Kershnar, Stephen - For Interrogational Torture

12/21/2007

International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 12 No 2 2005

This is a relatively quick and semi-technical piece that considers 'interrogational torture' of an 'attacker' from a a consequentialist and deontological position. The author first has to define the term 'interrogational torture':

Interrogational torture: the imposition of great suffering in a short amount of time that is neither willingly accepted or validly consented to, in order to gain information, usually from the person tortured. (IT)

The next definition is that of an 'attacker':

Attacker: a person who performs a gross injustice and is morally responsible for doing so.

With these two matters cleared up, author first quickly considers cases where, from a consequentialist perspective, IT is permissible. (pg 225). Author then moves to the deontological perspective, and argues that IT of an attacker doesn't violate any right of the attacker, either. Also, it is unclear or a toss-up about whether IT of an attacker is a 'free-floating' wrong (i.e. a wrong that doesn't attach to a particular person). Thus because it isn't a wrong to a person and isn't a free-floating wrong, it isn't wrong. The argument goes as follows:

P1 The only wrong to a person is one that infringes on her moral right
P2 moral rights are either natural rights or non-natural rights
C1 Torture must either wrong a natural right or a non-natural right
P3 IT doesn't infringe on a natural right
P4 IT doesn't infringe on a non-natural right
C2 IT doesn't wrong a person

Author first wants to cast moral rights as powers, in a way that provides support for P1. (pg 225-8) Author discusses three wrongs that might be done to an attacker: 1- infringing of rights, 2- exploitation, 3- contemptuous treatment. Author calls 1 object-centered, 2 subject-centered, and 3 falls either into the object-centered or the subject-centered. Author argues that the object-centered account is the best to go with since it makes the respect for others due to powers they have. Author argues that this properly captures what rights are. (226)

The next major move in the paper involves saying that an attacker has given up her rights against IT when she became an attacker. Author construes this as a case of self-defense. (pg 228-31) The objections are as follows:

Objection 1: Waiving a right against extreme suffering is invalid-- you can't waive such a right. Author's reply: the attacker is actually consenting to IT, though involuntarily, since the attacker lacks alternatives-- but this is not the fault of the torturer. (pg 232)

Objection 2: Autonomy-based rights can't be waived. Author: nonsense: we don't want maximal autonomy but narrative autonomy. What is important in autonomy is 'reflexive autonomy', which is something like [I guess]: 'all things considered, how much autonomy do I want in the upcoming events in my life?' (pg 233)

Objection 3: the reply to objection 2 is insufficient-- you shouldn't be allowed to take away someone's narrative autonomy. Author: remember, this is self-defense!

Objection 4: IT will most likely be imposed using an unreliable procedure, and is therefore unjustified. Author: though it might be 'wrong', it isn't 'morally wrong' in the sense of infringing on anyone's rights. This is a reply to Nozick. (233-4)

The next major discussion is author arguing that IT isn't a free-floating wrong. There are three free-floating wrongs: 1- exploitation, 2- indecency, 3- a failure to satisfy a consequentialist duty (pg 235)
1- Author claims it isn't clear that the attacker is being exploited by IT "It is not clear that the attacker receives an unfair share of the transactional surplus. This depends on the relative magnitude of the two parties' gains..." [what?!]
2- Author claims a reasonable person would find this self-defense not indecent.
3- Is IT optimizing good consequences? Author claims this is a tough empirical question that is most likely to be a toss-up.
So, since it isn't conclusive that IT is a free-floating wrong, and since it doesn't infringe on an attacker's rights, it isn't morally wrong.

Burgess-Jackson, Keith - The Logic of Torture

12/14/2007

Wall Street Journal, Dec 5 2007

This is a rather short piece that lays out some of the issues in moral philosophy: how there are rule and act consequentialists and absolute and moderate deontologists. Author also lays out types of questions around any moral issue (torture not unique in this regard)-- factual questions, conceptual questions, evaluative questions.

Author's position is that it is only conceptual questions that philosophers can help with-- clarifying ideas and correcting conceptual errors only. No one should look to philosophers for evaluative expertise, author claims. "Philosophers, as such, have neither factual nor evaluative expertise. (I would argue that nobody has evaluative expertise.)"

Author also distinguishes between what is permissible by law and what is permissible morally-- how the two are different, specifically that the law has to be practical and apply in a rule-like manner.

Lurz, Robert - In Defense of Wordless Thoughts About Thoughts

12/07/2007

Mind & Language Vol 22 No 3 June 2007

This is a paper almost exclusively aimed at refuting Bermudez's theory of nonlinguistic creatures and their capabilities. On Bermudez's account, nonlinguistic creatures can think about the world and have 'protocausal' reasoning, but cannot think thoughts about thoughts, that is, understand that their thoughts stand in relation to themselves-- that is, have 'higher-order propositional attitudes' or higher-order PAs. Author wants to deny this a priori theory.

First, author attacks the a priori aspect of Bermudez's theory by pointing to some empirical work that underlies the position that nonlinguistic animals can entertain higher-order PAs. (pg 272-3) Important to note that Bermudez does not deny that nonlinguistic animals can have thoughts about mental states, just not PAs. (pg 273)

Author quotes Bermudez and describes his theory:
P1) Ascribing PAs involves higher-order thinking (intentional ascent)
P2) Higher-order thinking (intentional ascent) can only be done by using words for the thoughts-- by using public-language sentences. Intentional ascent involves semantic ascent.
Conclusion: PA ascriptions involve public language. (pg 275)

higher-order thinking is considered by Bermudez to be 'consciously considering thoughts and how they relate to each other', which he names 'second-order cognitive dynamics' (pg 276). A point of interest is that this cannot be a sub-personal representation, since then it would conflict with the language of thought hypothesis. Author denies that ascribing PAs need to be done consciously, since there are many studies that seem to show that when children over 4 ascribe PAs to others, they aren't doing it in an acessible manner. (pg 277-9) Author offers a way out for Bermudez by saying that nonlinguistic animals can't explicitly engage in PA ascriptions, but author considers this a much weaker conclusion (pg 280-2).

Author considers an interpretation of Bermudez's theory: call 'first-order cognitive dynamics' the ability to explicitly, reflectively reason about states of affairs (not thoughts). It seems that Bermudez is committed to nonlinguistic animals doing some form of reasoning, but is it 'first-order cognitive dynamics'? If Bermudez says 'yes', then author tries to trap him into admitting that 'first-order' requires language just as much as 'second-order' does. If Bermudez says 'no': 'this happens on the subpersonal level', why wouldn't this happen for 'second-order' as well? (pg 282-4)

Author considers a possible story that suggests that nonlinguistic animals could reason about PAs. (pg 286-7) The story is about a nonlinguistic animal 'tricking' or letting another have a false belief in order to secure a means of amusement for itself. If the story is possible, then it seems that language isn't required to have reasoning about PAs. This goes directly against Bermudez, who thinks that for a PA to be thought about, it must first be represented, and thus requires a 'vehicle' at the 'personal level' (not sub-personal). If they weren't conscious (personal), then we wouldn't be able to 'regulate and police' our thoughts and what we're entitled to believe. The only viable systems available for all of this is analogue representative models (maps, images, models) and language. But Bermudez says that analogue is out (pg 288) so language is the only contender left standing.

Author denies that these two options are the only way to go, and furthermore that Bermudez is confused. He confuses what is a conscious consideration 'the thought' with whatever does the representative work 'the vehicle'. What is at the personal level are thoughts, the vehicles that represent could easily be at the subpersonal. (pg 288-9) Bermudez's apparent reply is that this seems unlikely since whenever you go and check your thoughts, you get words. (pg 289 bottom) Author denies this: there are thoughts that don't come in words, even though you can put them into words (pg 290-1).

Author concludes that it is an empirical issue, not a conceptual one, whether nonlinguistic animals can ascribe PAs.

Simmons, Alison - Changing the Cartesian Mind: Leibniz on Sensation, Representation and Consciousness

11/30/2007

The Philosophical Review, Vol 110 No 1 Jan 2001

This is largely a work of interpretation and explanation of Leibniz's position on the mind as compared to Descartes. Author observes that many lump Leibniz together with Descartes-- both rationalists claiming the soul is immaterial and immortal, etc. However, Leibniz takes the view that perception is primary to the mind, while Descartes is of the view that consciousness is. While this might seem trivial, it isn't; much of the distinctions Leibniz has can, in some ways, be linked to our more modern pictures of the mind, while Descartes is often the whipping boy of the wrong approaches.

