas are also limited to just the things that happen in the body; finally, all extended things are also mental things-- that is there is two attributes to every mode of God's action-- even a stone has some level of mentality. (pg129-130)
Author moves on to consider a defense of Spinoza (in section III), but first levels the primary objection of her paper: Spinoza fails to give an account of human mental representation that is anything like what we consider it to be. The reason is that he is committed to minds being about the bodies whose mode they share, which explodes the concept of mental representation. It is exploded (pg131) by failing to find a sufficient condition for a subset of what is going on in the body to be represented in the mind.
Section III deals with the problem of mental representation of objects-- author believes that for Spinoza a human mind can only represent what is happening in its body. Ok, but how do the representations that we have filter up from our bodies? The rub is that it is obvious that not everything that happens in our bodies is represented in our minds. So where's the difference? Author argues there is not one to be found (pg132).
Section IV is an in-depth analysis of the various texts of Spinoza that commentators have claimed purport to show a distinction between conscious and non-conscious thought. Author argues against this interpretation.
Author concludes that without a sufficient condition for human mental representation (as opposed to representing everything in our body) and without a robust distinction between conscious and non-conscious ideas, Spinoza does not have a theory of mind that captures anything like the human mind.
Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy Ch 9, Princeton University Press
This paper attempts to show that Spinoza's theory of a human mind isn't close to what we understand a human mind to be, especially something considered in Descartes as a thing capable of conscious representation of objects, real or imaginary. Author begins by contrasting Spinoza's conception of minds with Leibniz's 'complete concept' and Descartes' 'res cognitantes' (thinking things).
The first is Leibniz, who gives metaphysical space between God's ideas of objects and the objects themselves. The complete ideas exist within God, but the objects themselves are God creatures. Further, they could be different, as God could have created a different world. So it is likely that for Leibniz, God has complete ideas of even non-existent entities. (pg127) Spinoza seems at odds with both of these positions: objects are attributes of God, and it is unclear if God has ideas of non-existent objects (of extension). (pg127-8)
Author secondly examines Descartes, acknowledging the common problems with the Cartesian picture. However, some of the intuitions are shared by most: anything that occurs in the mind is, by definition, conscious. Secondly, the mind has the ability to have ideas of many different things, whether imaginary or right-in-front-of-your-eyes (formal). Lastly, the mind is supposed to be a marker for rationality, giving mind-substance to some creatures and not to others. On most of these positions it seems Spinoza also disagrees. Spinoza doesn't exactly have an explicit account of consciousness, but for him the mind has an idea of everything-- everything-- that occurs in its body. Spinoza's mental ideas are also limited to just the things that happen in the body; finally, all extended things are also mental things-- that is there is two attributes to every mode of God's action-- even a stone has some level of mentality. (pg129-130)
Author moves on to consider a defense of Spinoza (in section III), but first levels the primary objection of her paper: Spinoza fails to give an account of human mental representation that is anything like what we consider it to be. The reason is that he is committed to minds being about the bodies whose mode they share, which explodes the concept of mental representation. It is exploded (pg131) by failing to find a sufficient condition for a subset of what is going on in the body to be represented in the mind.
Section III deals with the problem of mental representation of objects-- author believes that for Spinoza a human mind can only represent what is happening in its body. Ok, but how do the representations that we have filter up from our bodies? The rub is that it is obvious that not everything that happens in our bodies is represented in our minds. So where's the difference? Author argues there is not one to be found (pg132).
Section IV is an in-depth analysis of the various texts of Spinoza that commentators have claimed purport to show a distinction between conscious and non-conscious thought. Author argues against this interpretation.
Author concludes that without a sufficient condition for human mental representation (as opposed to representing everything in our body) and without a robust distinction between conscious and non-conscious ideas, Spinoza does not have a theory of mind that captures anything like the human mind.
5/14/10
Donagan, Alan - Spinoza's Dualism
05/14/2010
Ch 7 of The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Vol 1 Historical Understanding and the History of Philosophy, University of Chicago Press
This paper is an attempt to show that, although Spinoza was an avowed monist, many of his positions seemed to embrace much of the dualist belief system and seem at odds with what a fully endorsed monist position might be. Author compares this odd stance with the one of Descartes relative to heliocentrism-- though Descartes avowed to be a geocentrist, many of his other positions would give fellow geocentrists little comfort and were compatible with heliocentrism.
Author believes that 'Spinoza accepted numerous positions that are distinctively dualist' (pg117). The first departure requires some explanation. The standard model for attributes and substance is that a substance has one distinct attribute, and that attribute defines its essence (pg117-8). This is inherited entirely from Descartes (the dualist). And yet Spinoza places two (at least) attributes into the God/Nature, both the attributes of extension and thought. This puzzling move seems to suggest that a substance with two attributes would have two essences. (Yet because a substance with 3 essences would be more complete than one with 2, we know that God's substance must encompass all attributes, all essences pg120). Author claims this is not in fundamental conflict with a dualist like Descartes (pg121-2), especially because it claims (with Descartes) that the two attributes are irreducible to each other.
Author takes an explanatory detour into Spinoza's dual-track attribute theory, where everything extended (in the physical world) has a corresponding mental idea or cognition. E.g. a rock tumbling down a hill also has a corresponding mental aspect. (pg123-5) This is germane because it shows the irreducibility of the one attribute into the other; indeed it seems to reinforce their complete unconnected independence.
Author argues that Spinoza could only reconcile his dualist positions with his explicit monism through the awkward (novel?) adoption of the idea that: two distinct attributes may be found together in the same substance. This awkwardness overturns much of his previous work that generally expressed the theory of one attribute=one essence=one substance.
Ch 7 of The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Vol 1 Historical Understanding and the History of Philosophy, University of Chicago Press
This paper is an attempt to show that, although Spinoza was an avowed monist, many of his positions seemed to embrace much of the dualist belief system and seem at odds with what a fully endorsed monist position might be. Author compares this odd stance with the one of Descartes relative to heliocentrism-- though Descartes avowed to be a geocentrist, many of his other positions would give fellow geocentrists little comfort and were compatible with heliocentrism.
Author believes that 'Spinoza accepted numerous positions that are distinctively dualist' (pg117). The first departure requires some explanation. The standard model for attributes and substance is that a substance has one distinct attribute, and that attribute defines its essence (pg117-8). This is inherited entirely from Descartes (the dualist). And yet Spinoza places two (at least) attributes into the God/Nature, both the attributes of extension and thought. This puzzling move seems to suggest that a substance with two attributes would have two essences. (Yet because a substance with 3 essences would be more complete than one with 2, we know that God's substance must encompass all attributes, all essences pg120). Author claims this is not in fundamental conflict with a dualist like Descartes (pg121-2), especially because it claims (with Descartes) that the two attributes are irreducible to each other.
Author takes an explanatory detour into Spinoza's dual-track attribute theory, where everything extended (in the physical world) has a corresponding mental idea or cognition. E.g. a rock tumbling down a hill also has a corresponding mental aspect. (pg123-5) This is germane because it shows the irreducibility of the one attribute into the other; indeed it seems to reinforce their complete unconnected independence.
Author argues that Spinoza could only reconcile his dualist positions with his explicit monism through the awkward (novel?) adoption of the idea that: two distinct attributes may be found together in the same substance. This awkwardness overturns much of his previous work that generally expressed the theory of one attribute=one essence=one substance.
2/12/10
Hart, Herbert - Are There Any Natural Rights?
02/12/2010
This paper is mainly a statement that 'If there are any moral rights at all, the right of humans to be free is a natural right'. The freedom granted as a right means that others mustn't coerce or restrain s from acting so long as s's actions aren't coercing, restraining, or 'designed to injure' others. (pg77) Most of there rest of the paper is a clarification of what it is for there to be moral rights, natural rights, and other clarifications. Note that the argument is in the form of a conditional: 'If' there are any moral rights, then the right to be free is one. (Author mentions as an aside that there may be other moral systems that would include terms like right/wrong, good/bad that do not rely on rights.) (pg78)
A natural right is one that accrues to s by virtue of s's being a human chooser, e.g. someone capable of choice. It is not dependent on having taken a particular voluntary action. Rights have special characteristics, and author lays them out as he sees them as follows:
A) Moral rights are different, but related to legal ones; to secure a legal right there must be the allowance for coercion and restraint in case such a right is at risk of being violated. Yet the justification for s's restraining another isn't because of a moral right that s has vs others, it is due to the principle of legal rights distribution (pg80)
B) S's Having 'a right to x' means that s has no duty to restrain from doing x. However, there is competition for limited resources that provides an interesting contrast. All may have a right to acquire x, but no corresponding duty to let the other have it. (pg80-1)
C) Is there a corresponding right for every duty? No. Author argues we have a duty to not abuse animals, but they do not have a right against us in that regard. (pg81) Just because someone stands to gain from the performance of our duties, that someone does not have a right to that performance. Author uses as another example the contract n signs with s to provide care to s's aging mother. N's duty is to s, not the aging mother; yet the mother stands to benefit from the performance of the duty. (pg81-2)
Author takes care to distinguish between Special rights and General rights. Special rights arise out of transactions between individuals, special relationships, or special situations. These are such things as i) promises, ii) s conferring the prerogative to protect s's rights to another, iii) 'mutuality of restrictions' such as in a political process (pg85-6). (It is during this portion where author discusses the possibility of having a legal duty to refrain from doing the morally right thing, or vice versa.) iv) natural relationships like parent/child, v) s confers special liberties to another (e.g. to read s's diary).
General rights, on the other hand, accrue to s because of there being no special right inhibiting s's actions and because s has a right to be free. (pg87-88) The last section of the article involves author claiming that there is a right to interfere, restrain or coerce s when s is trying to do the same (or injure) another.
This paper is mainly a statement that 'If there are any moral rights at all, the right of humans to be free is a natural right'. The freedom granted as a right means that others mustn't coerce or restrain s from acting so long as s's actions aren't coercing, restraining, or 'designed to injure' others. (pg77) Most of there rest of the paper is a clarification of what it is for there to be moral rights, natural rights, and other clarifications. Note that the argument is in the form of a conditional: 'If' there are any moral rights, then the right to be free is one. (Author mentions as an aside that there may be other moral systems that would include terms like right/wrong, good/bad that do not rely on rights.) (pg78)
A natural right is one that accrues to s by virtue of s's being a human chooser, e.g. someone capable of choice. It is not dependent on having taken a particular voluntary action. Rights have special characteristics, and author lays them out as he sees them as follows:
A) Moral rights are different, but related to legal ones; to secure a legal right there must be the allowance for coercion and restraint in case such a right is at risk of being violated. Yet the justification for s's restraining another isn't because of a moral right that s has vs others, it is due to the principle of legal rights distribution (pg80)
B) S's Having 'a right to x' means that s has no duty to restrain from doing x. However, there is competition for limited resources that provides an interesting contrast. All may have a right to acquire x, but no corresponding duty to let the other have it. (pg80-1)
C) Is there a corresponding right for every duty? No. Author argues we have a duty to not abuse animals, but they do not have a right against us in that regard. (pg81) Just because someone stands to gain from the performance of our duties, that someone does not have a right to that performance. Author uses as another example the contract n signs with s to provide care to s's aging mother. N's duty is to s, not the aging mother; yet the mother stands to benefit from the performance of the duty. (pg81-2)
Author takes care to distinguish between Special rights and General rights. Special rights arise out of transactions between individuals, special relationships, or special situations. These are such things as i) promises, ii) s conferring the prerogative to protect s's rights to another, iii) 'mutuality of restrictions' such as in a political process (pg85-6). (It is during this portion where author discusses the possibility of having a legal duty to refrain from doing the morally right thing, or vice versa.) iv) natural relationships like parent/child, v) s confers special liberties to another (e.g. to read s's diary).
General rights, on the other hand, accrue to s because of there being no special right inhibiting s's actions and because s has a right to be free. (pg87-88) The last section of the article involves author claiming that there is a right to interfere, restrain or coerce s when s is trying to do the same (or injure) another.
2/5/10
Smith, Malcom - Does Humanity Share a Common Moral Faculty?
02/05/2010
Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol 7 (2010)
This paper seeks to establish the plausibility of the view that humanity shares a deep common moral reasoning faculty. The first observation is that philosophers often utilize moral intuitions about hypothetical examples to come up with consensus around a moral precept. Author argues that claiming this is moral knowledge also presumes there is moral truth, and that most thinkers want these settled intuitions to be relevant in creating a normative theory. (pg38) The differences in what ability or attribute constitutes this faculty (Reason, or Sentiment) is irrelevant to the discussion here: what author is trying to argue for is its reasonableness. One stop along the way is an illustration of the differences of distribution that theorists have. Some, the 'Platonic elitists' might hold the faculty to be only well-developed in the philosopher class. But author instead seeks to establish the reasonableness of 'commonalism', (pg44) the idea that 'nonphilosophers' moral beliefs are no less authoritative than philosopers' (pg41).
