04/22/2011
Book Chapter from All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to find Meaning in a Secular Age, Free Press, 2011
This is the final chapter in a book that attempts to find meaning in a world of post-modern technological progress. Authors talk about two kinds of sacredness, or spheres of life that deserve reverence: physis and poietics. Physis involves a mass communal experience and 'wooshing', poietics is about the kind of reverence and understanding that comes from having intimate knowledge with a portion of the world.
Authors start by describing the kind of experience that people have when observing a sports competition, where they get carried away by the roar of the crowd. The first and primary example is the farewell speech and ceremonies for Lou Gehrig. The second example uses David Foster Wallace's exultation of Roger Federer (pg194-6). Authors claim: "There is no essential difference, really, in how it feels to rise as one in joy to sing the praises of the Lord, or to rise as one in joy to sing the praises of the Hail Mary pass..." (pg192-3) The claim is that it is partially due to the community experienced in each, and that such experiences "bring out everything that is important in the situation, letting each thing shine at its very best." (pg193) This is a kind of 'embodied' ecstasy, a celebration of bodily accomplishments. Authors claim that such an aesthetic experience cannot be "approached directly" and instead 'inclines toward reconciliation instead of purification' (pg198). The suggestion is that this sacredness is both fragile and also overpoweringly amoral.
Authors describe four points about the 'sacred moments in sport'. First is the wave metaphor, the wooshing. (pg199) Second is the connection to 'realness', or physis. Third, this phenomenon is not unique to sport but any communal embodied experience (MLK's speech, a family Thanksgiving, are two other given examples- pg202). Fourth, there is something amoral and inherently dangerous about participation in this experience, since one can be drawn in to immoral projects just as easily.(pg202-3) Here authors discuss the risk of being too 'enlightened' and having an overly autonomous reaction to physis events.(pg203-5)
The next section moves to another sacred sphere, that or poiesis or poietics. This is most notably exemplified in the way a craftsman treats her work, and perhaps more importantly, the resource she works. Author claim that "Learning a skill is learning to see the world differently" (pg207) and yet this kind of learning is being 'flattened' in our modern technological age, where technology makes many accomplishments easy. (pg213) The primary example here is the wheelwright, the person who made carriage wheels by hand and needed to know how to treat the wood that was used in the process. That treatment led to a powerful way of seeing the wood (pg208) and also a reverence for the trees, the land, as the origins of the wood the wheelwright must work (pg210). Author point out the need for 'meta-poiesis', which is the skill at recognizing where value is to be had, where meaning can be cultivated or discovered.
The claim that poiesis is being lost in the technological age is next discussed, and the paradigm example is the GPS system that takes all the skill out of navigation. (pg213-215) Authors claim not just that we lose a reverence for the world-- it looks 'increasingly nondescript', but also that we lose an understanding of ourselves (pg213).
The next discussion is around finding the sacred in what might have been considered every-day activities, like having the morning cup of coffee. (pg215-8) The thesis here is that these types of sacred spheres are different for different people and that one cannot just lay-out ahead of time which ones will be considered sacred, and how. One has to experiment, and try it out, to see. (pg218-9) This is very much like the call for the skill at meta-poiesis, with which authors close.
4/1/11
Connolly, John - Augustine on the Will, or Why Cooperation is an Unnatural Act
04/01/2011
Unpublished paper
The primary question of this paper is a launching point for a discussion about Augustine's troubles with the human will. The question involves why we humans are not naturally given to cooperation-- we are often uncooperative, and even when we do cooperate it is sometimes for ulterior motives, or long-term selfishness. The problem here is part of a general one: why are humans so disposed to irrational, sinful behavior? Author takes a walk through St Augustine's attempts to answer this question.
Author first looks at the book of Genesis, where Eve, then Adam, eat the fruit from the forbidden tree. The trouble for many religious thinkers, especially those who claim that God is both all-good and the creator of all things, is two: why did Eve fall prey to the serpent's guile, and furthermore, why was the serpent so guileful? At first face, it appears that there is a dualistic nature to the universe (good and evil, the Manichean perspective), or that God manufactured the creatures of the earth-- including mankind-- with flaws (this is trouble since God is flawless).
Neither of these options were palatable for Augustine, who tried his hand at a solution early on in On Free Choice of the Will. Augustine talks about the evils we suffer and suggests that some of them we suffer because they are just punishments from the evils we have committed. But of course for punishment to be just, the sinful acts must have been voluntary. This puts the trouble into the Will, which just pushes it back-- didn't God design the human will? Why is it subject to these common defects? Augustine puts forward an answer that the will itself was designed just fine, if used in accordance with reason or is properly 'ordered'. If 'disordered', it leads to sin. Author points out how similar this is to the Greeks. Author then takes an interlude to discuss the relative primitive conception of the Will here-- it is probably similar to what Aristotle considered boulesis-- the choice about what is worth pursuing (ideally using reason in that process). This choice is autonomous, as Augustine insists.
Augustine believes it is good that we have the freedom of the will, since then our positive decisions are with merit-- we could do otherwise. But this leads to the next problem: why would a rational will decide to pursue sin over the orderliness of virtue? This problem, author claims, Augustine has no good solution for. Augustine's first attempt considers such a movement of the will a kind of ex nihilo decision-- an irrationality that comes from nothing. And how can one know the cause of that which comes from nothing? This weird answer author calls "the mystery of the missing motivation". The final book of On Free Choice of the Will, added years later, opens a new line of argument: our wills are hopelessly degraded due to the original sin of our parents, Adam & Eve. Our only chance at salvation lies in the grace of God. This theological solution is bolstered by Augustine's common sense that each human is sinful from the beginning of its existence (birth).