Author juxtaposes the two thinkers as Descartes and his followers vs Leibniz. Often when Descartes is unclear on exactly his position, author uses many of his 'followers' like Louis de la Forge, Nicolas Malenbranche, Antoine Arnauld. As far as theory of mind goes, the Cartesian picture is that it is a thinking, i.e. conscious, thing. Nothing in the mind without being conscious-- or else how could it be in the mind? This leaves thinkers open to questions about memories, unconscious sensations, etc. Cartesians claim that these are just unremembered, not unconscious. The conscious aspect of the mind isn't a second-order perceptual ability-- it is intrinsic to the mind itself. The Cartesians do have a concept of 'reflective' consciousness, which is the consideration of a sensation, but still there is 'phenomenal consciousness', which is pervasive in the mind. (pg 36-7)

A second issue author discusses about Descartes is how much ideas/thoughts/conscious episodes are representational. Author claims Descartes is unclear and his followers are divided-- some claiming that it is always representational, others that ideas are modifications of the mind of the thinker, therefore not necessarily representational. (pg 37-9). Either way, it is consciousness, not representation, that is essential to the mind. For the Cartesian, author claims, sensations are: (pg 46-7)
1) Simple
2) Conscious
3) Ineffable or inexplicable
4) Stirred up by motions in bodies but
5) Do not resemble any bodily motions and
6) Do not represent anything bodily
This 6) is included because what we have in the mind doesn't seem to correspond to what is external, though sometimes Descartes and his followers say instead that they are 'confused' representations. (pg 48-50) Author points out some of the difficulty as traceable to missing a distinction between something 'presentationally representing' and 'referentially representing', the later needing to be transparent while the former does not.

The Leibnitzian picture is that perceptual representation (unclear, indistinct sensations) is intrinsic to the mind, not consciousness. Of course, for Leibniz consciousness is a second-order apparatus brought to bear on mental activities-- this is a different picture from the Cartesians. (pg 53-5) If perception is essential, then how does consciousness come into the picture? Author claims that once perceptions become more 'distinct' and are honed into 'sensations', they arise to our 'notice' and we become conscious of them. (pg 56-7) At work here is one of Leibniz's metaphysical commitments of continuity of change-- that nothing has big changes without smaller ones underlying it (pg 45).

Further discussion is about whether sensations are complex or simple. Author interprets Leibniz as saying that sensations are complexes of 'smaller perceptions'-- 'petites perceptions' that appear (confusedly or con-fusedly) as simple.(pg 61-66)

Some may say that Leibniz is saddled with placing the mind-body problem into the mind, instead of solving it. Instead, author claims, there are many good outcomes of this that avoid the mind-far-away-from-body that the Cartesians have. (pg 70)

Moller, Dan - Love And Death

11/16/2007

The Journal of Philosophy, June 2007

This is a relatively quick paper that discusses recent findings in psychology that people tend to recover relatively quickly after the death of their spouse. There are a number that don't, but in general there is remarkable 'resiliency' in the face of losing a loved one (the discussion is mostly about romantic love). This contradicts the conventional wisdom/folk psychology about grieving. Author considers this ability to have a brief grieving period and then relatively quick return to regular emotive states the 'Adaptive Theory' (pg 304). The Adaptive Theory:

The rationality of activity is evaluated according to whatever propensity that activity has toward promoting a person's interests.

One major concern about these findings is a lack of care for another(carelessness). Another concern is a lack of importance to or valuing of others (shallowness). Author wants to show these two as distinct. Both commonly use conditionals or counterfactuals, but author claims that it is clear we care for others because of the enormously costly things we will do for them while they are alive.(pg 307-8) Author discusses instead that these findings threaten the concept of importance, perhaps because the concept includes something like 'I am not replaceable'. (pg 308-10)

Another concern about these findings is that we may not be able to 'properly' grieve, or somehow not be able to 'digest' our loss. This is because the resilience factor goes to work before, perhaps, we are able to fully figure out what we have gone through. There is some evidence that we need emotions in order to complete our cognition of fraught experiences. (pg 311-2)

Author finishes paper (section III) by arguing that this is some sort of 'middle way' between complete shallowness and unending grief.

Note: In this paper there is an interesting summary of our errors in 'affective forecasting' and how readily we return to an affective 'baseline' within 3 months (approx) after good or bad events occur. (pg 305-7)

MacAllen, Susan - 'Muslim Immigrants--a Quandary'

11/09/2007

FaithFreedom.org July 25, 2007

This is a very short paper discussing the problems Denmark has faced with its muslim population. Denmark has traditionally had a 'cradle-to-grave' welfare system and a very generous immigrant welfare system designed to give immigrants many benefits and encourage 'multiculturalism' and 'inclusiveness'. This has been very ineffectual with the growing muslim immigrant population, and instead they have taken social services and been very hostile toward Danish culture.

Denmark has seen upticks in crime, murder, etc., mostly due to the muslim population. This, coupled with large welfare spending on a relatively small muslim immigrant population, has led to the election of a very conservative government that has placed exceedingly high bars for immigrants to become citizens.

Chadha, Monima - No Speech, Never Mind!

11/02/2007

Philosophical Psychology Vol 20 No 5 October 2007

The primary goal of this paper is to refute Donald Davidson's old claim that only language users have beliefs. In the early part of the paper, author rehearses Davidson's discussion from 1982 onward, culminating in a summary of Davidson's main argument: (pg 644)

Premise 1 (P1): Only interpreters can have the concept of belief
Premise 2 (P2): Only creatures who have the concept of belief can have beliefs
Conclusion: Only interpreters can have beliefs

For Davidson, interpretation is necessary for the concept of belief because a belief is distinct from an incorrigible representation, and an interpreter needs to know this. Interpretation functions because it charitably assumes that the speaker means something true, but still may be wrong (or lying). To have the concept of belief, one must grasp the subjective/objective distinction. But how does one grasp such a thing if one isn't involved in the 'social activity of interpreting the utterances of others'? (pg 645). Davidson claims that other sorts of behavior modification are insufficient to show subjective/objective distinction-- it can only be done with language users in a social context-- only be done by interpreters. This is the argument for showing with P1 is necessary.

Author points out that Davidson's argument for P2 actually shows that P2 is sufficient for belief, not that it is necessary. Davidson admits this, but then challenges interlocutors to come up with another way that one can discover the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. Since none so far have answered the challenge, Davidson concludes it is necessary too. (pg 646)

Interlude: Davidson suggested in "Thought and Talk" that he had another argument for P1, using the opacity of substitution for beliefs. The rational explanation for the teleology of a belief is fine grained, using language only to get the distinctions. Non-linguistic creatures will fail to get these fine-grained intentional states into their systems of interpretation, so they will be rather un-belief-like. This has been challenged by other writers as being too rational-teleological and not functional-teleological. (pg 646-7)

Author will consider a different strategy: she will attempt to provide another way that non-linguistic creatures can have the subjective/objective distinction without having the concept of belief. This is primarily established using case studies of other primates. Author does the work to establish another kind of mental state, 'metacognition'. Metacognition differs from higher-order intentional states because it doesn't go upward in the intentional. This sort of metacognition monitors other mental states or processes and takes part in their modification, but does not have higher-order accessibility ('the concept of belief') (pg 649). The key here for the author is to position this metacognitive function in terms of monitoring and controlling information flow from perception and instincts or, roughly, desires. Author shows that chimpanzees and bonobos often will interpret the behavior of their conspecifics, putting them into the category of interpreters. (pg 650-1) Often primates will also engage in deception, which goes a significant way to showing they are making use of the subjective/objective distinction. So a non-linguistic animal might not have the concept of truth or falsity but still have metacognitive normative mechanism that amends false beliefs and affirms true ones, at least within certain contexts (they aren't context-free, like we think our rationality is!). (pg 653).

Author main point is that the interpretive capacities of some non-linguistic animals gives license to ascribe to them mental states, and they don't need the concept of belief to be interpreters. They need instead to have a context-dependent normative metacognitive ability to monitor and control their belief nets.

Neween, Albert & Bartels, Andreas - Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts

10/26/2007

Philosophical Psychology Vol 20 No 3 June 2007

This quick moving paper takes a combination of empirical, intuitive and reasoned approach to giving an epistemic model of concept possession. That is to say: it tries to lay out conditions where we can ascribe the possession of concepts in non-human animals. The first step is to lay out what it means to have a concept. Here, authors borrow from Peacocke in using a psychological-functional mental-capacities approach to concepts. (pg 284) Here also some preliminary ground work is done for what a concept is, how to individuate it, and so on.

