8/2/07

Montero, Barbara - Physicalism Could Be True Even If Mary Learns Something New

08/03/2007

The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 57 No 227 April 2007

In this paper the thesis is that Mary would lack the concept of 'what it is like to see red', even if she knew what happened on the lower-level physical level, and could deduce what would happen on the higher-level physical level. Author dubs this the 'missing-concept' reply to the knowledge argument.

Author starts by discussing a 'less than ideal' knowledge argument that is open to flaws. She uses this as a starting point for some of her claims as replies. The less than ideal argument starts with 'Mary knows all the facts of physics, chemistry and neurophysiology...'. This is open to problems because there may be other physical facts that aren't included in these fields. There could be 'higher-level' physical facts (those that constitute/determine the experience of red) that aren't, strictly speaking, included in physics, chemistry or neuropsych. This is consistent with what author calls the 'non-reductive' physicalist position, with a conception of the 'broadly physical'. The 'broadly physical' is that mental facts are physical facts, whatever those facts may be (pg 179).

This leads to a discussion of what it is to be physical at all. Author begins with saying that as long as a property is either fundamental and physical or determined by fundamental physical properties, it is broadly physical. Much talk in the sciences involves talk of deducing higher-level physical facts from lower-level ones. There should be no reason why, in principle, this can't be done. This is the case, author points out, only if all fundamental physical facts are taken to be 'structural/relational' facts. If we construe the physical as the 'non-mental', then we won't have this necessary connection. (pg 181-2) [Doesn't this beg the question?] Only on a certain understanding of the physical as being ultimately accessible to physics using structure, position, charge, etc. can higher-level properties be deducible from lower-level physical ones.

The fixed Mary argument takes Mary to know all the fundamental lower-level physical facts and have perfect reasoning and deduction skills. Author abandons the previous argument she uses (above) and agrees that all higher-level facts are deducible from lower-level ones. Presumably, this can be done a priori. However, can it be done without the relevant concepts? One might think that this is what a priori just means. However, author claims that a priori means that the truth of the conclusion is justified from the truth of the premises without reference to empirical studies. This doesn't mean the conclusion can be reached by simply looking at the premises-- sometimes you'd need the relevant concepts to employ. (pg 183-87) Presumably, Mary could infer "Ahh, seeing red would look like this", except that she wouldn't understand that 'this' refers to, since she lacked the relevant concept of 'the experience of seeing red'.

The last bit of the paper tries to show that author's reply to the Mary argument is different from the 'old fact, new presentation' reply. The 'old fact, new presentation' argument uses identity between (brain-state B) and (seeing red). The 'non-reductive physicalist', however need not hold this identity-- in the sense that the two propositions have the same truth-value. (pg 188) [WHAT?!?]

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