Commonalism is taken to be the idea that we all share a largely similar (metaphorical) mentalistic "black box" where non-moral facts can be fed into it and through some causal-inferential process a similar 'converging' moral conclusion will be output about what is appropriate. This is the convergence hypothesis. (The moral conclusion supervenes on the factual one.) (pg41-2) The objection is that we experience moral disagreement. Author tries to distinguish between so-called 'surface' disagreement and 'deep' disagreement. Of surface moral belief, author ties to explain them away as differences in the non-moral beliefs that go into the moral judgment. E.g. a racist believes (falsely) that one race is inherently inferior. Another influence for disagreement is bias: personal interest, race, gender, etc. Of deep belief, author makes sure to point out indeterminacy due to competition between two valid moral standards, like e.g. failing to keep a promise but helping someone in need. (pg44-5) Competition indeterminacy does not necessarily go against commonalism, since it reveals no profound difference between those who choose to keep the promise, or those who help the victim, author claims.
Author's major argument in favor of commonalism and the convergence hypothesis is that we fruitfully engage in moral discourse, and that we understand and engage with people across particular societies and cultures. (pg45-6) Probably the biggest possible blow to commonalism is the abortion debate, which author admits may be intractable at the deep level. However author argues that much of this may be competition indeterminacy, bias, and non-moral differences in belief. (pg47) He then defends the charge that he has an a priori answer for every objection (pg47-8). (However, there is a 'deep difficulty' with criticizing commonalism in favor of some sort of elitist model: how do you find moral judgments that are convergent yet simultaneously deny that the common-man has access to them? (pg50-1))
Author then considers the upshot of adopting commonalism: it will do away with moral nihilism and reduce the strength of moral relativism, since relativism is partially motivated by nihilism. (pg49) It also can be a backbone for natural rights theories, which many societies' laws reference. (pg52) It could also further moral understanding, since it may council patient attitudes toward moral disagreement. (pg53)
Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol 7 (2010)
This paper seeks to establish the plausibility of the view that humanity shares a deep common moral reasoning faculty. The first observation is that philosophers often utilize moral intuitions about hypothetical examples to come up with consensus around a moral precept. Author argues that claiming this is moral knowledge also presumes there is moral truth, and that most thinkers want these settled intuitions to be relevant in creating a normative theory. (pg38) The differences in what ability or attribute constitutes this faculty (Reason, or Sentiment) is irrelevant to the discussion here: what author is trying to argue for is its reasonableness. One stop along the way is an illustration of the differences of distribution that theorists have. Some, the 'Platonic elitists' might hold the faculty to be only well-developed in the philosopher class. But author instead seeks to establish the reasonableness of 'commonalism', (pg44) the idea that 'nonphilosophers' moral beliefs are no less authoritative than philosopers' (pg41).
Commonalism is taken to be the idea that we all share a largely similar (metaphorical) mentalistic "black box" where non-moral facts can be fed into it and through some causal-inferential process a similar 'converging' moral conclusion will be output about what is appropriate. This is the convergence hypothesis. (The moral conclusion supervenes on the factual one.) (pg41-2) The objection is that we experience moral disagreement. Author tries to distinguish between so-called 'surface' disagreement and 'deep' disagreement. Of surface moral belief, author ties to explain them away as differences in the non-moral beliefs that go into the moral judgment. E.g. a racist believes (falsely) that one race is inherently inferior. Another influence for disagreement is bias: personal interest, race, gender, etc. Of deep belief, author makes sure to point out indeterminacy due to competition between two valid moral standards, like e.g. failing to keep a promise but helping someone in need. (pg44-5) Competition indeterminacy does not necessarily go against commonalism, since it reveals no profound difference between those who choose to keep the promise, or those who help the victim, author claims.
Author's major argument in favor of commonalism and the convergence hypothesis is that we fruitfully engage in moral discourse, and that we understand and engage with people across particular societies and cultures. (pg45-6) Probably the biggest possible blow to commonalism is the abortion debate, which author admits may be intractable at the deep level. However author argues that much of this may be competition indeterminacy, bias, and non-moral differences in belief. (pg47) He then defends the charge that he has an a priori answer for every objection (pg47-8). (However, there is a 'deep difficulty' with criticizing commonalism in favor of some sort of elitist model: how do you find moral judgments that are convergent yet simultaneously deny that the common-man has access to them? (pg50-1))
Author then considers the upshot of adopting commonalism: it will do away with moral nihilism and reduce the strength of moral relativism, since relativism is partially motivated by nihilism. (pg49) It also can be a backbone for natural rights theories, which many societies' laws reference. (pg52) It could also further moral understanding, since it may council patient attitudes toward moral disagreement. (pg53)
1/29/10
Bandman, Bertram - A Friendly Critique of a Child's Right to an Open Future
01/29/2010
Philosophy of Education 2001, Suzanne Rice ed.
This article explores two different kinds of legal rights against the backdrop of the supreme court decision Wisconsin v Yoder, a case about a child's rights to modern education rather than an Amish one. Wisconsin v Yoder involves the case of Barbara, who is taken out of modern-day schools by her parents for 9th and 10th grade, where they intend she will attend an Amish agricultural and vocational school instead. The minority opinion led by Douglas would have enjoined this, arguing that a child denied the opportunity of a modern education would be denied the opportunity to become an engineer or doctor, to enter "into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today" (pg438). The majority was delivered by White, who downplayed the 2 years of schooling as relatively minor and evidently believed that the survival of the Amish sect trumped the child's rights to an open future. (CROF)
The article considers Joel Feinberg's position on this matter in his "A Child's Right To An Open Future" paper. Author believes that Feinberg has a poor conception of rights, which befuddles his idea of CROF. Author reviews Feinberg's idea of "rights-in-trust": "these are autonomy rights in escrow, which are saved for children when the reach adulthood." (pg439) The metaphor that Feinberg uses is of a trustee, protecting a child's rights but also safeguarding the child from herself in some cases. Author believes there is at least two more conceptions of 'rights-in-trust':
1) Rights-in-trust are autonomy rights that children will eventually exercise but can be violated in advance of becoming adults. Once violated, some options for the child will be closed off, but that is ok as long the child can still fulfill her future interests [with the options still available?]. (pg440)
2) Rights-in-trust are autonomy rights, but really they become the right 'to develop with freedom, care, nurture and enlightenment' (pg441). So instead of being a trustee, the parent would act as a guardian.
Author distinguishes between a trustee and a guardian in the amount of discretion that is allowed. Both act for the sake of the child, but a trustee is allowed much greater discretion and influence, while a guardian is limited to protecting the rights of the child without 'taking liberties' (pg441) Author believes that Feinberg is confused about which metaphor he wants to have, and this is part of the reason why he paradoxically sides with White against the child in Wisconsin v Yoder.
Author tries to explain what is going on here as a confusion between rights construed solely as proprietary, liberty interests (typically against outside interference) and a richer set of rights that involve a person's rational self-interests. The traditional concept of rights involves a sort-of property whereby any outside influence is unacceptable-- therefore someone with a right toward X is under no obligation to refrain to do X, even if X can be a bad thing for others. (pg441-2) Usually included in this concept is the caveat that if you do not exercise your rights, 'too bad for you'.(pg442) Author wants to show that this is a poor conception of rights for children, since children may lack the capacity or ability to exercise their rights (e.g. CROF). Author suggests an alternate way to look at (some) rights is as interest-based rather than will-based. The liberty-exercise conception is will-based. A nurture and care conception would be interest-based, justified if a person would (counterfactually) agree with a decision made for them if they had the proper knowledge or experience. This interest-based approach toward a child's rights-in-trust might not be the same as Feinberg's CROF, but instead a Child's Right to Develop (CRD).
Philosophy of Education 2001, Suzanne Rice ed.
This article explores two different kinds of legal rights against the backdrop of the supreme court decision Wisconsin v Yoder, a case about a child's rights to modern education rather than an Amish one. Wisconsin v Yoder involves the case of Barbara, who is taken out of modern-day schools by her parents for 9th and 10th grade, where they intend she will attend an Amish agricultural and vocational school instead. The minority opinion led by Douglas would have enjoined this, arguing that a child denied the opportunity of a modern education would be denied the opportunity to become an engineer or doctor, to enter "into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today" (pg438). The majority was delivered by White, who downplayed the 2 years of schooling as relatively minor and evidently believed that the survival of the Amish sect trumped the child's rights to an open future. (CROF)
The article considers Joel Feinberg's position on this matter in his "A Child's Right To An Open Future" paper. Author believes that Feinberg has a poor conception of rights, which befuddles his idea of CROF. Author reviews Feinberg's idea of "rights-in-trust": "these are autonomy rights in escrow, which are saved for children when the reach adulthood." (pg439) The metaphor that Feinberg uses is of a trustee, protecting a child's rights but also safeguarding the child from herself in some cases. Author believes there is at least two more conceptions of 'rights-in-trust':
1) Rights-in-trust are autonomy rights that children will eventually exercise but can be violated in advance of becoming adults. Once violated, some options for the child will be closed off, but that is ok as long the child can still fulfill her future interests [with the options still available?]. (pg440)
2) Rights-in-trust are autonomy rights, but really they become the right 'to develop with freedom, care, nurture and enlightenment' (pg441). So instead of being a trustee, the parent would act as a guardian.
Author distinguishes between a trustee and a guardian in the amount of discretion that is allowed. Both act for the sake of the child, but a trustee is allowed much greater discretion and influence, while a guardian is limited to protecting the rights of the child without 'taking liberties' (pg441) Author believes that Feinberg is confused about which metaphor he wants to have, and this is part of the reason why he paradoxically sides with White against the child in Wisconsin v Yoder.
Author tries to explain what is going on here as a confusion between rights construed solely as proprietary, liberty interests (typically against outside interference) and a richer set of rights that involve a person's rational self-interests. The traditional concept of rights involves a sort-of property whereby any outside influence is unacceptable-- therefore someone with a right toward X is under no obligation to refrain to do X, even if X can be a bad thing for others. (pg441-2) Usually included in this concept is the caveat that if you do not exercise your rights, 'too bad for you'.(pg442) Author wants to show that this is a poor conception of rights for children, since children may lack the capacity or ability to exercise their rights (e.g. CROF). Author suggests an alternate way to look at (some) rights is as interest-based rather than will-based. The liberty-exercise conception is will-based. A nurture and care conception would be interest-based, justified if a person would (counterfactually) agree with a decision made for them if they had the proper knowledge or experience. This interest-based approach toward a child's rights-in-trust might not be the same as Feinberg's CROF, but instead a Child's Right to Develop (CRD).
1/22/10
Hart, Herbert - Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority
01/22/2010
Essay 10, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press 1984
In this essay originally published in 1973, author does a careful reading of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, in particular the principle that 'liberty can only be limited for the sake of liberty'. Author first outlines the fundamental parts of Rawls' argument:
The Main Idea: the principles of justice rely on rational actors being in a 'original position' behind a 'veil of ignorance', not knowing what roles they will take (or what kinds of people they will be) in the society they are agreeing to form the rules for. (pg224) From this, Rawls moves to the General Conception of justice, which is that all 'social values' will be distributed equally, unless distributing them unequally leads to everyone's advantage. Rawls' also had a special conception of justice which placed liberty as the primary social good. The special conception had the first principle:
"Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all" (pg225) This principle, Rawls argues, would be the considered outcome of rationally self-interested agents in the original position. This principle has priority over all other social values/goods.
Because liberty takes priority over all other social goods, Rawls argues that it can only be restricted for the sake of further liberty. The first problem author raises is the broadness of the term-- does it imply no such thing as private property (an obvious case of having far more liberties vs others')? (pg227) Author believes Rawls alters liberty to be liberties, a collection of them that includes private property, voting and legislative rights, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience and thought, and freedom of person (pg229). Author believes that enumerating liberties has limited the scope of the liberty principle to those liberties (and possibly others-- the list is rough). Author argues this for two reasons:
1) Rawls avoids the dilemma of liberty and private property by using a distinction between liberty and the value-of-liberty. For things like personal property, the value of the liberty exercised doesn't have to be equal. It can be unequal. However, for other liberties like voting, the value of the liberty must be equal. So employing this distinction shows that Rawls is paying attention not just to vaguely defined liberty, but to specific liberties. (pg229)
2) Rawls seems willing to allow for privately owned means-of-production. Author thinks that this wouldn't comport with "the most extensive liberty" taken as a whole, and not as specific liberties. (pg230)
The bulk of the paper is devoted to understanding how to "limit liberty for the sake of liberty" (pg233). In the simple case, there can be rules of order in conducting a public debate-- where people's liberties to speak when they please is limited because of an interest in allowing people to be free from interruption (for a period of time). Even this uncontroversial case is misleading, author argues. What is being secured by rules of order is not greater liberty, but something more valuable or 'profitable', namely the right to take time to formulate a complete thought without interruption.
The trouble here is that Rawls wants to keep liberty as the priority and that restrictions on it that aren't related to furthering liberties need scrutiny or to somehow show a relation to greater liberty. But author argues that this isn't possible in many cases (pg234-8). Author argues the problem becomes greater when an elected representative must consider how to adjudicate between liberty trade-offs, and must consider it from the standpoint of 'the representative equal citizen' (pg235). Author argues that different people are going to give differing weights to liberties, therefore making the 'common good' argument inaccessible as a decision procedure where only liberties are being weighed. (pg236) Author claims it is easy to see how there can be a conflict of liberties given particular temperaments and that justice might then become indeterminate, if liberty can only be traded-off against other liberty. (It certainly might become determinate if you could use other factors-- author's main contention).