The beginning attacks prior writers (Chater & Heyes) that argued that there are three theories of what a concept is: definitional, exemplar, and prototype. The problem is that only prototype concepts can be 'formulated' nonlinguistically, so thus nonlinguistic animals can only have this type of concept. But often it is impossible to tell the difference between conditioned stimulus-response (S-R) systems and prototype concept use. Using principles of parsimony, there is no reason to think animals have concepts. Authors take this to be a challenge of determining the differences between S-R and concept use. (pg 285-6)

Authors consider various approaches, e.g. Dretske, Allen & Hauser/Allen. Dretske gives the idea that you need a flexible response to the same stimuli at a minimum (to distinguish between S-R and concept use). Allen suggests that concepts require integration of more than one source of information in order to modify behavior-- stimulus independent, or as Pylyshyn suggests, 'transcendence of particular stimuli' (pg 287). Using this we arrive at the value of 'stable representations' that are independent of particular stimuli. This constraint is only necessary (not sufficient), since it could merely give us naming abilities for objects (see collie discussion pg 288).

Authors consider the Davidson argument about belief possession, and say flat out that it is wrong because it presupposes second-order belief usage in order to have first-order beliefs. That is, you need to have a concept of a concept before you can have a concept. Authors deny this could be realistic (pg 289), but agree with Davidson that there is a normative element to concept possession. Authors instead take this more modest metacognitive criterion from Allen:
ii. An Organism is capable of detecting some of its own discrimination errors between veridical applications of concept X and veridical applications of concept X (pg 289)

The next step is to have the ability to extract classes from perceptual data-- to separate properties from objects. Authors examine the case study for Alex the parrot, that was able to successfully 85% separate objects into piles according to the categories color, shape, material. Thus showing not just that Alex could learn red, blue, etc., but also higher-level categories. (pg 292-4) Authors distinguish between three different categories of cognitive capacities: nonconceptual representations (S-R), conceptual representations and propositional representations. Here is an interesting discussion about the 'cognitive' and what it means for something to be cognitive. [Clearly, 'cognition' isn't the same as 'thinking' anymore if an ant can do it to get home!] (pg 294) Here we are homing in on conceptual representations. In order to have a first-order perceptual concept (e.g. RED):
C1: The system has a stable representation of the property across a range of objects
C2: The system must be able to represent not only property X but also other properties of the same object
C3: The system has a distinguishing capacity that picks out particular properties of an object that is independent of the stimulus of the property itself (e.g. the system can, on its own, pick out the relevant property without its making itself salient somehow)
C4: The system has a minimal semantic net where the first-order concept fits into a proper dimension (e.g. RED fits into COLOR rather than STOPS or DANGER-WARNINGS).
There is extended discussion on these necessary conditions. (pg 296-7). Authors give their suggestions for what propositional representations are-- the combination of two concepts that are strongly stimulus-independent. Authors then look at the empirical evidence to see how non-human animals fit into the criteria. (pg 298-300) Authors reply to a few objections and summarize their claims. (pg 303-305)

Aizawa, Kenneth - Understanding the Embodiment of Perception

10/19/2007

Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 1 January 2007

This is an essay regarding the different views of the embodiment of perception, which author beings by acknowledging is obviously embodied. There are two contending views, the COH and the CAH. The COH is opposed by author, which is the view that

COH: Perceptual experience is constituted in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills

This contrasts with

CAH: Perceptual experience is caused in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills

Author claims this is an important discussion because the COH gives grist for the extended mind hypothesis, while the CAH does not particularly do so. The main target in this paper is a book by Noe Action in Perception. Noe calls the COH the enactive approach. 'Perception is not a process in the brain but a kind of skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole' (pg 9). Author first makes some preliminary comments:
1) Perceptual experience is not the same as mere peripheral stimulation of sense organs-- something more than sensation. (pg 9-10)
2) This debate is an empirical one, or settled by interpretations of empirical evidence-- e.g. not a priori or analytic. Thus, we need a definition or analysis of perception that leaves it open whether COH or CAH is right.
3) Sensorimotor skills are practical knowledge, not just (or maybe not at all) theoretical knowledge. This is complicated by Noe's apparent belief that sensorimotor skills also involve a level of theoretical knowledge.

Author reviews various empirical cases where COH (or CAH) is supposed to be supported: cases of removing congenital cataracts, cases of wearing distorting lenses, cases of images that fade from sight upon fixation. In each case, author gives alternatives to the COH analysis and supposes that COH fails to be established.

In the first case (of removing congenital cataracts), Noe claims that these are cases of 'experiential blindness', meaning that they cannot integrate sensations with patterns of movement and thought. Author claims 'it appears to be possible that some humans might perceive things, only without these perceptions being integrated into patterns of personal movement and thought.' (pg 15) Further, even if it were correct that these patients have 'experiential blindness', this would still fail to establish COH, since CAH can offer the alternative explanation that these patients' sensorimotor skills aren't yet connected (causally) to their sensory apparatus in the proper way. (pg 16)

The second example involves wearing distorting lenses and possible being 'experientially blind' in some manner or other. Author instead claims that since the subject is able to recognize these distorted objects, the subject really is perceiving. (pg 17) Further, all distorting lenses will really prove is a weaker version of COH, namely that the ability to exercises one kind of sensorimotor skill constitutes one kind of perception. Author claims this is weaker and doesn't establish COH. (pg 18)

Author also offers empirical evidence against COH, in the case of paralysis. Here is seems there is no exercise of sensorimotor skills, yet preception takes place. (pg 20-23)

Davidson, Donald - Problems in the Explanation of Action

10/12/2007

Metaphysics and Morality; Essays in honour of JJC Smart, Petit, Sylvan & Norman eds. Blackwell, 1987

Author starts with discussing his views on intentional actions and actions explained by reference to intentions. Specifically, author investigates the question posed by Wittgenstein: 'What must be added to my arm going up to make it my raising my arm?' Author claims that there is nothing that must be added; first is a discussion that if a raising of an arm is an effect of a previous act of the agent, it seems that previous act must also have a previous act, ad infinitum. The case is simple in the case of the arm raising the arm that is raised. However, what if a rope is tied to a pulley that raises a paralyzed arm (I pull the rope with the other arm)? It seems here there is the pulling of the lever and the raising of the arm-- 2 events. Author rejects this (pg 37), saying the 'two events' are identical. In a sense, the rising of my arm is not part of my raising my arm.

The next difficulty has to do with possible objections raised to this 'identity' thesis that show a disjunct between cause and effect, or at least a period of time and/or space that separates the two, thereby plausibly questioning the identity of the two 'actions'. (e.g. my sending a thank you message and the recipient not getting it until later) (pg 38). Author replies that often causal verbs actually have two (or more) parts where x causes y, then y causes z. This can fix certain space/time problems.

Author moves to a concern for giving explanations for actions. Often the explanation takes the form of describing the intention for the consequence. Author takes back a previous claim he had made in "Actions, Reasons and Causes" where he claimed that 'there were no such states as intending, there were just intentional actions.' Author claims that 'it is not enough to ensure that an action was performed with a certain intention that it was caused by that intention' (pg 39) and gives examples of deviant causal chains, which leads author to conclude that 'concepts of event, cause and intention are inadequate to account for intentional action'.

Forming an intention requires a belief and a 'pro-attitude' or desire. Desires aren't the same as intentions, since, according to the author, a desire is a conditional, dispositional state that can be countermanded, while an intention is 'sandwiched between cause and effect' (pg 41). The complaint now is that it seems that only an explanation of which desires and beliefs formed the intention that is a reason for the action (plays the part of a cause). The problem here is that it seems that the explanation for the cause is dependent on how the events are described and can be considered fragile in this way compared to the hard sciences. Perhaps what is desirable are psycho-laws that, once you specify the belief&desire, lawfully cause the action. Since these haven't been found, author claims this is not a reason to say reasons don't cause actions, rather that Author attempts to fix this problem by saying that causal powers may be mentioned in different explanatory contexts, but in principle instantiate laws (pg 42, bottom). This has come under criticism.

Author considers various attempts to specify reason-explanation laws, that are mostly inadequate (pg 43-4). His conclusion is that 'laws relating the mental and the physical are not like the laws of physics, therefore are not reducible to them' (pg 45) The big complaint (that is relevant to our recent previous readings) is that events causes each other by virtue of the lawlike behavior of properties, but the only real properties are physical. Thus there can't be mental-physical causation. Author then says that there are all sorts of kinds of laws, and with that different kinds of explanatory schemes that will apply according to our interests. This will make different properties causally efficacious. In the physical universe only (free of our interests), all properties cause the effect. (pg 45-6)

Author finishes by saying that there is a further distinction between physics, the special sciences (which may theoretically be ultimately reducible to physics) and reason-explanation in the explanation of action. The distinction between any scientific explanation and reason-explanations, is the normative. Here author identifies the semantic content as vital to explanation, and semantic content is subject to our interests in consistency, correctness, etc. Author ends by arguing against a behavioral system of 'black box' psychology.

