Kim, Jaegwon - Physicalism, or Something Near Enough

09/28/2007

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Ch 6 Princeton University Press, 2005

This book chapter isn't too different from the other recent papers by author. The major claim is that physicalism is mostly true, being able to account for everything but the non-functional aspects of qualia. Author uses the term 'ontological physicalism' as the view that material things in space-time are all there is. The first part of the chapter argues for accepting this view.

Why accept ontological physicalism?
Causal Closure:
The first point was that causation [at least how we understand it] requires a 'space-like structure' with objects that are identified within that space. Causation takes place in the physical realm-- we can't figure out how it could be otherwise. So if we are to have mental causation at all (that is things in the mind causing things in the world), then we need to believe that those things in the mind are physical. An objection to this comes from our desire to make us special, or to claim that mental properties 'emerge' from physical ones. All of this has failed, author claims (pg 152).

Causal Exclusion:
The second argument author uses is in reply to a dualist claiming that structuring causation as only physical is question-begging. So author instead gives us an explanation of what causes a finger to twitch while in pain, using only physical processes. Only now we also have mental properties-- both of which should cause the finger to twitch? This sounds like overdetermination with two distinct causes! Author claims that property dualists haven't been able to resolve this problem.

One alternative to ontological physicalism might be Davidson's anomalous monism or Putnam-Fodor and their functionalism, non-reductive materialism and emergentism. The only upshot to these claims is that: either the mental can't be causal or the mental is irrelevant. Since we want to save the causal efficacy of the mental, we need to reduce it to the physical. This is an if-then:

If the mental has causal efficacy, then it needs to reduce to the physical.

Reductionism: author lays out what he considers the principles of reduction. Reduction takes place when previously named 'concepts' or functional place-holders that describe causal entities/properties are shown to have mechanisms that underlie their functions/causal powers. Of course this allows for multiple realizations-- author denies this is a problem for physicalism (pg 164).
Reduction is a three step process: (pg 164)
1) Identify/name a concept that has a function or plays a causal role
2) Begin the scientific work to find the 'realizers' of this functional property
3) Develop an explanation of how the lower-level mechanisms perform the specified causal work

Author then claims that once we have discovered step 1, we can assume that the concept/property is reducible (pg 164). Now, what parts of the mind are reducible, and what parts aren't? Psychological states like beliefs, desires, thoughts, etc. are. Qualia aren't, at least to the extent of their qualitative character. That we can tell the difference between pink and light red is a discriminatory capacity that can be reduced, but the "look of red" is just mental residue. Author's suggestion: live with the residue and we have mostly, ontological physicalism with mental residue. Note: during this paper it seems author is skeptical that total zombies could exist (pg 169).