On the other side, often liberty is restricted because of other social values or benefits that accrue because of it, and that are unrelated to liberty, at least directly. For instance liberty is often restricted to prevent harm or suffering. Author argues that to claim that harm done to x is a restriction of x's liberty seems to be a stretch. (pg239) It might be possible to claim that 'natural duties' between persons would fill-in where the argument from the special conception of justice does not, but author thinks this will not do because it is too weak. (pg240) The general case the author makes is that a decision procedure based solely on liberty trade-offs (and maybe natural duties) will not be robust enough to settle a variety of cases from the original position. "...it confers on individuals the advantage of that liberty, but secondly it exposes them to whatever disadvantages the practices of that liberty by others man entail for them" (pg241-3)
The final part of the paper involves a critique of the reasons offered for the special conception of justice, whose first principle is that liberty can only be traded-off for other liberty. Author claims that Rawls' reasons are as follows: Once a society reaches a certain level of material or economic prosperity, its members will become less motivated by further material attainment and liberty will become the most prized. Author questions this, asking why people would want to put a restriction on trading their liberties for other benefits because, at some later point, they'll want those liberties back. (pg244-5)
Essay 10, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press 1984
In this essay originally published in 1973, author does a careful reading of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, in particular the principle that 'liberty can only be limited for the sake of liberty'. Author first outlines the fundamental parts of Rawls' argument:
The Main Idea: the principles of justice rely on rational actors being in a 'original position' behind a 'veil of ignorance', not knowing what roles they will take (or what kinds of people they will be) in the society they are agreeing to form the rules for. (pg224) From this, Rawls moves to the General Conception of justice, which is that all 'social values' will be distributed equally, unless distributing them unequally leads to everyone's advantage. Rawls' also had a special conception of justice which placed liberty as the primary social good. The special conception had the first principle:
"Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all" (pg225) This principle, Rawls argues, would be the considered outcome of rationally self-interested agents in the original position. This principle has priority over all other social values/goods.
Because liberty takes priority over all other social goods, Rawls argues that it can only be restricted for the sake of further liberty. The first problem author raises is the broadness of the term-- does it imply no such thing as private property (an obvious case of having far more liberties vs others')? (pg227) Author believes Rawls alters liberty to be liberties, a collection of them that includes private property, voting and legislative rights, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience and thought, and freedom of person (pg229). Author believes that enumerating liberties has limited the scope of the liberty principle to those liberties (and possibly others-- the list is rough). Author argues this for two reasons:
1) Rawls avoids the dilemma of liberty and private property by using a distinction between liberty and the value-of-liberty. For things like personal property, the value of the liberty exercised doesn't have to be equal. It can be unequal. However, for other liberties like voting, the value of the liberty must be equal. So employing this distinction shows that Rawls is paying attention not just to vaguely defined liberty, but to specific liberties. (pg229)
2) Rawls seems willing to allow for privately owned means-of-production. Author thinks that this wouldn't comport with "the most extensive liberty" taken as a whole, and not as specific liberties. (pg230)
The bulk of the paper is devoted to understanding how to "limit liberty for the sake of liberty" (pg233). In the simple case, there can be rules of order in conducting a public debate-- where people's liberties to speak when they please is limited because of an interest in allowing people to be free from interruption (for a period of time). Even this uncontroversial case is misleading, author argues. What is being secured by rules of order is not greater liberty, but something more valuable or 'profitable', namely the right to take time to formulate a complete thought without interruption.
The trouble here is that Rawls wants to keep liberty as the priority and that restrictions on it that aren't related to furthering liberties need scrutiny or to somehow show a relation to greater liberty. But author argues that this isn't possible in many cases (pg234-8). Author argues the problem becomes greater when an elected representative must consider how to adjudicate between liberty trade-offs, and must consider it from the standpoint of 'the representative equal citizen' (pg235). Author argues that different people are going to give differing weights to liberties, therefore making the 'common good' argument inaccessible as a decision procedure where only liberties are being weighed. (pg236) Author claims it is easy to see how there can be a conflict of liberties given particular temperaments and that justice might then become indeterminate, if liberty can only be traded-off against other liberty. (It certainly might become determinate if you could use other factors-- author's main contention).
On the other side, often liberty is restricted because of other social values or benefits that accrue because of it, and that are unrelated to liberty, at least directly. For instance liberty is often restricted to prevent harm or suffering. Author argues that to claim that harm done to x is a restriction of x's liberty seems to be a stretch. (pg239) It might be possible to claim that 'natural duties' between persons would fill-in where the argument from the special conception of justice does not, but author thinks this will not do because it is too weak. (pg240) The general case the author makes is that a decision procedure based solely on liberty trade-offs (and maybe natural duties) will not be robust enough to settle a variety of cases from the original position. "...it confers on individuals the advantage of that liberty, but secondly it exposes them to whatever disadvantages the practices of that liberty by others man entail for them" (pg241-3)
The final part of the paper involves a critique of the reasons offered for the special conception of justice, whose first principle is that liberty can only be traded-off for other liberty. Author claims that Rawls' reasons are as follows: Once a society reaches a certain level of material or economic prosperity, its members will become less motivated by further material attainment and liberty will become the most prized. Author questions this, asking why people would want to put a restriction on trading their liberties for other benefits because, at some later point, they'll want those liberties back. (pg244-5)
12/18/09
Dworkin, Ronald - Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief
12/18/2009
The New York Review of Books, Vol 44, No 5 March 27, 1997
This is a brief filed by 6 philosophers (Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, Thomson) with the US Supreme Court in support of assisted suicide, as there were two cases before the court relating to it. Dworkin wrote an introduction and in Slate Magazine there followed an exchange of letters between Michael McConnell and Dworkin, McConnell criticizing the brief's reliance on 'judicial rhetoric' and defending a reading of the due-process clause of the 14th amendment that rights are granted by the nation's 'tradition and experience' of granting them. Since the only one state has very recently allowed assisted suicide, there is no tradition and experience of granting this right therefore it is improper for the Court to grant it. Dworkin's reply is that this is a particular interpretation of the 14th amendment and isn't the only one used by the Court and certainly isn't the only defensible one.
The brief filed by the philosophers is introduced and summarized by author. Author takes the time to lay out the context of the debate: that there are two main 'slippery slopes' that the Court is worried about (or at least was worried about on oral argument): the theoretical and the practical.
The Theoretical slippery-slope says that there is no principled place to 'draw the line' about which assisted suicides are permissible and which are not. The Philosophers' response to this is to suggests a difference between firm, considered, deep convictions about life's value and impulsive decisions perhaps made out of emotional depression where the state has reason to believe that the person would be grateful later if they were prevented from dying.
The Practical slippery-slope says that if assisted-suicide were legal, states would no doubt try to regulate it; but there would be a mix of successes and failures, and the vulnerable patients, the poor or the less-cared-for, would die as an outcome of poor systematic protections. Author answers this first by suggesting that the wealthy already enjoy an informal version of this right. Author secondly suggests that this slippery-slope argument applies across the board, even with pain-management already. Building on this, if assisted suicide was legal, it would be likely legislated that all palliative measures would be legislated to be employed prior to the suicide, thereby possibly raising the level of care for the poor and needy.
Author proposes that there are three methods that the Court could use to rule against the lower courts (in favor of the right of assisted suicide) in this decision. The first would be to deny a liberty interest in assisted suicide. The second would be to grant a liberty interest in assisted suicide but claim that states can override this interest in toto. This seems to be 'a conundrum'. The final method would be postponement, which author favors as the least damaging way to reject lower courts' decisions.
The Philosophers' brief first claims that in a free society individuals have a right to determine, for themselves, their values about 'the most intimate and personal choices... central to a person's dignity and autonomy' (Casey). And offer deeply held beliefs about one's own death as falling under this category. Of particular interest is the discussion about the potential distinction between "letting die" and "killing", and a possible "common-sense" distinction between acts and omissions. The brief claims this is an error. Anything that causes death contrary to a patient's wishes, whether it is an act or an omission, is wrong for the same reason. The important interest here is the patient's wishes, and from a patient's perspective there is no difference what the doctor does if it is in line with her own wishes. From the doctor's perspective, there seems to be no difference either between less, more (or no) care if the death (or life) of the patient is what the doctor is aiming at. The final argument of the brief is that state interests are not high enough to categorically prohibit assisted suicide. The body of this argument involves responding to the Solicitor-General's arguments against assisted suicide.
The New York Review of Books, Vol 44, No 5 March 27, 1997
This is a brief filed by 6 philosophers (Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, Thomson) with the US Supreme Court in support of assisted suicide, as there were two cases before the court relating to it. Dworkin wrote an introduction and in Slate Magazine there followed an exchange of letters between Michael McConnell and Dworkin, McConnell criticizing the brief's reliance on 'judicial rhetoric' and defending a reading of the due-process clause of the 14th amendment that rights are granted by the nation's 'tradition and experience' of granting them. Since the only one state has very recently allowed assisted suicide, there is no tradition and experience of granting this right therefore it is improper for the Court to grant it. Dworkin's reply is that this is a particular interpretation of the 14th amendment and isn't the only one used by the Court and certainly isn't the only defensible one.
The brief filed by the philosophers is introduced and summarized by author. Author takes the time to lay out the context of the debate: that there are two main 'slippery slopes' that the Court is worried about (or at least was worried about on oral argument): the theoretical and the practical.
The Theoretical slippery-slope says that there is no principled place to 'draw the line' about which assisted suicides are permissible and which are not. The Philosophers' response to this is to suggests a difference between firm, considered, deep convictions about life's value and impulsive decisions perhaps made out of emotional depression where the state has reason to believe that the person would be grateful later if they were prevented from dying.
The Practical slippery-slope says that if assisted-suicide were legal, states would no doubt try to regulate it; but there would be a mix of successes and failures, and the vulnerable patients, the poor or the less-cared-for, would die as an outcome of poor systematic protections. Author answers this first by suggesting that the wealthy already enjoy an informal version of this right. Author secondly suggests that this slippery-slope argument applies across the board, even with pain-management already. Building on this, if assisted suicide was legal, it would be likely legislated that all palliative measures would be legislated to be employed prior to the suicide, thereby possibly raising the level of care for the poor and needy.
Author proposes that there are three methods that the Court could use to rule against the lower courts (in favor of the right of assisted suicide) in this decision. The first would be to deny a liberty interest in assisted suicide. The second would be to grant a liberty interest in assisted suicide but claim that states can override this interest in toto. This seems to be 'a conundrum'. The final method would be postponement, which author favors as the least damaging way to reject lower courts' decisions.
The Philosophers' brief first claims that in a free society individuals have a right to determine, for themselves, their values about 'the most intimate and personal choices... central to a person's dignity and autonomy' (Casey). And offer deeply held beliefs about one's own death as falling under this category. Of particular interest is the discussion about the potential distinction between "letting die" and "killing", and a possible "common-sense" distinction between acts and omissions. The brief claims this is an error. Anything that causes death contrary to a patient's wishes, whether it is an act or an omission, is wrong for the same reason. The important interest here is the patient's wishes, and from a patient's perspective there is no difference what the doctor does if it is in line with her own wishes. From the doctor's perspective, there seems to be no difference either between less, more (or no) care if the death (or life) of the patient is what the doctor is aiming at. The final argument of the brief is that state interests are not high enough to categorically prohibit assisted suicide. The body of this argument involves responding to the Solicitor-General's arguments against assisted suicide.
12/11/09
Dworkin, Ronald - Sex, Death, and the Courts
12/11/2009
Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2000, Ch 14
This is a chapter reviewing two strands of judicial interpretation of the rights enumerated in the US Constitution (and its amendments). The two topics that are used to reveal the tension between these interpretations are homosexuality and the right-to-die. Author argues that the 14th amendment is the 'most abstract source of these rights' (pg454), that is, rights not enumerated in the other amendments. Author frames these two issues as members of a larger set, that of an individual's right against the judgment of the majority about what is, by and large, an individual decision.
The 14th amendment offers two abstract and broad principles: that the state may not deprive a citizen of liberty with "due process of law" and that the state may not deny anyone "equal protection of the laws". This abstract language has both too broad and too narrow interpretations, yet the ones favored by judges seem to be two: 'historical' and 'integral'. The 'historical' interpretation is that individuals are protected with due process and equal protection on a limited number of rights that the American people historically and overwhelming have considered to be their rights. Author identifies Justice Byron White in the Bowers v Hardwick decision as a principal proponent of this interpretation. (pg454) The other interpretation, which the author calls the interpretation of 'integrity', is that the principles behind the enumerated (and common law) rights may, in some cases, rationally and logically suggest other rights that have not necessarily been considered rights previously. (pg455) Author sites Justice John Harlan as such an interpreter in a 1961 dissent of Poe v Ullman.
With these two interpretations in mind, author goes through supreme court decisions first about homosexuality in Colorado. Colorado amended its constitution to restrict any favorable discriminatory treatment to homosexuals, overturning some statutes instituted by some of the state's cities. The case of Evans v Romer was a challenge of the constitutionality of that amendment.