Polger, Thomas - Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind

10/05/2007

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 85 No 2 June 2007

Author's main target is Gillett's account of Realization and Reduction. Author has numerous objections to the family of realization accounts (Kim, Shoemaker, Gillett), as well as Gillett's specifically, which is called the 'dimensional' view. Author claims that these accounts of realization will destroy the distinction between Realization Physicalism (RP) and the original account (the account that RP was supposed to be an alternative to), identity theories. Author does not want to defend RP, but instead make sense of Realization so that RP can be properly evaluated.

Realization is not the same as 'instantiation'. Author gives multiple examples of use of the term 'realization' (pg 235), and suggests that the paradigm 'textbook' case is something like:
My computer currently realizes Microsoft Word; or
Memory fixation is realized in humans by long term potentiation of neurons.

"Certain electrical states of the device realize computational states such as, say, storing the contents of the last copy operation. The electrical activity of the device is not identical to any program state of Microsoft Word, but it implements or realizes such program states" (pg 236)

Author takes the view of Gillett et al to be that causal powers of properties of objects individuate the realization of the function in question. Author considers this the 'causal view' of Realization. Gillett's view differs from Kim & Shoemaker's in that their view is of a 'flat' causal theory where realizer and realized properties are in the same object, at the same level, in virtue simply of causal powers. Gillett's view is that the realizer properties can take place at a lower level, or a horizontal one, or as part of the structure of the object (or at the object level). This is considered the 'dimensional' causal view. (pg 238)

Author's major reply to the entire causal view is that it fails to capture objects that realize abstract processes, like machines that realize 'addition' or 'Microsoft Word'(pg 240). The claim is that an abstract function like addition is a formal and not a causal relation, and so you can't use causal powers to individuate them. Thus the causal approach fails to capture textbook cases of abstract, formal, or algorithm realization, since these things get realized but the objects/properties that realize them are not doing so causally but in form instead. Author extends this to intentional and etiological (historical) realized properties too (e.g. A US dollar is whatever the US Gov't says is a dollar). Author predicts there will be numerous objections to his attack, which he considers: (pg 243-6)
1) The computational/functional model of cognition (RP) is over
Author: so? We should still try to get the Realization relation right

2) The project of abstract realization in general is defunct
Author: wrong! 'We cannot dismiss abstract realization out of hand' (pg 245) [important!]

3) Ok, maybe a machine can't cause 'addition', but it can cause 'adding things', and that's all you need for Realization. Thus the causal view is saved.
Author: A) there are other realization relations that I hope that doesn't work for B) We can still say that an 'adder' that 'adds things' stands in a particular relation to addition, and thus name that Realization. (pg 246) [this makes no sense]

4) Realization of abstract functions is not Realization proper.
Author: But then we have no room for the special sciences, or for functionalism.

Author turns to the specific criticism of Gillett's dimensional causal view. Author claims (pg 248-50) it essentially destroys Realization and makes it into an identity theory. Author then proposes his own theory of Realization:

'to realize a property or state is to have a function'. (e.g. 'something realizes the property of being a heart iff it has the function of pumping blood') (pg 251)
Author leaves open what kinds of functions will be realized.

Author then considers a final attack on Gillett. This is a discussion about Multiple Realization (MR). Gillett thinks that before we have an idea of MR we need an account of R. But author denies this. Author says that MR is an argument for R, so we can't have R figuring in the explanation of MR-- that would beg the question. Author claims that MR is a theory about explanation and explanatory kinds, whereas R is a metaphysical theory about properties. (pg 255) This leads to a 'paradox' where something might be MR across species/objects/etc. but not actually realized (R) in the special, irreducible sense, since the multiple species/objects' properties are the same across those species/objects/items. Author puts forth that we must first use MR for kinds as an explanation, then investigate the relation between the properties realized (e.g. an eye) and the physical objects doing the explaining (e.g. retina, cornea). If the relation isn't one of identity across the MRs, then maybe we have the Realization relation instead.

Kim, Jaegwon - Physicalism, or Something Near Enough

09/28/2007

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Ch 6 Princeton University Press, 2005

This book chapter isn't too different from the other recent papers by author. The major claim is that physicalism is mostly true, being able to account for everything but the non-functional aspects of qualia. Author uses the term 'ontological physicalism' as the view that material things in space-time are all there is. The first part of the chapter argues for accepting this view.

Why accept ontological physicalism?
Causal Closure:
The first point was that causation [at least how we understand it] requires a 'space-like structure' with objects that are identified within that space. Causation takes place in the physical realm-- we can't figure out how it could be otherwise. So if we are to have mental causation at all (that is things in the mind causing things in the world), then we need to believe that those things in the mind are physical. An objection to this comes from our desire to make us special, or to claim that mental properties 'emerge' from physical ones. All of this has failed, author claims (pg 152).

Causal Exclusion:
The second argument author uses is in reply to a dualist claiming that structuring causation as only physical is question-begging. So author instead gives us an explanation of what causes a finger to twitch while in pain, using only physical processes. Only now we also have mental properties-- both of which should cause the finger to twitch? This sounds like overdetermination with two distinct causes! Author claims that property dualists haven't been able to resolve this problem.

One alternative to ontological physicalism might be Davidson's anomalous monism or Putnam-Fodor and their functionalism, non-reductive materialism and emergentism. The only upshot to these claims is that: either the mental can't be causal or the mental is irrelevant. Since we want to save the causal efficacy of the mental, we need to reduce it to the physical. This is an if-then:

If the mental has causal efficacy, then it needs to reduce to the physical.

Reductionism: author lays out what he considers the principles of reduction. Reduction takes place when previously named 'concepts' or functional place-holders that describe causal entities/properties are shown to have mechanisms that underlie their functions/causal powers. Of course this allows for multiple realizations-- author denies this is a problem for physicalism (pg 164).
Reduction is a three step process: (pg 164)
1) Identify/name a concept that has a function or plays a causal role
2) Begin the scientific work to find the 'realizers' of this functional property
3) Develop an explanation of how the lower-level mechanisms perform the specified causal work

Author then claims that once we have discovered step 1, we can assume that the concept/property is reducible (pg 164). Now, what parts of the mind are reducible, and what parts aren't? Psychological states like beliefs, desires, thoughts, etc. are. Qualia aren't, at least to the extent of their qualitative character. That we can tell the difference between pink and light red is a discriminatory capacity that can be reduced, but the "look of red" is just mental residue. Author's suggestion: live with the residue and we have mostly, ontological physicalism with mental residue. Note: during this paper it seems author is skeptical that total zombies could exist (pg 169).

Gillett, Carl - Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction

09/21/2007

Journal of Philosophy, Vol CIV No 4 April 2007

Author begins by discussing the recent move by Kim, a reductionist, from semantic reduction to metaphysical reduction. This eschews the long-standing 'Nagelian' approach of reducing entities in the 'special sciences' (basically, any science that isn't particle physics) to more elementary ones by way of 'bridge laws'. Instead, the focus is on the metaphysics and ontological relations involved in 'mechanistic explanation'. Mechanistic explanation is, basically, an explanation of how a device or entity works by description of its parts, how each part functions, and how the parts work together. One of the suspicions is toward the term 'metaphysics', but author claims that this is the 'metaphysics of science': a careful, abstract investigation of ontological issues as they arise within the sciences-- (e.g. not a priori). (pg 194-5)

Author discusses the main problems with previous reductionist attempts: there was an unavailability of 'bridge laws' or other descriptors of the lower-level entities such that the higher-level 'emergent' properties couldn't be explained in terms of the lower-level entities. Thus the antireductionists argued that the entities, terms and properties of the special sciences (higher-level) were ineliminable for proper scientific understanding and experimentation.

Author launches into an example of neuroscience where many diverse lower-level entities compose higher-level ones (pg 198). What is interesting in the example is that the higher-level changes that take place aren't caused by lower-level changes-- it is part of the structure of the entities involved that the changes take place. Author argues that this isn't causation but instead noncausal determination (pg 199-200), and that a familiar kind of scientific practice is going on here: explanation by describing composition.

Focusing on the compositional nature of higher-level entities reveals the following: (1) the powers ascribed to the higher-level entity does not have a lower-level analogue. This was the point made by the antireductionists. (2) The lower-level entities are qualitatively different in kind, making up the higher-level ones. This indicates a 'many-one' relation, not an 'identity-identity' relation.

Earlier author put how he individuates properties using a Shoemaker-type 'causal theory' attempt: a property is individuated by what power it gives to the objects that instantiate it. A 'power' is an entity whose possession allows an individual to enter into a certain process (pg 201). Basically, the powers in the lower-level entities comprise the powers in higher-level entities iff the activated powers of the lower-level entities all taken together activate the powers of the higher-level entities (pg 202), and not vice versa. There is some weird discussion/usage of 'manifestation grounds'. Given that there is asymmetry in the 'manifestation grounds', there is room to argue for reduction on an ontological level while leaving the semantic aspects of the special sciences intact and ineliminable.

