2/25/11

Ackrill, John Lloyd - Aristotle on Eudaimonia

02/25/2011



This paper advances the thesis that Aristotle considered eudaimonia to be an inclusive concept of a mixture between the political virtues and the activity of contemplation. Further, the practical/political virtues and contemplation are goods-in-themselves and take part in eudaimonia because they are constitutive of it, not because they are instrumental for eudaimonia.

Author begins by reviewing the main question around Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: what is the best life for a man to lead? The answer seems to first be the political/practical virtues (henceforth: the political virtues), and yet in book 10 of NE, Aristotle seems to claim that it is instead engaging in contemplation.

Author reviews prominent efforts to explain this discrepancy on a higher level-- explaining possible incoherence in Aristotle's thinking.
The first is Gauthier & Jolif, who contend that Aristotle believed that the political virtues create a characteristic state that favors the exercise of contemplation. But this would mean they were instrumental, so they aren't good-in-themselves, which is inconsistent with Aristotle's view on virtues. They try to explain the inconsistency by saying Aristotle confused the value of 'productive activity' with the value of actions themselves.
The second is Hintikka, who argues that Aristotle is locked into a teleological way of thinking, so he must relegate actions he found inherently valuable as means to an even further end, in this case a kind-of place holder: eudaimonia.
The third is Hardie, who argues that Aristotle has a standard view that eudaimonia has one "dominant" activity as the good in human life. (And that is contemplation). Instead of allowing eudaimonia to be inclusive of multiple activities (he has "flashes" where he allows that), Aristotle is committed to one end providing for eudaimonia, for humans: contemplation.
Author believes that Aristotle has an inclusive concept of eudaimonia and that there is no reason to believe he was confused on the matter. (pg59)

Author first takes time to lay out what is meant by an 'inclusive' concept of eudaimonia. (III) The idea is that there is a plurality of ends that make up eudaimonia, as opposed to a single 'dominant' or 'monolithic' end. Author also argues that eudaimonia as a concept does not entail dominance of one end. Author then delves into the text and focuses especially on a sequence in book 1 where Aristotle talks about subordinate activities and outcomes. The idea is that activities valued only instrumentally can be nested in a hierarchy of subordination (buy food-to cook food-to eat food) but that so too can activities valued in themselves also be nested in a hierarchy. Author believes this is the concept of good-as-constitutive, rather than just the standard good-as-means evaluation. (IV) What this allows is that goods-in-themselves can also be goods-for-the-sake-of eudaimonia (pg61-2).

Author then examines book 7 where eudaimonia is considered to be 'self-sufficient', meaning that it isn't aimed at for the sake of anything else, and that it is the final end of human pursuits. (V) (pg63-4) This is a logical point in the concept of eudaimonia. However, eudaimonia itself can be composed of numerous ends-in-themselves. "...There are several final ends. When Aristotle says that if so we are seeking the most final he is surely not laying down that only one of them (theoria) is really a final end." (pg65) Instead, he is saying that once we assess that there are many final ends, we must give the most final, which is eudaimonia. [This seems to turn eudaimonia into a kind-of placeholder.] Author swipes at Kenny, who tries to translate eudaimonia into happiness-- author denies this is possible since happiness can be forsaken for other pursuits, while eudaimonia as a concept cannot. (pg66-7)

Author then tries to debunk the reading that eudaimonia involves a 'dominant' activity or single object of desire. In book 1 chapter 2, Aristotle apparently commits the fallacy of concluding that since everything is done for a reason, a single reason is responsible for why everything is done. While Hardie (proponent of the 'dominant' end) acquits Aristotle (pg68), author holds Aristotle on the hook, but re-reads the passage to include the conceptual argument about eudaimonia previously given. So of course everything is done for the sake of eudaimonia-- that is a conceptual truth. The conclusion is only easy to disprove because there are multiple ends-in-themselves. But if eudaimonia is inclusive of those ends, then the conceptual nature of eudaimonia as including all ends-in-themselves is preserved.

Author then moves to discuss the famous ergon argument from Aristotle in book 1: that the specific function of a being will determine its eudaimonia. For humans, it is the rational element-- that intellect and reason can dictate to the emotions. Author argues this does not readily favor contemplation over practical reason (and the political virtues). (pg70) He even argues against such favoritism since contemplation is distinctive to the gods, not to humans. For author here as well as in other places, 'most final' means, for Aristotle, 'final without qualification'-- a comprehensive end that could easily include many constitutive ends-in-themselves. It doesn't mean one exclusive end-in-itself. (pg71)

The problem for this interpretation of Aristotle is that he should surely have realized that if there are more than a single end-in-itself to pursue, what is the combination-- what's the recipe-- for which ones to pursue, and when? Author complains that this is a difficult answer to work out, especially with Plato's Protagoras looking over Aristotle's shoulder. (VIII) (pg72)

Author goes on to examine the interplay of practical reason and contemplation after book 10-- does practical reason try to maximize contemplation? Do you perform the political virtues for the sake of contemplation? (Author: no. pg 73-4)

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