06/26/2009
The Case For Modern Man, Harper & Brothers 1956, Ch 6
This is a review of Niebuhr's main philosophies regarding the human condition. The discussion takes the form of a detailed exposition of Niebuhr's philosophy, and then a longer refutation of it. Niebuhr's main points are as follows:
-Humanity is trapped between ideal infinity and its finite nature, creating the defining emotion of anxiety.
-Anxiety in relation to unattainable perfection tends toward considering human finite nature to be the only worthy attainment, e.g. sin.
-The concept of original sin in the human condition plays a powerful explanatory role in human history. The concept works in this manner: because humanity does not recognize its finite nature it continually oversteps what it is capable of, ending in great disappointments (pg90).
-Liberalism attempts to deny that humanity has original sin and is therefore misguided and prone to failure.
-Original sin isn't a psychological phenomenon; it is somehow more: some sort of metaphysical condition on humanity that is insoluble (pg93-5). The insolubility comes from a fundamental 'paradox of human freedom', that humanity is free to choose yet bounded by causal necessity.
Author claims that this paradox is actually a logical mistake: there is no contradiction between being subject to the laws of nature and having freedom. Being predictable (subject to causal laws) doesn't entail lacking freedom (being able to choose based on your judgment). (pg96-98) Further, author claims that adding 'original sin' to human history does little to offer a better explanation, since sin is (1) ever present and (2) is a side-effect of the finite nature of humanity, though it has yet to be seen how finite humanity is. (pg100)
The next discussion relates to Niebuhr's indictment of liberalism's hope for man's progress. Yet Niebuhr makes a straw man out of liberalism; modern liberals were intimately familiar with humanity's self-interested motives and egoism. Author takes an extended look at the writings of Condorcet, whose writings, when translated into English, had the targeted term "the indefinite perfectibility of man'. (pg101-106) Condorcet was talking about how there are definite limits on how knowledge and social structures can improve mankind, but we aren't in a position to know what those limits are (until we reach them?). Really, it was a belief in the indefinite improvability of man'.
More importantly, author argues that the shift from 'man's sinfulness' to 'the goodness of man' wasn't a fundamental contradiction but instead a shift in focus. It wasn't an attempt to claim that the human condition was essentially good, but instead an attempt to redefine the focus of debate from soul/redemption-talk to social/societal-talk. (pg107-8) What the 'goodness of man' stance tries to get right is the primacy of social structures, government and knowledge in human flourishing, as opposed to the primacy of personal salvation in humanity's redemption.
The last discussion is an analysis of the context of Niebuhr's writings: they come at a time where 'everything seems to have contrived to make ... heightened moral impulses appear irrelevant' (pg112) and modern society experiences increasing alienation. Niebuhr's writings then make this experience a deep-seated, widespread metaphysical one, yet author argues that it explains little other than what we already know-- that humanity involves a struggle of ideals in a finite world. (pg113-5)
6/19/09
Neibuhr, Reinhold - The American Future
06/19/2009
The Irony of American History, Ch 7 University of Chicago Press, 2008
This chapter (written in 1951) discusses the prospects of the US in relation to itself and other nations. 1. Author first points out that the US was isolationist for a long time until WWII, where the US realized that technology had connected the world enough so that it couldn't 'be secure in an insecure world' (pg131). So in rising to the occasion and admitting to its abilities to lead and exercise its power, the US also employs its idealism, which author considers too 'oblivious' and needs to come 'to terms with the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historic configurations of power...' etc. (pg133)
2. The US's idealism is bolstered by what author sees as two factors, the first being that the US's power is very high on the world stage. While there are some advantages to concentrations of power in uniting states, the negative side is the resentment it can breed, as well as the temptation of the powerful side to abuse its power (pg135). Tempering power 'into the service of justice' has come in three ways: (a) redistribute power, (b) bring power 'under social and moral review', or (c) use religion to keep it in check. (pg135) Author argues that (a) is not relevant in the international community; it's just a fact of history. Option (b) is happening in the form of the United Nations, which author believes is salubrious, especially because 'it is impossible for any nation or individual fully to understand the peculiar circumstances and the unique history of any other nation or individual, which create their special view of reality.' (pg137) In this section author predicts that once the US realizes it must spend enormous efforts to upgrade its war preparedness with new technology, it may come to the UN more willing to work out a solution to the communist conflict. Strategy (c) involves humility and recognizing the 'other' is worthy of respect. (pg139)
3. The second factor that supposedly reinforces the US's idealism is that there seems to be no easy solution to the struggle against the communists. (pg140) This frustrates the US's liberal idealism that holds that a superior way of life should triumph without needing to compromise. What this misses is that 'human communities are never purely artifacts of the human mind and will' (pg142) and humans are creatures of history (pg141)-- meaning that it is sometimes difficult, sometimes impossible to wholly do away with undesirable powers and forces. (pg143) The argument seems to be that because of the US's idealism, it misinterprets this hard lesson as stubbornness or ignorance. (pg143)
4.-5. Author compares individual heroism with national heroism, pointing out the most dramatic difference is that individual heroism can be willingly self-sacrificing and pursue an end without much probability of achieving it, while a nation cannot reasonably do so-- there must be some decent probability of success. Author also states that a democracy could never engage in an 'explicit preventive war' (pg146). In the following section author discusses the tensions in the US and rejects one of the solutions offered: Kennan argues that the US too eagerly extends its moralistic constitutional scheme to other nations, intending to remake them in its own image. This brings out another source of US idealism: that its 'technocratic' mastery of physical nature encourages the same approach toward human nature. (pg147-8) Author rejects Kennan's solution, namely that the US should become solely self-interested. What is needed is true humility regarding the US's abilities and charity regarding other nations.
The selected introduction to Neibuhr's "Moral Man and Immoral Society" involved a polemic against social scientists, modern educators and moralists who seek to better society by doing social science. Author's principal arguments are as follows:
-humans have parts that belong to the 'order of nature' (pgxii) that cannot ever be fully controlled by reason and conscience
-Social change, unlike changes in knowledge (science), involves conflict between the haves and have-nots; therefore the exercise of power is vitally important to changing social situations. This makes the retardation of social sciences compared to the advancement of the natural sciences not a product of 'ignorance' (pgxiv-xv) but of social-structure maintenance.
-Those educators (author uses Dewey as a target) seem to miss the class-struggle aspect of social change and are fraught with 'middle-class prejudices'(pgxiii-xiv)
The Irony of American History, Ch 7 University of Chicago Press, 2008
This chapter (written in 1951) discusses the prospects of the US in relation to itself and other nations. 1. Author first points out that the US was isolationist for a long time until WWII, where the US realized that technology had connected the world enough so that it couldn't 'be secure in an insecure world' (pg131). So in rising to the occasion and admitting to its abilities to lead and exercise its power, the US also employs its idealism, which author considers too 'oblivious' and needs to come 'to terms with the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historic configurations of power...' etc. (pg133)
2. The US's idealism is bolstered by what author sees as two factors, the first being that the US's power is very high on the world stage. While there are some advantages to concentrations of power in uniting states, the negative side is the resentment it can breed, as well as the temptation of the powerful side to abuse its power (pg135). Tempering power 'into the service of justice' has come in three ways: (a) redistribute power, (b) bring power 'under social and moral review', or (c) use religion to keep it in check. (pg135) Author argues that (a) is not relevant in the international community; it's just a fact of history. Option (b) is happening in the form of the United Nations, which author believes is salubrious, especially because 'it is impossible for any nation or individual fully to understand the peculiar circumstances and the unique history of any other nation or individual, which create their special view of reality.' (pg137) In this section author predicts that once the US realizes it must spend enormous efforts to upgrade its war preparedness with new technology, it may come to the UN more willing to work out a solution to the communist conflict. Strategy (c) involves humility and recognizing the 'other' is worthy of respect. (pg139)
3. The second factor that supposedly reinforces the US's idealism is that there seems to be no easy solution to the struggle against the communists. (pg140) This frustrates the US's liberal idealism that holds that a superior way of life should triumph without needing to compromise. What this misses is that 'human communities are never purely artifacts of the human mind and will' (pg142) and humans are creatures of history (pg141)-- meaning that it is sometimes difficult, sometimes impossible to wholly do away with undesirable powers and forces. (pg143) The argument seems to be that because of the US's idealism, it misinterprets this hard lesson as stubbornness or ignorance. (pg143)
4.-5. Author compares individual heroism with national heroism, pointing out the most dramatic difference is that individual heroism can be willingly self-sacrificing and pursue an end without much probability of achieving it, while a nation cannot reasonably do so-- there must be some decent probability of success. Author also states that a democracy could never engage in an 'explicit preventive war' (pg146). In the following section author discusses the tensions in the US and rejects one of the solutions offered: Kennan argues that the US too eagerly extends its moralistic constitutional scheme to other nations, intending to remake them in its own image. This brings out another source of US idealism: that its 'technocratic' mastery of physical nature encourages the same approach toward human nature. (pg147-8) Author rejects Kennan's solution, namely that the US should become solely self-interested. What is needed is true humility regarding the US's abilities and charity regarding other nations.
The selected introduction to Neibuhr's "Moral Man and Immoral Society" involved a polemic against social scientists, modern educators and moralists who seek to better society by doing social science. Author's principal arguments are as follows:
-humans have parts that belong to the 'order of nature' (pgxii) that cannot ever be fully controlled by reason and conscience
-Social change, unlike changes in knowledge (science), involves conflict between the haves and have-nots; therefore the exercise of power is vitally important to changing social situations. This makes the retardation of social sciences compared to the advancement of the natural sciences not a product of 'ignorance' (pgxiv-xv) but of social-structure maintenance.
-Those educators (author uses Dewey as a target) seem to miss the class-struggle aspect of social change and are fraught with 'middle-class prejudices'(pgxiii-xiv)
6/12/09
Rorty, Richard - Religious faith, intellectual responsibility, and romance
06/12/2009
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 5, RA Putnam ed, 1997
This article is an overview of James' commitments to utilitarianism and pragmatism and how it provided the basis for James' view of religion. Author also suggests an alternate strategy of argumentation that he believes might have been more effective, using the same basic commitments. According to author, there are two major aspects of James' philosophy that provides space for the Will to Believe: (1) is that Mill's version of utilitarianism features the Harm principle, which is the principle that if a subject s does action x and x is not hurting anybody else, only s is the judge on whether to do x; and (2) that scientific pragmatism holds that intellectual responsibility is primarily to other people in a joint project of creating a workable description of the world. If you sufficiently privatize religion to isolate it from such a joint project, there is some room for it regardless of the scientific justification or evidence. (pg85)
Author reviews Clifford's main claims about evidence and justification, suggesting that there are two minimal ways to take Clifford: (1) that the meaning of a belief is what inferences it creates to other beliefs-- a kind of holism-- making any one belief inseparable from the social project; (or even more generally) (2) that to be rational is to submit belief to scrutiny, to intersubjective confirmation-- a belief that is not open for testing is not really a belief. (pg87-8) Clifford argues that without evidence then it is one's responsibility not to hold a belief, yet James 'resists', and creates a kind of forced, momentous and live choice as a result. (pg88) Author finds this unsatisfying (pg90) and suggests that James take another approach: instead of agreeing on a firm distinction between (public) beliefs and (private) desires/hopes, to cash out cognitive states in terms of actional consequences, using utilitarianism to talk about intellectual obligations to others, and areas where there are no such obligations. (pg89) Thus if religion is private action, then it can be pursued without obligation to others. While privatizing religion might make accepting religion not, strictly speaking, a belief, author argues it should make little difference to James. (pg90-1)
Privatization of religion is unsatifying to many (e.g. MacIntyre), since it seems to remove most actional elements (ex hypothesis) and talks vaguely about "the eternal". Author tries to distinguish pragmatists from instrumentalists: pragmatists are realists about theoretic entities but also believe that justification for any entity takes place within a human-interest context. Such a position allows for the justification of macro-objects like tables, micro entities like atoms, and perhaps even social institutions. (pg92) Author tries to show that pure scientific realists and religious fundamentalists 'are products of the same urge.... private projects which have gotten out of hand.' (pg93)
James' focus of the religious hypothesis 'perfection is eternal' can be unsatisfying since it removes much of the specific actional elements of a creed. Author tries to compare the private religious pursuit to that of love of another human. (pg94) Loving another certainly has actional consequences, but not because you are trying to 'predict or control' them or their behavior. (pg94) (Further, we commonly do not ask for justification for such love.) This sort of life-area carve-out threatens the theory that we can reduce all intentional states into belief-desire pairs with definite inferences and actional consequences. Without this reduction, pragmatism might be unable to support its claim of the inextricable nature of desire and beliefs, making it difficult to substitute intersubjective justification for so-called objective verification. (pg95) Luckily there is an externalist interpretation of the behavior of someone in love (or religious) that imputes beliefs and desires onto them based on their actions, though the beliefs might be unjustifiable intellectually. Author states that even though such belief-desire imputations might not fit into a scheme of justification that other beliefs of the subject would, they are still explanatory.
Author lastly discusses what he believes should have been the religious focus for James-- not in something external to human life (eternal things), but in the 'future possibilities of mortal humans', a faith that looks a lot like hope, love, or Romantic commitments. (pg96-7) Author tells a story about how we used to look to external forces for something better but now we should be looking only to our own human future. (pg97)
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 5, RA Putnam ed, 1997
This article is an overview of James' commitments to utilitarianism and pragmatism and how it provided the basis for James' view of religion. Author also suggests an alternate strategy of argumentation that he believes might have been more effective, using the same basic commitments. According to author, there are two major aspects of James' philosophy that provides space for the Will to Believe: (1) is that Mill's version of utilitarianism features the Harm principle, which is the principle that if a subject s does action x and x is not hurting anybody else, only s is the judge on whether to do x; and (2) that scientific pragmatism holds that intellectual responsibility is primarily to other people in a joint project of creating a workable description of the world. If you sufficiently privatize religion to isolate it from such a joint project, there is some room for it regardless of the scientific justification or evidence. (pg85)
Author reviews Clifford's main claims about evidence and justification, suggesting that there are two minimal ways to take Clifford: (1) that the meaning of a belief is what inferences it creates to other beliefs-- a kind of holism-- making any one belief inseparable from the social project; (or even more generally) (2) that to be rational is to submit belief to scrutiny, to intersubjective confirmation-- a belief that is not open for testing is not really a belief. (pg87-8) Clifford argues that without evidence then it is one's responsibility not to hold a belief, yet James 'resists', and creates a kind of forced, momentous and live choice as a result. (pg88) Author finds this unsatisfying (pg90) and suggests that James take another approach: instead of agreeing on a firm distinction between (public) beliefs and (private) desires/hopes, to cash out cognitive states in terms of actional consequences, using utilitarianism to talk about intellectual obligations to others, and areas where there are no such obligations. (pg89) Thus if religion is private action, then it can be pursued without obligation to others. While privatizing religion might make accepting religion not, strictly speaking, a belief, author argues it should make little difference to James. (pg90-1)
Privatization of religion is unsatifying to many (e.g. MacIntyre), since it seems to remove most actional elements (ex hypothesis) and talks vaguely about "the eternal". Author tries to distinguish pragmatists from instrumentalists: pragmatists are realists about theoretic entities but also believe that justification for any entity takes place within a human-interest context. Such a position allows for the justification of macro-objects like tables, micro entities like atoms, and perhaps even social institutions. (pg92) Author tries to show that pure scientific realists and religious fundamentalists 'are products of the same urge.... private projects which have gotten out of hand.' (pg93)
James' focus of the religious hypothesis 'perfection is eternal' can be unsatisfying since it removes much of the specific actional elements of a creed. Author tries to compare the private religious pursuit to that of love of another human. (pg94) Loving another certainly has actional consequences, but not because you are trying to 'predict or control' them or their behavior. (pg94) (Further, we commonly do not ask for justification for such love.) This sort of life-area carve-out threatens the theory that we can reduce all intentional states into belief-desire pairs with definite inferences and actional consequences. Without this reduction, pragmatism might be unable to support its claim of the inextricable nature of desire and beliefs, making it difficult to substitute intersubjective justification for so-called objective verification. (pg95) Luckily there is an externalist interpretation of the behavior of someone in love (or religious) that imputes beliefs and desires onto them based on their actions, though the beliefs might be unjustifiable intellectually. Author states that even though such belief-desire imputations might not fit into a scheme of justification that other beliefs of the subject would, they are still explanatory.