Author formulates his 'Argument from Composition': (pg 204-5)
1- Properties are individuated by what powers they grant to their instantiators
2- The properties belonging to the lower-level entities are sufficiently efficacious for manifesting higher-level powers
3- Higher-level properties grant no special powers to their higher-level entities, therefore are ontologically dispensable.

The remainder of the paper, author shows that though ontologically dispensable, higher-level entities and properties are not semantically or epistemologically dispensable, being necessary for science and scientific practice. Thus it seems to be granting some of the antireductionist points (and perhaps main contentions) while remaining reductionist in what matters most: ontology.

Clark, Andy - Curing Cognitive Hiccups: A Defense of the Extended Mind

09/14/07

Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 4 April 2007

This is written in response to an earlier paper written by Rupert proposing an alternate hypothesis to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC), namely, the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition (HEMC). The first part of the paper replies to Rupert's two major points:
1) The external aspects of so-called cognition for HEC look dramatically different from the internal aspects, causing a dis-analogy, and making HEC look like a stretch.
2) The proper study of cognitive science depends on taking the 'stable persisting human individual' as the subject matter. If we lose sight of this, we risk losing a lot.

Author first replies to 1 as follows: much of this objection comes from taking the parity principle too seriously. What we're trying to get at is equality of opportunity for all sorts of processes. If we encountered alien neurology, would we say it isn't cognitive because it doesn't look like ours? No. Similarly, just because the fine-grained differences are significant doesn't mean hybrid processes can't play a constitutive role. (pg 167-8)

Author replies to 2: In general, there is little to worry about. Most of the time the stable, persisting human individual's brain is the sole instantiator of cognition. But sometimes there are important 'soft-assembled' resources that also serve to instantiate parts of the cognitive process. We shouldn't be worried that science can't get this right. (pg 169-70)

Author discusses an experiment that deals with programming a VCR, with subjects sometimes seeing the screen, sometimes just trying to remember it, and other times able to remove a barrier. The goal was the fastest programming. What was found was that sometimes memory was used, sometimes visual input. The study concluded that what was important was the fastest, least time-wasted method of computation, whether that was using solely internal information or using external, or a mix. This lead to the Hypothesis of Cognitive Impartiality: problem solving doesn't privilege in-the-head resources over external ones. (pg 174) The risk here is to think that there is a centralized processor that seeks the most expedient route to solve the problem (giving priority to the brain). Here, author tries to distinguish between two 'explanatory targets':
A) The 'recruitment of the extended organization itself' (here the brain plays a crucial role)
B) The 'flow of information and processing in the new soft-assembled extended device.' Author wants to focus on B with HEC/Cognitive impartiality and claims HEMC blurs these distinctions. (pg 175) This leads to the conclusion that cognition is organism centred, even if not organism-bound.

Author then goes into an elaborate, extended discussion of multiple studies and thinkers who have worked on gesturing. (pg 176-183) Gesturing, the conclusion is, not just expression that helps make an already formed point, not just partially-offloaded spatial tasks that it is easier to do in real space, not just part of a marking or crude reminder about what to think about next/remember, but instead constitutive of the act of thinking about certain things. Author wants to be sure to avoid merely treating gesture as a causal aspect that assists with our thinking, but instead as constitutive to that thinking. [Interesting problem in the experimentation see top of pg 179]

Author concedes that there is an asymmetry in that neural processes are considered cognitive always, while gesturing by itself isn't always considered cognitive. (pg 183) However, this is not to invalidate the systematic cognitive process. Take, as an alternative one single neuron-- it isn't cognitive either per se-- only when placed into the larger context is it; the same with gesture. Further, just because the gesturing causes a neural process doesn't mean that the gesture itself is dispensable or somehow not part of the cognition. Author argues that other ways of (in principle) bypassing neural processes to get the end-result brain state would also satisfy this condition, but would be considered cognitive (183-4) [not according to B, above!].

There is a real danger of falling into a 'merely causal' reply about external processing-- but author argues, this danger is the by-product of believing that everything external can only be causal! Author then elaborates by using the example of rain drops on the window: they cannot be part of cognition, even if they prompt me (cause me) to think certain thoughts about poetry, nature, etc. They 'are not part of ... any system either selected or maintained for the support of better cognizing' (pg 184) [teleological?] The 'mere backdrop' or 'merely causal' aspects of the rain contrast with constitutive, self-stimulating loops (like a turbo-engine, where the exhaust from the motor turns an air injector, which then makes the motor more powerful) that are part of the process of larger cognitive accomplishments.

Author discusses a simple mechanical robot that can instantiate 'exclusive or' just by using 'inclusive or' and 'and' and a few simple rules of behavior. (pg 185-8) The point of this description is that even a simple machine can instantiate more complex logical manipulation using less complex rules, and it can then use these more complex rules in further processing if it has some sort of self-feedback device that reports back to itself what it is instantiating; this is supposed to be analogous to humans' overt behavior as playing a part in our further cognitive tasks.

Author concludes by saying that we should not fall into thinking HEC, HEMC or some other hypothesis is true until we have done much more experimentation-- but that we shouldn't be biased against HEC for sure.

Campbell, Sue - Our Faithfulness to the Past: Reconstructing Memory Value

09/07/2007

Philosophical Psychology Vol 19 No 3 June 2006

Author begins by noting the common distinction between memory and imagination, the former being concerned with accuracy or truth. However, author wants to expand what it means to remember properly: not only must memory be faithful but remembering should also get right the significance of the past in relation to the present. Because meaning and significance is often contextual and also brought out and interpreted in social settings, remembering can be affected and perhaps constituted by a 'varied set of human activities' (pg362).

Author gives examples of the intricate functions of auto-biographical memory: a single composite memory formed from repeated similar events, or of using objects or talismans to remember a loss or grief-ridden memory but it changes over time as they come to accept and move past what happened. (pg363-4) The main thesis is that construing memory as solely archival and that accuracy to an original scene is the only important value of memory will miss much of the other important personal aspects of memory (pg365). In particular, author argues for using 'accuracy' as opposed to 'truth' or even 'detail'. Adam Morton in dealing with the possibility of having accurate but not true emotions, argues that accuracy as not reducible to truth (pg366); author takes this line of argument up and applies it to memory, though author argues that detail isn't always preferable (for instance, you can have irrelevant detail, or fail to get the overall themes right). (pg367-8)

With the accuracy of memory as an analog of the accuracy of emotion, author focuses on two issues: how faithful memory can be considered appropriate, rather than straightforwardly true (pg369-70), and how accurate memories can have different significance and different pieces recalled based on present contexts (pg370). Next, author deals with 'integrity' of memory, which she re-frames from being a solely personal characteristic to being a 'personal/social virtue' (pg373). The idea here is that public memory can shape one's own memory, like the public memory of 9/11 versus the personal thoughts and feelings that one might have been having at the time. Thus there is a decision about how and whether to integrate your memories into the public one, changing the public sphere but also perhaps changing your own. (pg374-5) Author's case is that the two virtues in 'reconstructive' memory is not faithfulness and truth, but accuracy and integrity. (pg377)

Ismael, Jenann - Saving the Baby: Dennett on Autobiography, Agency and the Self

08/24/2007

Philosophical Psychology Vol 19 No 3 June 2006

Author uses Dennett's arguments against the Cartesian Theatre as a starting point for a discussion on the self and other concepts of a centralized self-identity. Dennett is hostile to the idea of a unified location or 'brain pearl' that has all systems of the brain in front of it. He uses the analogy of self-organizing systems that give the appearance of centralized intelligence but in fact have none (e.g. termite colonies). The origin of our thinking we have a centralized 'theatre' is our use of words to represent our actions to others-- a useful fiction. (pg 346-7)

Author agrees that there isn't a Cartesian Theatre, but thinks that doesn't mean we end up as termite colonies. Author uses an example of a ship that guides itself by using an internal map. Sensors receive input from the environment. The input is processed using various modules, and a program is run that takes the results of this processed information from all the sources and 'deliberates' about where it is on the map, and what course to set. This could all be displayed graphically, or it could simply be an internal, distributed program. The point is that there is a 'stream' that runs through the 'Joycean Machine', or a program that tries to place itself as a self-representation and 'deliberates' about what course to set. Author considers this the alternative to the self-organizing only model and the Cartesian Theatre model. (pg 349-51)

Author concedes that Dennett does not always talk as eliminatively as that. The tension within Dennett when he seems to endorse a limited 'Joycean Stream' but other times when he insists on only distributed self-organizing systems is reconciled, Author claims, if we take 'language as rooted in the development of explicit self-representation ... representation of ourselves and our states in a causally structured world' (pg 353) For Author, it is this need in social life for self-representation that lead to the Joycean Stream.