Though this seems to be Augustine's final answer on the problem of deficiencies of the will, the author is not satisfied. Author uses an analogy of a standardized test administered to the populous, but only after tutoring a portion of the demographic while ignoring the rest. It is hardly credible that who passes is not at least influenced by those who do the tutoring. And yet, it is technically true that the untutored fail without coercion and on their own autonomy. However, author argues this is unjust and capricious, not all-loving or perfectly just. Augustine begs off, asking that we accept a 'hidden equity'.
Author then discusses the general element of Augustine's struggle about humankind's proneness to sin. For example, many myths seem to point to a earlier age where sin was not a concern. Can this be squared with Darwinian evolution, which seems to show humans as emerging from a primate ancestor into greater cooperation than ever before? Author takes a suggestion from Jared Diamond's The Third Chimpanzee, which claims that the development of fixed agricultural and pastoral food production was the cause of much cultural change, including the creation of property, a ruling class, war, disease, and even racism. The thesis was that agriculture and animal husbandry diminished nutritional diversity, exposed humans to new diseases, created a fixed source of value that could be effectively controlled-- tempting an elite class, and finally caused societal divisions that destroyed our spirit of cooperation. Author reads the Genesis story of the fall from Eden into Diamond's description of the changes in human culture with the invention of agriculture.
Unpublished paper
The primary question of this paper is a launching point for a discussion about Augustine's troubles with the human will. The question involves why we humans are not naturally given to cooperation-- we are often uncooperative, and even when we do cooperate it is sometimes for ulterior motives, or long-term selfishness. The problem here is part of a general one: why are humans so disposed to irrational, sinful behavior? Author takes a walk through St Augustine's attempts to answer this question.
Author first looks at the book of Genesis, where Eve, then Adam, eat the fruit from the forbidden tree. The trouble for many religious thinkers, especially those who claim that God is both all-good and the creator of all things, is two: why did Eve fall prey to the serpent's guile, and furthermore, why was the serpent so guileful? At first face, it appears that there is a dualistic nature to the universe (good and evil, the Manichean perspective), or that God manufactured the creatures of the earth-- including mankind-- with flaws (this is trouble since God is flawless).
Neither of these options were palatable for Augustine, who tried his hand at a solution early on in On Free Choice of the Will. Augustine talks about the evils we suffer and suggests that some of them we suffer because they are just punishments from the evils we have committed. But of course for punishment to be just, the sinful acts must have been voluntary. This puts the trouble into the Will, which just pushes it back-- didn't God design the human will? Why is it subject to these common defects? Augustine puts forward an answer that the will itself was designed just fine, if used in accordance with reason or is properly 'ordered'. If 'disordered', it leads to sin. Author points out how similar this is to the Greeks. Author then takes an interlude to discuss the relative primitive conception of the Will here-- it is probably similar to what Aristotle considered boulesis-- the choice about what is worth pursuing (ideally using reason in that process). This choice is autonomous, as Augustine insists.
Augustine believes it is good that we have the freedom of the will, since then our positive decisions are with merit-- we could do otherwise. But this leads to the next problem: why would a rational will decide to pursue sin over the orderliness of virtue? This problem, author claims, Augustine has no good solution for. Augustine's first attempt considers such a movement of the will a kind of ex nihilo decision-- an irrationality that comes from nothing. And how can one know the cause of that which comes from nothing? This weird answer author calls "the mystery of the missing motivation". The final book of On Free Choice of the Will, added years later, opens a new line of argument: our wills are hopelessly degraded due to the original sin of our parents, Adam & Eve. Our only chance at salvation lies in the grace of God. This theological solution is bolstered by Augustine's common sense that each human is sinful from the beginning of its existence (birth).
Though this seems to be Augustine's final answer on the problem of deficiencies of the will, the author is not satisfied. Author uses an analogy of a standardized test administered to the populous, but only after tutoring a portion of the demographic while ignoring the rest. It is hardly credible that who passes is not at least influenced by those who do the tutoring. And yet, it is technically true that the untutored fail without coercion and on their own autonomy. However, author argues this is unjust and capricious, not all-loving or perfectly just. Augustine begs off, asking that we accept a 'hidden equity'.
Author then discusses the general element of Augustine's struggle about humankind's proneness to sin. For example, many myths seem to point to a earlier age where sin was not a concern. Can this be squared with Darwinian evolution, which seems to show humans as emerging from a primate ancestor into greater cooperation than ever before? Author takes a suggestion from Jared Diamond's The Third Chimpanzee, which claims that the development of fixed agricultural and pastoral food production was the cause of much cultural change, including the creation of property, a ruling class, war, disease, and even racism. The thesis was that agriculture and animal husbandry diminished nutritional diversity, exposed humans to new diseases, created a fixed source of value that could be effectively controlled-- tempting an elite class, and finally caused societal divisions that destroyed our spirit of cooperation. Author reads the Genesis story of the fall from Eden into Diamond's description of the changes in human culture with the invention of agriculture.