Author lastly discusses what he believes should have been the religious focus for James-- not in something external to human life (eternal things), but in the 'future possibilities of mortal humans', a faith that looks a lot like hope, love, or Romantic commitments. (pg96-7) Author tells a story about how we used to look to external forces for something better but now we should be looking only to our own human future. (pg97)
6/5/09
Clifford, William - The Ethics of Belief
06/05/2009
Lectures and Essays, 2nd edition, Macmillan & Co 1886
This paper inveighs against belief with insufficient evidence, calling it wrong in the moral/ethical sense, not just the epistemological. Author starts with a lengthy example of a shipowner who has some reason to believe his ship isn't seaworthy but nevertheless convinces himself to let her sail; on the seas she does down and the passengers die. Author takes a deonotological view of the morals of belief, arguing that it is morally wrong to believe on insufficient evidence no matter what the consequences were (pg340). After presenting another example relating to public defamation, author also argues that it is morally wrong to believe even a true proposition on insufficient evidence. (pg341)
Author entertains an objection: that what is morally wrong is the action taken that was based on the (epistemically) wrong belief, not the wrong belief itself. While author agrees that there are additional obligations that extend to action, he also argues that 'it is not possible to sever the belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning the other'.(pg342) Here the argument is that if you already believe that p is true, you're not going to do a thorough investigation of whether you should act as though p is false. Furthermore, author claims that if p really is to count as a belief and not just some fantasy, it takes some role, somewhere or other, in action. (pg342) Finally, author argues that 'no one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone', arguing that our common culture on which we all depend (and have all inherited) is strengthened by the successes of our ancestors-- an 'heirloom' into which everything we've said and done will be woven and passed down to succeeding generations-- thus an obligation to pass on only evidentially supported beliefs. (pg342-3)
Author discusses how withholding belief in cases where there isn't enough evidence can be unsettling (pg344), but the alternative of giving belief without the evidence is far worse for your own moral character ('weaken our powers of self-control') and for the society at large. Society at large is threatened by a credulous character in the same way as it is by thievery. To steal is wrong enough, but the real problem is that society can become a 'den of thieves'; in the same way being credulous is bad enough, but if it is a permanent character trait among the people, society might 'sink back into savagery'. (pg345)
II. The next matter author takes up is how to go about believing something for which you have no personal experience-- how to rely on authority. (Author also mentions in passing that it is permissible to act upon probability if there is not enough evidence to fully justify belief and action must be taken. pg347) In the case of accepting the word of another, we must be concerned with her truthfulness and her knowledge. (pg348-350) Author seems to put forth some version of a verification principle; if the evidence for a belief isn't capable of being retrieved by humans, then you should not believe it. (pg353-4)
Author uses the case of Mohammed, who spoke honestly but author doubts his ability to know-- his divine knowledge. Even though his precepts are adopted by thousands and they live happily only shows, according to author, that the belief system is 'comfortable' and 'pleasant to the soul', not that it is true. What may be confirmed instead is that the prophet had 'knowledge of human nature', not that he had divine inspiration or celestial knowledge. (pg351) Author supposes that there is a 'celestial visitor' who makes prophesies, some of which are verified. This still would give no grounds for believing those prophesies yet untested (or currently untestable). (pg350) Author also attacks beliefs passed down through traditions, and takes as an example the modern liberal belief that it is good to give to beggars. Instead, it is good to give them work, not to encourage idleness. (pg356)
III.Further along the lines of what to believe and when, author discusses the limits of inference. Author first points out that whenever we direct our thinking toward the future (or toward actions), we go beyond our experience and infer the continuity and uniformity of nature-- that the past is similar to the future. (pg360) Author argues that in cases where we are required to infer things about, e.g. the sun, based on our observations on the earth, all we need to use is the assumption of the uniformity of nature. (pg361)
Lectures and Essays, 2nd edition, Macmillan & Co 1886
This paper inveighs against belief with insufficient evidence, calling it wrong in the moral/ethical sense, not just the epistemological. Author starts with a lengthy example of a shipowner who has some reason to believe his ship isn't seaworthy but nevertheless convinces himself to let her sail; on the seas she does down and the passengers die. Author takes a deonotological view of the morals of belief, arguing that it is morally wrong to believe on insufficient evidence no matter what the consequences were (pg340). After presenting another example relating to public defamation, author also argues that it is morally wrong to believe even a true proposition on insufficient evidence. (pg341)
Author entertains an objection: that what is morally wrong is the action taken that was based on the (epistemically) wrong belief, not the wrong belief itself. While author agrees that there are additional obligations that extend to action, he also argues that 'it is not possible to sever the belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning the other'.(pg342) Here the argument is that if you already believe that p is true, you're not going to do a thorough investigation of whether you should act as though p is false. Furthermore, author claims that if p really is to count as a belief and not just some fantasy, it takes some role, somewhere or other, in action. (pg342) Finally, author argues that 'no one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone', arguing that our common culture on which we all depend (and have all inherited) is strengthened by the successes of our ancestors-- an 'heirloom' into which everything we've said and done will be woven and passed down to succeeding generations-- thus an obligation to pass on only evidentially supported beliefs. (pg342-3)
Author discusses how withholding belief in cases where there isn't enough evidence can be unsettling (pg344), but the alternative of giving belief without the evidence is far worse for your own moral character ('weaken our powers of self-control') and for the society at large. Society at large is threatened by a credulous character in the same way as it is by thievery. To steal is wrong enough, but the real problem is that society can become a 'den of thieves'; in the same way being credulous is bad enough, but if it is a permanent character trait among the people, society might 'sink back into savagery'. (pg345)
II. The next matter author takes up is how to go about believing something for which you have no personal experience-- how to rely on authority. (Author also mentions in passing that it is permissible to act upon probability if there is not enough evidence to fully justify belief and action must be taken. pg347) In the case of accepting the word of another, we must be concerned with her truthfulness and her knowledge. (pg348-350) Author seems to put forth some version of a verification principle; if the evidence for a belief isn't capable of being retrieved by humans, then you should not believe it. (pg353-4)
Author uses the case of Mohammed, who spoke honestly but author doubts his ability to know-- his divine knowledge. Even though his precepts are adopted by thousands and they live happily only shows, according to author, that the belief system is 'comfortable' and 'pleasant to the soul', not that it is true. What may be confirmed instead is that the prophet had 'knowledge of human nature', not that he had divine inspiration or celestial knowledge. (pg351) Author supposes that there is a 'celestial visitor' who makes prophesies, some of which are verified. This still would give no grounds for believing those prophesies yet untested (or currently untestable). (pg350) Author also attacks beliefs passed down through traditions, and takes as an example the modern liberal belief that it is good to give to beggars. Instead, it is good to give them work, not to encourage idleness. (pg356)
III.Further along the lines of what to believe and when, author discusses the limits of inference. Author first points out that whenever we direct our thinking toward the future (or toward actions), we go beyond our experience and infer the continuity and uniformity of nature-- that the past is similar to the future. (pg360) Author argues that in cases where we are required to infer things about, e.g. the sun, based on our observations on the earth, all we need to use is the assumption of the uniformity of nature. (pg361)
5/29/09
Hollinger, David - James, Clifford, and the scientific conscience
05/29/2009
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 4, RA Putnam ed, 1997
Though mostly an overview, this paper argues that the WK Clifford quoted in James' Will to Believe was largely misrepresented by James, in particular regarding the willingness of someone who guides her beliefs only with sufficient evidence to act without enough of it. James seems to cast Clifford as staunchly opposed to it, when author claims instead that Clifford was more reasoned and sophisticated. Clifford wrote The Ethics of Belief, which (according to author) took as the root concern the 'structure of plausibility' (pg70)-- meaning what those with intellectual (scientific) mindsets would consider acceptable additions to their worldview prior to receiving the evidence.
Most of the paper explores the arguments given by Clifford and James and gives their context. James suggests in Will to Believe that in the two scientific passions-- the desire to find truth and avoid error-- the desire to avoid error will paralyze you in times where action is required (forced choice) but there isn't sufficient evidence to fix a belief. James quotes Clifford as an example of the passion to avoid error: a reasonable conclusion is that Clifford would advocate withholding action. But Clifford understood this problem well and suggested instead that we act on probabilities in such cases. (pg71) Other misrepresentations occurred with James' discussion of the uniformity of nature. (pg72-3) Author grants that in some respects the impression James left was fair: Clifford was more hostile to religion and more positive about the previous advancements of scientific knowledge than James was (pg73, 75).
The Jamesian program was to give an essentially personal defense of a theistic religious commitment, though particular pillars of such a belief were largely unexplored (pg74-5). The break with Clifford was that Clifford put religious belief in the same sphere as all other beliefs-- there wasn't a special realm for religious ones. One of Clifford's main tenets was that beliefs had actional and therefore (probably) social consequences, making it a general moral concern that you avoid errors in your beliefs. Clifford used an example of a ship-owner who uncritically believed (falsely) that his ship was sea-worthy, sent it out and it sunk, killing the passengers. (pg76) While James did also emphasize the behavioristic consequences of belief, he leaves religious belief personal and isolated, and does not discuss what actional results it would take; author calls this 'obscurantist'. (pg77) James made a distinction between questions that could be settled 'on intellectual grounds' and those that 'by nature' could not; this was a distinction that allowed for the freedom of belief, and one Clifford did not abide. (pg79) Author takes this divide to be at odds with Peirce, and eventually the later James in his work Pragmatism.
This paper also gives attention to the context and concerns of the writers. Clifford wrote in England and perceived a milieu of wary skepticism about the abilities and worth of science, while James wrote in America and echoed a concern that science was intimidating the laymen.(pg78, 80-1)
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 4, RA Putnam ed, 1997
Though mostly an overview, this paper argues that the WK Clifford quoted in James' Will to Believe was largely misrepresented by James, in particular regarding the willingness of someone who guides her beliefs only with sufficient evidence to act without enough of it. James seems to cast Clifford as staunchly opposed to it, when author claims instead that Clifford was more reasoned and sophisticated. Clifford wrote The Ethics of Belief, which (according to author) took as the root concern the 'structure of plausibility' (pg70)-- meaning what those with intellectual (scientific) mindsets would consider acceptable additions to their worldview prior to receiving the evidence.
Most of the paper explores the arguments given by Clifford and James and gives their context. James suggests in Will to Believe that in the two scientific passions-- the desire to find truth and avoid error-- the desire to avoid error will paralyze you in times where action is required (forced choice) but there isn't sufficient evidence to fix a belief. James quotes Clifford as an example of the passion to avoid error: a reasonable conclusion is that Clifford would advocate withholding action. But Clifford understood this problem well and suggested instead that we act on probabilities in such cases. (pg71) Other misrepresentations occurred with James' discussion of the uniformity of nature. (pg72-3) Author grants that in some respects the impression James left was fair: Clifford was more hostile to religion and more positive about the previous advancements of scientific knowledge than James was (pg73, 75).
The Jamesian program was to give an essentially personal defense of a theistic religious commitment, though particular pillars of such a belief were largely unexplored (pg74-5). The break with Clifford was that Clifford put religious belief in the same sphere as all other beliefs-- there wasn't a special realm for religious ones. One of Clifford's main tenets was that beliefs had actional and therefore (probably) social consequences, making it a general moral concern that you avoid errors in your beliefs. Clifford used an example of a ship-owner who uncritically believed (falsely) that his ship was sea-worthy, sent it out and it sunk, killing the passengers. (pg76) While James did also emphasize the behavioristic consequences of belief, he leaves religious belief personal and isolated, and does not discuss what actional results it would take; author calls this 'obscurantist'. (pg77) James made a distinction between questions that could be settled 'on intellectual grounds' and those that 'by nature' could not; this was a distinction that allowed for the freedom of belief, and one Clifford did not abide. (pg79) Author takes this divide to be at odds with Peirce, and eventually the later James in his work Pragmatism.
This paper also gives attention to the context and concerns of the writers. Clifford wrote in England and perceived a milieu of wary skepticism about the abilities and worth of science, while James wrote in America and echoed a concern that science was intimidating the laymen.(pg78, 80-1)
5/22/09
James, William - The Will To Believe
05/22/2009
Essays In Popular Philosophy, Ch 1 Longmans Green & Co 1911
This well-known paper is about the permissibility of belief in religion, probably considered now to be a stand-in for belief in the divine. The main argument is that when you are forced to make a momentous choice where there is some credibility for either option, making either choice is beyond rebuke. Author first spends time investigating kinds of hypotheses and the nature of science and scientific investigation.
The first move is to discuss different kinds of hypotheses-- live or dead, forced or unforced, momentous or trivial. The most interesting is the live or dead hypothesis: a live hypothesis is subjective and relative-- if the hypothesis proposed 'appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed' (I) then it is live. A dead hypothesis isn't considered a possibility related to action-- something that individual would take up as true. (A momentous hypothesis is also subjective and relative). Author readily concedes that as a matter of psychology choosing to believe A over B simply for expediency or for the benefits (e.g. Pascal's wager) isn't possible. (II) However, author interprets this as largely applicable for dead hypotheses, not necessarily live ones. Instead, he believes that our passions do influence what beliefs we readily keep. He points out that many of our beliefs we accept on 'authority' or because they carry 'prestige' (e.g. that democracy or progress is worthwhile); such beliefs would not hold up to serious skeptical challenge. (III)
The next distinction to draw is between an 'empiricist' and an 'absolutist' approach to truth. Roughly, the absolutist contends that once we've made a hypothesis T covering cases A, and experiment E confirms T, we will also be able to tell whether T is the final and true characterization for A. In other words, we can know that we know T. The empiricist-- once E confirms T-- says that T is the current knowledge on A but we do not know for sure that it is the final and irrevocable characterization. (V) According to author, most of science has adopted the empiricist bent, while most of philosophy is absolutist. Moreover, being absolutist is mostly our tendency-- we are only empiricists (if we ever are) 'on reflection'. Author endorses empiricism, even though 'objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals', we have no good procedure to determine what underwrites an absolutist's claim. (VI) More importantly the the purpose of this argument, the empiricist acknowledges that what may be true will not necessarily announce itself to us as true-- we may believe it for whatever reason (or for good reasons) but we understand that we are not waiting for some additional level of certitude to appear.
The last bit of preliminaries author discusses (VII) are the ideals (passions) that abide in scientific life: those of finding truth or avoiding error. While the two sound similar, author argues that they are 'two materially different laws', one of which must be given priority in belief-fixing pursuits. For James, he prefers the seeking of truth as primary. More importantly, for live momentous forced choices, the ideal/passion of avoiding falsehood will lead to withholding a decision, which in forced choices is equivalent to making one. (VIII) An example of such choices are questions of the truth of morals-- that is whether arguments to be moral are 'true' or binding. A skeptical approach or withholding judgment 'until all facts are in' will result in opting out of morality. Author uses the example of building friendship. (IX) In the case of becoming a friend to someone, I must first act as though I like her, and/or act as though she likes me. I can't 'stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence' that the other wants to befriend me-- this will probably lead to failure. This is considered a matter of faith helping to create the fact it is looking to find. (IX)
In the case of religious belief, we see also that it is a momentous forced choice. For those for whom it is live, and who take the pursuit of truth to be a higher value than avoidance of error, believing in religion is justified. Since the hypothesis is momentous (very important to the individual making the decision), author argues that whatever choice we make we are entitled to make. Author argues that taking avoidance of error as a higher ideal in this case will also lead to the same conclusion-- since it is a forced choice-- as disbelieving. Moreover, author argues that the absolute approach to truth may easily result in withholding judgment (=disbelieving) since in such matters there is no scientific resolution available and therefore no certitude given from that quarter. (X) The abstract conclusion is that 'we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will'. While this may sound silly, it is because we forget that a live hypothesis is something that is legitimately tempting to believe (and is therefore not ruled out by the whole of science and rational argument). If a particular hypothesis isn't legitimately possible (living), then this whole endeavor will appear to be Pascal's wager. Yet if it is alive for an individual, and since it is a momentous forced choice, the individual is given the freedom to believe.
Essays In Popular Philosophy, Ch 1 Longmans Green & Co 1911
This well-known paper is about the permissibility of belief in religion, probably considered now to be a stand-in for belief in the divine. The main argument is that when you are forced to make a momentous choice where there is some credibility for either option, making either choice is beyond rebuke. Author first spends time investigating kinds of hypotheses and the nature of science and scientific investigation.
The first move is to discuss different kinds of hypotheses-- live or dead, forced or unforced, momentous or trivial. The most interesting is the live or dead hypothesis: a live hypothesis is subjective and relative-- if the hypothesis proposed 'appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed' (I) then it is live. A dead hypothesis isn't considered a possibility related to action-- something that individual would take up as true. (A momentous hypothesis is also subjective and relative). Author readily concedes that as a matter of psychology choosing to believe A over B simply for expediency or for the benefits (e.g. Pascal's wager) isn't possible. (II) However, author interprets this as largely applicable for dead hypotheses, not necessarily live ones. Instead, he believes that our passions do influence what beliefs we readily keep. He points out that many of our beliefs we accept on 'authority' or because they carry 'prestige' (e.g. that democracy or progress is worthwhile); such beliefs would not hold up to serious skeptical challenge. (III)
The next distinction to draw is between an 'empiricist' and an 'absolutist' approach to truth. Roughly, the absolutist contends that once we've made a hypothesis T covering cases A, and experiment E confirms T, we will also be able to tell whether T is the final and true characterization for A. In other words, we can know that we know T. The empiricist-- once E confirms T-- says that T is the current knowledge on A but we do not know for sure that it is the final and irrevocable characterization. (V) According to author, most of science has adopted the empiricist bent, while most of philosophy is absolutist. Moreover, being absolutist is mostly our tendency-- we are only empiricists (if we ever are) 'on reflection'. Author endorses empiricism, even though 'objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals', we have no good procedure to determine what underwrites an absolutist's claim. (VI) More importantly the the purpose of this argument, the empiricist acknowledges that what may be true will not necessarily announce itself to us as true-- we may believe it for whatever reason (or for good reasons) but we understand that we are not waiting for some additional level of certitude to appear.
The last bit of preliminaries author discusses (VII) are the ideals (passions) that abide in scientific life: those of finding truth or avoiding error. While the two sound similar, author argues that they are 'two materially different laws', one of which must be given priority in belief-fixing pursuits. For James, he prefers the seeking of truth as primary. More importantly, for live momentous forced choices, the ideal/passion of avoiding falsehood will lead to withholding a decision, which in forced choices is equivalent to making one. (VIII) An example of such choices are questions of the truth of morals-- that is whether arguments to be moral are 'true' or binding. A skeptical approach or withholding judgment 'until all facts are in' will result in opting out of morality. Author uses the example of building friendship. (IX) In the case of becoming a friend to someone, I must first act as though I like her, and/or act as though she likes me. I can't 'stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence' that the other wants to befriend me-- this will probably lead to failure. This is considered a matter of faith helping to create the fact it is looking to find. (IX)
In the case of religious belief, we see also that it is a momentous forced choice. For those for whom it is live, and who take the pursuit of truth to be a higher value than avoidance of error, believing in religion is justified. Since the hypothesis is momentous (very important to the individual making the decision), author argues that whatever choice we make we are entitled to make. Author argues that taking avoidance of error as a higher ideal in this case will also lead to the same conclusion-- since it is a forced choice-- as disbelieving. Moreover, author argues that the absolute approach to truth may easily result in withholding judgment (=disbelieving) since in such matters there is no scientific resolution available and therefore no certitude given from that quarter. (X) The abstract conclusion is that 'we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will'. While this may sound silly, it is because we forget that a live hypothesis is something that is legitimately tempting to believe (and is therefore not ruled out by the whole of science and rational argument). If a particular hypothesis isn't legitimately possible (living), then this whole endeavor will appear to be Pascal's wager. Yet if it is alive for an individual, and since it is a momentous forced choice, the individual is given the freedom to believe.