Author talks about three types of unity that the Joycean Machine enables:

-Synthetic Unity: the integrating of various disparate information sources.

-Univocity: when the information is integrated into a coherent stream, they are given a 'collective voice'. Here author uses much analogy: like a state-wide referendum that takes all different perspectives and makes them into a 'yes' or 'no', the Joycean Machine is the mouth-piece for a group that has a distributed identity. There is no 'commander' other than the reporter. (pg 356-7)

-Dynamical Unity: The Joycean Machine mediates interactions with other systems, as changes occur.

The important point of all of this is that the reporting of self doesn't mean there is an entity inside the brain 'the self'. The 'reporting' is more like asserting-- a performative that makes it true by concluding what is going on within itself.

Menary, Richard - Attacking the Bounds of Cognition

08/17/2007

Philosophical Psychology Vol 19 No 3 June 2006

Author is undertaking to defend the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) and also what author considers is a more radical project that he calls 'cognitive integration', which takes internal (biological) and external vehicles to be integrated into a whole, which is properly considered cognition. The aim of this paper isn't to establish HEC or cognitive integration, but to defend it from the attacks of Adams, Aizawa, and Rupert (A&A).

Author lays out what the cognitive integrationist is committed to:

1) Manipulation thesis: place the 'cognizer' into an environment; agents complete cognitive tasks often by manipulating features of the environment. There are three types of manipulation:
A) Biological cases of coupling (pg 331)
B) Using the environment directly, without representing
C) Manipulation of the external representational system in accordance with cognitive norms

2) Hybrid Mind thesis: cognition is understood as a hybrid process of internal and external systems.

3) Transformation thesis: our cognitive capacities have grown, been transformed, or otherwise augmented by our ability to manipulate, use hybrid processes, and so on.

4) Cognitive Norm thesis: we are able to manipulate external vehicles of cognition because we learn norms that operate on how to manipulate those vehicles. (These norms of external vehicle manipulation are just as cognitive as internal ones.)

A&A, as 'traditional cognitive internalists', do not deny that we use e.g. mathematical symbols to complete cognitive tasks, they just deny such use constitutes a cognitive process. Author claims their objections misconstrue the manipulation thesis and attack a 'weak' parity principle.

The Parity Principle: if an external process were located in the skull, we'd call it cognitive (pg 333) This is supposed to be intuitive, not necessarily an argument for HEC.

A&A's first argument says that if a cognitive process uses/is coupled to object X, it doesn't follow that X is part of the cognition. Author replies that this misunderstands the where/how the cognition is being done. The cognitive integrationist instead has it that cognition is happening with internal processes and objects, together making up cognition. Thus: X is the manipulation of (e.g. the notebook) reciprocally coupled to Y (the brain process) which together constitute the cognitive process of (e.g. remembering). If this seems question begging, author claims that HEC has been independently established, and is beyond the scope of this paper (pg 334).

A&A have a 'intrinsic content' condition that author next attacks. The intrinsic condition seems to be that a process can be counted as cognitive only if it involves at least some intrinsic/non-derived content. Thus a process that involves no intrinsic content is non-cognitive. Somehow mental representations of 'natural objects' are fixed by 'naturalistic conditions on meaning' (Fodor or Millikan or Dretske), and A&A argue that artifical objects can be fixed the same way. The problem here, author claims, is that when you avoid saying that an internalist idea of an artificial object is fixed by conventional content, you stop yourself by using the convential norms that govern use of that artificial object in cognition. But we do use these norms in manipulation of these artificial objects. So either the objection takes us to be less competent than we are, or the objection posits intrinsic content that is suspiciously similar to convential content. (For an in-depth review of the dialectic, see pg 334-7)

A&A object that we have no good way of making a science out of the combination of brains and external tools, since external tools are all so disparate. A related objection from Rupert is that notebooks and any external tool you can use so far can't really be used when keeping up in conversation, so conversational memory doesn't work if it is external. (pg 339) Author replies to A&A by saying that they miss the entire point. It isn't that cognitive integrationists say that what happens externally is just like what happens internally! (pg 340) It is that, instead, the external vehicles take part in a hybrid process of cognition. Author replies to Rupert that he may be right, but other sorts of memory work differently.

Fisher, Justin - Why Nothing Mental Is Just In The Head

08/10/2007

Nous, Vol 41 No 2 2007

This paper uses a counter-example to 'mental internalism' to show that it isn't just what happens 'in the head' that influences mental events. Author defines a 'mental internalist' early:
A Mental Internalist believes that an individual's mental features supervene on what is in that individual's head at that time. Likewise for two individuals with the same mechanical layout: same things inside the head = same mental features. Author explains how some of this has been challenged by 'classical' externalist arguments (Putnam, Kripke, Burge), particularly on the side of the content of mental features (for instance, the content of my thought that 'Water is wet'), and in what justifies a belief. Of course, externalism of this sort has been open to challenge from a 'narrow content' view of the content of beliefs-- but author tries to get away from this. Classical externalist arguments haven't touched many of the hallmark mental features: phenomenal experiences, rationality, moral character, emotions, propositional-attitude-types. Author constructs an example that disproves mental internalism:

Imagine a world where there are 100 radiation 'pulses' per second shooting around. They are disruptive to the human physiology so that our mechanics/mental causation would go haywire if we were on that world 'Pulse-world': we would go quite mad. However, there are 'Pulselings' who have evolved to be just like humans except that their mental mechanics do just fine (maybe even need) to have these pulses going through their heads 100x/second. Now, one Pulseling Paula is having the experience of driving, and an Earthling Edna is having the experience of playing the saxophone. At some point in time t (in between pulses) author stipulates that these two people's mechanical/physical/inside-the-head properties are identical. (pg 321-2) If this is possible, there is a difference between mechanical inside-the-head and mental features. Thus mental internalism is false.

The next section deals with whether this example is possible. Author claims his example rests on three assumptions:
1) Our mental features are produced as the consequence of relatively simple interactions between many elements in our heads
2) These pulses 'coax' the elements in our heads to change the mechanics of how they operate
3) If these pulses change small elements in our heads, they can change large ones too
The moral of the story is that all cognitive systems depend deeply on the appropriate support (or at least non-interference) from their surroundings. (pg 324)

Author next considers replies to his example. The first is the other-minds skeptic. Since nobody can say much to him, author can't either. Nobody can convince the other-minds skeptic that other humans have mental features, let alone Pulselings. Another defense might be that a pulseling that receives these pulses is disqualified from having mental features attributed to her, because of these pulses. This is ad hoc, and denies explanatory power (since it certainly looks as though Pulselings are intelligent, have feelings, and so on), and might also disqualify ourselves as well (since we might be dependent on some sort of environmental factor).

Author considers two possible alternatives to mental internalism. The first is 'wide functionalism', which expands the mental features to some more of the subject's current surroundings. Author dislikes this in favor of 'teleo-functionalist' historical perspective, which takes into account the history of the subject in order to determine what the normal mechanics are for 'in the head' mental features. Author espouses the Principle of Mental Inertia:

--Altering things outside a creature's head won't significantly change the progression of mental states that that creature will undergo, unless those external alterations also bring about change within the creature's head. (pg 329) [What? Things won't be different unless they're different?!?]

Author briefly describes why his teleo-functionalist account is superior to the wide functionalist account, by suggesting that both Edna (Earthling) and Paula (Pulseling) are de-brained and their brains are thrust into identical vats: each would still have the same surroundings but their mental features would be different. Thus wide functionalism would fail here, but the Principle of Mental Inertia would be consistent with this result.

Montero, Barbara - Physicalism Could Be True Even If Mary Learns Something New

08/03/2007

The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 57 No 227 April 2007

In this paper the thesis is that Mary would lack the concept of 'what it is like to see red', even if she knew what happened on the lower-level physical level, and could deduce what would happen on the higher-level physical level. Author dubs this the 'missing-concept' reply to the knowledge argument.

Author starts by discussing a 'less than ideal' knowledge argument that is open to flaws. She uses this as a starting point for some of her claims as replies. The less than ideal argument starts with 'Mary knows all the facts of physics, chemistry and neurophysiology...'. This is open to problems because there may be other physical facts that aren't included in these fields. There could be 'higher-level' physical facts (those that constitute/determine the experience of red) that aren't, strictly speaking, included in physics, chemistry or neuropsych. This is consistent with what author calls the 'non-reductive' physicalist position, with a conception of the 'broadly physical'. The 'broadly physical' is that mental facts are physical facts, whatever those facts may be (pg 179).