Using the 14th amendment's 'due process' clause, the strategy would go as follows: 1) show the law compromises a 'liberty interest'-- a constitutionally protected right, and if so, 2) show the law does not have enough legitimate state interest to pass a balancing test. (pg457)
Using the 'equal protection' clause, the strategy would be: 1) show that the law requires more than 'relaxed scrutiny', (rational basis) but instead 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny because it reduces the ability of a certain group to participate in the political process-- it systematically disadvantages a class. (pg58-9) This is commonly used in the case of 'suspect' classes like blacks due to this country's history of discrimination. (459-60) The strategy would be to claim that simple 'the prejudice and contempt' of a majority is sufficient to warrant 'strict' scrutiny of legislation that will affect them. (pg460-1)
When the case got to the supreme court, a separate amici curiae (friends of the court) brief was written in opposition to the law, which neglected the previous judicial frameworks: it argued instead that the law stops a class from being a class, which is a violation of equal protection. The actual supreme court decision, 6-3, was 'surprisingly bold' (pg463) because it said that the law did not even pass 'relaxed scrutiny' because it was based on nothing more "except animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests" (pg464). Author considered this a victory for the 'integrity' interpretation.
The second topic considered is the right-to-die and assisted-suicide cases. Here, a supreme court decision of 9-0 against supporting such a right might seem like a resounding victory for the historicist approach, and the majority opinion of the court seemed like a straightforward historicisit reading-- inconsistent on principle, but in-line with history. What was interesting about the case was that the majority decision didn't represent 9 justices-- only 5. The others wrote their own opinions, and many of them revealed an 'integral' interpretation, but nevertheless held with the majority in this case. Author examines the different opinions and concludes that it isn't a knock-down victory for the historicist interpretation.
Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2000, Ch 14
This is a chapter reviewing two strands of judicial interpretation of the rights enumerated in the US Constitution (and its amendments). The two topics that are used to reveal the tension between these interpretations are homosexuality and the right-to-die. Author argues that the 14th amendment is the 'most abstract source of these rights' (pg454), that is, rights not enumerated in the other amendments. Author frames these two issues as members of a larger set, that of an individual's right against the judgment of the majority about what is, by and large, an individual decision.
The 14th amendment offers two abstract and broad principles: that the state may not deprive a citizen of liberty with "due process of law" and that the state may not deny anyone "equal protection of the laws". This abstract language has both too broad and too narrow interpretations, yet the ones favored by judges seem to be two: 'historical' and 'integral'. The 'historical' interpretation is that individuals are protected with due process and equal protection on a limited number of rights that the American people historically and overwhelming have considered to be their rights. Author identifies Justice Byron White in the Bowers v Hardwick decision as a principal proponent of this interpretation. (pg454) The other interpretation, which the author calls the interpretation of 'integrity', is that the principles behind the enumerated (and common law) rights may, in some cases, rationally and logically suggest other rights that have not necessarily been considered rights previously. (pg455) Author sites Justice John Harlan as such an interpreter in a 1961 dissent of Poe v Ullman.
With these two interpretations in mind, author goes through supreme court decisions first about homosexuality in Colorado. Colorado amended its constitution to restrict any favorable discriminatory treatment to homosexuals, overturning some statutes instituted by some of the state's cities. The case of Evans v Romer was a challenge of the constitutionality of that amendment.
Using the 14th amendment's 'due process' clause, the strategy would go as follows: 1) show the law compromises a 'liberty interest'-- a constitutionally protected right, and if so, 2) show the law does not have enough legitimate state interest to pass a balancing test. (pg457)
Using the 'equal protection' clause, the strategy would be: 1) show that the law requires more than 'relaxed scrutiny', (rational basis) but instead 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny because it reduces the ability of a certain group to participate in the political process-- it systematically disadvantages a class. (pg58-9) This is commonly used in the case of 'suspect' classes like blacks due to this country's history of discrimination. (459-60) The strategy would be to claim that simple 'the prejudice and contempt' of a majority is sufficient to warrant 'strict' scrutiny of legislation that will affect them. (pg460-1)
When the case got to the supreme court, a separate amici curiae (friends of the court) brief was written in opposition to the law, which neglected the previous judicial frameworks: it argued instead that the law stops a class from being a class, which is a violation of equal protection. The actual supreme court decision, 6-3, was 'surprisingly bold' (pg463) because it said that the law did not even pass 'relaxed scrutiny' because it was based on nothing more "except animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests" (pg464). Author considered this a victory for the 'integrity' interpretation.
The second topic considered is the right-to-die and assisted-suicide cases. Here, a supreme court decision of 9-0 against supporting such a right might seem like a resounding victory for the historicist approach, and the majority opinion of the court seemed like a straightforward historicisit reading-- inconsistent on principle, but in-line with history. What was interesting about the case was that the majority decision didn't represent 9 justices-- only 5. The others wrote their own opinions, and many of them revealed an 'integral' interpretation, but nevertheless held with the majority in this case. Author examines the different opinions and concludes that it isn't a knock-down victory for the historicist interpretation.
11/20/09
Sommers, Fred - Dissonant Beliefs
11/20/2009
Analysis, Vol 69 No 2 April 2009
This article attempts to change the conception of a belief as a propositional attitude. 'Propositionalists', as author calls them, believe that believing is primarily a relation between a believer and a proposition. Author also considers Fodor a propositionalist even though he gives a three-part relation, a believer, a sentential expression, and a proposition. Author's proposal is different: believing is a relation between a believer and the world. This view author dubs the 'mondialist' view, and believes it can account for so-called 'dissonant beliefs', which are beliefs where a person seems to believe a contradiction (or an inconsistency, since 'contradiction' may imply propositions)
Author lays out the standard two kinds of belief: de re and de dicto. He wants to add a third: de mundo, which takes the world to be 'xish'. Here is how the progression might work:
-Formation of a de re belief about the ringing of a smoke alarm
-Formation of a de mundo belief: the world is smoke-alarm-ish
-Possible, but not necessary or automatic: de dicto belief: 'There is a smoke alarm ringing'.
The separation between the first two and the third gives space for non-human animals to have beliefs, de re and de mundo, but not de dicto. (pg270)
In order to make this work, 'the world' needs a bit of a specialized understanding. Author gives it: 'the world is characterized by what is and is not in it.' (pg268-9) So, our world is 'elk-ish' and not 'elf-ish' since there are elks in the world but not elves. The second understanding is that there is a context that constrains mondial beliefs-- a 'Domain under Consideration' (DC). We use this when we say things like "it's raining". It isn't raining in the whole world-- just in our DC-- in our DC the world is rain-ish.
Author believes that mundial beliefs are more primitive than propositional belief-- he loosely translates mundial beliefs as 'being aware of something'. (pg270) The two advantages of having them is that they are good fits for non-human animal beliefs and also that they can account for 'dissonant beliefs'.
Author takes dissonant beliefs to be commonplace in our world. For the well-educated, dissonant beliefs come when we believe a proposition (de dicto) like E=mc2 but have no idea what the world is like because of it, or what it would be like if it weren't true. Author thinks it is rational to keep your mundial and your de dicto beliefs in line, but it may be very difficult given the amount of arcane scientific knowledge we are exposed to. (pg272) But a more mundane example is where someone who doesn't believe in the afterlife still feels as though her dead relative is checking in on her. Here a mundial belief of 'the world is father-ish' is inconsistent with the propositional belief 'my father is dead and gone'. (pg271)
Lastly, author advocates that treating beliefs as primarily non-propositional will allow for uncomplex analyses of difficult examples. The one he uses is of a man who sees a reflection through a window of a man with his pants on fire. He believes de dicto 'there is a man with his pants on fire', but does he believe this man is himself? Propositionalists, author claim, need to do cart in the concept of a 'presenting sentence' ('my pants' or 'somebody's pants'). Author simply says that the man can have two different mundial beliefs: 'the world is my-pants-on-fire-ish' or 'the world is somebody's-pants-on-fire-ish'.
Analysis, Vol 69 No 2 April 2009
This article attempts to change the conception of a belief as a propositional attitude. 'Propositionalists', as author calls them, believe that believing is primarily a relation between a believer and a proposition. Author also considers Fodor a propositionalist even though he gives a three-part relation, a believer, a sentential expression, and a proposition. Author's proposal is different: believing is a relation between a believer and the world. This view author dubs the 'mondialist' view, and believes it can account for so-called 'dissonant beliefs', which are beliefs where a person seems to believe a contradiction (or an inconsistency, since 'contradiction' may imply propositions)
Author lays out the standard two kinds of belief: de re and de dicto. He wants to add a third: de mundo, which takes the world to be 'xish'. Here is how the progression might work:
-Formation of a de re belief about the ringing of a smoke alarm
-Formation of a de mundo belief: the world is smoke-alarm-ish
-Possible, but not necessary or automatic: de dicto belief: 'There is a smoke alarm ringing'.
The separation between the first two and the third gives space for non-human animals to have beliefs, de re and de mundo, but not de dicto. (pg270)
In order to make this work, 'the world' needs a bit of a specialized understanding. Author gives it: 'the world is characterized by what is and is not in it.' (pg268-9) So, our world is 'elk-ish' and not 'elf-ish' since there are elks in the world but not elves. The second understanding is that there is a context that constrains mondial beliefs-- a 'Domain under Consideration' (DC). We use this when we say things like "it's raining". It isn't raining in the whole world-- just in our DC-- in our DC the world is rain-ish.
Author believes that mundial beliefs are more primitive than propositional belief-- he loosely translates mundial beliefs as 'being aware of something'. (pg270) The two advantages of having them is that they are good fits for non-human animal beliefs and also that they can account for 'dissonant beliefs'.
Author takes dissonant beliefs to be commonplace in our world. For the well-educated, dissonant beliefs come when we believe a proposition (de dicto) like E=mc2 but have no idea what the world is like because of it, or what it would be like if it weren't true. Author thinks it is rational to keep your mundial and your de dicto beliefs in line, but it may be very difficult given the amount of arcane scientific knowledge we are exposed to. (pg272) But a more mundane example is where someone who doesn't believe in the afterlife still feels as though her dead relative is checking in on her. Here a mundial belief of 'the world is father-ish' is inconsistent with the propositional belief 'my father is dead and gone'. (pg271)
Lastly, author advocates that treating beliefs as primarily non-propositional will allow for uncomplex analyses of difficult examples. The one he uses is of a man who sees a reflection through a window of a man with his pants on fire. He believes de dicto 'there is a man with his pants on fire', but does he believe this man is himself? Propositionalists, author claim, need to do cart in the concept of a 'presenting sentence' ('my pants' or 'somebody's pants'). Author simply says that the man can have two different mundial beliefs: 'the world is my-pants-on-fire-ish' or 'the world is somebody's-pants-on-fire-ish'.
11/13/09
Berlin, Isiah - The Pursuit of the Ideal
11/13/2009
Chapter from The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Henry Hardy ed., Alfred Knoph pub, 1991
This chapter gives an account of author's (autobiographical) progression from believing in one true ideal for the human condition to believing in a relativistic plurality of objective values. Author wants to avoid isolationist or absolute relativism, where the two parties can't come to understand each other. Author believes that with imagination and creativity we can understand the objective ends of other cultures, civilizations and people. (pg11) Author also understands 'objective values' to be things that humans pursue 'for their own sakes' (pg11).
The chapter is more story-oriented than full of argumentation: it starts with the reading of the great Russian writers, specifically Tolstoy, who were engaged in the struggle to find objective values and a way of living that supported them. This jibed well with the Greeks, at least Plato, and also with Hegel and Marx. The idea was that history was a set of progressive stages, some errors, but ultimately leading to a set of practices and principles that, if followed, would result in a utopian-type society. (II-IV, pg2-7)
Author began to change his mind about the unity of one ideal as the objective value for mankind when he started Machiavelli. It wasn't the political experience that started to crack this idealistic facade-- it was the observation that the Christian virtues were, inherently, at odds with the Roman ones. Further exploring the possibility of incompatible objective values, author took up Giambattista Vico's La Scienza Nuova, which discussed the various irreconcilable cultural ideals that have existed in the course of human history. (pg8-9) Author came to believe that there is no one ascendant objective value, but a pluralistic set of them, some mutually exclusive. And some are less acceptable than others-- e.g. ritualistic murder, slavery, torture for pleasure. (pg18)
The best (only?) way to get into an acceptable level of civilization is to pick a set of priorities that are mostly agreeable-- like reducing poverty, premature death, disease, suffering-- and use skill and wisdom to create a society that accomplishes them. But author also continually reminds that even these goals have unintended consequences, which will create additional problems that require further work-- utopia is unattainable. Author also states that the 'perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist... [is] conceptually incoherent' (pg13) This is because there is a multitude of valid objective values and they 'collide'.
Chapter from The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Henry Hardy ed., Alfred Knoph pub, 1991
This chapter gives an account of author's (autobiographical) progression from believing in one true ideal for the human condition to believing in a relativistic plurality of objective values. Author wants to avoid isolationist or absolute relativism, where the two parties can't come to understand each other. Author believes that with imagination and creativity we can understand the objective ends of other cultures, civilizations and people. (pg11) Author also understands 'objective values' to be things that humans pursue 'for their own sakes' (pg11).