3/18/11
Kraut, Richard - Aristotle on Human Good - An Overview
03/18/2011
This book chapter is a brief walk-through of the arguments author put forward in the book Aristotle on the Human Good. Author goes through the many issues around the structure of Aristotle's metaethical concepts, starting with the question of whether eudaimonia is inclusive of all intrinsic goods or if it is a singular-dominant intrinsic good. Author begins with considering the idea that eudaimonia is an inclusive good of many intrinsic ends, making it a (possibly conceptual) statement about ultimate ends. (pg80) Author believes this is a misreading of a famous passage about the self-sufficiency of eudaimonia (happiness for this author), where it is suggested that eudaimonia is made better by adding it to other worthwhile goods. (pg81) However this conflicts with the next passage, about the 'ergon' or function of humans. From this discussion it appears that virtuous activity (activity done using the exercise of reason) is the singular-dominant good. Furthermore, emphasis that eudaimonia is an activity rather than a state (or rather than both) seems to conflict with the inclusive reading. (pg82-3) Author also points out that in Aristotle's other writings, he does not indicate that eudaimonia is an inclusive end either. Author then looks for a way to re-read the self-sufficiency passage: author reads it to mean that eudaimonia is 'the' good, not 'a' good that can be improved upon. Though this is consistent with the inclusive good reading, it does not establish it. Instead, Aristotle argues that eudaimonia is one intrinsic good, virtuous activity. (pg84-5)
Side note: author reads the discussion in Aristotle that relates to not counting someone as happy even when virtuous if she is insufficiently equipped with an external good (like honor, fortune, health) to be not an indication that these external goods are components of eudaimonia, but instead they are resources needed in order to practice eudaimonia. (pg83)
The next topic author examines is the contest between the practice of contemplation (book 10) and the political virtues (facilitated by practical reason) that is in NE. This is an age-old problem in Aristotle interpretation, and author does not believe that the way out is to highlight the best component of eudaimonia, contemplation, among the other inclusive goods (since author does not advocate the inclusive reading of eudaimonia) (pg86). Instead, author claims that eudaimonia is indeed contemplation, but when you are unable to perform it, you can be happy in the 'second degree' with the political virtues. Author therefore takes the two activities as from the same genus "virtuous activity of the rational soul", but separates them-- strictly speaking eudaimonia is just contemplation. But for a full life, you can't just practice contemplation, so thus the political virtues are needed. (pg87-90)
Author then reviews various other concepts introduced in the NE, the first being Aristotle's understanding of the 'mean', or the right action between two extremes along a theme, for instance, bravery in between foolhardiness and cowardice. While Aristotle calls for a more instructive way of determining the mean, author argues what he provides is the basis for such decisions, namely the exercise of the intellect.
The next discussion is on whether Aristotle should rightly be called an 'egoist'. Author criticizes the interpretation that Aristotle is a benign egoist, who advocates self-regard as the metaethical stance, but because the virtues are the best thing for the self, there should be no societal conflict. Author claims that because the highest good is contemplation, this would mean that other activities, that is, the political virtues, could be seen as conflicting with contemplation (pg93-4). Since contemplation and the good citizenship might easily conflict, this would be a 'departure' from ordinary moral standards which Aristotle wouldn't want to do. (pg94) Furthermore, Aristotle frequently talks about the 'good for man', not for the particular individual, and regards self-love as only good because it is good for others (pg95). Author claims Aristotle isn't an egoist, but doesn't resolve a potential conflict between self-interest and duties to others.
The final substantive section talks about the distinctions between Plato and Aristotle, how Aristotle rejects the abstract view of 'the good' in favor of a objective one, not a perspectival one. (pg99)
This book chapter is a brief walk-through of the arguments author put forward in the book Aristotle on the Human Good. Author goes through the many issues around the structure of Aristotle's metaethical concepts, starting with the question of whether eudaimonia is inclusive of all intrinsic goods or if it is a singular-dominant intrinsic good. Author begins with considering the idea that eudaimonia is an inclusive good of many intrinsic ends, making it a (possibly conceptual) statement about ultimate ends. (pg80) Author believes this is a misreading of a famous passage about the self-sufficiency of eudaimonia (happiness for this author), where it is suggested that eudaimonia is made better by adding it to other worthwhile goods. (pg81) However this conflicts with the next passage, about the 'ergon' or function of humans. From this discussion it appears that virtuous activity (activity done using the exercise of reason) is the singular-dominant good. Furthermore, emphasis that eudaimonia is an activity rather than a state (or rather than both) seems to conflict with the inclusive reading. (pg82-3) Author also points out that in Aristotle's other writings, he does not indicate that eudaimonia is an inclusive end either. Author then looks for a way to re-read the self-sufficiency passage: author reads it to mean that eudaimonia is 'the' good, not 'a' good that can be improved upon. Though this is consistent with the inclusive good reading, it does not establish it. Instead, Aristotle argues that eudaimonia is one intrinsic good, virtuous activity. (pg84-5)
Side note: author reads the discussion in Aristotle that relates to not counting someone as happy even when virtuous if she is insufficiently equipped with an external good (like honor, fortune, health) to be not an indication that these external goods are components of eudaimonia, but instead they are resources needed in order to practice eudaimonia. (pg83)
The next topic author examines is the contest between the practice of contemplation (book 10) and the political virtues (facilitated by practical reason) that is in NE. This is an age-old problem in Aristotle interpretation, and author does not believe that the way out is to highlight the best component of eudaimonia, contemplation, among the other inclusive goods (since author does not advocate the inclusive reading of eudaimonia) (pg86). Instead, author claims that eudaimonia is indeed contemplation, but when you are unable to perform it, you can be happy in the 'second degree' with the political virtues. Author therefore takes the two activities as from the same genus "virtuous activity of the rational soul", but separates them-- strictly speaking eudaimonia is just contemplation. But for a full life, you can't just practice contemplation, so thus the political virtues are needed. (pg87-90)
Author then reviews various other concepts introduced in the NE, the first being Aristotle's understanding of the 'mean', or the right action between two extremes along a theme, for instance, bravery in between foolhardiness and cowardice. While Aristotle calls for a more instructive way of determining the mean, author argues what he provides is the basis for such decisions, namely the exercise of the intellect.
The next discussion is on whether Aristotle should rightly be called an 'egoist'. Author criticizes the interpretation that Aristotle is a benign egoist, who advocates self-regard as the metaethical stance, but because the virtues are the best thing for the self, there should be no societal conflict. Author claims that because the highest good is contemplation, this would mean that other activities, that is, the political virtues, could be seen as conflicting with contemplation (pg93-4). Since contemplation and the good citizenship might easily conflict, this would be a 'departure' from ordinary moral standards which Aristotle wouldn't want to do. (pg94) Furthermore, Aristotle frequently talks about the 'good for man', not for the particular individual, and regards self-love as only good because it is good for others (pg95). Author claims Aristotle isn't an egoist, but doesn't resolve a potential conflict between self-interest and duties to others.