This leads to a discussion of what it is to be physical at all. Author begins with saying that as long as a property is either fundamental and physical or determined by fundamental physical properties, it is broadly physical. Much talk in the sciences involves talk of deducing higher-level physical facts from lower-level ones. There should be no reason why, in principle, this can't be done. This is the case, author points out, only if all fundamental physical facts are taken to be 'structural/relational' facts. If we construe the physical as the 'non-mental', then we won't have this necessary connection. (pg 181-2) [Doesn't this beg the question?] Only on a certain understanding of the physical as being ultimately accessible to physics using structure, position, charge, etc. can higher-level properties be deducible from lower-level physical ones.

The fixed Mary argument takes Mary to know all the fundamental lower-level physical facts and have perfect reasoning and deduction skills. Author abandons the previous argument she uses (above) and agrees that all higher-level facts are deducible from lower-level ones. Presumably, this can be done a priori. However, can it be done without the relevant concepts? One might think that this is what a priori just means. However, author claims that a priori means that the truth of the conclusion is justified from the truth of the premises without reference to empirical studies. This doesn't mean the conclusion can be reached by simply looking at the premises-- sometimes you'd need the relevant concepts to employ. (pg 183-87) Presumably, Mary could infer "Ahh, seeing red would look like this", except that she wouldn't understand that 'this' refers to, since she lacked the relevant concept of 'the experience of seeing red'.

The last bit of the paper tries to show that author's reply to the Mary argument is different from the 'old fact, new presentation' reply. The 'old fact, new presentation' argument uses identity between (brain-state B) and (seeing red). The 'non-reductive physicalist', however need not hold this identity-- in the sense that the two propositions have the same truth-value. (pg 188) [WHAT?!?]

MacDonald, Cynthia & Graham - The Metaphysics of Mental Causation

07/27/2007

The Journal of Philosophy, Vol CII, No 11, November 2006

This is a difficult (and long) paper about the causal efficacy and causal relevance of mental events. The causal efficacy of an event is a necessary condition for the causal relevance of one of the event's properties. The issue here is that there seem to be two causes that are causally efficacious for the same effect, e.g. turning on a light 'because you noticed it was cold' or 'because of some neuro-physical explanation'. Here is the 'qua problem' of non-reductive monism. Notice that if you can/want to reduce the mental to the physical, this isn't a concern. But if you believe the mental can't be reduced, then you have a case, made especially by Kim, that mental properties are 'too little' relevance for effects. This calls for a defense of the mental in conjunction with 'minimal physicalism', which makes the case for the irreducibility of the mental. The problem goes as follows:

PCR: physical properties of physical events are causally relevant to the physical effects of those events

MCR: Mental properties of physical events are causally relevant to some of the mental and physical effects of those events

EXCL: If P is causally sufficient for an effect, there is no other property Q that is distinct from and independent of P, that is causally relevant for that same effect

CLOS: If a physical event has a cause, it has a sufficient physical cause, where physical Ps are causally sufficient for the effect

Put all these together and it seems we have physical properties being causally relevant for physical effects, and the mental properties being 'too little' to be included. (pg546) Yet for the causal efficacy of mental events, you should be able to preserve all these 4 principles.

One possible fix for the causal efficacy of events is a trope theory. Tropes are abstract and not concrete, but this distinction doesn't map onto a universal/particular distinction. (pg547) Instead, a trope of red is the unique red of a certain robin (at a certain time and place), an abstract gained from attending to just one aspect of the robin. The concrete robin is all the tropes taken together. Under the trope theory, there are two conceptions of what it is to be a property. The first considered is the 'class of tropes' theory, where a property is all tropes of red taken together. (pg548) The second is that a property is just another trope. Authors consider the 'class of tropes' conception of properties first in their analysis of whether the trope theory solves the problem of mental efficacy.

The setup is that physical tropes (that are causally relevant) fit into a class of similar tropes to form a homogeneous property. A mental property is a higher-level (not 'higher-order') property that contains classes of these same physical tropes, and other physical tropes that instantiate the same trope-functional mental trope, e.g. pain is c-fibers and/or h-fibers and/or o-fibers... (pg550-1) Since the physical trope that is causally relevant falls into both a physical property and a mental property, the problem looks solvable. However, authors throw up the following objections: if a physical trope is causally relevant, in virtue of what? Prima facie, it seems relevant because it is a physical property, not because it is also a mental one. (pg552) Secondly, just because you call a higher-level property 'mental' doesn't make it mental-- there are lots of higher-level properties that are also physical. (pg553) Finally, authors claim that logically there is no connection between a causally relevant physical trope that is a physical property and a mental property, even if that causally relevant physical trope also inhabits that mental class. After all, there are several other heterogeneous classes which that physical trope will also inhabit that should not be considered causally relevant. (pg553-4)

A way out for the trope theorist is to claim not that properties are classes of tropes but instead just the tropes within the classes. (pg554) Authors attribute this view to Heil & Robb. Here is where authors level their biggest objection: the trope theorist misses the point of causal relevance: it isn't that a P property and an M property are identical therefore both relevant; causal relevance is the problem of: what is effected in virtue of what property? (pg555) This problem authors claim the trope theorist fails to address. Instead, authors offer up the Property Exemplification Account (PEA). PEA says that events like having a pain right now not only has the property of 'being a pain event' but also is an exemplifying of a property like 'has-pain'. (pg556). Here's how it works: objects are the subjects of events. In objects, property exemplifyings occur. When a property is an exemplifying in an event, it is actually exemplifying in the subject. A property exemplifying in a subject at a time is constitutive of an event, (pg556-7) though does not 'constitute' the event the same way e.g. a chair parts constitute a chair. (pg559)

Authors then posit that not only do events have constitutive properties (the properties of the objects), but events also have 'characterizing properties' as well. Characterizing properties have exemplifyings in events, and constitutive properties have exemplifyings in objects, the subjects of those events. (pg560) This sets up two sets of properties that an event can have. Kim argues that mind-body identity in events must be between constitutive properties of events, but authors consider instead that the identity should be between the properties of the events, not of their objects (subjects).

From here authors elaborate what a property is according to the PEA, and claim that two distinct properties can have exemplifyings in the same object of an event. In this case, you can have a mental property and a physical property exemplify in the same object of an event. They claim the mental-physical co-instantiation is a supervenience relation that is similar to the metaphysical relation between 'being colored' and 'being red' (pg561). So mental properties and physical ones are both exemplified in the same subject in the same event. Authors then argue that the 'universalist understanding' of properties forces the causal efficacy of mental events, since when a mental property is exemplified in an object of a physical event, that event is constitutively a mental event as well.(pg562) The result is that all properties that are exemplified in the subject of an event become efficacious. The immediate objection arises: too many properties are efficacious! Authors argue that this isn't a problem-- the only problem is if too many properties are causally relevant. (pg563)

To save causal relevance from this objection, authors introduce another thesis that works off the 'is colored'/'is red' relation by talking about different levels of mental and physical properties. Mental properties are 'higher-level' than their lower-level physical ones, but related in that when the lower-level one is exemplified, the higher-level one automatically is. Authors call this the Property-Dependence thesis (pg564). Crucial to this is understanding that a mental property of 'thinking of Vienna' is a higher-level property of 'neuro-state x'. The causal relevance of the lower-level physical property then can become the causal relevance of the higher-level mental one of the same object in the same event. Yet not every property becomes causally relevant (though every one could be considered causally efficacious) since not every property of the object is a higher-level property of the lower-level, causally relevant physical property. Lastly, mental properties aren't considered constitutive to the event (I guess they are part of the 'characterizing properties' of the event). This is a supervenience relation that authors analyze (pg565).

The next step is to show that mental properties can be causally relevant qua mental properties, not because they supervene on causally relevant physical ones. Authors claim that the framing of this problem by Kim is hostile to this possibility, so if they can show that the causal relevance of the mental no more problematic than any other causal relevance claim, they have done enough (pg567). At this point they draw the distinction between property instances and properties themselves. Causal efficacy is about property instances; causal relevance is about the properties themselves (that are instanced in objects of events). This distinction serves to show that there can be many physical properties being instanced in an event that will not be causally relevant to some of the effects. Authors claim this is a by-product of having a metaphysics that allows for multiple properties to be exemplified in the same event. In other words, there are some properties being relevant to some effects, other properties relevant to other effects, and so on. So it isn't just mental properties but also other physical ones that may fail to be causally relevant (for a particular effect property exemplifying). Given that this is context-dependent and empirical, authors insist it would be 'churlish' to reject the mental. (pg568)

The last objection is one that claims that Davidson's Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality (PNCC), combined with the position that the mental is anomalous (the mental doesn't figure in causal laws), makes mental property relevance impossible. (pg571) Authors first argue that PNCC isn't the only enduring causal theory, and that proposals from the likes of Lewis have suggested co-variance as a theory of causation. (pg572) These new propoals remove the 'covering-law' as necessary for causation, therefore still leaving open the possibility of mental property relevance along with physical property relevance. The lesson here is that 'overdetermination has to do with causal instances-- efficacy, not relevance' (pg574) Authors argue that two 'co-variation relationships' (causally relvant properties) can exist 'harmoniously'.