5/15/09
Putnam, Hilary - A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy
05/15/2009
Renewing Philosophy, Harvard Press 1992 Ch 9
This chapter tries to establish Dewey's defense of democracy as an argument for social morality. Author beings by quoting Bernard Williams when it comes to giving a justification of moral claims-- forget trying to convince someone to be moral and instead try to justify the concepts and particulars to someone already committed to being moral. Williams' shortfall however was in giving an objective justification for ethics as an individual case of having a personally deleterious moral character-- a justification coming from psychology. This is considered a personal, ontological justification, which is orthogonal to Dewey's social, epistemological one (pg182). It is social because it addresses society and societal problems. It is epistemological in that it posits that intelligent empirical investigation is the best chance at finding effectual strategies for fixing social problems.(pg186) Author considers this anti-metaphysical because it doesn't presuppose that there is one 'absolute' answer outside of whatever we can find in scientific investigation. (pg187) So the grounds of moral activity comes from the shortcomings of the current social situation and the likelihood that science will find a solution. This jointly justifies 'democratic institutions as freedom of thought and speech' (pg188). One important factor in this argument is that Dewey doesn't leave it to the 'experts' (pg189) to show us progress, since privilege can easily create privileged interests and 'cognitive distortion' about the good. Instead, social progress must be done in the same way (by analogy) that scientific progress is done: with open, informed, free democratic investigation and thus justification.
The worth of democracy is occasionally objected two by two different sources, according to author. They include extreme relativists who object to interventions into any other culture's traditions, even the most undemocratic (pg183-5). They also include the reactionaries who believe that society begins to regress once democracy is established-- author considers Alasdair MacIntyre as an example (pg185-6).
One criticism author levels at Dewey's approach is that it lacks the content required to settle personal ontic anxiety-- existential moral questions-- such as the one posed by Sartre about staying at home to help your elderly mother or going off to join the anti-fascist revolution. (pg190-2) More importantly, James extends this criticism (in The Will To Believe) to be against scientific inquiry when it comes to many deep personal decisions-- you can't try both and see which suit you better. (pg192-6)
The chapter (and book?) ends with a conclusion and discusses how important true equality is in a liberal democracy-- so that everyone can partake in the free play of their natural endowments. (pg198-199)
Renewing Philosophy, Harvard Press 1992 Ch 9
This chapter tries to establish Dewey's defense of democracy as an argument for social morality. Author beings by quoting Bernard Williams when it comes to giving a justification of moral claims-- forget trying to convince someone to be moral and instead try to justify the concepts and particulars to someone already committed to being moral. Williams' shortfall however was in giving an objective justification for ethics as an individual case of having a personally deleterious moral character-- a justification coming from psychology. This is considered a personal, ontological justification, which is orthogonal to Dewey's social, epistemological one (pg182). It is social because it addresses society and societal problems. It is epistemological in that it posits that intelligent empirical investigation is the best chance at finding effectual strategies for fixing social problems.(pg186) Author considers this anti-metaphysical because it doesn't presuppose that there is one 'absolute' answer outside of whatever we can find in scientific investigation. (pg187) So the grounds of moral activity comes from the shortcomings of the current social situation and the likelihood that science will find a solution. This jointly justifies 'democratic institutions as freedom of thought and speech' (pg188). One important factor in this argument is that Dewey doesn't leave it to the 'experts' (pg189) to show us progress, since privilege can easily create privileged interests and 'cognitive distortion' about the good. Instead, social progress must be done in the same way (by analogy) that scientific progress is done: with open, informed, free democratic investigation and thus justification.
The worth of democracy is occasionally objected two by two different sources, according to author. They include extreme relativists who object to interventions into any other culture's traditions, even the most undemocratic (pg183-5). They also include the reactionaries who believe that society begins to regress once democracy is established-- author considers Alasdair MacIntyre as an example (pg185-6).
One criticism author levels at Dewey's approach is that it lacks the content required to settle personal ontic anxiety-- existential moral questions-- such as the one posed by Sartre about staying at home to help your elderly mother or going off to join the anti-fascist revolution. (pg190-2) More importantly, James extends this criticism (in The Will To Believe) to be against scientific inquiry when it comes to many deep personal decisions-- you can't try both and see which suit you better. (pg192-6)
The chapter (and book?) ends with a conclusion and discusses how important true equality is in a liberal democracy-- so that everyone can partake in the free play of their natural endowments. (pg198-199)
5/8/09
Dewey, John - Antinaturalism In Extremis
05/08/2009
Naturalism & The Human Spirit, ch 1 Columbia University Press, 1944
This paper is more polemical and rhetorical than many current philosophy papers usually are. The main point is to defend naturalism from criticism leveled by 'supernaturalists'. Author argues against what he considers to be the orthodox position that moral virtue is only acquired through supernatural means, instead arguing that all virtues we find worthwhile come solely from human nature. Author considers this the 'Pauline' and 'Augustinian' doctrines of natural degradation and supernatural salvation. (pg2)
Author points out the tremendous advancement that naturalism (in this case considered scientific materialism) has made through the centuries and how the same scientific inquiries relating to humans have been blocked by a religion's supernaturalist doctrines (pg3-4).
The main bulk of the paper is devoted to taking examples of anti-naturalist statements and rebutting or attacking them. (part II) Notably GK Chesterton writes that democracy would not survive if it didn't have a catholic or christian underpinning (pg8), to which author responds with a fundamental thesis: 'naturalism finds the values in question, the worth and dignity of men and women, residing in human nature itself, in the connections, actual and potential, that human beings sustain to one another in the natural environment.' (pg9)
The consequences of being an anti-naturalist, author argues, is to discount the natural resources available for the betterment of humans and to discount the possibility of gains made by the sciences into human nature. (pg10-11) The biggest rub comes from the problem of whether to accept the numerous biological findings placing humankind 'squarely within the natural world' (pg11). Yet at the same time (some) anti-naturalists wish to deny that humans are 'simply a highly developed animal' (pg7). This tension leave anti-naturalists in a contradictory position when it comes to accepting scientific discovery.
The final discussion is about moral virtue and normative standards; anti-naturalists hold that naturalism cannot provide for them. (pg12-15) Author finds this is a deeply pessimistic view of human nature, and of scientific progress.
Naturalism & The Human Spirit, ch 1 Columbia University Press, 1944
This paper is more polemical and rhetorical than many current philosophy papers usually are. The main point is to defend naturalism from criticism leveled by 'supernaturalists'. Author argues against what he considers to be the orthodox position that moral virtue is only acquired through supernatural means, instead arguing that all virtues we find worthwhile come solely from human nature. Author considers this the 'Pauline' and 'Augustinian' doctrines of natural degradation and supernatural salvation. (pg2)
Author points out the tremendous advancement that naturalism (in this case considered scientific materialism) has made through the centuries and how the same scientific inquiries relating to humans have been blocked by a religion's supernaturalist doctrines (pg3-4).
The main bulk of the paper is devoted to taking examples of anti-naturalist statements and rebutting or attacking them. (part II) Notably GK Chesterton writes that democracy would not survive if it didn't have a catholic or christian underpinning (pg8), to which author responds with a fundamental thesis: 'naturalism finds the values in question, the worth and dignity of men and women, residing in human nature itself, in the connections, actual and potential, that human beings sustain to one another in the natural environment.' (pg9)
The consequences of being an anti-naturalist, author argues, is to discount the natural resources available for the betterment of humans and to discount the possibility of gains made by the sciences into human nature. (pg10-11) The biggest rub comes from the problem of whether to accept the numerous biological findings placing humankind 'squarely within the natural world' (pg11). Yet at the same time (some) anti-naturalists wish to deny that humans are 'simply a highly developed animal' (pg7). This tension leave anti-naturalists in a contradictory position when it comes to accepting scientific discovery.
The final discussion is about moral virtue and normative standards; anti-naturalists hold that naturalism cannot provide for them. (pg12-15) Author finds this is a deeply pessimistic view of human nature, and of scientific progress.
5/1/09
Schaub, Edward - Dewey's Interpretation of Religion
05/01/2009
The Philosophy of John Dewey, Ch 13, Schilpp ed., 1951
This is a general review of Dewey's work on religion and also of the work of his students and followers; the conclusion is that they are more extreme than Dewey was. Author first tries to give a state-of-religion overview and then takes some time to develop the concept of religion as a human activity whose explanation should be 'less impersonal than the standpoint of functionalism and instrumentalism'(pg400-1).
Dewey's early exposition against religion as having a monopoly over the spiritual led many of his followers to take a decidedly anti-religion stance (pg401-4), yet author claims many were confused about whether it was naively naturalistic or fulfilling some specific practical human need.(pg401) The author concludes here that instrumentalism was inadequate to give an account of religion.(pg404)
In part III, author reviews the most sustained work Dewey did on religion in A Common Faith. Author claims that Dewey did not seriously attempt to work religion through the instrumentalist/utilitarian psychology that he had created, nor did he wish to critically engage with modern-day religious theology (pg406-7). Instead his major target is 'supernaturalism', a belief system author thinks is a strawman or at least very outdated. (pg407) Moreover, author claims Dewey levels an a priori argument against a kind-of remote supernaturalism, god(s) in another world apart from the natural one that we all live in. This doesn't account for the varieties of different religious beliefs that contradict that a priori analysis (pg409). Author then reviews Dewey's account of a religious outlook as opposed to 'a religion' (pg411-13) and specifically pinpoints the argument that the seat of religious attitudes is an imaginative ideal. Author argues that Dewey hasn't established that we can be sufficiently motivated by an ideal if we don't take it to be metaphysically active in the world (pg414-416). The argument offered by the author is that the terrifyingly finite, mortal aspects of humans have been the primary motivations for the establishing of religion, but these are metaphysical aspects of living in 'Nature'-- hence a metaphysical 'Reality' that is the proper seat of religious ideals.
Dewey Replies to Schaub in Experience, Knowledge and Value; he mostly argues that his earlier work that was quoted was taken out of context: it was a discussion that religion should not be taught in public schools, not a discussion on the general problems of religion.
The Philosophy of John Dewey, Ch 13, Schilpp ed., 1951
This is a general review of Dewey's work on religion and also of the work of his students and followers; the conclusion is that they are more extreme than Dewey was. Author first tries to give a state-of-religion overview and then takes some time to develop the concept of religion as a human activity whose explanation should be 'less impersonal than the standpoint of functionalism and instrumentalism'(pg400-1).
Dewey's early exposition against religion as having a monopoly over the spiritual led many of his followers to take a decidedly anti-religion stance (pg401-4), yet author claims many were confused about whether it was naively naturalistic or fulfilling some specific practical human need.(pg401) The author concludes here that instrumentalism was inadequate to give an account of religion.(pg404)
In part III, author reviews the most sustained work Dewey did on religion in A Common Faith. Author claims that Dewey did not seriously attempt to work religion through the instrumentalist/utilitarian psychology that he had created, nor did he wish to critically engage with modern-day religious theology (pg406-7). Instead his major target is 'supernaturalism', a belief system author thinks is a strawman or at least very outdated. (pg407) Moreover, author claims Dewey levels an a priori argument against a kind-of remote supernaturalism, god(s) in another world apart from the natural one that we all live in. This doesn't account for the varieties of different religious beliefs that contradict that a priori analysis (pg409). Author then reviews Dewey's account of a religious outlook as opposed to 'a religion' (pg411-13) and specifically pinpoints the argument that the seat of religious attitudes is an imaginative ideal. Author argues that Dewey hasn't established that we can be sufficiently motivated by an ideal if we don't take it to be metaphysically active in the world (pg414-416). The argument offered by the author is that the terrifyingly finite, mortal aspects of humans have been the primary motivations for the establishing of religion, but these are metaphysical aspects of living in 'Nature'-- hence a metaphysical 'Reality' that is the proper seat of religious ideals.
Dewey Replies to Schaub in Experience, Knowledge and Value; he mostly argues that his earlier work that was quoted was taken out of context: it was a discussion that religion should not be taught in public schools, not a discussion on the general problems of religion.
4/24/09
Dewey, John - A Common Faith Ch 3
04/24/2009
Yale University Press, 1934
This final chapter focuses mainly on the distinction that religions draw between two realms of living, the supernatural and the natural, or the sacred and the profane. The biggest current threat to religion, author claims, is the growing participation and involvement that humans have with those profane/natural realms of life: an involvement in science, technology, commerce, civics, etc. In the rise of these other engagements, the church-- or participation in a religion-- has become a special kind of institution within a secular community-- it has lost its supremacy over all realms of life (pg60-2). While science itself may have had little direct effect in this 'shift in the social center of gravity', author argues it has had a great indirect effect in changing many of the conditions that humans now live under (pg62-3). The problem for religions (but not a religious attitude) is this distinction between the supernatural and the natural, since now the natural has risen greatly in concern. However, a religious attitude, as previously defined as a life outlook motivated by ideals found in the imagination, needs to make no such distinction and is therefore free to permeate all realms of human social life. (pg66-68)
Author then discusses what he sees as the evolution of the supernatural that permeated human life (when it was invoked for explanations of natural events) to now its self-made relegation of a special mode of relating to the supernatural (pg69-70). Author also links this to the argument that humans need the supernatural for moral motivation and spiritual vitality and offers the alternative that our concrete relations provide us with the necessary motivations and experiences. (pg70-1)
Author takes some time to counter a possible objection from a religion: that those other realms of human social life are rife with corruption, cynicism, greed, sins, etc and therefore aren't worth investing in compared to religion and the church.(pg74) What this argument assumes, author argues, is that the current social institutions are the only ones possible for humans to have, or that the ones we have now are essentially this way, rather than accidentally this way. Once our social institutions are seen in a historical context, there is no reason to think they must continue in the way they operate now. (pg75-8) This kind of thinking makes the supernatural realm and the maintenance of the status quo 'twins'(pg78).
Thus the secular objection to religion is that it considers material conditions that are very changeable to be unchangeable or it has 'the tendency to dispose of social evils in terms of general moral causes' (pg77). (pg77-80) The argument is that the separated realm of religion often rails against the symptoms of social problems, rather than the causes (pg69), which are to be studied by social science, economics, politics, etc. Thus the churches find themselves in a difficult situation-- to the extent they wish to participate in working for social betterment they have to be involved in the natural world, yet in an awkward way must still hold their 'unique relation' to 'supreme values and motivating forces', making 'it impossible for the churches to participate in promotion of social ends on a natural and equal human basis'. (pg83) Author sees the salvation of the religious attitude to engage in the world through concerted effort that isn't diverted through a religion that claims a special realm of authority. Author draws a contrast between 'intelligence' and 'reason'; intelligence specifically can be infused with emotional support and passion, while reason is considered contrary to such an infusion. (pg79)
Yale University Press, 1934
This final chapter focuses mainly on the distinction that religions draw between two realms of living, the supernatural and the natural, or the sacred and the profane. The biggest current threat to religion, author claims, is the growing participation and involvement that humans have with those profane/natural realms of life: an involvement in science, technology, commerce, civics, etc. In the rise of these other engagements, the church-- or participation in a religion-- has become a special kind of institution within a secular community-- it has lost its supremacy over all realms of life (pg60-2). While science itself may have had little direct effect in this 'shift in the social center of gravity', author argues it has had a great indirect effect in changing many of the conditions that humans now live under (pg62-3). The problem for religions (but not a religious attitude) is this distinction between the supernatural and the natural, since now the natural has risen greatly in concern. However, a religious attitude, as previously defined as a life outlook motivated by ideals found in the imagination, needs to make no such distinction and is therefore free to permeate all realms of human social life. (pg66-68)
Author then discusses what he sees as the evolution of the supernatural that permeated human life (when it was invoked for explanations of natural events) to now its self-made relegation of a special mode of relating to the supernatural (pg69-70). Author also links this to the argument that humans need the supernatural for moral motivation and spiritual vitality and offers the alternative that our concrete relations provide us with the necessary motivations and experiences. (pg70-1)
Author takes some time to counter a possible objection from a religion: that those other realms of human social life are rife with corruption, cynicism, greed, sins, etc and therefore aren't worth investing in compared to religion and the church.(pg74) What this argument assumes, author argues, is that the current social institutions are the only ones possible for humans to have, or that the ones we have now are essentially this way, rather than accidentally this way. Once our social institutions are seen in a historical context, there is no reason to think they must continue in the way they operate now. (pg75-8) This kind of thinking makes the supernatural realm and the maintenance of the status quo 'twins'(pg78).