The final substantive section talks about the distinctions between Plato and Aristotle, how Aristotle rejects the abstract view of 'the good' in favor of a objective one, not a perspectival one. (pg99)
2/25/11
Ackrill, John Lloyd - Aristotle on Eudaimonia
02/25/2011
This paper advances the thesis that Aristotle considered eudaimonia to be an inclusive concept of a mixture between the political virtues and the activity of contemplation. Further, the practical/political virtues and contemplation are goods-in-themselves and take part in eudaimonia because they are constitutive of it, not because they are instrumental for eudaimonia.
Author begins by reviewing the main question around Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: what is the best life for a man to lead? The answer seems to first be the political/practical virtues (henceforth: the political virtues), and yet in book 10 of NE, Aristotle seems to claim that it is instead engaging in contemplation.
Author reviews prominent efforts to explain this discrepancy on a higher level-- explaining possible incoherence in Aristotle's thinking.
The first is Gauthier & Jolif, who contend that Aristotle believed that the political virtues create a characteristic state that favors the exercise of contemplation. But this would mean they were instrumental, so they aren't good-in-themselves, which is inconsistent with Aristotle's view on virtues. They try to explain the inconsistency by saying Aristotle confused the value of 'productive activity' with the value of actions themselves.
The second is Hintikka, who argues that Aristotle is locked into a teleological way of thinking, so he must relegate actions he found inherently valuable as means to an even further end, in this case a kind-of place holder: eudaimonia.
The third is Hardie, who argues that Aristotle has a standard view that eudaimonia has one "dominant" activity as the good in human life. (And that is contemplation). Instead of allowing eudaimonia to be inclusive of multiple activities (he has "flashes" where he allows that), Aristotle is committed to one end providing for eudaimonia, for humans: contemplation.
Author believes that Aristotle has an inclusive concept of eudaimonia and that there is no reason to believe he was confused on the matter. (pg59)
Author first takes time to lay out what is meant by an 'inclusive' concept of eudaimonia. (III) The idea is that there is a plurality of ends that make up eudaimonia, as opposed to a single 'dominant' or 'monolithic' end. Author also argues that eudaimonia as a concept does not entail dominance of one end. Author then delves into the text and focuses especially on a sequence in book 1 where Aristotle talks about subordinate activities and outcomes. The idea is that activities valued only instrumentally can be nested in a hierarchy of subordination (buy food-to cook food-to eat food) but that so too can activities valued in themselves also be nested in a hierarchy. Author believes this is the concept of good-as-constitutive, rather than just the standard good-as-means evaluation. (IV) What this allows is that goods-in-themselves can also be goods-for-the-sake-of eudaimonia (pg61-2).
Author then examines book 7 where eudaimonia is considered to be 'self-sufficient', meaning that it isn't aimed at for the sake of anything else, and that it is the final end of human pursuits. (V) (pg63-4) This is a logical point in the concept of eudaimonia. However, eudaimonia itself can be composed of numerous ends-in-themselves. "...There are several final ends. When Aristotle says that if so we are seeking the most final he is surely not laying down that only one of them (theoria) is really a final end." (pg65) Instead, he is saying that once we assess that there are many final ends, we must give the most final, which is eudaimonia. [This seems to turn eudaimonia into a kind-of placeholder.] Author swipes at Kenny, who tries to translate eudaimonia into happiness-- author denies this is possible since happiness can be forsaken for other pursuits, while eudaimonia as a concept cannot. (pg66-7)
Author then tries to debunk the reading that eudaimonia involves a 'dominant' activity or single object of desire. In book 1 chapter 2, Aristotle apparently commits the fallacy of concluding that since everything is done for a reason, a single reason is responsible for why everything is done. While Hardie (proponent of the 'dominant' end) acquits Aristotle (pg68), author holds Aristotle on the hook, but re-reads the passage to include the conceptual argument about eudaimonia previously given. So of course everything is done for the sake of eudaimonia-- that is a conceptual truth. The conclusion is only easy to disprove because there are multiple ends-in-themselves. But if eudaimonia is inclusive of those ends, then the conceptual nature of eudaimonia as including all ends-in-themselves is preserved.
Author then moves to discuss the famous ergon argument from Aristotle in book 1: that the specific function of a being will determine its eudaimonia. For humans, it is the rational element-- that intellect and reason can dictate to the emotions. Author argues this does not readily favor contemplation over practical reason (and the political virtues). (pg70) He even argues against such favoritism since contemplation is distinctive to the gods, not to humans. For author here as well as in other places, 'most final' means, for Aristotle, 'final without qualification'-- a comprehensive end that could easily include many constitutive ends-in-themselves. It doesn't mean one exclusive end-in-itself. (pg71)
The problem for this interpretation of Aristotle is that he should surely have realized that if there are more than a single end-in-itself to pursue, what is the combination-- what's the recipe-- for which ones to pursue, and when? Author complains that this is a difficult answer to work out, especially with Plato's Protagoras looking over Aristotle's shoulder. (VIII) (pg72)
Author goes on to examine the interplay of practical reason and contemplation after book 10-- does practical reason try to maximize contemplation? Do you perform the political virtues for the sake of contemplation? (Author: no. pg 73-4)
This paper advances the thesis that Aristotle considered eudaimonia to be an inclusive concept of a mixture between the political virtues and the activity of contemplation. Further, the practical/political virtues and contemplation are goods-in-themselves and take part in eudaimonia because they are constitutive of it, not because they are instrumental for eudaimonia.
