Kraut, Richard - Aristotle on Human Good - An Overview

03/18/2011

This book chapter is a brief walk-through of the arguments author put forward in the book Aristotle on the Human Good. Author goes through the many issues around the structure of Aristotle's metaethical concepts, starting with the question of whether eudaimonia is inclusive of all intrinsic goods or if it is a singular-dominant intrinsic good. Author begins with considering the idea that eudaimonia is an inclusive good of many intrinsic ends, making it a (possibly conceptual) statement about ultimate ends. (pg80) Author believes this is a misreading of a famous passage about the self-sufficiency of eudaimonia (happiness for this author), where it is suggested that eudaimonia is made better by adding it to other worthwhile goods. (pg81) However this conflicts with the next passage, about the 'ergon' or function of humans. From this discussion it appears that virtuous activity (activity done using the exercise of reason) is the singular-dominant good. Furthermore, emphasis that eudaimonia is an activity rather than a state (or rather than both) seems to conflict with the inclusive reading. (pg82-3) Author also points out that in Aristotle's other writings, he does not indicate that eudaimonia is an inclusive end either. Author then looks for a way to re-read the self-sufficiency passage: author reads it to mean that eudaimonia is 'the' good, not 'a' good that can be improved upon. Though this is consistent with the inclusive good reading, it does not establish it. Instead, Aristotle argues that eudaimonia is one intrinsic good, virtuous activity. (pg84-5)

Side note: author reads the discussion in Aristotle that relates to not counting someone as happy even when virtuous if she is insufficiently equipped with an external good (like honor, fortune, health) to be not an indication that these external goods are components of eudaimonia, but instead they are resources needed in order to practice eudaimonia. (pg83)

The next topic author examines is the contest between the practice of contemplation (book 10) and the political virtues (facilitated by practical reason) that is in NE. This is an age-old problem in Aristotle interpretation, and author does not believe that the way out is to highlight the best component of eudaimonia, contemplation, among the other inclusive goods (since author does not advocate the inclusive reading of eudaimonia) (pg86). Instead, author claims that eudaimonia is indeed contemplation, but when you are unable to perform it, you can be happy in the 'second degree' with the political virtues. Author therefore takes the two activities as from the same genus "virtuous activity of the rational soul", but separates them-- strictly speaking eudaimonia is just contemplation. But for a full life, you can't just practice contemplation, so thus the political virtues are needed. (pg87-90)

Author then reviews various other concepts introduced in the NE, the first being Aristotle's understanding of the 'mean', or the right action between two extremes along a theme, for instance, bravery in between foolhardiness and cowardice. While Aristotle calls for a more instructive way of determining the mean, author argues what he provides is the basis for such decisions, namely the exercise of the intellect.

The next discussion is on whether Aristotle should rightly be called an 'egoist'. Author criticizes the interpretation that Aristotle is a benign egoist, who advocates self-regard as the metaethical stance, but because the virtues are the best thing for the self, there should be no societal conflict. Author claims that because the highest good is contemplation, this would mean that other activities, that is, the political virtues, could be seen as conflicting with contemplation (pg93-4). Since contemplation and the good citizenship might easily conflict, this would be a 'departure' from ordinary moral standards which Aristotle wouldn't want to do. (pg94) Furthermore, Aristotle frequently talks about the 'good for man', not for the particular individual, and regards self-love as only good because it is good for others (pg95). Author claims Aristotle isn't an egoist, but doesn't resolve a potential conflict between self-interest and duties to others.

The final substantive section talks about the distinctions between Plato and Aristotle, how Aristotle rejects the abstract view of 'the good' in favor of a objective one, not a perspectival one. (pg99)