Thus the secular objection to religion is that it considers material conditions that are very changeable to be unchangeable or it has 'the tendency to dispose of social evils in terms of general moral causes' (pg77). (pg77-80) The argument is that the separated realm of religion often rails against the symptoms of social problems, rather than the causes (pg69), which are to be studied by social science, economics, politics, etc. Thus the churches find themselves in a difficult situation-- to the extent they wish to participate in working for social betterment they have to be involved in the natural world, yet in an awkward way must still hold their 'unique relation' to 'supreme values and motivating forces', making 'it impossible for the churches to participate in promotion of social ends on a natural and equal human basis'. (pg83) Author sees the salvation of the religious attitude to engage in the world through concerted effort that isn't diverted through a religion that claims a special realm of authority. Author draws a contrast between 'intelligence' and 'reason'; intelligence specifically can be infused with emotional support and passion, while reason is considered contrary to such an infusion. (pg79)
4/17/09
Dewey, John - A Common Faith Ch 2
04/17/2009
Yale University Press, 1934
This chapter 'Faith and Its Object' seeks to establish the problem with religion's claiming factual knowledge about the world based on supernatural truths or revelations. The early pages show the rift between scientific knowledge about the world and the tenets of theological belief (author wants to show a tension not between 'science' and 'religion' but between 'science' and 'theology' pg31). Author points out that each time science seems to provide an alternate, natural explanation for a particular article of theology, liberal theologians surrender that particular issue and simultaneously argue that it wasn't a crucial part of the theology (pg32). The problem is not this-or-that belief but the entire outlook of method and justification for non-scientific objective belief systems. (pg32-3)
One solution was to partition two realms: one of 'nature' and one of 'grace', or one for scientific experience and another for religious. (pg34) But remember that so-called mystical experience, according to author, is frequently interpreted through the lens of cultural practices and theology that one already has available (pg35-38). The distinction between two kinds of experience is just the old metaphysical distinction between two worlds, but remade into modern cultural sensibilities. (pg38) Author also defends science from those who misunderstand it, specifically that science is committed to a set of naturalistic doctrines. Instead, science is a method of acquiring knowledge about the world-- so far the best method (p38-9).
The next part of the discussion has to do with symbols-- that religious matters involve beliefs that are symbolic. Author argues that symbols can be interpreted in two ways-- as symbolic of another objective item (that we can't attain for some reason or other) or as symbolic of a truly ideal item. If theological beliefs are symbolic in the first sense, then they are intellectually dubious and aren't truly 'ideal'. But if they are in the second sense, then there is no reason to suppose the objective aspect of the symbolized items/people/events. (pg40-2) The suggestion then becomes that 'God' be the 'unification of ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin'(pg43). Author further argues that trying to find the existence of the supernatural will distract humans and make them think that their betterment will come from an exterior source rather than from themselves (pg45-7).
The last part of the paper deals with arguing that ideals seated in the imagination are not 'imaginary stuff' but real and physical since they motivate us to act in particular ways in the world (pg49-51). The value of mystical experiences is to further one's commitment to the ideals they live by (pg52). Author discusses parallels that he sees between 'aggressive' atheism and traditional supernaturalism (e.g. Christianity) (pg52-3) in that they both view humans as separate from the natural world-- both are mistaken.
Yale University Press, 1934
This chapter 'Faith and Its Object' seeks to establish the problem with religion's claiming factual knowledge about the world based on supernatural truths or revelations. The early pages show the rift between scientific knowledge about the world and the tenets of theological belief (author wants to show a tension not between 'science' and 'religion' but between 'science' and 'theology' pg31). Author points out that each time science seems to provide an alternate, natural explanation for a particular article of theology, liberal theologians surrender that particular issue and simultaneously argue that it wasn't a crucial part of the theology (pg32). The problem is not this-or-that belief but the entire outlook of method and justification for non-scientific objective belief systems. (pg32-3)
One solution was to partition two realms: one of 'nature' and one of 'grace', or one for scientific experience and another for religious. (pg34) But remember that so-called mystical experience, according to author, is frequently interpreted through the lens of cultural practices and theology that one already has available (pg35-38). The distinction between two kinds of experience is just the old metaphysical distinction between two worlds, but remade into modern cultural sensibilities. (pg38) Author also defends science from those who misunderstand it, specifically that science is committed to a set of naturalistic doctrines. Instead, science is a method of acquiring knowledge about the world-- so far the best method (p38-9).
The next part of the discussion has to do with symbols-- that religious matters involve beliefs that are symbolic. Author argues that symbols can be interpreted in two ways-- as symbolic of another objective item (that we can't attain for some reason or other) or as symbolic of a truly ideal item. If theological beliefs are symbolic in the first sense, then they are intellectually dubious and aren't truly 'ideal'. But if they are in the second sense, then there is no reason to suppose the objective aspect of the symbolized items/people/events. (pg40-2) The suggestion then becomes that 'God' be the 'unification of ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin'(pg43). Author further argues that trying to find the existence of the supernatural will distract humans and make them think that their betterment will come from an exterior source rather than from themselves (pg45-7).
The last part of the paper deals with arguing that ideals seated in the imagination are not 'imaginary stuff' but real and physical since they motivate us to act in particular ways in the world (pg49-51). The value of mystical experiences is to further one's commitment to the ideals they live by (pg52). Author discusses parallels that he sees between 'aggressive' atheism and traditional supernaturalism (e.g. Christianity) (pg52-3) in that they both view humans as separate from the natural world-- both are mistaken.
4/10/09
Dewey, John - A Common Faith Ch 1
04/10/2009
Yale University Press, 1934
This chapter tries to create an adjective 'religious' that is distinct from 'religion'. The first discussion is about how diverse and varied the practice of religion is (pg4-6) and how, once placed in the cultural and historical context, it isn't obvious that the current cultural context is the correct one. Yet to try to give a theory of religion so that it covers all of the practices around the world and throughout history will make it so abstract and disjointed to be unrecognizable. Author concludes that there are instead 'a multitude of religions'. (pg7-8)
The next move is to distinguish between 'religion' and 'religious', which does not have the institutional history or theology that a religion is committed to. A religious attitude is different from a 'religious experience' however. A religious experience as a kind separate from aesthetic or political experiences is not what author has in mind. (pg10-11) This kind of experience is characterized by its outcome but labeled according to whatever culturally/institutionally relevant categories the individual may have handy. (pg11-13) But what is important about the experience is the 'adjustment' made within a person's self; different religions will call it different things. The important experience that can underwrite a religious attitude is one whose effects are an enduring deep-seated adjustment or orientation. (pg16-17)
Author takes pains to articulate the meta-psychological underpinning of a religious attitude: the imagination has an ideal for the self to strive for as it strives for integration, since integration takes place with something external to the self-- an ideal. (pg19) The non-objective nature of an ideal-- the non-factual aspect of it-- is contrasted by author to 'faith', which has become an evidential claim, a part of metaphysics instead of human imagination. (pg20) Author suggests that once the moral (imaginative) ideal of the religious attitude was converted into a claim of objective metaphysics by religion, it actually diminished moral faith, since it was not discovered to be present objectively (pg20-22).
Going to the positive account of the religious attitude, it should not just be an intense emotional feeling but also a broadly inclusive self-unifying end-ideal.(pg22-23) In this way the religious attitude involves a willful submission. Further discussion about the history of religions to assist (or inhibit) with the religious attitude follows (pg24-25). Lastly, author gives a discussion the human condition and asserts that the religious attitude includes cooperation and seeing one's place in a larger whole (pg25).
Yale University Press, 1934
This chapter tries to create an adjective 'religious' that is distinct from 'religion'. The first discussion is about how diverse and varied the practice of religion is (pg4-6) and how, once placed in the cultural and historical context, it isn't obvious that the current cultural context is the correct one. Yet to try to give a theory of religion so that it covers all of the practices around the world and throughout history will make it so abstract and disjointed to be unrecognizable. Author concludes that there are instead 'a multitude of religions'. (pg7-8)
The next move is to distinguish between 'religion' and 'religious', which does not have the institutional history or theology that a religion is committed to. A religious attitude is different from a 'religious experience' however. A religious experience as a kind separate from aesthetic or political experiences is not what author has in mind. (pg10-11) This kind of experience is characterized by its outcome but labeled according to whatever culturally/institutionally relevant categories the individual may have handy. (pg11-13) But what is important about the experience is the 'adjustment' made within a person's self; different religions will call it different things. The important experience that can underwrite a religious attitude is one whose effects are an enduring deep-seated adjustment or orientation. (pg16-17)
Author takes pains to articulate the meta-psychological underpinning of a religious attitude: the imagination has an ideal for the self to strive for as it strives for integration, since integration takes place with something external to the self-- an ideal. (pg19) The non-objective nature of an ideal-- the non-factual aspect of it-- is contrasted by author to 'faith', which has become an evidential claim, a part of metaphysics instead of human imagination. (pg20) Author suggests that once the moral (imaginative) ideal of the religious attitude was converted into a claim of objective metaphysics by religion, it actually diminished moral faith, since it was not discovered to be present objectively (pg20-22).
Going to the positive account of the religious attitude, it should not just be an intense emotional feeling but also a broadly inclusive self-unifying end-ideal.(pg22-23) In this way the religious attitude involves a willful submission. Further discussion about the history of religions to assist (or inhibit) with the religious attitude follows (pg24-25). Lastly, author gives a discussion the human condition and asserts that the religious attitude includes cooperation and seeing one's place in a larger whole (pg25).
4/3/09
Kennett, Jeanette & Smith, Michael - Synchronic self-control is always non-actional
04/03/2009
Analysis Vol 57 No 2 April 1997
This is a reply to Mele's previous article 'Underestimating self-control...' where authors lay out a strong case for the unintelligiblity of synchronic actional self-control. One of Mele's arguments was that it was very difficult to formulate exactly what the 'truism' of intentional aciton is: is it really that 'whenever people do something intentionall, they want to do that thing more than they want to do anything else the believe they can do at that time'? Mele argued against it, using the example of non-conflicting desires being mixed together into one action but at least some component desires perhaps not being intrinsically stronger than other desires that weren't being acted upon (e.g. drinking tea while reading article A, even though drinking tea was less strong than the desire to read article B). Authors re-write this counterexample to say that really, one doesn't have the desire to drink tea, read article A, or read article B, but instead to read A & drink tea, read B & drink tea, read A, or read B, or drink tea. Thus the truism is preserved. (pg125)
The next thing authors do is take up the case Mele describes about trying to use a second-order desire to reduce the strength of your first order desire as a case of synchronic actional self-control. (pg126) Authors argue that what happens here is either a case of losing control (e.g. eating a sweet while reducing the desire's strength) or diachronic self-control (e.g. eventually reducing the strength of your desire for sweets so that, eventually, you won't eat them). (pg126-7) And diachronic self-control can be actional and isn't a contradiction of the truism. The authors generalized that all synchronic self-control is non-actional. 'They are non-actional because there is no suitable strongest desire to cause an exercise of actional synchronic self-control'. (pg128)
The last part of the paper deals with the logical possibility of actional synchronic self-control. The possibility for such an action, authors claim, lies in the fact that the connection between desires and actions is a causal connection that happens over time, and it might be possible for a stronger cause-effect event to take place in between an earlier cause and its characteristic effect. (e.g., you desire sweets but before it causes you to take action to eat one, an faster desire for health intervenes and causes you to refrain.) Authors reply by further discussing what a desire-cause must do: not only must it initiate the action-effect, but if the action takes place over time (as most do), then the desire also has to sustain the action. (pg129) Authors consider this mechanic to set up a dilemma: either you prepare to defend yourself from your desire for sweets, or as soon as the desire for sweets arises, your previous desire can't 'causally sustain' itself. (pg130) Either the self-control is diachronic, or it isn't self-control. Authors comment that if you agree that thoughts last longer than 'an instant', you might have to believe that actional synchronic self-control is logically impossible.
Analysis Vol 57 No 2 April 1997
This is a reply to Mele's previous article 'Underestimating self-control...' where authors lay out a strong case for the unintelligiblity of synchronic actional self-control. One of Mele's arguments was that it was very difficult to formulate exactly what the 'truism' of intentional aciton is: is it really that 'whenever people do something intentionall, they want to do that thing more than they want to do anything else the believe they can do at that time'? Mele argued against it, using the example of non-conflicting desires being mixed together into one action but at least some component desires perhaps not being intrinsically stronger than other desires that weren't being acted upon (e.g. drinking tea while reading article A, even though drinking tea was less strong than the desire to read article B). Authors re-write this counterexample to say that really, one doesn't have the desire to drink tea, read article A, or read article B, but instead to read A & drink tea, read B & drink tea, read A, or read B, or drink tea. Thus the truism is preserved. (pg125)
The next thing authors do is take up the case Mele describes about trying to use a second-order desire to reduce the strength of your first order desire as a case of synchronic actional self-control. (pg126) Authors argue that what happens here is either a case of losing control (e.g. eating a sweet while reducing the desire's strength) or diachronic self-control (e.g. eventually reducing the strength of your desire for sweets so that, eventually, you won't eat them). (pg126-7) And diachronic self-control can be actional and isn't a contradiction of the truism. The authors generalized that all synchronic self-control is non-actional. 'They are non-actional because there is no suitable strongest desire to cause an exercise of actional synchronic self-control'. (pg128)
The last part of the paper deals with the logical possibility of actional synchronic self-control. The possibility for such an action, authors claim, lies in the fact that the connection between desires and actions is a causal connection that happens over time, and it might be possible for a stronger cause-effect event to take place in between an earlier cause and its characteristic effect. (e.g., you desire sweets but before it causes you to take action to eat one, an faster desire for health intervenes and causes you to refrain.) Authors reply by further discussing what a desire-cause must do: not only must it initiate the action-effect, but if the action takes place over time (as most do), then the desire also has to sustain the action. (pg129) Authors consider this mechanic to set up a dilemma: either you prepare to defend yourself from your desire for sweets, or as soon as the desire for sweets arises, your previous desire can't 'causally sustain' itself. (pg130) Either the self-control is diachronic, or it isn't self-control. Authors comment that if you agree that thoughts last longer than 'an instant', you might have to believe that actional synchronic self-control is logically impossible.
3/27/09
Kennett, Jeanette & Smith, Michael - Frog and Toad lose control ... Mele, Alfred - Underestimating self-control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad
03/27/2009
Frog & Toad: Analysis Vol 56 No 2 April 1996
Underestimating self-control: Analysis Vol 57 No 2 April 1997
Kennett & Smith:
This paper is written about the philosophical problem of self-control, specifically synchronic resistance, which is considered here by the authors as 'not to do what we most want to do' at the same time as we want to do it. This is separate from diachronic self-control, which is taking action now to resist acting on what you anticipate will be your strongest desire in the future (pg67-8). The premise of the problem is that action is produced from intrinsic desires of a certain strength mixing with beliefs, being transmitted rationally over 'the means-ends relation' into extrinsic desires of the same strength, then the strongest extrinsic desire becoming an action. The question is how you could avoid doing your strongest intrinsic desire; how self-control is possible synchronically.
The first explanation (1.) from Kennett & Smith is that there can be a failure in transmitting intrinsic desires into extrinsic ones: thus a stronger intrinsic desire for good health doesn't become a stronger extrinsic desire to avoid eating cookies (compared to a weaker intrinsic desire for sweets becoming the strongest extrinsic desire). This they consider to be a failure in instrumental rationality.
The second explanation (2.) for self-control is to be 'orthonomous', which is a kind of action that results when one is fully rational, not just instrumentally. To be 'fully rational' one needs to have 'knowledge of all the relevant facts' (pg66). Being orthonomous (having orthonomy) means acting according to what your desires would be if you were fully rational. So since it is fully rational to intrinsically desire good health over sweets, even if one had no extrinsic desires for good health, one could override extrinsic desires for sweets. Authors tell a tale for how this might be psychologically possible (pg66).
The next part of the paper (3.) tries to avoid a contradiction of the following form: I want most to eat sweets and want even more (more than most?) to prevent myself from eating treats. The solution is to treat the exercise of self-control as not a contradictory action (or a contradictory trying) but instead as the occurrence of thoughts and dispositions that allow the transmission of the relevant intrinsic desires for health across the means-ends relation (e.g. having thoughts that picture sweets as disgusting things). This 'doing' is not an action because, authors claim, it doesn't satisfy the standard picture that an action is a caused by a desire to x and then beliefs about how to get x. (pg69) Instead, having such thoughts enable orthonomy or a fix to one's instrumental rationality. (pg69-70)
Mele:
This response takes the premise of the Kennett & Smith paper to task as being faulty. The problem is that it's quite difficult to formulate how exactly the connection between intrinsic desires and intentional action is made. Author argues that Kennett & Smith's claim that 'whenever we do something [and whenever we try do to something] we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do' (K&S pg63) is just false, and gives a counterexample of sipping tea while reading article x. Certainly he wanted to read article x more than article y, but he didn't want to sip tea more than read article y. Yet he sipped tea nonetheless. The key here is that it is tricky to specify when and how desires will conflict in action and when they won't, and the possibility of instrumental irrationality makes any sort of mix possible. (pg120-121) (Here it seems author argues that because instrumental rationality is possible, so is it possible to desire to eat sweets and also desire to reduce that desire.) So it is certainly possible to have an intrinsic desire to reduce the power of the extrinsic desire of eating sweets (this would count as a second-order desire).
Mele also argues that, given instrumental irrationality, one can have a desire to engage in a 'picturing technique' that then enables synchronic self-control. But this desire would have been intentionally actional, a 'trying', and therefore allows that synchronic self-control can also be actional. (pg122)
Frog & Toad: Analysis Vol 56 No 2 April 1996
Underestimating self-control: Analysis Vol 57 No 2 April 1997
Kennett & Smith:
This paper is written about the philosophical problem of self-control, specifically synchronic resistance, which is considered here by the authors as 'not to do what we most want to do' at the same time as we want to do it. This is separate from diachronic self-control, which is taking action now to resist acting on what you anticipate will be your strongest desire in the future (pg67-8). The premise of the problem is that action is produced from intrinsic desires of a certain strength mixing with beliefs, being transmitted rationally over 'the means-ends relation' into extrinsic desires of the same strength, then the strongest extrinsic desire becoming an action. The question is how you could avoid doing your strongest intrinsic desire; how self-control is possible synchronically.