Author begins by reviewing the main question around Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: what is the best life for a man to lead? The answer seems to first be the political/practical virtues (henceforth: the political virtues), and yet in book 10 of NE, Aristotle seems to claim that it is instead engaging in contemplation.
Author reviews prominent efforts to explain this discrepancy on a higher level-- explaining possible incoherence in Aristotle's thinking.
The first is Gauthier & Jolif, who contend that Aristotle believed that the political virtues create a characteristic state that favors the exercise of contemplation. But this would mean they were instrumental, so they aren't good-in-themselves, which is inconsistent with Aristotle's view on virtues. They try to explain the inconsistency by saying Aristotle confused the value of 'productive activity' with the value of actions themselves.
The second is Hintikka, who argues that Aristotle is locked into a teleological way of thinking, so he must relegate actions he found inherently valuable as means to an even further end, in this case a kind-of place holder: eudaimonia.
The third is Hardie, who argues that Aristotle has a standard view that eudaimonia has one "dominant" activity as the good in human life. (And that is contemplation). Instead of allowing eudaimonia to be inclusive of multiple activities (he has "flashes" where he allows that), Aristotle is committed to one end providing for eudaimonia, for humans: contemplation.
Author believes that Aristotle has an inclusive concept of eudaimonia and that there is no reason to believe he was confused on the matter. (pg59)
Author first takes time to lay out what is meant by an 'inclusive' concept of eudaimonia. (III) The idea is that there is a plurality of ends that make up eudaimonia, as opposed to a single 'dominant' or 'monolithic' end. Author also argues that eudaimonia as a concept does not entail dominance of one end. Author then delves into the text and focuses especially on a sequence in book 1 where Aristotle talks about subordinate activities and outcomes. The idea is that activities valued only instrumentally can be nested in a hierarchy of subordination (buy food-to cook food-to eat food) but that so too can activities valued in themselves also be nested in a hierarchy. Author believes this is the concept of good-as-constitutive, rather than just the standard good-as-means evaluation. (IV) What this allows is that goods-in-themselves can also be goods-for-the-sake-of eudaimonia (pg61-2).
Author then examines book 7 where eudaimonia is considered to be 'self-sufficient', meaning that it isn't aimed at for the sake of anything else, and that it is the final end of human pursuits. (V) (pg63-4) This is a logical point in the concept of eudaimonia. However, eudaimonia itself can be composed of numerous ends-in-themselves. "...There are several final ends. When Aristotle says that if so we are seeking the most final he is surely not laying down that only one of them (theoria) is really a final end." (pg65) Instead, he is saying that once we assess that there are many final ends, we must give the most final, which is eudaimonia. [This seems to turn eudaimonia into a kind-of placeholder.] Author swipes at Kenny, who tries to translate eudaimonia into happiness-- author denies this is possible since happiness can be forsaken for other pursuits, while eudaimonia as a concept cannot. (pg66-7)
Author then tries to debunk the reading that eudaimonia involves a 'dominant' activity or single object of desire. In book 1 chapter 2, Aristotle apparently commits the fallacy of concluding that since everything is done for a reason, a single reason is responsible for why everything is done. While Hardie (proponent of the 'dominant' end) acquits Aristotle (pg68), author holds Aristotle on the hook, but re-reads the passage to include the conceptual argument about eudaimonia previously given. So of course everything is done for the sake of eudaimonia-- that is a conceptual truth. The conclusion is only easy to disprove because there are multiple ends-in-themselves. But if eudaimonia is inclusive of those ends, then the conceptual nature of eudaimonia as including all ends-in-themselves is preserved.
Author then moves to discuss the famous ergon argument from Aristotle in book 1: that the specific function of a being will determine its eudaimonia. For humans, it is the rational element-- that intellect and reason can dictate to the emotions. Author argues this does not readily favor contemplation over practical reason (and the political virtues). (pg70) He even argues against such favoritism since contemplation is distinctive to the gods, not to humans. For author here as well as in other places, 'most final' means, for Aristotle, 'final without qualification'-- a comprehensive end that could easily include many constitutive ends-in-themselves. It doesn't mean one exclusive end-in-itself. (pg71)
The problem for this interpretation of Aristotle is that he should surely have realized that if there are more than a single end-in-itself to pursue, what is the combination-- what's the recipe-- for which ones to pursue, and when? Author complains that this is a difficult answer to work out, especially with Plato's Protagoras looking over Aristotle's shoulder. (VIII) (pg72)
Author goes on to examine the interplay of practical reason and contemplation after book 10-- does practical reason try to maximize contemplation? Do you perform the political virtues for the sake of contemplation? (Author: no. pg 73-4)
2/11/11
Bush, Stephen - Divine and Human Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics
02/11/2011
Philosophical Review, Vol 117 No 1, 2008
This paper discusses the ostensibly contradictory position by Aristotle that in the Nichomachean Ethics happiness consists in contemplation (the exercise of theoretic reason) and, also, that happiness consists in the exercise of the political virtues. Author's position is that Aristotle takes a dualistic approach to happiness, one activity of a human is divine happiness, another activity of a human being human happiness. This is contrary to two other interpretations, one he considers "monistic" and another is 'inclusive', or aggregate. The monistic version tries to have the contemplative activity as the good and argues that the civic virtues are somehow related, approximating, or subservient to theoretical reason. The inclusive or aggregate view author believes is an unnatural reading of the text, so it is largely ignored (pg50).
The monist interpretation, after reading book 10 of NE, becomes an intellectualist interpretation since contemplation, or exercise of theoretic reason, is the highest good. The trouble is what the status of the civic virtues like generosity, courage, justice are if they are not human goods in themselves. Author reviews the recent attempts by three authors to show how the civic virtues are related to the intellecualist position. The authors are Gabriel Richardson Lear, John Cooper, and Richard Kraut.