The chapter is more story-oriented than full of argumentation: it starts with the reading of the great Russian writers, specifically Tolstoy, who were engaged in the struggle to find objective values and a way of living that supported them. This jibed well with the Greeks, at least Plato, and also with Hegel and Marx. The idea was that history was a set of progressive stages, some errors, but ultimately leading to a set of practices and principles that, if followed, would result in a utopian-type society. (II-IV, pg2-7)
Author began to change his mind about the unity of one ideal as the objective value for mankind when he started Machiavelli. It wasn't the political experience that started to crack this idealistic facade-- it was the observation that the Christian virtues were, inherently, at odds with the Roman ones. Further exploring the possibility of incompatible objective values, author took up Giambattista Vico's La Scienza Nuova, which discussed the various irreconcilable cultural ideals that have existed in the course of human history. (pg8-9) Author came to believe that there is no one ascendant objective value, but a pluralistic set of them, some mutually exclusive. And some are less acceptable than others-- e.g. ritualistic murder, slavery, torture for pleasure. (pg18)
The best (only?) way to get into an acceptable level of civilization is to pick a set of priorities that are mostly agreeable-- like reducing poverty, premature death, disease, suffering-- and use skill and wisdom to create a society that accomplishes them. But author also continually reminds that even these goals have unintended consequences, which will create additional problems that require further work-- utopia is unattainable. Author also states that the 'perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist... [is] conceptually incoherent' (pg13) This is because there is a multitude of valid objective values and they 'collide'.
11/6/09
Westphal, Jonathan - The Indicative Conditional: An Amendment to Stalnaker
11/06/2009
Unpublished
This paper explores the indicative conditional and the material conditional. Author starts with this 'old familiar question' and thinks that Stalnaker's answer is nearly correct: the conditional "if p then q" is true if 'the consequent is true, not necessarily in the world as it is, but in the world as it would be if the antecedent were true'.
Author gives the case of Seabiscuit, and the conditional: if Seabiscuit runs, he will win. "If r then w". First author distinguishes between regular cases where the race is fair, and the conditional is picking out the salient features of the situation. The trouble here is that the truth table could have a weird outcome in the case of the antecedent being false and the consequent being true. How could Seabiscuit win and not have run? So there is a kind-of dependence between the 'guide propositions'. Author concludes that for the truth tables to apply, there must be genuine independence between them.
Author then considers what happens when there is genuine independence but the antecedent is false. In these cases, it seems that the conditional is true when the consequent is true, but it isn't the 'if p then q' setup that 'force[s] it true'. When the consequent is true, this 'allow[s]' the conditional to be true-- but the distinction between 'forcing' and 'allowing' is lost in the analysis.
Author revisits the Seabiscuit conditional, "If Seabiscuit runs, he will win":
If R then W
If the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, then the conditional is false no matter what Seabiscuit does-- whether he does run or not. Even in the weird case where the antecedent is false and the consequent is true (he doesn't run, but wins), the conditional is... false! This is a 'line-dependent' outcome that the author points out. If both the antecedent and the consequent is true, then the conditional is true no matter what Seabiscuit does. So the final two lines of the truth table (where the antecedent is false) depend on the the first two lines, where the truth of the consequent varies.
Author considers finally 'silly conditionals', like: 'if the moon is cheese, then 17 is prime'. He concludes that the material conditional is the correct analysis here.
Author concludes that in cases of the indicative conditional, when the antecedent is false the conditional is undetermined-- or at least dependent on the outcome of the consequent when the antecedent is true. This makes it an open question whether the 'if... then...' rule is equivalent to 'not p, or q' (~p v q).
Unpublished
This paper explores the indicative conditional and the material conditional. Author starts with this 'old familiar question' and thinks that Stalnaker's answer is nearly correct: the conditional "if p then q" is true if 'the consequent is true, not necessarily in the world as it is, but in the world as it would be if the antecedent were true'.
Author gives the case of Seabiscuit, and the conditional: if Seabiscuit runs, he will win. "If r then w". First author distinguishes between regular cases where the race is fair, and the conditional is picking out the salient features of the situation. The trouble here is that the truth table could have a weird outcome in the case of the antecedent being false and the consequent being true. How could Seabiscuit win and not have run? So there is a kind-of dependence between the 'guide propositions'. Author concludes that for the truth tables to apply, there must be genuine independence between them.
Author then considers what happens when there is genuine independence but the antecedent is false. In these cases, it seems that the conditional is true when the consequent is true, but it isn't the 'if p then q' setup that 'force[s] it true'. When the consequent is true, this 'allow[s]' the conditional to be true-- but the distinction between 'forcing' and 'allowing' is lost in the analysis.
Author revisits the Seabiscuit conditional, "If Seabiscuit runs, he will win":
If R then W
If the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, then the conditional is false no matter what Seabiscuit does-- whether he does run or not. Even in the weird case where the antecedent is false and the consequent is true (he doesn't run, but wins), the conditional is... false! This is a 'line-dependent' outcome that the author points out. If both the antecedent and the consequent is true, then the conditional is true no matter what Seabiscuit does. So the final two lines of the truth table (where the antecedent is false) depend on the the first two lines, where the truth of the consequent varies.
Author considers finally 'silly conditionals', like: 'if the moon is cheese, then 17 is prime'. He concludes that the material conditional is the correct analysis here.
Author concludes that in cases of the indicative conditional, when the antecedent is false the conditional is undetermined-- or at least dependent on the outcome of the consequent when the antecedent is true. This makes it an open question whether the 'if... then...' rule is equivalent to 'not p, or q' (~p v q).
10/29/09
Raghuramaraju, A - Away From the Binary: Reading Rajas and Tamas in Mahatma Gandhi
10/30/2009
Unpublished book chapter
This is a chapter in a book about Gandhi-- this chapter seeks to locate Gandhi's policy of non-violence in a classical context of the three aspects of being: violence, non-violence, and non-action. Author argues that this is an important three-part substance that involves domination of one substance (non-violence) over the other two, rather than flat-out rejection of them. Furthermore, current writers simplify Gandhi into a two-part binary of violence and non-violence and suggest that one can be rejected and the other affirmed; both the factual claim and the meta-psychological conception is mistaken, according to author.
Author's first target is Richard Lannoy's binary relation, violence and non-violence. What is missing here is a third possibility: inaction. The three options correspond to three 'gunas': 'tamas' (inaction), 'rajas' (violent action) and 'sattva' (non-violent action). Author brings out through quotations that Gandhi preferred violent action to inaction, which upsets the notion that Gandhi rejected violence as an acceptable mode of action.
Author contends that Gandhi was rajastic (violent) in nature but constantly strove to overcome and dominate that tendency for the sake of sattva, non-violent action. Author locates the metapsychology here as coming from the Bhagavat Gita's discussion of the three gunas-- they are each constitutive elements of action, just one dominating the others during a particular action. Yet from this classical understanding did Gandhi stray, not accepting non-action (tamas) as a worthy possibility.
Unpublished book chapter
This is a chapter in a book about Gandhi-- this chapter seeks to locate Gandhi's policy of non-violence in a classical context of the three aspects of being: violence, non-violence, and non-action. Author argues that this is an important three-part substance that involves domination of one substance (non-violence) over the other two, rather than flat-out rejection of them. Furthermore, current writers simplify Gandhi into a two-part binary of violence and non-violence and suggest that one can be rejected and the other affirmed; both the factual claim and the meta-psychological conception is mistaken, according to author.
Author's first target is Richard Lannoy's binary relation, violence and non-violence. What is missing here is a third possibility: inaction. The three options correspond to three 'gunas': 'tamas' (inaction), 'rajas' (violent action) and 'sattva' (non-violent action). Author brings out through quotations that Gandhi preferred violent action to inaction, which upsets the notion that Gandhi rejected violence as an acceptable mode of action.
Author contends that Gandhi was rajastic (violent) in nature but constantly strove to overcome and dominate that tendency for the sake of sattva, non-violent action. Author locates the metapsychology here as coming from the Bhagavat Gita's discussion of the three gunas-- they are each constitutive elements of action, just one dominating the others during a particular action. Yet from this classical understanding did Gandhi stray, not accepting non-action (tamas) as a worthy possibility.
10/16/09
Waldron, Jeremy - Right and Wrong: Psychologists vs Philosophers
10/16/2009
New York Review of Books Vol 56 No 15 Oct 8, 2009
This is a review of Appiah's "Experiments in Ethics", which is cast as an attempt to take seriously the challenge to ethics coming from the psychologists. Author is critical of Appiah's seemingly facile attempt to grapple with the problems. He claims that Appiah alternates between taking the psychologists' "case against character" or the "psychologits' challenge" too seriously, or then not seriously enough.
Appiah seems to take the psychologists' challenge seriously at first, when he cites numerous studies that apparently show that the so-called virtues of charity or honesty aren't cross-situational, and are frequently influenced by small, seemingly insignificant changes in the situation. E.g. a person is more likely to be helpful to a stranger if he has previously found a spare dime in a telephone booth. The challenge to virtue ethics is that good character traits aren't as entrenched as we'd like to think, or that we frequently misidentify good characters. But author replies that another way to read much of this work is that it is irrelevant to virtue ethics-- many of the experiments are trivial. And in the more meaningful ones, people did show virtues like charity (e.g. the Milgram experiments). Author charges that Appiah doesn't mount a reply in this vein, instead moving to include additional virtues more suitable to being a full-fledged social human (humor, originality, love) or focusing on laws, institutions, and social construction of culture to give people the opportunity to do good in the most favorable circumstances.
The next move in the pschologists' challenge is the challenge to intuition, the 'spontaneous unreflected judgment'. Much work has been done in this field to show them to be flawed and unreliable. Author pushes Appiah: 'flawed' compared to what? Considered moral judgment? Where is that independent source of judgment? How do we talk about considered moral judgments without propping them up with intuitions and without adding some other psychological flaw or taint? This was the work that the reviewer wanted Appiah to do, and which he charges Appiah did not. One current and important challenge comes from a variety of 'trolley' problems that talks about having to sacrifice one person in order to save 5. People's intuitions are very messy when asked about what they would or should do in a multitude of situations. Yet author argues that we need to expand the studies and maybe take away another lesson: people can be prone to optical illusions; why can't they also be prone to moral illusions? We work through optical illusions by measuring, by using other standards, by changing our vantage-point. Why not do the same if we want to get the moral judgments right? Author argues that this reply assumes the same issue that author was asking for earlier-- an independent source of moral judgment.
Author reports that Appiah returns, at the end of the book, to a familiar argument that our considered moral judgments are perfectly safe, a let-down for the author who thought Appiah was taking the pscyhologists' challenge more seriously. Author praises the book for being exploratory, but criticizes it for not being serious enough.
New York Review of Books Vol 56 No 15 Oct 8, 2009
This is a review of Appiah's "Experiments in Ethics", which is cast as an attempt to take seriously the challenge to ethics coming from the psychologists. Author is critical of Appiah's seemingly facile attempt to grapple with the problems. He claims that Appiah alternates between taking the psychologists' "case against character" or the "psychologits' challenge" too seriously, or then not seriously enough.
Appiah seems to take the psychologists' challenge seriously at first, when he cites numerous studies that apparently show that the so-called virtues of charity or honesty aren't cross-situational, and are frequently influenced by small, seemingly insignificant changes in the situation. E.g. a person is more likely to be helpful to a stranger if he has previously found a spare dime in a telephone booth. The challenge to virtue ethics is that good character traits aren't as entrenched as we'd like to think, or that we frequently misidentify good characters. But author replies that another way to read much of this work is that it is irrelevant to virtue ethics-- many of the experiments are trivial. And in the more meaningful ones, people did show virtues like charity (e.g. the Milgram experiments). Author charges that Appiah doesn't mount a reply in this vein, instead moving to include additional virtues more suitable to being a full-fledged social human (humor, originality, love) or focusing on laws, institutions, and social construction of culture to give people the opportunity to do good in the most favorable circumstances.
The next move in the pschologists' challenge is the challenge to intuition, the 'spontaneous unreflected judgment'. Much work has been done in this field to show them to be flawed and unreliable. Author pushes Appiah: 'flawed' compared to what? Considered moral judgment? Where is that independent source of judgment? How do we talk about considered moral judgments without propping them up with intuitions and without adding some other psychological flaw or taint? This was the work that the reviewer wanted Appiah to do, and which he charges Appiah did not. One current and important challenge comes from a variety of 'trolley' problems that talks about having to sacrifice one person in order to save 5. People's intuitions are very messy when asked about what they would or should do in a multitude of situations. Yet author argues that we need to expand the studies and maybe take away another lesson: people can be prone to optical illusions; why can't they also be prone to moral illusions? We work through optical illusions by measuring, by using other standards, by changing our vantage-point. Why not do the same if we want to get the moral judgments right? Author argues that this reply assumes the same issue that author was asking for earlier-- an independent source of moral judgment.
Author reports that Appiah returns, at the end of the book, to a familiar argument that our considered moral judgments are perfectly safe, a let-down for the author who thought Appiah was taking the pscyhologists' challenge more seriously. Author praises the book for being exploratory, but criticizes it for not being serious enough.
10/9/09
Weinberg, Steven - The Missons of Astronomy
10/09/2009
The New York Review of Books Vol 56 No 16 10/22/2009
This is an article in the popular press about the history of astronomy, its importance in the ancient world, and the places it currently occupies in science. The thesis is that astronomy was developed as a science much earlier than other studies like physics or biology, probably because the movements of the stars and planets followed such regular patterns. The practical also contributed to the advancement of astronomy since it assisted with navigation, predicting the seasons and telling the time. As other mechanisms like GPS and atomic clocks have become widely used, the practicality of astronomy has become diminished. Yet astronomy has become much more important in figuring out our cosmology and sub-atomic laws of nature. For instance, it took observations of the deflection of light around a gravitational field to confirm the General Theory of Relativity.