The first explanation (1.) from Kennett & Smith is that there can be a failure in transmitting intrinsic desires into extrinsic ones: thus a stronger intrinsic desire for good health doesn't become a stronger extrinsic desire to avoid eating cookies (compared to a weaker intrinsic desire for sweets becoming the strongest extrinsic desire). This they consider to be a failure in instrumental rationality.
The second explanation (2.) for self-control is to be 'orthonomous', which is a kind of action that results when one is fully rational, not just instrumentally. To be 'fully rational' one needs to have 'knowledge of all the relevant facts' (pg66). Being orthonomous (having orthonomy) means acting according to what your desires would be if you were fully rational. So since it is fully rational to intrinsically desire good health over sweets, even if one had no extrinsic desires for good health, one could override extrinsic desires for sweets. Authors tell a tale for how this might be psychologically possible (pg66).
The next part of the paper (3.) tries to avoid a contradiction of the following form: I want most to eat sweets and want even more (more than most?) to prevent myself from eating treats. The solution is to treat the exercise of self-control as not a contradictory action (or a contradictory trying) but instead as the occurrence of thoughts and dispositions that allow the transmission of the relevant intrinsic desires for health across the means-ends relation (e.g. having thoughts that picture sweets as disgusting things). This 'doing' is not an action because, authors claim, it doesn't satisfy the standard picture that an action is a caused by a desire to x and then beliefs about how to get x. (pg69) Instead, having such thoughts enable orthonomy or a fix to one's instrumental rationality. (pg69-70)
Mele:
This response takes the premise of the Kennett & Smith paper to task as being faulty. The problem is that it's quite difficult to formulate how exactly the connection between intrinsic desires and intentional action is made. Author argues that Kennett & Smith's claim that 'whenever we do something [and whenever we try do to something] we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do' (K&S pg63) is just false, and gives a counterexample of sipping tea while reading article x. Certainly he wanted to read article x more than article y, but he didn't want to sip tea more than read article y. Yet he sipped tea nonetheless. The key here is that it is tricky to specify when and how desires will conflict in action and when they won't, and the possibility of instrumental irrationality makes any sort of mix possible. (pg120-121) (Here it seems author argues that because instrumental rationality is possible, so is it possible to desire to eat sweets and also desire to reduce that desire.) So it is certainly possible to have an intrinsic desire to reduce the power of the extrinsic desire of eating sweets (this would count as a second-order desire).
Mele also argues that, given instrumental irrationality, one can have a desire to engage in a 'picturing technique' that then enables synchronic self-control. But this desire would have been intentionally actional, a 'trying', and therefore allows that synchronic self-control can also be actional. (pg122)
3/18/09
Weinberg, Steven - Without God
03/20/2009
The New York Review of Books Vol 55 No 14 Sept 25, 2008
A short article for the popular press, the first section discusses the 4 tensions author sees between religion and science, then the second section talks about how we can live without the concept of a deity.
Importantly, author doesn't see a tension in how religion has historically made pronouncements on how natural events work (e.g. world created in 6 days). Instead:
1) Belief in god is often marshaled as the best explanation for mysterious phenomena. As science has had the most success in explaining these phenomena, the appeal of belief in god has receded.
2) Humans' role in the order of the cosmos seems rather contingent and haphazard-- not 'special'-- especially with the advancement of theories of evolution and cosmology. Author argues that that consciousness seems to be the last bastion on specialness.
3) The theory that the world has natural, unbreakable laws (discovered by science) is contrary to god being omnipotent. Author argues this is more a Muslim rather than Christian tension, but also suggests that this argument has significantly affected the Islamic world's interest in religion.
4) Religion relies on authorities for its truth, science on discoveries that follow a formal process. While science has its heroes, the pronouncements of them is open, not closed like they can be in religious discourse.
The second part suggests some ways to live given that there is no belief in god and that 'the worldview of science is rather chilling'. Author suggests humor, 'ordinary pleasures' or the flesh, aesthetic pleasures (though he claims that without religion-inspired art, art wouldn't have as much of a history). Also, he makes the case that moral decline will not result from non-belief. Author argues that the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient god is a non-sequitur to moral theory anyway-- you have to decide whether to do what that god says or not anyway. But the greatest problem we have without god is that there is no afterlife now; author suggests that the possibility of an afterlife was never really that comforting in the first place.
The New York Review of Books Vol 55 No 14 Sept 25, 2008
A short article for the popular press, the first section discusses the 4 tensions author sees between religion and science, then the second section talks about how we can live without the concept of a deity.
Importantly, author doesn't see a tension in how religion has historically made pronouncements on how natural events work (e.g. world created in 6 days). Instead:
1) Belief in god is often marshaled as the best explanation for mysterious phenomena. As science has had the most success in explaining these phenomena, the appeal of belief in god has receded.
2) Humans' role in the order of the cosmos seems rather contingent and haphazard-- not 'special'-- especially with the advancement of theories of evolution and cosmology. Author argues that that consciousness seems to be the last bastion on specialness.
3) The theory that the world has natural, unbreakable laws (discovered by science) is contrary to god being omnipotent. Author argues this is more a Muslim rather than Christian tension, but also suggests that this argument has significantly affected the Islamic world's interest in religion.
4) Religion relies on authorities for its truth, science on discoveries that follow a formal process. While science has its heroes, the pronouncements of them is open, not closed like they can be in religious discourse.
The second part suggests some ways to live given that there is no belief in god and that 'the worldview of science is rather chilling'. Author suggests humor, 'ordinary pleasures' or the flesh, aesthetic pleasures (though he claims that without religion-inspired art, art wouldn't have as much of a history). Also, he makes the case that moral decline will not result from non-belief. Author argues that the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient god is a non-sequitur to moral theory anyway-- you have to decide whether to do what that god says or not anyway. But the greatest problem we have without god is that there is no afterlife now; author suggests that the possibility of an afterlife was never really that comforting in the first place.
3/13/09
Coyne, Jerry - Seeing and Believing: The neverending attempt to reconcile science and religion, and why it is doomed to fail
03/13/2009
The New Republic, Feb 4 2009
This is a book review of two attempts to show how belief in god and evolution are compatible, one by Giberson "Saving Darwin: How to be a Christian and Believe in Evolution" and other by Miller "Only a Theory: Evolution and the Battle for America's Soul". Author believes that these attempts are flawed, as are all attempts to try to have science and religion coexist. The first thing that author discredits is the weak 'god is nature' argument offered by Spinoza, who has a cousin in Einstein's 'god is bewildering wonder' conception. This makes god 'meaningless'-- according to author a true reconciliation must be not through the eyes of liberal theologians but of the common theistic, interactive deity religion.
Author gives his analysis of the 4 traits of creationists:
1) Devout belief in god
2) God miraculously intervened in the development of life
3) One of these interventions was the creation of humans
4) All have some sort of 'irreducible complexity' argument about how evolution couldn't have produced such a complex system incrementally.
Both Miller and Giberson reject the theory of Intelligent Design. They credit the origin of ordinary Americans trying to put this into schools as a type of anti-authoritarian strand in American culture. They also place much of the vehement culture wars around this issue on the virulent atheists like Dawkins and Dennett.
Author claims the biggest part of the argument for compatibility is the evolutionary convergence, the 'niche' that humans occupy-- using a known evolutionary theory that the world constrains practical developments to favor things like wings, eyes, endoskeletons. Yet author argues that humans are a very unlikely convergence, having only evolved 'once, in Africa'.
The other argument for creationists is the 'fine tuning of the universe', which employs the idea that the universe needs to be set up to be 'just right' to allow life to evolve and thrive-- the so-called 'anthropic principle'. Author's reply to this is that science is working on it, and that, so far as we know, it was pretty inefficient to create the entire universe so that 14bn years later, humans would evolve.
Next, author considers Gould's NOMA: Non-Overlapping Magisteria and argues that it would be nice for religion to not make any claims about the natural world, but in practice it does, all the time. Also, if religion offers a type of 'truth', is it falsifiable? Is it anything like the truths offered as explanations for the natural world given by science?
Author believes that both Miller and Giberson eventually display 3/4 of the Creationist tennets: 1-3. The real conflict isn't between religion and science but between religion and 'secular reason'-- the kind of reason that believes that reason has to be shown in most other human pursuits-- and they are 'incompatible' as well. Perhaps they are compatible in the same sense you can commit adultery at the same time as being married, but this just shows that a person can keep contradictory concepts in mind, not that they are compatible, author quips. In the end, author argues that an endeavor that reconciles old-style religion (that includes creationism) is bound to be contradicted and defeated by, science.
The New Republic, Feb 4 2009
This is a book review of two attempts to show how belief in god and evolution are compatible, one by Giberson "Saving Darwin: How to be a Christian and Believe in Evolution" and other by Miller "Only a Theory: Evolution and the Battle for America's Soul". Author believes that these attempts are flawed, as are all attempts to try to have science and religion coexist. The first thing that author discredits is the weak 'god is nature' argument offered by Spinoza, who has a cousin in Einstein's 'god is bewildering wonder' conception. This makes god 'meaningless'-- according to author a true reconciliation must be not through the eyes of liberal theologians but of the common theistic, interactive deity religion.
Author gives his analysis of the 4 traits of creationists:
1) Devout belief in god
2) God miraculously intervened in the development of life
3) One of these interventions was the creation of humans
4) All have some sort of 'irreducible complexity' argument about how evolution couldn't have produced such a complex system incrementally.
Both Miller and Giberson reject the theory of Intelligent Design. They credit the origin of ordinary Americans trying to put this into schools as a type of anti-authoritarian strand in American culture. They also place much of the vehement culture wars around this issue on the virulent atheists like Dawkins and Dennett.
Author claims the biggest part of the argument for compatibility is the evolutionary convergence, the 'niche' that humans occupy-- using a known evolutionary theory that the world constrains practical developments to favor things like wings, eyes, endoskeletons. Yet author argues that humans are a very unlikely convergence, having only evolved 'once, in Africa'.
The other argument for creationists is the 'fine tuning of the universe', which employs the idea that the universe needs to be set up to be 'just right' to allow life to evolve and thrive-- the so-called 'anthropic principle'. Author's reply to this is that science is working on it, and that, so far as we know, it was pretty inefficient to create the entire universe so that 14bn years later, humans would evolve.
Next, author considers Gould's NOMA: Non-Overlapping Magisteria and argues that it would be nice for religion to not make any claims about the natural world, but in practice it does, all the time. Also, if religion offers a type of 'truth', is it falsifiable? Is it anything like the truths offered as explanations for the natural world given by science?
Author believes that both Miller and Giberson eventually display 3/4 of the Creationist tennets: 1-3. The real conflict isn't between religion and science but between religion and 'secular reason'-- the kind of reason that believes that reason has to be shown in most other human pursuits-- and they are 'incompatible' as well. Perhaps they are compatible in the same sense you can commit adultery at the same time as being married, but this just shows that a person can keep contradictory concepts in mind, not that they are compatible, author quips. In the end, author argues that an endeavor that reconciles old-style religion (that includes creationism) is bound to be contradicted and defeated by, science.
3/6/09
Albert, David & Rivka, Galchen - A Quantum Threat
03/06/2009
Scientific American, March 2009
An article in a popular science magazine that gives a history and modern understanding on quantum physics and its relation to the theory of special relativity. The screwiest thing about quantum physics is its 'nonlocality', meaning that particles manage to affect each other without being next to each other, that is, without being local and having no intervening physical connection between them. This spooky action at a distance is what Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen declared, in their EPR argument, was the reason that quantum physics is an incomplete theory, missing part of reality. Bohr responded instead that this part of reality is just plain murky, and that physics should give up its quest to give a complete and finalized picture of the universe. This reply underwrote much of the philosophical approach of physics until the 1990s, when accurate models of the quantum realm began to gain strength. The drawback was that it seemed that Einstein's theory of special relativity was being theoretically threatened. Authors pinpoint Tim Maudlin's 1994 book Quantum Nonlocality and Relativity as one of the strongest challengers: entanglement of particles seems to involve 'absolute simultaneity' of causal or informational transmission, which is incompatible with the impossibility of faster-than-light transmissions postulated by special relativity.
The new science tries either to repair these problems for the two theories or to keep the tension and jettison a third 'primordial' assumption, for instance, that there is an exact physical condition of the world at a certain time.
Scientific American, March 2009
An article in a popular science magazine that gives a history and modern understanding on quantum physics and its relation to the theory of special relativity. The screwiest thing about quantum physics is its 'nonlocality', meaning that particles manage to affect each other without being next to each other, that is, without being local and having no intervening physical connection between them. This spooky action at a distance is what Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen declared, in their EPR argument, was the reason that quantum physics is an incomplete theory, missing part of reality. Bohr responded instead that this part of reality is just plain murky, and that physics should give up its quest to give a complete and finalized picture of the universe. This reply underwrote much of the philosophical approach of physics until the 1990s, when accurate models of the quantum realm began to gain strength. The drawback was that it seemed that Einstein's theory of special relativity was being theoretically threatened. Authors pinpoint Tim Maudlin's 1994 book Quantum Nonlocality and Relativity as one of the strongest challengers: entanglement of particles seems to involve 'absolute simultaneity' of causal or informational transmission, which is incompatible with the impossibility of faster-than-light transmissions postulated by special relativity.
The new science tries either to repair these problems for the two theories or to keep the tension and jettison a third 'primordial' assumption, for instance, that there is an exact physical condition of the world at a certain time.
2/27/09
Westphal, Jonathan - The future and the truth-value links: a common sense view
02/27/2009
Analysis, Vol 66 No 1 Jan 2006
This article gives an argument for the truth-value of future-tense sentences like 'I'm meeting with Johnson tomorrow.' Author's intention is to show that future events can make current ones about it true or false when uttered, though we have to wait until the future happens to determine which. He considers this the 'common sense view' that 'preserves bivalence' and also claims this conforms to Ockham's conception of time as given by Adams & Kretzman. This is contrary to the Aristotelean view that future-tense sentences have no truth value.
The problem with using the future to underwrite the truth-value of future-tense sentences is that you could get into trouble with a valid but unsound argument:
Let 'A' be a proposition about a future event E
1) if an event E is in the future, it isn't occurring now
2) E is in the future
3) E isn't not occurring
4) If A is true, E is now occurring
5) A is not true
6) A is false
Author believes that 4 is the false premise and wishes to re-write it to be:
4*) if A is true, E has occurred, or is occurring, or will occur.
Dummett offers a variety of views (that author expands upon) about the reality of the past, present, and future-- author likes this model, though it is 'still much too far away'. To bring out the value of eternalism for making future-tense sentences true, author discusses how a future-tensed sentence could be true when we have to wait for it (that is, wait until the future becomes the present) for it to be true. So 'I will meet Johnson' might be made true when I meet Johnson, except not really: the sentence 'I will meet Johnson' isn't made true when 'I meet Johnson', since the latter is a different sentence. The easy solution to the 'toy' problem is to claim that both sentences express the same proposition, namely '[I] [meeting] [Johnson] [date]'. This requires what Dummett calls 'truth-value links', which insist 'perforce' that if this proposition is true, it is true at all times, whether it has yet to occur, or has already occurred, or is now occurring.
The use of truth-value links bolsters only a conditional claim: if future-tense sentences can express true propositions, then present-tense sentences expressing the same proposition must be true once the future in question comes.
2/20/09
Westphal, Jonathan - The Retrenchability of 'The Present'
02/20/2009
Analysis, Vol 62 No 1 2002
This paper tries to undo the common problem of 'the present' as having no substance, no extension. St Agustine is quoted as framing the problem: the past just happened, the future is yet to happen. Anytime you look at a divisible section of time, some part is the future, some the past-- the present has no length. Author argues this is a fallacy of composition; Augustine insists that the whole of a unit of time must also be within one of its container units, e.g. the whole of 2001 must be within May 2001. Author argues this is an 'absurd' requirement, using a spatial analogy of 'here' in place of 'the present'. Yet the permissibility of using such a counter-example is disputed by GEL Owen, who defended the asymmetry of space to time for himself and Aristotle, on the argument that time past is irretreiveably closed while 'over there' and 'over here' is open, alterable. Author replies first by pointing out that he does not need to level symmerty between space and time for his analogy to be plausible. Secondly, author argues that 'the present' sometimes can count as a year, sometimes a month, depending on the context of use-- much like 'here'. Lastly, author points out that 'the present' is 'logically incomplete', requiring a determinant like 'day', 'epoch', 'election-cycle'. One curious problem might be that this doesn't seem to be the same with 'the future'.
Analysis, Vol 62 No 1 2002
This paper tries to undo the common problem of 'the present' as having no substance, no extension. St Agustine is quoted as framing the problem: the past just happened, the future is yet to happen. Anytime you look at a divisible section of time, some part is the future, some the past-- the present has no length. Author argues this is a fallacy of composition; Augustine insists that the whole of a unit of time must also be within one of its container units, e.g. the whole of 2001 must be within May 2001. Author argues this is an 'absurd' requirement, using a spatial analogy of 'here' in place of 'the present'. Yet the permissibility of using such a counter-example is disputed by GEL Owen, who defended the asymmetry of space to time for himself and Aristotle, on the argument that time past is irretreiveably closed while 'over there' and 'over here' is open, alterable. Author replies first by pointing out that he does not need to level symmerty between space and time for his analogy to be plausible. Secondly, author argues that 'the present' sometimes can count as a year, sometimes a month, depending on the context of use-- much like 'here'. Lastly, author points out that 'the present' is 'logically incomplete', requiring a determinant like 'day', 'epoch', 'election-cycle'. One curious problem might be that this doesn't seem to be the same with 'the future'.