Richardson Lear argues that there are mid-level ends that are both goods-in-themselves but also for some other good. The way that the civic virtues are goods for the sake of happiness is a good-by-approximation. "If a middle-level end approximates the final end in some significant manner, that relation of approximation endows the middle-level end with intrinsic value that is derived from the value of the final end." (pg52) Another author, Cooper, argues differently. For Cooper, contemplation is an activity that is kind-of the progenitor of the exercise of civic virtues, since they are properly executed using practical reason. Since practical reason resembles theoretic reason and practical reason is the executive for the civic virtues, the intrinsic value of theoretic reason is conferred to practical reason and the exercise of the civic virtues. The final author considered here, Kraut, gives a kind-of first-choice, second-choice answer: the highest happiness is contemplation, but failing that, the second-best is civic virtue. (pg54-5) Author gives the problem for each of the intellectual monists: civic virtue and contemplation are two distinct activities; if both constitute happiness, then the view can't be monistic. "While Richardson Lear and Cooper spend proportionately a great deal of time demonstrating that the morally virtuous life is choiceworthy and valuable, neither gives much attention to how we can properly call that life happy." (pg53) Author presents his inconsistent tetrad: (pg54)
a) happiness is monistic
b) contemplative activity is exclusively happiness
c) contemplative activity and morally virtuous activity are distinct from each other
d) morally virtuous activity is happiness
What Cooper and Richardson Lear seem to advocate is that one can have a happy life without practicing theoretic reason since civic virtue approximates (Richardson Leer) or is related to (Cooper) theoretic reason. But this means a life of civic virtue can be a happy one but it lacks the activity of happiness, that is, contemplation. So author takes an interlude through the text of NE to discover whether Aristotle believed that one could be happy without the activity of happiness (pg56-8), or whether Aristotle believed that there was a robust condition of happiness that was separate from the good activity. (Author concludes: no)
Author believes Aristotle is clear that practicing the civic virtues is happiness, and that practicing contemplation is happiness. While this indicts monism, it does not lead him to an aggregate or inclusivist theory; rather, author advances a dualist theory of happiness. Other dualist theories have come from writers like Dominic Scott, whose work author reviews (pg60-1). Scott believes that Aristotle has primary happiness, in the strict sense, as contemplation, but derivative, secondary, happiness in the civic virtues. This is because humans have a bifocal nature-- one of contemplation but also one of practical reason and emotion. Author finds this particular take unconvincing because of the paradigmatic/secondary aspect of happiness.
Instead, author proposes a distinction between the 'characteristic human good' and 'the highest good that humans can obtain'. (pg61-2) The concept is that humans can reach human happiness based on their characteristic human good (practical reason), but that humans also possess theoretic reason, which will allow them to engage in an activity of divine happiness (contemplation). The characteristic human activity is to have its emotions conform to reason (the compound of reason and emotion)-- in the civic virtues. Yet, "The characteristic or peculiar good of a species is not necessarily the highest good that a species can obtain." (pg62) Author takes this thesis through the text of the NE (pg62-68). Along the way author pulls the strands of characteristic human-goods and human-happiness and of divine-goods and divine-happiness (pg64). So, on this reading, the highest human good is civic virtue, but humans can still access even a higher good-- though not a human one (a divine one)-- in contemplation. (pg67)
The interpretive difficulty in author's dualistic theory is a question about whether Aristotle implies that humans are 'mostly theoretic', and so the highest human good should be identified by the practice of their characteristic activity-- their theoretic capacities, contemplation. This would throw the divine element back into the human compound, destroying the dualistic distinction. (pg69-70) This is a question of how Aristotle sees the identity of the human-- what is the distinctive quality for humans? Author favors a reading of 'mostly' (malista) not as 'strictly' but 'especially'. (pg71) Author supposes Aristotle favors a distinction between what is 'merely human' and what is human and also divine. (pg72)
Philosophical Review, Vol 117 No 1, 2008
This paper discusses the ostensibly contradictory position by Aristotle that in the Nichomachean Ethics happiness consists in contemplation (the exercise of theoretic reason) and, also, that happiness consists in the exercise of the political virtues. Author's position is that Aristotle takes a dualistic approach to happiness, one activity of a human is divine happiness, another activity of a human being human happiness. This is contrary to two other interpretations, one he considers "monistic" and another is 'inclusive', or aggregate. The monistic version tries to have the contemplative activity as the good and argues that the civic virtues are somehow related, approximating, or subservient to theoretical reason. The inclusive or aggregate view author believes is an unnatural reading of the text, so it is largely ignored (pg50).
The monist interpretation, after reading book 10 of NE, becomes an intellectualist interpretation since contemplation, or exercise of theoretic reason, is the highest good. The trouble is what the status of the civic virtues like generosity, courage, justice are if they are not human goods in themselves. Author reviews the recent attempts by three authors to show how the civic virtues are related to the intellecualist position. The authors are Gabriel Richardson Lear, John Cooper, and Richard Kraut.