Haldane, John - The Breakdown of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

07/20/2007

Mind, Metaphysics and Value, ed. J. Haldane, 2002

This is a self-contained chapter in a collection that tries to recapture some of the ancient theories (Aristotle & Acquinas) that grappled with the mind-body problem. As the problem became different with Descartes, part of what it means to use ancient theories is to change what the problem is in the first place. The first part of the paper is devoted to author comparing what the scholastic philosophy world was like just before Descartes to what our current anglo-analytic philosophy world is like, suggesting that there is about to be a major revolution that will sweep all this work away as irrelevant, or at least outdated.

Author continues to stress how we need a different approach to the mind-body problem altogether. One example is to focus on the non-representational forms of intentionality, using quotes from Merleau-Ponty and Anscombe that talk about immediate, unmediated practical knowledge that the mind acquires from the world. (pg 57-8) To make his point that current understandings are in need of overhaul, author points to the following problems:

-- The problem of eliminitivism: the unwelcome conclusion that denies mental content/experience
-- The problem of supervenience: the unwelcome conclusion that asserts some kind of connection between the mental and the physical, but fails to capture how (the problem given to the non-reductive physicalist)
--The problem of dualism: the unwelcome conclusion that separates the mind from the body in all important ways

With these three problems put in this way, it isn't clear how we're going to get out of it using our current reasoning. Author assumes that eliminitivism is a bad conclusion, as is mentalism. Author focuses on the problem of supervenience/dependence. What is the nature of this relation? The Davidsonian reply is weak: you can't have a change in the mental without a change in the physical, and vice verse (then add an asymmetry that favors the physical as the primary causal source). (This doesn't go as far as type-type or token-token identity.) The problem here is that any change in the physical (in any part of the world) could account for a change in my mental state, a sort of 'global supervenience' that is absurd.

In the next discussion, we have a potential fix that tries to use perceptual externalism. The problem is that we don't have a good world-mind connection, so why don't we just say that part of what is in the mind is the things that are in the world? (pg 62) Author thinks this fails because of the problems of genuine mental causation. The first problem of genuine mental causation is basically the same as the earlier problems: are there two distinct processes, one (non-identical) process, or what? (pg 64-5) The second problem is that it seems as though the physical systems are doing all the causal 'work', with the mental is an epiphenomenal, or byproduct of the physical. (pg 65-7)

Author turns to three possible arguments from Acquinas, two of which he would like to see revitalized. (pg 72) These are as follows:
2) Human reasoning uses not empirical particulars but abstract universals, which don't 'exist' per se
3) Thinking is self-reflexive: when I am thinking, I know I am thinking-- but not as a second-order thought but instead as part of the original thought.

Author thinks that pursuing these lines of argument might be fruitful.

Arnold, Jack & Shapiro, Stewart - Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of Non-contradiction?

07/13/2007

Nous, Vol 4 Issue 2, 2007

This is a paper that tries establish that there are two interpretations of Quine, or perhaps more accurately, that Quine was of two minds when it came to the status of logical truths. Authors believe there was a 'logic-friendly' Quinean empiricism, one that placed the rules of truth-preserving inference (logic) outside of the possibility of revision by recalcitrant experience. There was also 'radical' Quinean empiricism, dating back to 'Two Dogmas', that did not exclude any of the rules of logic from possible revision. This is a concern because it could mean that the law of non-contradiction and 'ex falso quodlibet' (explosion) are subject to revision. Because authors are classical logicians, this is troubling to them. Authors first lay out the possible conflict between the logic-friendly Quine and the radical Quine, but then mostly focus on the implications for the radical Quine. The thesis for the paper is that if we are to take these rules of logic on using the radical Quine's own principles of empirical confirmation, these rules will not have the robust status of universal rationality that many (most) logicians want them to have.

The first part of the paper entails the authors go to the original sources often and trying to work out the radical Quine's theory (pg 279-281). Ultimately the authors conclude that it is part of Quine's holism that logic is included in the 'web' of beliefs. It just so happens that the 'theories' of logic go very far to the inside of the web, making recalcitrant experience more likely to change beliefs on the edges rather than closer to the insides. This is complicated by other claims made by Quine that seem to say that logic cannot be changed since, any change in logic is a 'change of subject'. This is Quine's reply to dialetheists-- 'you're just changing the subject'. So, is a change in the theory of logic change the meaning of the theory? Quine says yes. (pg 280-281) Now we might be left to wonder how theories of logic could be changed at all without changing everything altogether.

The next matter for consideration is how the rules of logic should be used within the web of belief. Should they be used everywhere? One problem here is that Quine does not like to engage with normativity when discussing belief. Talk of 'should' would mean that the rules of logic have some sort of force other than merely helping to make predictions and avoid recalcitrant experience. Authors interpret Quine as talking about using causation (or constant conjunction) for belief formation and ordering (pg 283-4), not using normative logical rules.

Lastly, we have a problem of what 'recalcitrant experience' really is. Does it mean there are contradictions between one belief and another? If so, then it appears the law of non-contradiction has some priority and is immune from alteration. The authors use the same talk of data causing assent to Belief A, and they previously would have assented Belief ~A, which is impossible to do. No real talk of contradictions, just of beliefs that cannot be taken together because they are impossible. (pg 285-286)

The second portion of the paper involves using only a descriptive picture of the realm of science and the realm of ordinary every-day beliefs in discovering the status of the law of non-contradiction and explosion. Authors look at two 'chunks' of belief: everyday beliefs, and scientific theories. In both cases, authors argue that the law of non-contradiction applies in some areas and not in others, and that (in the case of everyday beliefs) humans have a 'knack' for intuiting where to apply it and where not to, and that (in the case of science) often we are willing to accept contradictions as long as we get the predictions right (pg 286-292). The case for explosion (ex falso quodlibet) is even worse. There is no widespread acceptance of this in everyday usage or even in science.

The last part of the paper discusses that we are left with. The only hope of establishing a robust notion of the law of non-contradiction is to assert it's epistemic usefulness. Certainly it fits into a logical system (classical logic) that is disciplined, consistent and orderly. But so is a paraconsistent system! This does not save the law of non-contradiction. (pg 292-293) Lastly, we might hope that the Minimum Mutilation Thesis preserves the truths of logic. Unfortunately, this seems consistent with paraconsistent/dialetheists as well.

Blankenhorn, David - Ch 6 Deinstitutionalize Marriage?

07/06/2007

The Future of Marriage, Encounter Books, 2007

In this chapter author discusses what it means to deinstitutionalize marriage, and why he thinks SSM is going to do that. Author starts by discussing the claims of Jonathan Rauch, who thinks that SSM will actually strengthen marriage. Author criticizes this 'dream' as using a purile definition or conception of marriage, one that is essentially private. Author then moves on to citing various leftist activists who are generally against traditional marriage but very much in favor of SSM.

After reciting a bunch of leftist writers who want to transform marriage and favor SSM for that very reason, author presents his main claim about the leftist thinkers; there are those who:
1) think marriage is a good thing and gays deserve to be brought in
2) think marriage is a bad thing and why not bring gays into it
3) think marriage is a bad thing and SSM will help to transform it

Author claims that we need to get clear about the fundamentals of marriage-- what it is for, what it is essentially about-- so that we can get clear on it's public meanings. The real fight here is about the public meaning of marriage, because that is what the 'institution' of marriage really is-- what public meanings it has. Author claims that the arguments often used to support SSM talk about what marriage is fundamentally about, and these miss the point. (#1-5 on pg 139-140). Author claims that the definitions/conceptions of marriage used in these pro-SSM arguments are mainly about supporting 'close personal relationships', not marriage-- and there is a big difference between the two things.

Next are five claims that 'disconnect' the traditionalist view of marriage from what marriage is now. (#6-10 on pg 139-140) Author likens these to 'turning off the lights until it is dark enough to suit us' (pg 150), referring to taking out of the conception of marriage the following: monogamous sex, bridging the male-female divide, raising biological children with a mother and father, and having a 'natural parent'.

Lastly, author wants to reply to various leftist objections to marriage a religious institution: marriage came about before religion in any modern sense of the word. Also, author points out that some claim that marriage as an institution has become weaker, making it a reason to allow SSM. Author sees this as totally backward-- that if it is only a weakened institution of marriage that will accept SSM, we should strengthen marriage and then, of course, this would exclude SSM. Many of author's conclusion end with a dilemma-- choose SSM and the various ideas that support and go along with it, or go with the other choice, a pro-marriage as a robust institution, anti-SSM package. "We must choose".