2/13/09
Allen-Hermanson, Sean - Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies?
02/13/2009
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 55 No 8 August 2008
This paper attempts to show that bees are natural zombies and lay out a kind of consciousness test for animals 'lower' on the phylogenetic scale from humans. The argument turns as follows: the phenomenon of blindsight can reasonably establish beliefs or proto-belief-like cognitive schemes without consciousness. Bees share analogous similarities with blindsighted chimpanzees, thus by analogy bees can be blindsighted-- like zombies. Author uses a representationalist theory of consciousness, which claims that the subjective nature of consciousness is exhausted by it's representational content. (pg390) There are two varieties of this theory, the FOT 'First-Order Thought' and the HOT 'Higher-Order Thought' theories. The major advantage of FOT is that it allows for non-human animals to have consciousness (pg391).
Author wants to use FOT but thinks that it is faced with a dilemma where it must either admit that anything that uses concepts/thinks/has beliefs is conscious, or that things that seem to employ proto-beliefs aren't doing so. (pg391) Author thinks that he can find a middle road where FOT doesn't fall into this trap by revising it into FOT*, where phenomenally conscious states are those sensory representations poised to construct first-order thoughts specific for action rather than conceptual adjustment and manipulation-- poised, 'abstract' [fuzzy?], non-conceptual 'dorsal-style'(pg406).
Author sketches FOT: phenomenal awareness depends on tokening first-order thoughts or judgments. FOT thinkers are Dretske, Tye, Kirk. (pg392-7) Author discusses the objection to the entire representationalist program is blindsight, which appears to give weird kinds of first-order thoughts but no consciousness. (pg397-408) The goal here is to discuss the problems with blindsight and conclude that though it is a difficult objection, it isn't devastating to FOT. One interesting discussion is about the 'two-systems' reply to blindsight where there is a 'ventral' and a 'dorsal' system of seeing, the former dealing with representing objects and the latter dealing with action with respect to those objects. (pg400)
Author moves to a study of purported blindsight in a monkey, where it is supposed to touch a button when there is 'no-stimulus' in the occluded field. Monkeys get this wrong by affirming 'no-stimulus' when there is one. But, on the other hand, under certain conditions they will also reliably find the stimulus when it is present (pg408-9) The next step is to imagine that there are some animals that are just like this naturally, 'natural zombies'. The honey bee is a possibility, something that shows world-mapping capabilities (proto-beliefs?) but probably couldn't distinguish whether there is a stimulus present or there is no stimulus, thus, author argues, establishing it as blindsighted, according to a theoretical scientific experiment he is proposing (pg410-413).
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 55 No 8 August 2008
This paper attempts to show that bees are natural zombies and lay out a kind of consciousness test for animals 'lower' on the phylogenetic scale from humans. The argument turns as follows: the phenomenon of blindsight can reasonably establish beliefs or proto-belief-like cognitive schemes without consciousness. Bees share analogous similarities with blindsighted chimpanzees, thus by analogy bees can be blindsighted-- like zombies. Author uses a representationalist theory of consciousness, which claims that the subjective nature of consciousness is exhausted by it's representational content. (pg390) There are two varieties of this theory, the FOT 'First-Order Thought' and the HOT 'Higher-Order Thought' theories. The major advantage of FOT is that it allows for non-human animals to have consciousness (pg391).
Author wants to use FOT but thinks that it is faced with a dilemma where it must either admit that anything that uses concepts/thinks/has beliefs is conscious, or that things that seem to employ proto-beliefs aren't doing so. (pg391) Author thinks that he can find a middle road where FOT doesn't fall into this trap by revising it into FOT*, where phenomenally conscious states are those sensory representations poised to construct first-order thoughts specific for action rather than conceptual adjustment and manipulation-- poised, 'abstract' [fuzzy?], non-conceptual 'dorsal-style'(pg406).
Author sketches FOT: phenomenal awareness depends on tokening first-order thoughts or judgments. FOT thinkers are Dretske, Tye, Kirk. (pg392-7) Author discusses the objection to the entire representationalist program is blindsight, which appears to give weird kinds of first-order thoughts but no consciousness. (pg397-408) The goal here is to discuss the problems with blindsight and conclude that though it is a difficult objection, it isn't devastating to FOT. One interesting discussion is about the 'two-systems' reply to blindsight where there is a 'ventral' and a 'dorsal' system of seeing, the former dealing with representing objects and the latter dealing with action with respect to those objects. (pg400)
Author moves to a study of purported blindsight in a monkey, where it is supposed to touch a button when there is 'no-stimulus' in the occluded field. Monkeys get this wrong by affirming 'no-stimulus' when there is one. But, on the other hand, under certain conditions they will also reliably find the stimulus when it is present (pg408-9) The next step is to imagine that there are some animals that are just like this naturally, 'natural zombies'. The honey bee is a possibility, something that shows world-mapping capabilities (proto-beliefs?) but probably couldn't distinguish whether there is a stimulus present or there is no stimulus, thus, author argues, establishing it as blindsighted, according to a theoretical scientific experiment he is proposing (pg410-413).
2/6/09
Read, Stephen - Monism: The One True Logic
02/06/2009
In this paper author attacks the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, which tries to admit to classical, constructionist and situational logics as all equally valid. Author categorizes their argument as follows:
1. Validity (V) is defined as: (V) A conclusion 'A' follows from premises iff in any case the premises are true is also a case when A is true. (here cases are 'worlds' or 'constructions' or 'situations')
2. A 'logic' specifies the cases mentioned in (V)
3. There are at least two different specifications
(pg1)
Author represents Beall & Restall as reconstructing different times when (V) can be specified: in classical logic, (V) is preserved in 'complete and consistent situations' like 'worlds'. Constructive logic specifies (V) in possibly incomplete or indeterminate situations, and finally relevance logic specifies a logic that satisfies (V) in inconsistent situations. (pg1) Author now repeats Graham Priest's challenge to this account: take logic K1 and K2-- in K1 premises P imply conclusion C. In K2, P doesn't imply C. P is true. Is C true? Author argues this challenge forces the position that K1 is superior to K2 (K1 being classical logic here). (pg2-3)
Author believes that Beall & Restall's logical pluralism by trying to preserve truth under (V) will plunge into inconsistency (pg4), a major sticking point being the non-dialetheic paraconsistentist, who belives that Ex Falso Quodlibet (from a contradiction, anything follows) is invalid but also doesn't believe that contradictions can be true. (pg5-6) The Beall & Restall reply is to ask for not just truth-preservation but also relevance-preservation from (V), but author argues this doesn't fit the bill either (pg6).
The problem, author believes, is to try to write the semantics of non-classical logics in 'classical metalanguage'. This puts the classicist in an unfair advantage when evaluating validity (pg7). Author unravels this argument in the pages that follow (pg8-10), by the way examining the claims of Varzi and Yagisawa in trying to establish the coherency of possible impossible worlds. Author offers instead relevance logic as the one true logic and chastises Beall & Restall for 'combining non-classical theory with a classical metatheory' (pg9).
In this paper author attacks the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, which tries to admit to classical, constructionist and situational logics as all equally valid. Author categorizes their argument as follows:
1. Validity (V) is defined as: (V) A conclusion 'A' follows from premises iff in any case the premises are true is also a case when A is true. (here cases are 'worlds' or 'constructions' or 'situations')
2. A 'logic' specifies the cases mentioned in (V)
3. There are at least two different specifications
(pg1)
Author represents Beall & Restall as reconstructing different times when (V) can be specified: in classical logic, (V) is preserved in 'complete and consistent situations' like 'worlds'. Constructive logic specifies (V) in possibly incomplete or indeterminate situations, and finally relevance logic specifies a logic that satisfies (V) in inconsistent situations. (pg1) Author now repeats Graham Priest's challenge to this account: take logic K1 and K2-- in K1 premises P imply conclusion C. In K2, P doesn't imply C. P is true. Is C true? Author argues this challenge forces the position that K1 is superior to K2 (K1 being classical logic here). (pg2-3)
Author believes that Beall & Restall's logical pluralism by trying to preserve truth under (V) will plunge into inconsistency (pg4), a major sticking point being the non-dialetheic paraconsistentist, who belives that Ex Falso Quodlibet (from a contradiction, anything follows) is invalid but also doesn't believe that contradictions can be true. (pg5-6) The Beall & Restall reply is to ask for not just truth-preservation but also relevance-preservation from (V), but author argues this doesn't fit the bill either (pg6).
The problem, author believes, is to try to write the semantics of non-classical logics in 'classical metalanguage'. This puts the classicist in an unfair advantage when evaluating validity (pg7). Author unravels this argument in the pages that follow (pg8-10), by the way examining the claims of Varzi and Yagisawa in trying to establish the coherency of possible impossible worlds. Author offers instead relevance logic as the one true logic and chastises Beall & Restall for 'combining non-classical theory with a classical metatheory' (pg9).
1/30/09
Donagan, Alan - Philosophical Progress and the Theory of Action
01/30/2009
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 1981-2, also reprinted as chapter 1 in Action, Reason, and Value
In this paper author tried to give a rendering of the progress that has been made in the philosophy of human action since Aristotle. Author first admits Rorty's point that the content of philosophy is often influenced by whatever is currently fashionable or reflective of academic power struggles. Author proceeds though to give a construction of the progress on theories of human action (as distinct from action that humans--and animals-- do) that goes from Aristotle to Aquinas to Frege and then Davidson.
Author's first topic is Aristotle's theory of human action and claims the theory is a causal one, placing rational appetite in conjunction with intellectual deliberation about means-ends reasoning. (pg4-5) The famous objection raised by Ryle in The Concept of Mind was as follows: if the components to the causal story aren't human actions, how can the result be? Author defends the causal theory by claiming Ryle is question-begging on a causal story-- causes are different from their effects, so non-human-action causes can effect a human-action. (pg6-8) Author then also critiques Aristotle because of his claim that one's ethical character is reflected at all times in one's rational appetite (a necessary component for choice and action). Thus weakness of the will is not chosen-- an unappealing result. (pg8) An enduring lesson from Aristotle is that humans only act on what they think it is possible for them to do.
Aquinas systematized and cleaned up Aristotle's theory, naming the faculty that hosts the rational appetite 'the will'. Importantly, Aquinas also created an 'intention', which wills an end through a means. But the intention is for the ends; a 'choice' is for the means. (pg9) Author considers that the concept of causation used here is not the same as its 'post-Humean relative': the ancient causal theory is one of essences within objects activating changes in other objects, rather than 'nomological relation between events'. (pg10) This raises the challenge to the causal account of human action raised by Wittgenstein and Ryle (again), namely that it is semantic-mental relations, not physical causes, that underwrite human action. (pg10-11) Author points out, however, that semantic relations can enter into causal ones and he will continue to interpret the progress in terms of causation. (pg12)
The next part of the paper deals with the opacity of intentions, e.g. Oedipus intending to kill the stranger that insulted him, but not intending to kill his father, even though the insulting stranger and his father are the same person (though he didn't know it). (pg12-16) Here Frege enters with his analysis of referents in opaque conditions (indirect reference) and he adds an important feature to the theory: 'an action as an individual event cannot be intended. It is intended only to the extent that it makes true a proposition that is intended' (pg15) Thus the addition that an action is to make true a proposition that it intends. Author also considers wayward causation problems (pg16-19) as well. His (and Frankfurt's) solution is adding a proviso: the bodily movements (or mental processes) that are supposed to accomplish a particular end depend on my intending to move (or think) them in order to make the particular end happen. (pg18-19)
The last problem in the causal theory of human action that the author deals with is the problem of what parts of a causal sequence are included in a human action. Do we include the effects of an action in it? Do we include the causes? (pg19-20) Hornsby argues for including the causes of human actions in the action itself, a break, author claims, from Aristotle. According to Donagan, Aristotle claimed that the act of intending and then choosing causes a human action, but isn't a human action itself. Hornsby's mistake, according to author, is of narrating an event rather than looking for the specific bodily movements that the action consisted in. (pg20-21)
The other part of this problem is that an intention seems to effect an action, but an intention forms in the brain and therefore effects just a bunch of neuro-electrical signals. Maybe; but add this to the claim that the effects of actions aren't included in the actions themselves and it seems to claim that overt bodily movements (that are the effects of neuro-electical signals) aren't part of a human action! (pg20-21). Excluding effects from the analysis of actions separates bodily movements from actions, since they are the far-end causal effects of many internal physical processes (pg21). Author's solution is to remember Frege's proviso on actions: intending in action is not intending the occurring effects, but a proposition those effects make true. (pg22) Finally, the author brings to bear Aquinas' treatment of choices for means and intentions for ends on the problem of how to include seemingly peripheral bodily movements into human actions. (pg23)
1/23/09
Restall, Greg - What Does Pittsburgh Have to Do with Canberra?
01/23/2009
rough draft of paper given May 1, 2008
This is a paper that attempts to connect proof theory and the pragmatic semantics of inference to the philosophical notions of metaphysical necessity, analyticity, and a priori knowledge (pg2). The paper begins by reviewing the origins of author's particular brand of pragmatism, birthed by Wittgenstein's 'meaning is use' injunction but interpreted by Brandom as a normative exhortation: what x means is how one should use x e.g. in an assertion or denial (pg2-3). The pragmatic elements author borrows from Gentzen, where traditional forms of contradiction are read as 'self-defeating' (rather than, perhaps, metaphysically impossible). (pg3) The validity of logical consequence is that it gives license to inference; thus, author seeks to connect (or perhaps, underwrite) the semantics of a term with normative pragmatism in logic. (pg3-6)
There are three 'triangular' concepts in philosophy that author wants to connect together through his logic. They are:
-Metaphysical necessity (using modality)
-A priori knowability
-Analyticity, or the framework that underwrite analytic truth
Author gives a little history of these concepts in philosophy since Kant (pg6-8). Of keen interest was Kripke's version of necessary a posteriori. Author claims this is a kind of necessity but not as robust as we're accustomed to since it may be metaphysical but not epistemological. (pg8) Author thinks this prompts Davies & Humberstone to give a 'two-dimensional semantics' where there is a distinction in possible world semantics between: (pg8-9)
-When we consider what the actual world might be like (epistemic possibility)
-How other worlds are different from (or the same as) the actual one (metaphysical possibility)
Thus worlds that might be metaphysically impossible (1 dimension of necessity) might still be epistemically possible-- we don't know that it's impossible (yet, or at all). Author uses the work of Jackson and Chalmers to extend this discussion into the metaphysical/epistemic (Davies & Humberstone don't use that distinction when talking about their two dimensions of modality), but also believes that Chalmers gets it wrong on the value of this distinction between metaphysical modality and epistemic modality. Author also believes that 2-d semantics doesn't give a proper account of what a possible world is. (pg 9-10)
For a re-framing of the 2-d semantics, author turns to inferentialism. He tries to connect the a priori with considering what other worlds might be like (metaphysical possibility) independent of what we know is or isn't the case. Author considers this 'indicative supposition' (pg10-13). Then there is 'subjunctive supposition', which works when you're 'planning' action-- it doesn't matter what is metaphysically true or not, the only thing that matters is what you know or believe (epistemic possibility) (pg13-14). This connects to necessity in the Kripkean sense: H2O is necessarily water because of how we are going to treat H2O and water in all possible worlds... [?]
Author concludes with some summaries of his arguments and by acknowledging that his theory relies on cognitive psychology for its verification. (pg15)
-When we consider what the actual world might be like (epistemic possibility)
-How other worlds are different from (or the same as) the actual one (metaphysical possibility)
Thus worlds that might be metaphysically impossible (1 dimension of necessity) might still be epistemically possible-- we don't know that it's impossible (yet, or at all). Author uses the work of Jackson and Chalmers to extend this discussion into the metaphysical/epistemic (Davies & Humberstone don't use that distinction when talking about their two dimensions of modality), but also believes that Chalmers gets it wrong on the value of this distinction between metaphysical modality and epistemic modality. Author also believes that 2-d semantics doesn't give a proper account of what a possible world is. (pg 9-10)
For a re-framing of the 2-d semantics, author turns to inferentialism. He tries to connect the a priori with considering what other worlds might be like (metaphysical possibility) independent of what we know is or isn't the case. Author considers this 'indicative supposition' (pg10-13). Then there is 'subjunctive supposition', which works when you're 'planning' action-- it doesn't matter what is metaphysically true or not, the only thing that matters is what you know or believe (epistemic possibility) (pg13-14). This connects to necessity in the Kripkean sense: H2O is necessarily water because of how we are going to treat H2O and water in all possible worlds... [?]
Author concludes with some summaries of his arguments and by acknowledging that his theory relies on cognitive psychology for its verification. (pg15)
12/19/08
Royce, Josiah - The Problem of Christianity Chapters 2, 9 and 13
12/19/2008
Edition with Introduction by John E Smith
The selections from chapter 2 and is about the problem of the composition and identity of a community. Author first seeks to establish that there are genuine creations of a community that reflect intelligence but cannot be reduced to the creations of any of the individuals, e.g. customs, language, religion. Author claims that the appropriate unit here is that of the community, which will have psychological laws (and deserving of certain moral treatment) all of its own. In chapter 9 author lays out the objections to this view, that of the many composing the one, and specifically how there are three parts of an individual that seem un-malleable: (VII)
1) we have an intimate connection to our own feelings and not to those of others
2) we have an intimate connection to our own thoughts and not to those of others
3) our deeds are done individually, by my own will for which I am only responsible
Author believes this final feature is the one of the most moral significance and complicates it by suggesting there are times when, in the throes of a mob or collective, you do something that didn't originate from your own considered judgment but instead from group 'ethical pluralism'. Author discusses how James was forced to concede that there were times when individuals became part of a larger collective, yet author doesn't believe that James had found the appropriate identifying conditions. (VIII-IX) The aspect of a group that makes it a community is an analog to the aspect of a present human organism that makes it a self: a sense of history and self-conscious placement within that history. (X-XI) The individual interprets its history and projects its future, just as it places itself within a history that it shares with the community's history. Author calls this a 'community of memory'.