Richardson Lear argues that there are mid-level ends that are both goods-in-themselves but also for some other good. The way that the civic virtues are goods for the sake of happiness is a good-by-approximation. "If a middle-level end approximates the final end in some significant manner, that relation of approximation endows the middle-level end with intrinsic value that is derived from the value of the final end." (pg52) Another author, Cooper, argues differently. For Cooper, contemplation is an activity that is kind-of the progenitor of the exercise of civic virtues, since they are properly executed using practical reason. Since practical reason resembles theoretic reason and practical reason is the executive for the civic virtues, the intrinsic value of theoretic reason is conferred to practical reason and the exercise of the civic virtues. The final author considered here, Kraut, gives a kind-of first-choice, second-choice answer: the highest happiness is contemplation, but failing that, the second-best is civic virtue. (pg54-5) Author gives the problem for each of the intellectual monists: civic virtue and contemplation are two distinct activities; if both constitute happiness, then the view can't be monistic. "While Richardson Lear and Cooper spend proportionately a great deal of time demonstrating that the morally virtuous life is choiceworthy and valuable, neither gives much attention to how we can properly call that life happy." (pg53) Author presents his inconsistent tetrad: (pg54)
a) happiness is monistic
b) contemplative activity is exclusively happiness
c) contemplative activity and morally virtuous activity are distinct from each other
d) morally virtuous activity is happiness
What Cooper and Richardson Lear seem to advocate is that one can have a happy life without practicing theoretic reason since civic virtue approximates (Richardson Leer) or is related to (Cooper) theoretic reason. But this means a life of civic virtue can be a happy one but it lacks the activity of happiness, that is, contemplation. So author takes an interlude through the text of NE to discover whether Aristotle believed that one could be happy without the activity of happiness (pg56-8), or whether Aristotle believed that there was a robust condition of happiness that was separate from the good activity. (Author concludes: no)
Author believes Aristotle is clear that practicing the civic virtues is happiness, and that practicing contemplation is happiness. While this indicts monism, it does not lead him to an aggregate or inclusivist theory; rather, author advances a dualist theory of happiness. Other dualist theories have come from writers like Dominic Scott, whose work author reviews (pg60-1). Scott believes that Aristotle has primary happiness, in the strict sense, as contemplation, but derivative, secondary, happiness in the civic virtues. This is because humans have a bifocal nature-- one of contemplation but also one of practical reason and emotion. Author finds this particular take unconvincing because of the paradigmatic/secondary aspect of happiness.
Instead, author proposes a distinction between the 'characteristic human good' and 'the highest good that humans can obtain'. (pg61-2) The concept is that humans can reach human happiness based on their characteristic human good (practical reason), but that humans also possess theoretic reason, which will allow them to engage in an activity of divine happiness (contemplation). The characteristic human activity is to have its emotions conform to reason (the compound of reason and emotion)-- in the civic virtues. Yet, "The characteristic or peculiar good of a species is not necessarily the highest good that a species can obtain." (pg62) Author takes this thesis through the text of the NE (pg62-68). Along the way author pulls the strands of characteristic human-goods and human-happiness and of divine-goods and divine-happiness (pg64). So, on this reading, the highest human good is civic virtue, but humans can still access even a higher good-- though not a human one (a divine one)-- in contemplation. (pg67)
The interpretive difficulty in author's dualistic theory is a question about whether Aristotle implies that humans are 'mostly theoretic', and so the highest human good should be identified by the practice of their characteristic activity-- their theoretic capacities, contemplation. This would throw the divine element back into the human compound, destroying the dualistic distinction. (pg69-70) This is a question of how Aristotle sees the identity of the human-- what is the distinctive quality for humans? Author favors a reading of 'mostly' (malista) not as 'strictly' but 'especially'. (pg71) Author supposes Aristotle favors a distinction between what is 'merely human' and what is human and also divine. (pg72)
1/13/11
Connolly , John - Aquinas on Happiness and the Will (unpublished chapter)
01/14/2011
Unpublished Manuscript
This is a book chapter about Aquinas' apparent paradox regarding human nature and happiness. The trouble can be summed up as follows:
P1. All humans desire their perfect good (happiness that is perfectly satisfying)
P2. Human nature is sufficient to attain perfectly satisfying happiness
C1. It's within human nature to attain its perfectly satisfying happiness
P3. Perfectly satisfying happiness is the Beatific Vision
P4. The Beatific Vision is received by God's grace only
C2. It's not within human nature to attain perfectly satisfying happiness
The chapter begins by discussing how Aquinas adopted much of the Nicomachean Ethics from Aristotle to talk about the naturally (according to human nature) attainable virtues (bravery, magnanimous-ness, etc.) (and prudence and theoretical reason), and also Aristotle's format for an ethic, that happiness for humans is attaining the goods according to their nature. The change comes when Aquinas posits that we desire, as our complete good, the Beatific Vision (knowledge of God). This desire is part of our nature-- we are paradoxical in some sense because we desire that which is beyond our nature, and it is this thing that will perfectly satisfy humans. (#3) Author points out a problem with this teleological concept of happiness: for Aquinas it is out of the reach of our nature, but still it is the only complete happiness for our nature.
Author delves into the paradox to investigate it more fully. The first investigation is whether Aquinas would be considered 'eudaimonistic' in the sense that Aristotle was. After all, Aristotle believed that:
1.humans have a particular nature
2.happiness for humans is finding (and attaining) the virtues in that nature
3.that happiness is perfectly satisfying.