The article ends with bemoaning the misplaced priorities of NASA and other government funding for manned spaceflight instead of unmanned, arguing that more, and more useful, scientific data could be collected by unmanned space missions.
The New York Review of Books Vol 56 No 16 10/22/2009
This is an article in the popular press about the history of astronomy, its importance in the ancient world, and the places it currently occupies in science. The thesis is that astronomy was developed as a science much earlier than other studies like physics or biology, probably because the movements of the stars and planets followed such regular patterns. The practical also contributed to the advancement of astronomy since it assisted with navigation, predicting the seasons and telling the time. As other mechanisms like GPS and atomic clocks have become widely used, the practicality of astronomy has become diminished. Yet astronomy has become much more important in figuring out our cosmology and sub-atomic laws of nature. For instance, it took observations of the deflection of light around a gravitational field to confirm the General Theory of Relativity.
The article ends with bemoaning the misplaced priorities of NASA and other government funding for manned spaceflight instead of unmanned, arguing that more, and more useful, scientific data could be collected by unmanned space missions.
10/2/09
Connolly, John - Augustine, the Will, and Original Sin
10/02/2009
DRAFT
This paper tries to sort out the complexities and possible contradictions that Augustine finds himself in when trying to combat both Manicheanism and also Pelagians. Author lays out the difficulty:
-The Manichees believed that good and evil were two forces in the universe, essentially that god had an evil equal. Augustine needed to establish there was only one god, a good one. But then the problem of the origins of evil arises. The solution was to claim that humans are stuck with Original Sin from the primal sin of Adam & Eve eating from the tree.
-The Pelagians believed that one could improve herself enough so that she could turn against sin on her own, thereby overcoming the weakened human condition brought on by primal sin. Augustine found this contrary to requiring Jesus for salvation and therefore had to argue that primal sin could not be overcome without god's grace.
Augustine's conception of primal sin was important to bolster his defense against both Manicheanism and the Peligians. However it has been argued previously that primal sin seems troubling: it must originate with the first humans, but not from any defect in their wills, or their characters, since that would mean that their maker (god) was partially at fault for their sin. But from whence does it come, if not from their ill will (pushing the problem one step back) or from a fault in their character? MacDonald has suggested that the answer lies in an act of negligence, of failing to attend to good reasons you have for doing something. This paper is largely a review of MacDonald's theory of Primal Sin; the conclusion is that this theory isn't enough to underwrite primal sin.
Author makes a comparison to MacDonald's theory of primal sin to the case of Aiden Quinn, the relatively upstanding individual who absent-mindedly text-messaged as he was driving a MBTA trolley, and ended up hitting another one. The intuition here at first bolsters MacDonald: this is a case of a careless act without ill-will, and yet we are very much inclined to blame Quinn for this negligence-- in short: it is sinful negligence without ill-will.
But author argues that we have a yet further analysis of this event if we are to consider it truly blameworthy-- that the actor failed to exercise the caution of the 'prudent man'. The standard we hold someone to prior to punishing her for gross (sinful) negligence is the standard of what a prudent person would take note of and account for in her decisions. The problem is that we do not believe that Adam & Eve could have failed that test, a hypothesis that MacDonald asks us to believe if his theory of primal sin is correct. It doesn't make sense that they would fail this test, thus making MacDonald's theory of primal sin implausible. This leaves the primal sin still in the difficult situation of being a sin ex nihilo, and remains a problem for Augustine.
DRAFT
This paper tries to sort out the complexities and possible contradictions that Augustine finds himself in when trying to combat both Manicheanism and also Pelagians. Author lays out the difficulty:
-The Manichees believed that good and evil were two forces in the universe, essentially that god had an evil equal. Augustine needed to establish there was only one god, a good one. But then the problem of the origins of evil arises. The solution was to claim that humans are stuck with Original Sin from the primal sin of Adam & Eve eating from the tree.
-The Pelagians believed that one could improve herself enough so that she could turn against sin on her own, thereby overcoming the weakened human condition brought on by primal sin. Augustine found this contrary to requiring Jesus for salvation and therefore had to argue that primal sin could not be overcome without god's grace.
Augustine's conception of primal sin was important to bolster his defense against both Manicheanism and the Peligians. However it has been argued previously that primal sin seems troubling: it must originate with the first humans, but not from any defect in their wills, or their characters, since that would mean that their maker (god) was partially at fault for their sin. But from whence does it come, if not from their ill will (pushing the problem one step back) or from a fault in their character? MacDonald has suggested that the answer lies in an act of negligence, of failing to attend to good reasons you have for doing something. This paper is largely a review of MacDonald's theory of Primal Sin; the conclusion is that this theory isn't enough to underwrite primal sin.
Author makes a comparison to MacDonald's theory of primal sin to the case of Aiden Quinn, the relatively upstanding individual who absent-mindedly text-messaged as he was driving a MBTA trolley, and ended up hitting another one. The intuition here at first bolsters MacDonald: this is a case of a careless act without ill-will, and yet we are very much inclined to blame Quinn for this negligence-- in short: it is sinful negligence without ill-will.
But author argues that we have a yet further analysis of this event if we are to consider it truly blameworthy-- that the actor failed to exercise the caution of the 'prudent man'. The standard we hold someone to prior to punishing her for gross (sinful) negligence is the standard of what a prudent person would take note of and account for in her decisions. The problem is that we do not believe that Adam & Eve could have failed that test, a hypothesis that MacDonald asks us to believe if his theory of primal sin is correct. It doesn't make sense that they would fail this test, thus making MacDonald's theory of primal sin implausible. This leaves the primal sin still in the difficult situation of being a sin ex nihilo, and remains a problem for Augustine.
9/24/09
Smith, Malcolm - Indifference and Moral Acceptance
09/25/2009
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 9 No 1 Jan 1972
This paper attempts to show that one can make a moral judgment and yet not have a prescriptive attitude toward that judgment. It defines 'internalism' as the theory that acceptance of a moral judgment implies having a favorable/unfavorable attitude toward the content of the judgment. Author considers philosophers such as Stevenson and Hare to hold or imply such views. Internalism can be found in emotivism and prescriptivism and is contrasted with 'externalism', which is that one may accept a moral judgment while have no corresponding favorable or unfavorable attitude towards it.
Author takes an example a moral dispute about segregation, where someone believes it is morally permissible for the reasons that blacks are inferior and more prone to immorality. But, upon being informed that they are not so (perhaps by showing social science studies), he is convinced that 'segregation is morally wrong'. But, strangely, also says that 'I am completely indifferent as to whether the practice continues' (pg87) The internalist claims that this person fails to understand what it means to say 'segregation is morally wrong', therefore he must not understand the meaning of the sentence. Yet author points out this person had previously believed that segregation was morally permissible and was convinced through argumentation that it was not. It seems to be prima facia that he understood what the sentences meant. (pg88)
Author considers three replies from the internalist, who might then turn to a non-cognitive analysis of 'morally wrong':
1) Stevenson's account of meaning: that 'morally wrong' has emotive meaning that disposes people to have unfavorable attitudes. Author believes this doesn't do the work the internalist needs (pg88)
2) A 'meaning as use' theory might claim that you misuse the 'morally wrong' term when you lack the unfavorable attitude. Author: this just pushes the problem one step back, and the externalist will disagree it is a misuse.
3) The person who is indifferent does not understand the meaning of 'morally wrong'. Author: this is question-begging.
Author does review many plausible reasons to be drawn to the internalist picture: that we expect someone who sincerely believes that segregation is wrong to feel unfavorable about it; that we don't consider it a success if we convince someone that x is morally wrong and then he is indifferent towards it; that when someone assents that x is wrong but then is indifferent that we consider him insincere; and finally that moral disagreements will entail differing attitudes when the issue is supported or rejected by the public. Author claims that what these intuitions show is that moral judgments almost always come in the context of moral concern, where our interests are intermixed. But this does not establish internalism, since the two sides of the judgment can-- in principle-- be pulled apart. (pg89-90)
Author then tries to give an account of why internalism is intuitively plausible by making a distinction between two kinds of 'assent'-- one that is merely belief-oriented and another that includes evaluative attitudes. The example is 'Jones eats like a pig', which you might accept disapprovingly (it is gross), or approvingly (it is natural-good). "Believing is not the only way in which persons may accept what is expressed by utterances of certain sentences, nor is divergence in believe the only kind of disagreement" (pg91) With this distinction-- between belief and assent-- author claims we can understand the plausibility of our intuitions without being internalists.
The final section of the paper considers the problems with non-cognitive meta-ethical theories if internalism is false, or at least if it has no support for its truth. Author claims that internalism is used as a premise to show that concepts like 'morally good' and 'valuable' are different in kind from concepts like 'red' or 'rectangular'. Internalism is also used as a basis for the claim that moral judgments are not a species of factual judgments. If internalism isn't properly underwritten, it cannot support these further meta-ethical claims.
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 9 No 1 Jan 1972
This paper attempts to show that one can make a moral judgment and yet not have a prescriptive attitude toward that judgment. It defines 'internalism' as the theory that acceptance of a moral judgment implies having a favorable/unfavorable attitude toward the content of the judgment. Author considers philosophers such as Stevenson and Hare to hold or imply such views. Internalism can be found in emotivism and prescriptivism and is contrasted with 'externalism', which is that one may accept a moral judgment while have no corresponding favorable or unfavorable attitude towards it.
Author takes an example a moral dispute about segregation, where someone believes it is morally permissible for the reasons that blacks are inferior and more prone to immorality. But, upon being informed that they are not so (perhaps by showing social science studies), he is convinced that 'segregation is morally wrong'. But, strangely, also says that 'I am completely indifferent as to whether the practice continues' (pg87) The internalist claims that this person fails to understand what it means to say 'segregation is morally wrong', therefore he must not understand the meaning of the sentence. Yet author points out this person had previously believed that segregation was morally permissible and was convinced through argumentation that it was not. It seems to be prima facia that he understood what the sentences meant. (pg88)
Author considers three replies from the internalist, who might then turn to a non-cognitive analysis of 'morally wrong':
1) Stevenson's account of meaning: that 'morally wrong' has emotive meaning that disposes people to have unfavorable attitudes. Author believes this doesn't do the work the internalist needs (pg88)
2) A 'meaning as use' theory might claim that you misuse the 'morally wrong' term when you lack the unfavorable attitude. Author: this just pushes the problem one step back, and the externalist will disagree it is a misuse.
3) The person who is indifferent does not understand the meaning of 'morally wrong'. Author: this is question-begging.
Author does review many plausible reasons to be drawn to the internalist picture: that we expect someone who sincerely believes that segregation is wrong to feel unfavorable about it; that we don't consider it a success if we convince someone that x is morally wrong and then he is indifferent towards it; that when someone assents that x is wrong but then is indifferent that we consider him insincere; and finally that moral disagreements will entail differing attitudes when the issue is supported or rejected by the public. Author claims that what these intuitions show is that moral judgments almost always come in the context of moral concern, where our interests are intermixed. But this does not establish internalism, since the two sides of the judgment can-- in principle-- be pulled apart. (pg89-90)
Author then tries to give an account of why internalism is intuitively plausible by making a distinction between two kinds of 'assent'-- one that is merely belief-oriented and another that includes evaluative attitudes. The example is 'Jones eats like a pig', which you might accept disapprovingly (it is gross), or approvingly (it is natural-good). "Believing is not the only way in which persons may accept what is expressed by utterances of certain sentences, nor is divergence in believe the only kind of disagreement" (pg91) With this distinction-- between belief and assent-- author claims we can understand the plausibility of our intuitions without being internalists.
The final section of the paper considers the problems with non-cognitive meta-ethical theories if internalism is false, or at least if it has no support for its truth. Author claims that internalism is used as a premise to show that concepts like 'morally good' and 'valuable' are different in kind from concepts like 'red' or 'rectangular'. Internalism is also used as a basis for the claim that moral judgments are not a species of factual judgments. If internalism isn't properly underwritten, it cannot support these further meta-ethical claims.
9/18/09
Stevenson, CL - Persuasive Definitions
09/18/2009
Facts & Values, Ch 3 Yale Press 1963
This paper explores the rhetorical device of 'persuasive definition', which is the act of giving a new conceptual meaning to a word without changing its 'emotive meaning'-- its connotative or affective meaning. Author contends that this is common in philosophy and that it is a misleading device. Author uses an example of "cultured", originally created from the predicates: 'well-read and familiar with the arts', but which eventually took on its own emotive meaning of esteem due to the way people often accompanied praise and good-will on those called "cultured". However, someone comes along and argues that what is truly valuable is having 'imaginative sensitivity' and argues that this should be the 'real meaning' of "cultured". Author doesn't consider this an 'analysis of a common concept' or a 'mere abbreviation'-- but instead an attempt to hijack the valued emotion of the concept for a new purpose- 'it changed interests by changing names'. (pg34) Author gives additional definitions and discusses that a persuasive definition is in the locus of changes of interest and changes of terminology. However, a persuasive definition in author's sense is one that doesn't just narrow interests with a definition of a term, but one where the speaker intends to alter our interests by employing an emotively laden word to a new conceptual definition. (pg38-9) The important point is that a persuasive definition involved the re-defining of a conceptual definition and keeping the same emotive support for the word.