Chapter 13 deals with interpretation, starting with a 'community of interpretation' in the sciences. Before a particular scientists' work is adopted into the general consensus of knowledge, it must be accepted by the scientific community in general, specifically they must understand and interpret what data she used and how her conclusions relate to the rest of scientific knowledge. This is a 'triadic' process (II-VI) where the individual scientist relates her concepts about the world to others, who then relate their concepts to her concepts and then to the world-- a method of interpretation. Author uses the example of two men in a row boat: neither can confirm the others' peculiar perspective, so therefore the real properties real row boat is a matter of interpreting their different perceptions in a communal space about the real row boat. (V)
The second part of the chapter seeks to underwrite the how necessary is the existence of the community of interpretation. Author does this by making it requisite for the existence of the real world. There are two general theses in metaphysics, author calls them 'the idea of present experience and the idea of the goal of experience' (XII). This is a version of a becoming/being or appearance/Reality distinction. The goal of metaphysics is to interpret these thesis into a working model: to interpret. Yet interpretation takes a communal nature, especially when 'no man should be a judge in his own case' especially when there is a social, communal interest in the outcome. (III-IV) Thus the interpretation of the real world and a community of interpretation are intricately related and as sure as we are there is a real world, we also presuppose a community of interpretation.
Edition with Introduction by John E Smith
The selections from chapter 2 and is about the problem of the composition and identity of a community. Author first seeks to establish that there are genuine creations of a community that reflect intelligence but cannot be reduced to the creations of any of the individuals, e.g. customs, language, religion. Author claims that the appropriate unit here is that of the community, which will have psychological laws (and deserving of certain moral treatment) all of its own. In chapter 9 author lays out the objections to this view, that of the many composing the one, and specifically how there are three parts of an individual that seem un-malleable: (VII)
1) we have an intimate connection to our own feelings and not to those of others
2) we have an intimate connection to our own thoughts and not to those of others
3) our deeds are done individually, by my own will for which I am only responsible
Author believes this final feature is the one of the most moral significance and complicates it by suggesting there are times when, in the throes of a mob or collective, you do something that didn't originate from your own considered judgment but instead from group 'ethical pluralism'. Author discusses how James was forced to concede that there were times when individuals became part of a larger collective, yet author doesn't believe that James had found the appropriate identifying conditions. (VIII-IX) The aspect of a group that makes it a community is an analog to the aspect of a present human organism that makes it a self: a sense of history and self-conscious placement within that history. (X-XI) The individual interprets its history and projects its future, just as it places itself within a history that it shares with the community's history. Author calls this a 'community of memory'.
Chapter 13 deals with interpretation, starting with a 'community of interpretation' in the sciences. Before a particular scientists' work is adopted into the general consensus of knowledge, it must be accepted by the scientific community in general, specifically they must understand and interpret what data she used and how her conclusions relate to the rest of scientific knowledge. This is a 'triadic' process (II-VI) where the individual scientist relates her concepts about the world to others, who then relate their concepts to her concepts and then to the world-- a method of interpretation. Author uses the example of two men in a row boat: neither can confirm the others' peculiar perspective, so therefore the real properties real row boat is a matter of interpreting their different perceptions in a communal space about the real row boat. (V)
The second part of the chapter seeks to underwrite the how necessary is the existence of the community of interpretation. Author does this by making it requisite for the existence of the real world. There are two general theses in metaphysics, author calls them 'the idea of present experience and the idea of the goal of experience' (XII). This is a version of a becoming/being or appearance/Reality distinction. The goal of metaphysics is to interpret these thesis into a working model: to interpret. Yet interpretation takes a communal nature, especially when 'no man should be a judge in his own case' especially when there is a social, communal interest in the outcome. (III-IV) Thus the interpretation of the real world and a community of interpretation are intricately related and as sure as we are there is a real world, we also presuppose a community of interpretation.
12/12/08
Davidson, Donald - Interpretation: Hard In Theory, Easy In Practice
12/12/2008
Paper given in 1998
The paper tries to establish the mutual dependence of language and thought, more aptly conceptualization. When comparing with a form of conceptual atomism (Fodor), author distinguishes between having a concept which is 'simply to discriminate objects or properties of one sort or another' and 'plac[ing] objects in[to] a category' (pg2), the latter being the approach he prefers. To place something into a category is to 'opine that it belongs there, and opnions are prone to error, they are true or false, and they are in part identified by their relations to other judgments' (pg2)
The paper wanders through the typical problems of interpreting another's propositional content from their speech.(pg3-4) With the example of a non-human animal that is able to discriminate between colors, author want to know how we can eliminate the possiblity that it 'isn't the activation of certain rods and cones in his eyes, or the firing of certain optic nerves...' instead of color. If we can't distinguish between the various possible causes for the parrot (Alex's) response, then we can't determine the content of the answer. But if we cannot attribute content to Alex, then we can't attribute thought, since there is no thought without content. (pg4-5)
Interestingly, in this paper Davidson retracts his Swampman argument, claming that 'science fiction stories that imagine thigs that never happen provide poor testing ground for our intuitions concerning concepts like the concept of a person' (pg6)
Author tours through a brief history of the various realist and nominalist positions from Plato to Quine, then concludes that there is a difference between 'showing, by one's behavior, that one merely responds to perceptual similarities, and that one has a criterion for grouping things found perceptually similar.' (pg10) To have a concept 'is to be able to judge, that is, believe, that something falls under the concept. Having a concept is like knowing what a predicate means... in other words, no concepts without propositional contents'. (pg10-11)
So how do we attribute these to people or non-human animals? We can know that propositional attitudes like belief are also related to intentions, perceptions, memories, desires, hopes, etc (pg11), so finding any will give us reason to assume the rest (pg11). Author briefly sketches his triangulation argument, that we're given reason to attribute conceptualization when we encounter not just animals that perceive (pg12) but also ones that recognize when they make mistakes, that is, can distinguish between objective conditions and their categorizations. Not only this, but 'it seems likely that a mind cannot accpt the idea of error without some notion of how error is to be explained. We know of no way all this can be shared by creatures except through the use of language' (pg13). Language and thought become interdependent, with true conceptualization arising 'only in a social setting, and in that setting conceptualization and thought emerge accompanied by the development of language' (pg14).
Paper given in 1998
The paper tries to establish the mutual dependence of language and thought, more aptly conceptualization. When comparing with a form of conceptual atomism (Fodor), author distinguishes between having a concept which is 'simply to discriminate objects or properties of one sort or another' and 'plac[ing] objects in[to] a category' (pg2), the latter being the approach he prefers. To place something into a category is to 'opine that it belongs there, and opnions are prone to error, they are true or false, and they are in part identified by their relations to other judgments' (pg2)
The paper wanders through the typical problems of interpreting another's propositional content from their speech.(pg3-4) With the example of a non-human animal that is able to discriminate between colors, author want to know how we can eliminate the possiblity that it 'isn't the activation of certain rods and cones in his eyes, or the firing of certain optic nerves...' instead of color. If we can't distinguish between the various possible causes for the parrot (Alex's) response, then we can't determine the content of the answer. But if we cannot attribute content to Alex, then we can't attribute thought, since there is no thought without content. (pg4-5)
Interestingly, in this paper Davidson retracts his Swampman argument, claming that 'science fiction stories that imagine thigs that never happen provide poor testing ground for our intuitions concerning concepts like the concept of a person' (pg6)
Author tours through a brief history of the various realist and nominalist positions from Plato to Quine, then concludes that there is a difference between 'showing, by one's behavior, that one merely responds to perceptual similarities, and that one has a criterion for grouping things found perceptually similar.' (pg10) To have a concept 'is to be able to judge, that is, believe, that something falls under the concept. Having a concept is like knowing what a predicate means... in other words, no concepts without propositional contents'. (pg10-11)
So how do we attribute these to people or non-human animals? We can know that propositional attitudes like belief are also related to intentions, perceptions, memories, desires, hopes, etc (pg11), so finding any will give us reason to assume the rest (pg11). Author briefly sketches his triangulation argument, that we're given reason to attribute conceptualization when we encounter not just animals that perceive (pg12) but also ones that recognize when they make mistakes, that is, can distinguish between objective conditions and their categorizations. Not only this, but 'it seems likely that a mind cannot accpt the idea of error without some notion of how error is to be explained. We know of no way all this can be shared by creatures except through the use of language' (pg13). Language and thought become interdependent, with true conceptualization arising 'only in a social setting, and in that setting conceptualization and thought emerge accompanied by the development of language' (pg14).
12/5/08
Davidson, Donald - Mental Events
12/05/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 11 Clarendon Press 1980
In this essay author lays out the support for the theory of anamalous monism, which is needed because he wants to make the following triad consistent:
1) At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.
2) Where there is causality, there is a description of deterministic lawfulness.
3) There are no strict deterministic laws that predict or explain mental events.
These seem inconsistent and all plausible. The first part of the paper deals with giving a view of physicalism that is consistent with 3. Author lays out an identity theory where mental events are identical to physical ones, and events are tokens 'unrepeatable, dated individuals'. (pg209) There is some difficulty with including bona fide mental events among all the physical ones. (pg210-12) Author proposes to consider intentionality as the criterion. (pg211) The downside of this approach is that it denies there are 'strict laws connecting the mental and the physical', a kind-kind identity (pg212-13). The different kinds of of monism and dualism are described, with author taking anamalous monism and briefly describing it.
The second part of the paper defends the downside of the theory that there are no strict psychophysical laws. This seems to be a case of philosophy encroaching on science, which author wants to deny. (pg216-219) Author uses an analogy of how using behaviorism in trying to define belief has failed us, and that a more general point is that the holism in interpretation of the mental is what restricts the possibility of psychophysical laws. Author also delves into the grue / bleen problem. Author lays out a distinction between homonomic and heteronomic generalizations, heteronomic being ones that, in order to describe the lawfulness of a generalization, needs to shift between vocabularies. (pg219) Author discusses the problem of 'longer-than': it is only a problem until there are a whole 'set of axioms, laws or postulates', e.g., the idea of rigid, macroscopic objects that 'longer-than' is a part of, that underwrite lawlike statements of the physical sciences. (pg221) The ideal in the physical sciences is to have a homonomic set of descriptions, yet much of it is still heteronomic, especially all the areas that link the mental to the physical. (pg221-2) 'There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence' (pg222).
The last part of the paper proves the identity of the mental to the physical, or at least those mental events that cause physical ones and vice versa. Mental events that enter into causal relations with physical ones must be subject to physical law (of causation), thus have a physical description, hence is physical. (pg224) Note that this only works for mental events that interact with physical ones via causation.
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 11 Clarendon Press 1980
In this essay author lays out the support for the theory of anamalous monism, which is needed because he wants to make the following triad consistent:
1) At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.
2) Where there is causality, there is a description of deterministic lawfulness.
3) There are no strict deterministic laws that predict or explain mental events.
These seem inconsistent and all plausible. The first part of the paper deals with giving a view of physicalism that is consistent with 3. Author lays out an identity theory where mental events are identical to physical ones, and events are tokens 'unrepeatable, dated individuals'. (pg209) There is some difficulty with including bona fide mental events among all the physical ones. (pg210-12) Author proposes to consider intentionality as the criterion. (pg211) The downside of this approach is that it denies there are 'strict laws connecting the mental and the physical', a kind-kind identity (pg212-13). The different kinds of of monism and dualism are described, with author taking anamalous monism and briefly describing it.
The second part of the paper defends the downside of the theory that there are no strict psychophysical laws. This seems to be a case of philosophy encroaching on science, which author wants to deny. (pg216-219) Author uses an analogy of how using behaviorism in trying to define belief has failed us, and that a more general point is that the holism in interpretation of the mental is what restricts the possibility of psychophysical laws. Author also delves into the grue / bleen problem. Author lays out a distinction between homonomic and heteronomic generalizations, heteronomic being ones that, in order to describe the lawfulness of a generalization, needs to shift between vocabularies. (pg219) Author discusses the problem of 'longer-than': it is only a problem until there are a whole 'set of axioms, laws or postulates', e.g., the idea of rigid, macroscopic objects that 'longer-than' is a part of, that underwrite lawlike statements of the physical sciences. (pg221) The ideal in the physical sciences is to have a homonomic set of descriptions, yet much of it is still heteronomic, especially all the areas that link the mental to the physical. (pg221-2) 'There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence' (pg222).
The last part of the paper proves the identity of the mental to the physical, or at least those mental events that cause physical ones and vice versa. Mental events that enter into causal relations with physical ones must be subject to physical law (of causation), thus have a physical description, hence is physical. (pg224) Note that this only works for mental events that interact with physical ones via causation.
11/21/08
Davidson, Donald - Intending
11/21/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 5 Clarendon Press 1980
A landmark essay that begins with a distinction between having an intention and forming an intention. Author gives the first take on his idea of acting with an intention: you act for a reason. The difference is brought out in the following examples: (pg83-85)
1) His reason for boarding a plane marked 'London' was that he wanted to board a plane headed for London, England, and he believed the plane marked 'London' was going there.
2) His intention in boarding the plane marked 'London' was to board a plane headed for London, England.
Author comments that 1) entails 2), but not necessarily 2) entails 1). Also, the belief in 1) is opaque-- you can't substitute into it (for instance, if the plane marked 'London' was going to London, Ontario). Yet the plane in 2) is transparent. Author also suggests that the 'intention in boarding the plane marked...' is opaque. (pg85) Reasons comprised of beliefs and pro-attitude 'value judgments' (pg86) underwrite intentions, though many intentional actions aren't done by actively forming an intention. (pg85) The problem with this traditional account is intervening causation that manages to perform the action but not for the right reasons. (pg87) A more fruitful discussion of intention might be better served by looking at 'pure intending', that is, intending without accompanied by action. (pg88)
--Is pure intending an action? Not in the performative sense. (pg89-91)
--Is intending to act a belief that one will do so? This is tricky. Adding 'if I can' to an intention is superfluous, unless it is an overt speech act to reduce the probability of your intention happening. (pg92-3) Yet an intention might be formed even when you believe it will be difficult, or unlikely, that you'll complete the action. (pg95)
--Is intending to do something the same as wanting to do it? Here we have a problem from Anscombe where the desire to eat something sweet might be expressed as a law-like generalization that will make tons of variegated actions as desirable (e.g. eating candy laced with poison). 'The trouble about pure intending is that there is no action to judge simply good or desirable' (pg97) Author proposes that actions that are desirable in a certain attribute (e.g. sweet-eating) are prima facie judgments. There must be a further judgment that this attribute is enough to act on, an all-out judgment that results in 'This action is desirable' (pg98). Having specificity is very important because it picks from the class of possible actions one particular action that can be evaluated (pg96). Pure intending (an all-out judgment) for a certain action type is also possible if there are background beliefs and conditions that will avoid undesirable actions. (pg98)
Lastly, author clears up the earlier issue of 'if I can' and such: an all-out judgment about what is desirable is held 'given the rest of what I believe about the immediate future'. (pg99-100) Author also distinguishes from intentions and wishes, aside from wishes not consistent with what one believes is possible, there is little to distinguish them, except the assertion that intentions are 'not mere' wishes (pg101).
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 5 Clarendon Press 1980
A landmark essay that begins with a distinction between having an intention and forming an intention. Author gives the first take on his idea of acting with an intention: you act for a reason. The difference is brought out in the following examples: (pg83-85)
1) His reason for boarding a plane marked 'London' was that he wanted to board a plane headed for London, England, and he believed the plane marked 'London' was going there.
2) His intention in boarding the plane marked 'London' was to board a plane headed for London, England.
Author comments that 1) entails 2), but not necessarily 2) entails 1). Also, the belief in 1) is opaque-- you can't substitute into it (for instance, if the plane marked 'London' was going to London, Ontario). Yet the plane in 2) is transparent. Author also suggests that the 'intention in boarding the plane marked...' is opaque. (pg85) Reasons comprised of beliefs and pro-attitude 'value judgments' (pg86) underwrite intentions, though many intentional actions aren't done by actively forming an intention. (pg85) The problem with this traditional account is intervening causation that manages to perform the action but not for the right reasons. (pg87) A more fruitful discussion of intention might be better served by looking at 'pure intending', that is, intending without accompanied by action. (pg88)
--Is pure intending an action? Not in the performative sense. (pg89-91)
--Is intending to act a belief that one will do so? This is tricky. Adding 'if I can' to an intention is superfluous, unless it is an overt speech act to reduce the probability of your intention happening. (pg92-3) Yet an intention might be formed even when you believe it will be difficult, or unlikely, that you'll complete the action. (pg95)
--Is intending to do something the same as wanting to do it? Here we have a problem from Anscombe where the desire to eat something sweet might be expressed as a law-like generalization that will make tons of variegated actions as desirable (e.g. eating candy laced with poison). 'The trouble about pure intending is that there is no action to judge simply good or desirable' (pg97) Author proposes that actions that are desirable in a certain attribute (e.g. sweet-eating) are prima facie judgments. There must be a further judgment that this attribute is enough to act on, an all-out judgment that results in 'This action is desirable' (pg98). Having specificity is very important because it picks from the class of possible actions one particular action that can be evaluated (pg96). Pure intending (an all-out judgment) for a certain action type is also possible if there are background beliefs and conditions that will avoid undesirable actions. (pg98)
Lastly, author clears up the earlier issue of 'if I can' and such: an all-out judgment about what is desirable is held 'given the rest of what I believe about the immediate future'. (pg99-100) Author also distinguishes from intentions and wishes, aside from wishes not consistent with what one believes is possible, there is little to distinguish them, except the assertion that intentions are 'not mere' wishes (pg101).
