Smith, Malcolm - Indifference and Moral Acceptance

09/25/2009

American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 9 No 1 Jan 1972

This paper attempts to show that one can make a moral judgment and yet not have a prescriptive attitude toward that judgment. It defines 'internalism' as the theory that acceptance of a moral judgment implies having a favorable/unfavorable attitude toward the content of the judgment. Author considers philosophers such as Stevenson and Hare to hold or imply such views. Internalism can be found in emotivism and prescriptivism and is contrasted with 'externalism', which is that one may accept a moral judgment while have no corresponding favorable or unfavorable attitude towards it.

Author takes an example a moral dispute about segregation, where someone believes it is morally permissible for the reasons that blacks are inferior and more prone to immorality. But, upon being informed that they are not so (perhaps by showing social science studies), he is convinced that 'segregation is morally wrong'. But, strangely, also says that 'I am completely indifferent as to whether the practice continues' (pg87) The internalist claims that this person fails to understand what it means to say 'segregation is morally wrong', therefore he must not understand the meaning of the sentence. Yet author points out this person had previously believed that segregation was morally permissible and was convinced through argumentation that it was not. It seems to be prima facia that he understood what the sentences meant. (pg88)

Author considers three replies from the internalist, who might then turn to a non-cognitive analysis of 'morally wrong':
1) Stevenson's account of meaning: that 'morally wrong' has emotive meaning that disposes people to have unfavorable attitudes. Author believes this doesn't do the work the internalist needs (pg88)
2) A 'meaning as use' theory might claim that you misuse the 'morally wrong' term when you lack the unfavorable attitude. Author: this just pushes the problem one step back, and the externalist will disagree it is a misuse.
3) The person who is indifferent does not understand the meaning of 'morally wrong'. Author: this is question-begging.

Author does review many plausible reasons to be drawn to the internalist picture: that we expect someone who sincerely believes that segregation is wrong to feel unfavorable about it; that we don't consider it a success if we convince someone that x is morally wrong and then he is indifferent towards it; that when someone assents that x is wrong but then is indifferent that we consider him insincere; and finally that moral disagreements will entail differing attitudes when the issue is supported or rejected by the public. Author claims that what these intuitions show is that moral judgments almost always come in the context of moral concern, where our interests are intermixed. But this does not establish internalism, since the two sides of the judgment can-- in principle-- be pulled apart. (pg89-90)

Author then tries to give an account of why internalism is intuitively plausible by making a distinction between two kinds of 'assent'-- one that is merely belief-oriented and another that includes evaluative attitudes. The example is 'Jones eats like a pig', which you might accept disapprovingly (it is gross), or approvingly (it is natural-good). "Believing is not the only way in which persons may accept what is expressed by utterances of certain sentences, nor is divergence in believe the only kind of disagreement" (pg91) With this distinction-- between belief and assent-- author claims we can understand the plausibility of our intuitions without being internalists.

The final section of the paper considers the problems with non-cognitive meta-ethical theories if internalism is false, or at least if it has no support for its truth. Author claims that internalism is used as a premise to show that concepts like 'morally good' and 'valuable' are different in kind from concepts like 'red' or 'rectangular'. Internalism is also used as a basis for the claim that moral judgments are not a species of factual judgments. If internalism isn't properly underwritten, it cannot support these further meta-ethical claims.