Aizawa, Kenneth - Understanding the Embodiment of Perception

10/19/2007

Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 1 January 2007

This is an essay regarding the different views of the embodiment of perception, which author beings by acknowledging is obviously embodied. There are two contending views, the COH and the CAH. The COH is opposed by author, which is the view that

COH: Perceptual experience is constituted in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills

This contrasts with

CAH: Perceptual experience is caused in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills

Author claims this is an important discussion because the COH gives grist for the extended mind hypothesis, while the CAH does not particularly do so. The main target in this paper is a book by Noe Action in Perception. Noe calls the COH the enactive approach. 'Perception is not a process in the brain but a kind of skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole' (pg 9). Author first makes some preliminary comments:
1) Perceptual experience is not the same as mere peripheral stimulation of sense organs-- something more than sensation. (pg 9-10)
2) This debate is an empirical one, or settled by interpretations of empirical evidence-- e.g. not a priori or analytic. Thus, we need a definition or analysis of perception that leaves it open whether COH or CAH is right.
3) Sensorimotor skills are practical knowledge, not just (or maybe not at all) theoretical knowledge. This is complicated by Noe's apparent belief that sensorimotor skills also involve a level of theoretical knowledge.

Author reviews various empirical cases where COH (or CAH) is supposed to be supported: cases of removing congenital cataracts, cases of wearing distorting lenses, cases of images that fade from sight upon fixation. In each case, author gives alternatives to the COH analysis and supposes that COH fails to be established.

In the first case (of removing congenital cataracts), Noe claims that these are cases of 'experiential blindness', meaning that they cannot integrate sensations with patterns of movement and thought. Author claims 'it appears to be possible that some humans might perceive things, only without these perceptions being integrated into patterns of personal movement and thought.' (pg 15) Further, even if it were correct that these patients have 'experiential blindness', this would still fail to establish COH, since CAH can offer the alternative explanation that these patients' sensorimotor skills aren't yet connected (causally) to their sensory apparatus in the proper way. (pg 16)

The second example involves wearing distorting lenses and possible being 'experientially blind' in some manner or other. Author instead claims that since the subject is able to recognize these distorted objects, the subject really is perceiving. (pg 17) Further, all distorting lenses will really prove is a weaker version of COH, namely that the ability to exercises one kind of sensorimotor skill constitutes one kind of perception. Author claims this is weaker and doesn't establish COH. (pg 18)

Author also offers empirical evidence against COH, in the case of paralysis. Here is seems there is no exercise of sensorimotor skills, yet preception takes place. (pg 20-23)