11/14/08
Davidson, Donald - How is Weakness of the Will Possible?
11/14/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 2 Clarendon Press 1980
A reprinting of a paper where author tries to deal with the logical problem of weakness of the will in intentional actions. Davidson first decides this is the same as incontinence (pg21-2), and gives a definition: (pg22)
A acts incontinently iff: A does x intentionally; A believes that y is open to him; A judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than x.
The problem is that an intentional action seems to be one done once all things are considered. There seems to be an inconsistent triad:
P1) If A wants x more than y and can do either and acts intentionally, A will do x over y
P2) If A judges that it's better to do x than y, A will want to do x more than y
P3) There are incontinent actions
Author doesn't want to pick away at these premises, but instead largely affirm them and also claim they aren't inconsistent. (pg23-4)
I. What follows is a discussion largely about the nature of intentional action, how it's opaque to substitution (pg25), how it is independent from moralizing (pg29-30), how it doesn't argue for any particular meta-ethical theory (pg26). Author also argues strongly that we must resist the temptation to reject P2 (pg27-8).
II. Author discusses Aristotle's practical syllogism and Aquinas' account of the incontinent man. (pg31-3) This leads to a specific point: even if we get rid of the multiple sources for desire, just within, say, the desire to act morally and only morally there can be conflict. Author rejects the 'single principle' solution. (pg34) In Aristotle, Aquinas and Hare, the battle is between two forces, one wins. In Plato and Butler and perhaps Dante, there are three actors: the two forces, and then another, 'the will' or 'conscience' that decides which wins. (pg35-6)
The solution to the problem of incontinence is to hold that there is a prima facie judgment based on a set of reasons that holds x desirable, but there is another, all-things-considered judgment based on a set of reasons (that includes the earlier set) that holds y more desirable. A performs x, and there is no logical contradition between an all-things-considered (universalized) judgment and a prima facie one. (pg37-39) 'If we are to have a coherent theory of practical reason, we must give up the idea that we can detacth conclusions about what is desirable ... from the principles that lend those conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things' (pg37)
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 2 Clarendon Press 1980
A reprinting of a paper where author tries to deal with the logical problem of weakness of the will in intentional actions. Davidson first decides this is the same as incontinence (pg21-2), and gives a definition: (pg22)
A acts incontinently iff: A does x intentionally; A believes that y is open to him; A judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than x.
The problem is that an intentional action seems to be one done once all things are considered. There seems to be an inconsistent triad:
P1) If A wants x more than y and can do either and acts intentionally, A will do x over y
P2) If A judges that it's better to do x than y, A will want to do x more than y
P3) There are incontinent actions
Author doesn't want to pick away at these premises, but instead largely affirm them and also claim they aren't inconsistent. (pg23-4)
I. What follows is a discussion largely about the nature of intentional action, how it's opaque to substitution (pg25), how it is independent from moralizing (pg29-30), how it doesn't argue for any particular meta-ethical theory (pg26). Author also argues strongly that we must resist the temptation to reject P2 (pg27-8).
II. Author discusses Aristotle's practical syllogism and Aquinas' account of the incontinent man. (pg31-3) This leads to a specific point: even if we get rid of the multiple sources for desire, just within, say, the desire to act morally and only morally there can be conflict. Author rejects the 'single principle' solution. (pg34) In Aristotle, Aquinas and Hare, the battle is between two forces, one wins. In Plato and Butler and perhaps Dante, there are three actors: the two forces, and then another, 'the will' or 'conscience' that decides which wins. (pg35-6)
The solution to the problem of incontinence is to hold that there is a prima facie judgment based on a set of reasons that holds x desirable, but there is another, all-things-considered judgment based on a set of reasons (that includes the earlier set) that holds y more desirable. A performs x, and there is no logical contradition between an all-things-considered (universalized) judgment and a prima facie one. (pg37-39) 'If we are to have a coherent theory of practical reason, we must give up the idea that we can detacth conclusions about what is desirable ... from the principles that lend those conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things' (pg37)
11/7/08
Davidson, Donald - Actions, Reasons, and Causes
11/07/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 23 1963
An oldie where the main argument is that reasons for action are causes for action. Reasons 'rationalize' action by showing: (pg685)
a) a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind
b) believing one's actions are of this kind
These two combine to form a 'primary reason' for why an agent performed an action. (pg686) The paper then describes how to construct a primary reason, and then argues that a primary reason for an action is the action's cause.
Author discusses how, in general, primary reasons are given and how they should be given. (pg686-690) Further discussion is spent defending against some small technicalities: justifying isn't the same as giving reasons (pg691), and that re-describing reasons doesn't rule out reasons being causes. (pg691-3)
Lastly is the defense for the thesis that a primary reason for an action is its cause.
The objections:
A. Causes are events, and mental states aren't events.
Reply: there are mental events that are almost always part of primary reasons
B. Effects and Causes must be logically distinct, primary reasons aren't distinct from their actions
Reply: logically they are, even though, perhaps, they aren't always distinct grammatically (see pg687-8)
C. Causes relate to Effects by a lawlike generality, there are no such available in actions
Reply: true, but the trouble here is that you're looking for laws among the wrong kinds of things
D. Knowledge of Cause and Effect is inductive, but self-knowledge about reasons isn't
Reply: this isn't essential to causes and effects
E. Talking about causes of actions is weird, either removing the agent or involving infinite regress
Reply: not when you use reasons as causes!
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 23 1963
An oldie where the main argument is that reasons for action are causes for action. Reasons 'rationalize' action by showing: (pg685)
a) a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind
b) believing one's actions are of this kind
These two combine to form a 'primary reason' for why an agent performed an action. (pg686) The paper then describes how to construct a primary reason, and then argues that a primary reason for an action is the action's cause.
Author discusses how, in general, primary reasons are given and how they should be given. (pg686-690) Further discussion is spent defending against some small technicalities: justifying isn't the same as giving reasons (pg691), and that re-describing reasons doesn't rule out reasons being causes. (pg691-3)
Lastly is the defense for the thesis that a primary reason for an action is its cause.
The objections:
A. Causes are events, and mental states aren't events.
Reply: there are mental events that are almost always part of primary reasons
B. Effects and Causes must be logically distinct, primary reasons aren't distinct from their actions
Reply: logically they are, even though, perhaps, they aren't always distinct grammatically (see pg687-8)
C. Causes relate to Effects by a lawlike generality, there are no such available in actions
Reply: true, but the trouble here is that you're looking for laws among the wrong kinds of things
D. Knowledge of Cause and Effect is inductive, but self-knowledge about reasons isn't
Reply: this isn't essential to causes and effects
E. Talking about causes of actions is weird, either removing the agent or involving infinite regress
Reply: not when you use reasons as causes!
10/31/08
Smith, Michael - The Explanatory Role Of Being Rational
10/31/2008
This paper starts with a discussion of the classical Humean description of action, as being a belief and a desire put together in a particular causal way to produce an action. Author argues that there is actually another piece to this story, that the agent so doing is instrumentally rational. So, put this way we have:
a desire for an end + a means-ends belief + instrumental rationality = an action
Roughly, this corresponds to Hempel's deductivist claim about what schema action needs to conform to: (pg90)
1- Actor was in situation of type C
2- A was a rational agent
3- In a type C situation, any rational agent will do X
Conclusion: A does X
Author quotes Hempel, who defends this schema. (pg91-2) The instrumental rationality isn't just having the capacity, it's exercising it. (pg94-5)
This approach was criticized by Davidson, who claimed that instrumental rationality is the background assumption of action, not a peculiar constitutive element. (pg96-8) Author responds to this point by discussing a problem that Davidson himself had: that of 'wayward internal causation' (pg100-1). This is where the appropriate belief and desire are formed but something else ends up causing the intended action. The consensus on a fix of this is to use modal propositions about how the agent would have behaved under slight variations in the situation. Author argues this already imports elements of very local instrumental rationality. (pg101-2)
Author wants to expand this local rationality to mean a larger kind of rationality altogether (pg102). For this author uses a thought experiment of a John, who has a desire to be healthy and believes that flexing his bicep will do so, but so will flexing his triceps.(pg102-8) Good instrumental rationality should assign equal preference for either action if both are equally salubrious, lesser if one is lesser, etc.
The second part of the paper considers how rationality might play a non-constitutive part in action, namely playing a part in forming beliefs and forming desires. (pg110-120) Here there can be rational ways to form means-ends beliefs, and less rational ways. But what of desires? Surely a Humean will deny rational ways to form desires. Author here tries to convince us that we can appeal to reason about what we should desire in a non-instrumental way (pg116-121), perhaps showing that some situations are 'reason-giving'. The schema would go as follows:
1- A was in situation of type E
2- A was a rational subject
3- In a situation of type E and rational agent will desire the end that Q
Conclusion: A rationally desired the end that Q
This paper starts with a discussion of the classical Humean description of action, as being a belief and a desire put together in a particular causal way to produce an action. Author argues that there is actually another piece to this story, that the agent so doing is instrumentally rational. So, put this way we have:
a desire for an end + a means-ends belief + instrumental rationality = an action
Roughly, this corresponds to Hempel's deductivist claim about what schema action needs to conform to: (pg90)
1- Actor was in situation of type C
2- A was a rational agent
3- In a type C situation, any rational agent will do X
Conclusion: A does X
Author quotes Hempel, who defends this schema. (pg91-2) The instrumental rationality isn't just having the capacity, it's exercising it. (pg94-5)
This approach was criticized by Davidson, who claimed that instrumental rationality is the background assumption of action, not a peculiar constitutive element. (pg96-8) Author responds to this point by discussing a problem that Davidson himself had: that of 'wayward internal causation' (pg100-1). This is where the appropriate belief and desire are formed but something else ends up causing the intended action. The consensus on a fix of this is to use modal propositions about how the agent would have behaved under slight variations in the situation. Author argues this already imports elements of very local instrumental rationality. (pg101-2)
Author wants to expand this local rationality to mean a larger kind of rationality altogether (pg102). For this author uses a thought experiment of a John, who has a desire to be healthy and believes that flexing his bicep will do so, but so will flexing his triceps.(pg102-8) Good instrumental rationality should assign equal preference for either action if both are equally salubrious, lesser if one is lesser, etc.
The second part of the paper considers how rationality might play a non-constitutive part in action, namely playing a part in forming beliefs and forming desires. (pg110-120) Here there can be rational ways to form means-ends beliefs, and less rational ways. But what of desires? Surely a Humean will deny rational ways to form desires. Author here tries to convince us that we can appeal to reason about what we should desire in a non-instrumental way (pg116-121), perhaps showing that some situations are 'reason-giving'. The schema would go as follows:
1- A was in situation of type E
2- A was a rational subject
3- In a situation of type E and rational agent will desire the end that Q
Conclusion: A rationally desired the end that Q
10/23/08
Fish, Stanley - Buttons and Bows
10/24/2008
New York Times, October 12, 2008
An article in the secular media about a few examples of teachers in public schools and publicly funded educational institutions being restricted by the administration from wearing buttons that endorse candidates. Author describes the potential US Constitutional issues here regarding free speech, refers to the supreme court case of Tinker v Des Moines where a test is given about restrictions on free speech: does it 'materially disrupt the work and discipline of the school'? In many cases of students' speech, the answer is no. Author argues that the teacher's displaying his/her views may alter the way a student studies, writes papers, etc. Author argues that teachers aren't restricted from wearing buttons outside of the classroom, just inside where they prime duties are to teach, not to proselytize.
New York Times, October 12, 2008
An article in the secular media about a few examples of teachers in public schools and publicly funded educational institutions being restricted by the administration from wearing buttons that endorse candidates. Author describes the potential US Constitutional issues here regarding free speech, refers to the supreme court case of Tinker v Des Moines where a test is given about restrictions on free speech: does it 'materially disrupt the work and discipline of the school'? In many cases of students' speech, the answer is no. Author argues that the teacher's displaying his/her views may alter the way a student studies, writes papers, etc. Author argues that teachers aren't restricted from wearing buttons outside of the classroom, just inside where they prime duties are to teach, not to proselytize.
10/17/08
Nichols, Shaun & Knobe, Joshua - Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuition
10/17/2008
Nous, vol 41 number 4 2007
This paper explores how affect plays a role in evaluating moral responsibility. Here the debate is framed in a way to shed some light on an age-old debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism in moral theory. Compatibilism is the theory that moral agency is compatible with a deterministic universe. Incompatibilism is the opposite: moral agency doesn't wholly apply if we live in a deterministic universe. Philosophers have relied on different bits of psychological and anecdotal evidence for claiming that people are either largely compatibilists or largely incompatibilists.
The paper seeks to show that in some contexts people come out as incompatibilists, yet in others they are strongly compatibilist. The difference comes out instead when affective responses are elicited in a description of a hypothetical where subjects have to assign moral responsibility. At times when the description is largely abstract and a deterministic world is posited, people reply with incompatibilist-type responses, largely alleviating moral responsibility. When a more concrete situation is described, using names and giving an identifying story to the moral hypothetical, people assign moral agency (or moral blame) and become compatibilists. (pg664-671) This effect becomes less pronounced as concrete hypotheticals become more terse and resemble short abstract hypotheticals. (pg670) Also of note is that people are more apt to give harsher punishments once the transgressor has been identified, rather than prior to that identification. (pg665)
Authors propose 3 distinct theories that could account for this phenomenon. (pg671-5) They are as follows:
Performance Error Model: affective responses distort people's judgments, making them unable to apply their theory of moral responsibility. Thus people are largely incompatibilists but readily assign moral responsibility when they have an affective response to a hypothetical. This has an affinity with people willing to hold people more responsible when they are experiencing even unrelated negative emotions.
Affective Competence Model: employing affective responses about moral situations is the core method by which moral judgments are reached, thus the abstract hypotheticals are problematic, not the concrete ones. Hence people are fundamentally compatibilist.
Concrete Competence Model: it is concreteness, not affect, that is the primary difference here; abstract hypotheticals fail to adequately signal the subject (or a special 'moral module' inside the subject) for a moral judgment, while concrete hypotheticals do.
Authors consider that hybrid answers are also possible, but they advocate one in particular: 'Affect serves both as part of the fundamental competence underlying responsibility judgments and as a factor that can sometimes lead to performance errors.' (pg674) Authors then try to show some other evidence that might eliminate one of the models, and possibly support their own hybrid theory.
The evidence offered (pg675-7) now dealt with two concrete hypotheticals, one 'high-affect' about rape and the other 'low-affect' about tax evasion. This experiement attempted to control for concreteness. The results were that people were compatibilists about rape but incompatibilists about tax evasion. The Affective Competence model might have a hard time accounting for the difference that is also revealed between a deterministic condition and a indeterministic-free-will condition.(pg676-7)
Lastly, authors examine how their findings might change the way philosophers view people's intuitions about (in)compatibilism. (pg677-680)
Nous, vol 41 number 4 2007
This paper explores how affect plays a role in evaluating moral responsibility. Here the debate is framed in a way to shed some light on an age-old debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism in moral theory. Compatibilism is the theory that moral agency is compatible with a deterministic universe. Incompatibilism is the opposite: moral agency doesn't wholly apply if we live in a deterministic universe. Philosophers have relied on different bits of psychological and anecdotal evidence for claiming that people are either largely compatibilists or largely incompatibilists.
The paper seeks to show that in some contexts people come out as incompatibilists, yet in others they are strongly compatibilist. The difference comes out instead when affective responses are elicited in a description of a hypothetical where subjects have to assign moral responsibility. At times when the description is largely abstract and a deterministic world is posited, people reply with incompatibilist-type responses, largely alleviating moral responsibility. When a more concrete situation is described, using names and giving an identifying story to the moral hypothetical, people assign moral agency (or moral blame) and become compatibilists. (pg664-671) This effect becomes less pronounced as concrete hypotheticals become more terse and resemble short abstract hypotheticals. (pg670) Also of note is that people are more apt to give harsher punishments once the transgressor has been identified, rather than prior to that identification. (pg665)
Authors propose 3 distinct theories that could account for this phenomenon. (pg671-5) They are as follows:
Performance Error Model: affective responses distort people's judgments, making them unable to apply their theory of moral responsibility. Thus people are largely incompatibilists but readily assign moral responsibility when they have an affective response to a hypothetical. This has an affinity with people willing to hold people more responsible when they are experiencing even unrelated negative emotions.
Affective Competence Model: employing affective responses about moral situations is the core method by which moral judgments are reached, thus the abstract hypotheticals are problematic, not the concrete ones. Hence people are fundamentally compatibilist.
Concrete Competence Model: it is concreteness, not affect, that is the primary difference here; abstract hypotheticals fail to adequately signal the subject (or a special 'moral module' inside the subject) for a moral judgment, while concrete hypotheticals do.
Authors consider that hybrid answers are also possible, but they advocate one in particular: 'Affect serves both as part of the fundamental competence underlying responsibility judgments and as a factor that can sometimes lead to performance errors.' (pg674) Authors then try to show some other evidence that might eliminate one of the models, and possibly support their own hybrid theory.
The evidence offered (pg675-7) now dealt with two concrete hypotheticals, one 'high-affect' about rape and the other 'low-affect' about tax evasion. This experiement attempted to control for concreteness. The results were that people were compatibilists about rape but incompatibilists about tax evasion. The Affective Competence model might have a hard time accounting for the difference that is also revealed between a deterministic condition and a indeterministic-free-will condition.(pg676-7)
Lastly, authors examine how their findings might change the way philosophers view people's intuitions about (in)compatibilism. (pg677-680)
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