Author argues that persuasive definitions have been used all over philosophy, for instance by Spinoza in re-writing "God" to mean "the one substance" but still keeping the emotively laden term "God" in place. Author suggests that Carnap utilized it when defining "meaning" narrowly and then assigning everything without meaning to be "nonsense", a strongly negative word. Author also thinks Plato used a persuasive definition in the Republic for the term "justice". (pg45)
The last part of the paper entails a description of four cases where it is important to take note of the differences between a disagreement in belief and a disagreement in interest. Author argues that once we understand that terms like "justice" carry strong emotive baggage, we may understand that not every disagreement is one about what predicates attach to a word, but instead how much value (interest) a word deserves. In cases of a disagreement about whether a particular law is "just", two men disagree in the following way:
1) Both agree that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, but one is unsure that the law leads to A & B.
2) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to B.
3) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to C.
Here, as in the others, the disagreement may be resolved empirically by showing whether the law does or does not lead to the consequences in question. But in the case of 3, the disputants are coming up against disagreements not just in concepts but in interests. (pg49-50) This leads to the next case:
4) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C, and it is well established that the law leads to A & B but not C. Here is a disagreement that cannot be resolved empirically since it is a disagreement 'in interest'. The author does offer one use for the empirical method: to show that C would lead to further consequences D, E, F that they agree are antithetical to justice.
Facts & Values, Ch 3 Yale Press 1963
This paper explores the rhetorical device of 'persuasive definition', which is the act of giving a new conceptual meaning to a word without changing its 'emotive meaning'-- its connotative or affective meaning. Author contends that this is common in philosophy and that it is a misleading device. Author uses an example of "cultured", originally created from the predicates: 'well-read and familiar with the arts', but which eventually took on its own emotive meaning of esteem due to the way people often accompanied praise and good-will on those called "cultured". However, someone comes along and argues that what is truly valuable is having 'imaginative sensitivity' and argues that this should be the 'real meaning' of "cultured". Author doesn't consider this an 'analysis of a common concept' or a 'mere abbreviation'-- but instead an attempt to hijack the valued emotion of the concept for a new purpose- 'it changed interests by changing names'. (pg34) Author gives additional definitions and discusses that a persuasive definition is in the locus of changes of interest and changes of terminology. However, a persuasive definition in author's sense is one that doesn't just narrow interests with a definition of a term, but one where the speaker intends to alter our interests by employing an emotively laden word to a new conceptual definition. (pg38-9) The important point is that a persuasive definition involved the re-defining of a conceptual definition and keeping the same emotive support for the word.
Author argues that persuasive definitions have been used all over philosophy, for instance by Spinoza in re-writing "God" to mean "the one substance" but still keeping the emotively laden term "God" in place. Author suggests that Carnap utilized it when defining "meaning" narrowly and then assigning everything without meaning to be "nonsense", a strongly negative word. Author also thinks Plato used a persuasive definition in the Republic for the term "justice". (pg45)
The last part of the paper entails a description of four cases where it is important to take note of the differences between a disagreement in belief and a disagreement in interest. Author argues that once we understand that terms like "justice" carry strong emotive baggage, we may understand that not every disagreement is one about what predicates attach to a word, but instead how much value (interest) a word deserves. In cases of a disagreement about whether a particular law is "just", two men disagree in the following way:
1) Both agree that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, but one is unsure that the law leads to A & B.
2) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to B.
3) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to C.
Here, as in the others, the disagreement may be resolved empirically by showing whether the law does or does not lead to the consequences in question. But in the case of 3, the disputants are coming up against disagreements not just in concepts but in interests. (pg49-50) This leads to the next case:
4) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C, and it is well established that the law leads to A & B but not C. Here is a disagreement that cannot be resolved empirically since it is a disagreement 'in interest'. The author does offer one use for the empirical method: to show that C would lead to further consequences D, E, F that they agree are antithetical to justice.
9/4/09
McTaggart, JME - The Unreality of Time
09/04/2009
The Philosophy of Time, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Poidevin & MacBeath, eds
This is a reprint of an old (1908) essay that seeks to show two things: first that time is essentially a matter of past, present and future, and second that these notions are contradictory. Since they contradict, time can't be real. Author starts by making a distinction between two positions of time, the, indicated by an A series and the B series. The A series involves the past, present and future, and things passing from the future to the present into the past. The B series involves things that are earlier, contemporaneous, and later, where events are related to each other along that scale. It may be tempting to believe that the B series is objective and the A series subjective, therefore time is essentially a B series matter. But author disagrees and set about claiming that the A series is the essential element to time, not the B series. (pg24-5)
Author submits that 'time involves change' and that 'there could be no time if nothing changed' (pg25). The next matter is to ask whether you can have change without the A series-- that is, if the A series is just accidental, subjective, or inessential to the nature of time. Author approaches the problem first by looking at whether you can have change using solely the B series. Here author claims that there is no change if there is solely the B series version of events. The argument goes as follows: (pg25-6)
1. For time to exist, events must change
2. Change is one event M ceasing and another N beginning
3. In the B series, event N follows event M
4. In the B series, event N always and forever follows event M
5. Therefore, the relations between N and M are permanent
6. Therefore, in the B series, N always exists after M (which also always exists)
7. If N always exists, it does not cease or begin (likewise for M)
8. Therefore there is no change in the B series
9. Therefore, there is no time in the B series
The solution, author suggests, is to make one of the relations between M and N change. That relation is the A series relation, of M being, at one point, in the present and N the future, and then eventually making M the past and N the present. This A series possibility changes the relations between the events, making change possible and thus being an essential element to time. (pg26-7)
Author then considers various objections to this view, starting with Bertrand Russell (pg27-8), who claims that the A series is merely a subjective aspect of time. The second objection is that time exists in fictitious works (like stories) but there is clearly no A series. (pg29) The upshot here is that author posits that 'time only belongs to the existent'. (pg29) The third objection is that it may be possible that time has several real and independent time-series. Meaning there could be more than one 'present', but just in different 'series'. This seems to be an objection to both the B and the A series, so author leaves it as showing that there wouldn't be 'the present', but 'the present of a certain aspect of the universe' (pg30).
The second part of the paper is devoted to showing that the A series involves a contradiction and therefore cannot exist. (pg31) The author starts by reminding us that the B series is insufficient to underwrite time, but that the A series needs to stand in relation to something outside the time series (pg31-2) 'If, then, anything is to be rightly called past, present, or future, it must be because it is in relation to something else.' Finding what that something else is 'would not be easy'. (pg32) But the real difficulty is that the terms 'past', 'present', and 'future' are incompatible predicates to apply to an event, yet each event has at least two. (pg32) Author argues that there is no way to dispel this inconsistency without an infinite regress into additional time predicates, which are all based around those initial three terms. (pg32-3)
Author ends by claiming that time is unreal and that our view of it is erroneous.
The Philosophy of Time, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Poidevin & MacBeath, eds
This is a reprint of an old (1908) essay that seeks to show two things: first that time is essentially a matter of past, present and future, and second that these notions are contradictory. Since they contradict, time can't be real. Author starts by making a distinction between two positions of time, the, indicated by an A series and the B series. The A series involves the past, present and future, and things passing from the future to the present into the past. The B series involves things that are earlier, contemporaneous, and later, where events are related to each other along that scale. It may be tempting to believe that the B series is objective and the A series subjective, therefore time is essentially a B series matter. But author disagrees and set about claiming that the A series is the essential element to time, not the B series. (pg24-5)
Author submits that 'time involves change' and that 'there could be no time if nothing changed' (pg25). The next matter is to ask whether you can have change without the A series-- that is, if the A series is just accidental, subjective, or inessential to the nature of time. Author approaches the problem first by looking at whether you can have change using solely the B series. Here author claims that there is no change if there is solely the B series version of events. The argument goes as follows: (pg25-6)
1. For time to exist, events must change
2. Change is one event M ceasing and another N beginning
3. In the B series, event N follows event M
4. In the B series, event N always and forever follows event M
5. Therefore, the relations between N and M are permanent
6. Therefore, in the B series, N always exists after M (which also always exists)
7. If N always exists, it does not cease or begin (likewise for M)
8. Therefore there is no change in the B series
9. Therefore, there is no time in the B series
The solution, author suggests, is to make one of the relations between M and N change. That relation is the A series relation, of M being, at one point, in the present and N the future, and then eventually making M the past and N the present. This A series possibility changes the relations between the events, making change possible and thus being an essential element to time. (pg26-7)
Author then considers various objections to this view, starting with Bertrand Russell (pg27-8), who claims that the A series is merely a subjective aspect of time. The second objection is that time exists in fictitious works (like stories) but there is clearly no A series. (pg29) The upshot here is that author posits that 'time only belongs to the existent'. (pg29) The third objection is that it may be possible that time has several real and independent time-series. Meaning there could be more than one 'present', but just in different 'series'. This seems to be an objection to both the B and the A series, so author leaves it as showing that there wouldn't be 'the present', but 'the present of a certain aspect of the universe' (pg30).
The second part of the paper is devoted to showing that the A series involves a contradiction and therefore cannot exist. (pg31) The author starts by reminding us that the B series is insufficient to underwrite time, but that the A series needs to stand in relation to something outside the time series (pg31-2) 'If, then, anything is to be rightly called past, present, or future, it must be because it is in relation to something else.' Finding what that something else is 'would not be easy'. (pg32) But the real difficulty is that the terms 'past', 'present', and 'future' are incompatible predicates to apply to an event, yet each event has at least two. (pg32) Author argues that there is no way to dispel this inconsistency without an infinite regress into additional time predicates, which are all based around those initial three terms. (pg32-3)
Author ends by claiming that time is unreal and that our view of it is erroneous.
8/28/09
Dummett, Michael - A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time
08/28/2009
Truth and Other Enigmas, Harvard University Press 1978
This article gives a lengthy explication of McTaggart's argument for there being a contradiction in time. Author reconstructs the argument:
a) an event M is past, present or future
b) an event M is before, at the same time as, or after another event N
Crucial here is that the facts of kind a) cannot be reducible to facts of kind b). Apparently McTaggart's reasoning for this is that change is essential to time, but there is no change in the truth function of the fact 'M comes after N', or 'M came before N'. Such facts, if true, are eternally true and therefore don't involve change. (pg351) Now the problem is that an event M can be described using three mutually incompatible predicates (past, present, future). This leads to a contradiction in describing the event, thus time is an unreality.
Author considers a possible response: the predicates applying to event M isn't just 'past', 'present', 'future', but 'will be past', 'is present', and 'was future'-- building tenses into the predicate. But adding tense verbs into the predicates only pushes the further back, since now there are 9 different predicate combinations: 'was past', 'is past', 'will be past' and so on for 'present' and 'future'. In any case the contradiction can be generated again. (pg351-2)
A more sophisticated response employs 'token-reflexive' expressions (e.g. 'I', 'here', 'now'), which are like indexicals that change a sentence's truth conditions according to context. We then specify that token-reflexive expressions are essential to time-facts and resolve the apparent incompatibility (pg353). This response, author points out, trivializes McTaggart's argument since it could also be made for space or personhood, just as it was for time. Yet McTaggart doesn't make analogous arguments about space or personhood, so author thinks there is more to his argument.
The difference, author claims, between the argument about time and an analogous one about space is that token-reflexivity is essential to time but it isn't to space. (pg354) Author discusses how it is possible to have a description of objects in space that doesn't include the describer-- that has no 'spatially token-reflexive expressions in giving a description of the physical uinverse' (pg354)-- but the same is not possible for time. Author argues that any account of a sequence of events without token-reflexive expressions will leave the question 'but what is happening right now' unanswered, therefore the account will be incomplete. Another possibility is to think of an external observer seeing time as a fourth dimension that is static, similar to how a full spatial description of the world would be a static image in 3 dimensions. In a weird turn, author argues that what would be observed would be a 'model' of events, not the events themselves. (pg355)
The possible response to this essential aspect of time is to jettison the notion that there is one complete description of reality (pg356), but author admits he is partial to this. Instead, it appears the unreality of time is self-defeating, since our apprehension of the world is certainly temporal.
Truth and Other Enigmas, Harvard University Press 1978
This article gives a lengthy explication of McTaggart's argument for there being a contradiction in time. Author reconstructs the argument:
a) an event M is past, present or future
b) an event M is before, at the same time as, or after another event N
Crucial here is that the facts of kind a) cannot be reducible to facts of kind b). Apparently McTaggart's reasoning for this is that change is essential to time, but there is no change in the truth function of the fact 'M comes after N', or 'M came before N'. Such facts, if true, are eternally true and therefore don't involve change. (pg351) Now the problem is that an event M can be described using three mutually incompatible predicates (past, present, future). This leads to a contradiction in describing the event, thus time is an unreality.
Author considers a possible response: the predicates applying to event M isn't just 'past', 'present', 'future', but 'will be past', 'is present', and 'was future'-- building tenses into the predicate. But adding tense verbs into the predicates only pushes the further back, since now there are 9 different predicate combinations: 'was past', 'is past', 'will be past' and so on for 'present' and 'future'. In any case the contradiction can be generated again. (pg351-2)
A more sophisticated response employs 'token-reflexive' expressions (e.g. 'I', 'here', 'now'), which are like indexicals that change a sentence's truth conditions according to context. We then specify that token-reflexive expressions are essential to time-facts and resolve the apparent incompatibility (pg353). This response, author points out, trivializes McTaggart's argument since it could also be made for space or personhood, just as it was for time. Yet McTaggart doesn't make analogous arguments about space or personhood, so author thinks there is more to his argument.
The difference, author claims, between the argument about time and an analogous one about space is that token-reflexivity is essential to time but it isn't to space. (pg354) Author discusses how it is possible to have a description of objects in space that doesn't include the describer-- that has no 'spatially token-reflexive expressions in giving a description of the physical uinverse' (pg354)-- but the same is not possible for time. Author argues that any account of a sequence of events without token-reflexive expressions will leave the question 'but what is happening right now' unanswered, therefore the account will be incomplete. Another possibility is to think of an external observer seeing time as a fourth dimension that is static, similar to how a full spatial description of the world would be a static image in 3 dimensions. In a weird turn, author argues that what would be observed would be a 'model' of events, not the events themselves. (pg355)
The possible response to this essential aspect of time is to jettison the notion that there is one complete description of reality (pg356), but author admits he is partial to this. Instead, it appears the unreality of time is self-defeating, since our apprehension of the world is certainly temporal.
8/14/09
Farley, John - The Scientific Case for Modern Anthropogenic Global Warming
08/14/2009
Monthly Review, July-August 2008
This article tries to give some general scientific background for understanding the human causes of global warming, and rebut a series of arguments made by Alexander Cockburn that anthropogenic global warming is a myth.
The evidence for human-made global warming presented by author is fairly straightforward: when the sun's rays hit the earth, some is radiated back into the atmosphere, mostly as infrared light. This light gets trapped in the atmosphere by greenhouse gases, which are opaque to this light. The three gasses are water vapor, CO2, and methane. This undisputed greenhouse effect is already responsible for heating the planet from a surface temperature of -1F to 60F. The experimental data collected by Keeling in Hawaii since 1959 shows a steady increase in CO2 into the atmosphere, which is also undisputed. Further, it is possible to examine air bubbles in arctic ice that shows a rise in CO2 around the industrial revolution, after holding relatively steady for the last 10,000 years. Author claims the reason for the recent rise is the anthropogenic burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.
Author admits that water vapor is the largest contributor to the greenhouse effect, but CO2 represents from 9-26% depending on how the counting is done. Another aspect to consider is that adding to infrared opacity in the atmosphere might have no effect if the opacity is already 100%. Instead, increasing CO2 will affect the 'wings', the areas where opacity is lower. Author likens increasing CO2 in those areas to closing the windows in a hot house.
According to author, the major debate among scientists isn't whether 'climate forcing' by humans is happening (increasing the atmospheric temperature by 2.2-2.3F), but what the 'climate response' will be-- the feedback from the earth that may increase or decrease our forcing. Author presents evidence for the possibility of negative feedback (e.g. decreasing the temperature) and positive feedback (e.g. increasing the temperature). Author reports the general consensus to be for positive feedback, somewhere from 2.7 to 8.1F. Two effects might indicate positive feedback:
(P1)- Ice-albedo effect-- as the temperature rises, ice near the poles melts and exposes more earth, decreasing the earth's reflectance of ultraviolet and visible light, heating it.
(P2)- Increased water vapor-- warmer air can hold more water vapor than cool air can, increasing the opacity for infrared light and causing an additional greenhouse effect.
Then there is some evidence for possible negative feedback:
(N1)- If warmer temperatures create more clouds and clouds have a net cooling effect, this could reduce the anthropogenic effects of increasing CO2.
(N2)- Richard Lindzen's "adaptive iris" effect, which suggests that greater temperatures in the tropics will create fewer cirrus clouds that increase the "leakage" of infrared radiation, resulting in cooling.
The state of science makes it difficult to predict a priori whether there will be net positive or negative feedback, but author argues that if we can take the long-term historical evidence as accurate, the warming temperatures were higher than one would predict without positive feedback. So positive feedback is consistent with previous periods of non-anthropogenic global warming. Author gives evidence from the earth's past ice ages, which are 'almost unanimously' agreed to be because of changes in the earth's axis tilt (Milankovich cycle). Yet simple changes in sunlight doesn't result in the amount of cooling (or, later, warming) that took place-- suggesting positive feedback played a part in those cases. Author also discusses the modes temperatures changes that took place from 1600-1800.
Author then directly addresses Cockburn's 6 main arguments:
1- During the economic depression of the 1930s, burning of fossil fuels decreased 30%, but there was no decrease of CO2 in the atmosphere, thus the two are unrelated.
Response: If CO2 entering the atmosphere decreases by 30%, that means the rate of CO2 'flux' decreases 30%, not the CO2 'reservoir' that is already in the atmosphere. Cutting CO2 flux to zero would mean there would be an eventual lowering of the CO2 reservoir, but that didn't happen so we should not have expected it.
2- Water vapor is the biggest greenhouse gas and the effects from CO2 are negligible.
Response: Yes it is true that water vapor is a larger effect than CO2. But the CO2 effect is appreciable.
3- Earth's last ice age ended when the the earth tilted slightly on its axis, temperatures rose and then CO2 in the atmosphere rose. CO2 rises as a result of global temperature, not as a cause of it.
Response: That is a true account of 10,000 years ago. But there are many ways to increase temperatures in the climate, and in the last 200 years, CO2 rises preceded temperature rises.
4- The increase of CO2 comes naturally from the oceans, not the man-made burning of fossil fuels.
Response: Yes the ocean has lots of CO2 in it. But there are two kinds of CO2 molecules, since there are two carbon isotopes (heavy ones have one extra neutron)-- the heavy ones are about 1% of the total carbon atoms. In turns out that plants prefer the regular 12-weight-carbons when adding to their biomass (growing). Thus you'd expect to find fewer 13-weight-carbons in plants and their derivatives, fossil fuels; and that is what experiments have found. The CO2 in the atmosphere contains a lower concentration of 13C than the norm, suggesting that the CO2 in the atmosphere comes from lower 13C sources (e.g. fossil fuels). On ocean surfaces there is a higher concentration of 13C, and in the deep oceans a depleted amount of 13C. Moreover, evidence from the Maua Loa observatory in Hawaii shows an increase of 12C in the atmosphere.
5- Any addition of CO2 to the atmosphere by humans will be dissolved into the ocean within a year or two, making anthropogenic effects short-lived if at all.
Response: This is an old, persistent belief that CO2 will easily and quickly dissolve into ocean waters since it does so in pure water. Author argues that it isn't an issue of whether all the CO2 in the atmosphere can get into the oceans, it's an issue of how long it will take-- a 'transient' problem rather than a 'equilibrium' problem. Estimates from ocean chemists suggest it will take from 60 to 360 years for the biggest percentage of CO2 to dissolve into the oceans-- and that is talking about the reservoir-- not the flux!
6- Global warming forecasts are largely dependent on computer models, which are easily manipulated to show whatever scary but unrealistic outcome you want to get.
Response: Yes, computer models are suspect, but much of our evidence doesn't come from models but instead from historical observations and old-fashioned theory. Moreover, much of the controversy is about what kind of feedback there will be-- the climate response-- not the climate forcing evidence (that doesn't rely on computer models). If the climate response is a positive feedback like there was during ice-age transitions, this is more evidence for the IPCC's estimates that don't rely on computer models.
Monthly Review, July-August 2008
This article tries to give some general scientific background for understanding the human causes of global warming, and rebut a series of arguments made by Alexander Cockburn that anthropogenic global warming is a myth.
The evidence for human-made global warming presented by author is fairly straightforward: when the sun's rays hit the earth, some is radiated back into the atmosphere, mostly as infrared light. This light gets trapped in the atmosphere by greenhouse gases, which are opaque to this light. The three gasses are water vapor, CO2, and methane. This undisputed greenhouse effect is already responsible for heating the planet from a surface temperature of -1F to 60F. The experimental data collected by Keeling in Hawaii since 1959 shows a steady increase in CO2 into the atmosphere, which is also undisputed. Further, it is possible to examine air bubbles in arctic ice that shows a rise in CO2 around the industrial revolution, after holding relatively steady for the last 10,000 years. Author claims the reason for the recent rise is the anthropogenic burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.
Author admits that water vapor is the largest contributor to the greenhouse effect, but CO2 represents from 9-26% depending on how the counting is done. Another aspect to consider is that adding to infrared opacity in the atmosphere might have no effect if the opacity is already 100%. Instead, increasing CO2 will affect the 'wings', the areas where opacity is lower. Author likens increasing CO2 in those areas to closing the windows in a hot house.
According to author, the major debate among scientists isn't whether 'climate forcing' by humans is happening (increasing the atmospheric temperature by 2.2-2.3F), but what the 'climate response' will be-- the feedback from the earth that may increase or decrease our forcing. Author presents evidence for the possibility of negative feedback (e.g. decreasing the temperature) and positive feedback (e.g. increasing the temperature). Author reports the general consensus to be for positive feedback, somewhere from 2.7 to 8.1F. Two effects might indicate positive feedback:
(P1)- Ice-albedo effect-- as the temperature rises, ice near the poles melts and exposes more earth, decreasing the earth's reflectance of ultraviolet and visible light, heating it.
(P2)- Increased water vapor-- warmer air can hold more water vapor than cool air can, increasing the opacity for infrared light and causing an additional greenhouse effect.
Then there is some evidence for possible negative feedback:
(N1)- If warmer temperatures create more clouds and clouds have a net cooling effect, this could reduce the anthropogenic effects of increasing CO2.
(N2)- Richard Lindzen's "adaptive iris" effect, which suggests that greater temperatures in the tropics will create fewer cirrus clouds that increase the "leakage" of infrared radiation, resulting in cooling.
The state of science makes it difficult to predict a priori whether there will be net positive or negative feedback, but author argues that if we can take the long-term historical evidence as accurate, the warming temperatures were higher than one would predict without positive feedback. So positive feedback is consistent with previous periods of non-anthropogenic global warming. Author gives evidence from the earth's past ice ages, which are 'almost unanimously' agreed to be because of changes in the earth's axis tilt (Milankovich cycle). Yet simple changes in sunlight doesn't result in the amount of cooling (or, later, warming) that took place-- suggesting positive feedback played a part in those cases. Author also discusses the modes temperatures changes that took place from 1600-1800.
Author then directly addresses Cockburn's 6 main arguments:
1- During the economic depression of the 1930s, burning of fossil fuels decreased 30%, but there was no decrease of CO2 in the atmosphere, thus the two are unrelated.
Response: If CO2 entering the atmosphere decreases by 30%, that means the rate of CO2 'flux' decreases 30%, not the CO2 'reservoir' that is already in the atmosphere. Cutting CO2 flux to zero would mean there would be an eventual lowering of the CO2 reservoir, but that didn't happen so we should not have expected it.
2- Water vapor is the biggest greenhouse gas and the effects from CO2 are negligible.
Response: Yes it is true that water vapor is a larger effect than CO2. But the CO2 effect is appreciable.
3- Earth's last ice age ended when the the earth tilted slightly on its axis, temperatures rose and then CO2 in the atmosphere rose. CO2 rises as a result of global temperature, not as a cause of it.
Response: That is a true account of 10,000 years ago. But there are many ways to increase temperatures in the climate, and in the last 200 years, CO2 rises preceded temperature rises.
4- The increase of CO2 comes naturally from the oceans, not the man-made burning of fossil fuels.
Response: Yes the ocean has lots of CO2 in it. But there are two kinds of CO2 molecules, since there are two carbon isotopes (heavy ones have one extra neutron)-- the heavy ones are about 1% of the total carbon atoms. In turns out that plants prefer the regular 12-weight-carbons when adding to their biomass (growing). Thus you'd expect to find fewer 13-weight-carbons in plants and their derivatives, fossil fuels; and that is what experiments have found. The CO2 in the atmosphere contains a lower concentration of 13C than the norm, suggesting that the CO2 in the atmosphere comes from lower 13C sources (e.g. fossil fuels). On ocean surfaces there is a higher concentration of 13C, and in the deep oceans a depleted amount of 13C. Moreover, evidence from the Maua Loa observatory in Hawaii shows an increase of 12C in the atmosphere.
5- Any addition of CO2 to the atmosphere by humans will be dissolved into the ocean within a year or two, making anthropogenic effects short-lived if at all.
Response: This is an old, persistent belief that CO2 will easily and quickly dissolve into ocean waters since it does so in pure water. Author argues that it isn't an issue of whether all the CO2 in the atmosphere can get into the oceans, it's an issue of how long it will take-- a 'transient' problem rather than a 'equilibrium' problem. Estimates from ocean chemists suggest it will take from 60 to 360 years for the biggest percentage of CO2 to dissolve into the oceans-- and that is talking about the reservoir-- not the flux!
6- Global warming forecasts are largely dependent on computer models, which are easily manipulated to show whatever scary but unrealistic outcome you want to get.
Response: Yes, computer models are suspect, but much of our evidence doesn't come from models but instead from historical observations and old-fashioned theory. Moreover, much of the controversy is about what kind of feedback there will be-- the climate response-- not the climate forcing evidence (that doesn't rely on computer models). If the climate response is a positive feedback like there was during ice-age transitions, this is more evidence for the IPCC's estimates that don't rely on computer models.
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