Because Aquinas breaks both 2. and 3., isn't this a dramatic departure? (#5)
The next investigation is about the ends of human action-- Aquinas' teleology. This is a general review of Aquinas' theories of human action, not just activities done by humans but full-fledged human action. (#6-7) The key piece here is that every human action is done for the sake of one's ultimate end, perfectly satisfying happiness. (The Beatific Vision #8)
Author then spells out how, generally, Aquinas meant for his synthesis of Aristotle and Christian beliefs to work: attainment of the Aristotelian virtues is all humans can do by their natures but provides for imperfect happiness. Perfect happiness comes from receiving God's grace and then infusing those virtues with the divine gifts of Faith, Hope, and Charity. By acting with these infused virtues can humans become meritorious of the Beatific Vision. (#10-11) Does this make Aquinas an egoistic rationalist because he recommends being virtuous not as an end-in-itself but for the reward for such behavior? (#12) The trouble here is that grace is supposed to infuse a human with such virtues as charity, which is supposed to be performed out of love for God. It wouldn't be correct to call such performance self-serving, even though it is meritorious of divine reward. (#13) However, author believes that this ethic should be considered consequentialist, our aspirations for the Beatific Vision rewarded by our meritorious behavior while on earth. (#15)
Author returns to the apparent paradox of a perfect good that is desired but unattainable by nature in #16 and also discusses the limitations that Aquinas was under due to Papal edict: it was heretical to claim that humans had a God-like element in themselves, making it possible to attain their perfect good. (#17), yet it was also not possible to claim that the only happiness possible for human nature was that of the Aristotelian virtues, the non-grace-infused humanistic ones. One trouble for Aquinas is his sticking to the Aristotelian principle that "nature does nothing in vain" (#18), since God surpasses the nature of all creatures, yet we have the natural desire for the Beatific Vision as our perfectly satisfying happiness. This leads to the question as to whether the Beatific Vision itself surpasses human nature-- whether human nature desires something it cannot hold. Author believes that (#19) there is a second problem for the principle: desire will then imply the possibility of attaining that desire, which we know in the case of the Beatific Vision, is not attainable, it is instead given by God's will. [Interestingly, it is in the footnotes where Author tells us that, according to the Scholastics, there was a category for a desire with no expectation of fulfillment-- a "velleitas" or wish]
The dilemma that seems to arise here is even worse than the earlier one: at (#20) it seems that the created & finite nature of human beings makes it impossible to hold the Beatific Vision, or, that the Beatific Vision is attainable by a created & finite creature. Or, that a human being can be made to hold the Beatific Vision by having a part of itself be uncreated & infinite. Author believes that Eckhart holds this last disjunct (#21), but that Aquinas cannot due to orthodoxy.
The final portion of the chapter gives Aquinas' rejection of the divine component of the human soul, saying that any similarity between God and humans should be taken to be by analogy, not by sharing the same property. (#23-24)
Unpublished Manuscript
This is a book chapter about Aquinas' apparent paradox regarding human nature and happiness. The trouble can be summed up as follows:
P1. All humans desire their perfect good (happiness that is perfectly satisfying)
P2. Human nature is sufficient to attain perfectly satisfying happiness
C1. It's within human nature to attain its perfectly satisfying happiness
P3. Perfectly satisfying happiness is the Beatific Vision
P4. The Beatific Vision is received by God's grace only
C2. It's not within human nature to attain perfectly satisfying happiness
The chapter begins by discussing how Aquinas adopted much of the Nicomachean Ethics from Aristotle to talk about the naturally (according to human nature) attainable virtues (bravery, magnanimous-ness, etc.) (and prudence and theoretical reason), and also Aristotle's format for an ethic, that happiness for humans is attaining the goods according to their nature. The change comes when Aquinas posits that we desire, as our complete good, the Beatific Vision (knowledge of God). This desire is part of our nature-- we are paradoxical in some sense because we desire that which is beyond our nature, and it is this thing that will perfectly satisfy humans. (#3) Author points out a problem with this teleological concept of happiness: for Aquinas it is out of the reach of our nature, but still it is the only complete happiness for our nature.
Author delves into the paradox to investigate it more fully. The first investigation is whether Aquinas would be considered 'eudaimonistic' in the sense that Aristotle was. After all, Aristotle believed that:
1.humans have a particular nature
2.happiness for humans is finding (and attaining) the virtues in that nature
3.that happiness is perfectly satisfying.
Because Aquinas breaks both 2. and 3., isn't this a dramatic departure? (#5)
The next investigation is about the ends of human action-- Aquinas' teleology. This is a general review of Aquinas' theories of human action, not just activities done by humans but full-fledged human action. (#6-7) The key piece here is that every human action is done for the sake of one's ultimate end, perfectly satisfying happiness. (The Beatific Vision #8)
Author then spells out how, generally, Aquinas meant for his synthesis of Aristotle and Christian beliefs to work: attainment of the Aristotelian virtues is all humans can do by their natures but provides for imperfect happiness. Perfect happiness comes from receiving God's grace and then infusing those virtues with the divine gifts of Faith, Hope, and Charity. By acting with these infused virtues can humans become meritorious of the Beatific Vision. (#10-11) Does this make Aquinas an egoistic rationalist because he recommends being virtuous not as an end-in-itself but for the reward for such behavior? (#12) The trouble here is that grace is supposed to infuse a human with such virtues as charity, which is supposed to be performed out of love for God. It wouldn't be correct to call such performance self-serving, even though it is meritorious of divine reward. (#13) However, author believes that this ethic should be considered consequentialist, our aspirations for the Beatific Vision rewarded by our meritorious behavior while on earth. (#15)
Author returns to the apparent paradox of a perfect good that is desired but unattainable by nature in #16 and also discusses the limitations that Aquinas was under due to Papal edict: it was heretical to claim that humans had a God-like element in themselves, making it possible to attain their perfect good. (#17), yet it was also not possible to claim that the only happiness possible for human nature was that of the Aristotelian virtues, the non-grace-infused humanistic ones. One trouble for Aquinas is his sticking to the Aristotelian principle that "nature does nothing in vain" (#18), since God surpasses the nature of all creatures, yet we have the natural desire for the Beatific Vision as our perfectly satisfying happiness. This leads to the question as to whether the Beatific Vision itself surpasses human nature-- whether human nature desires something it cannot hold. Author believes that (#19) there is a second problem for the principle: desire will then imply the possibility of attaining that desire, which we know in the case of the Beatific Vision, is not attainable, it is instead given by God's will. [Interestingly, it is in the footnotes where Author tells us that, according to the Scholastics, there was a category for a desire with no expectation of fulfillment-- a "velleitas" or wish]
The dilemma that seems to arise here is even worse than the earlier one: at (#20) it seems that the created & finite nature of human beings makes it impossible to hold the Beatific Vision, or, that the Beatific Vision is attainable by a created & finite creature. Or, that a human being can be made to hold the Beatific Vision by having a part of itself be uncreated & infinite. Author believes that Eckhart holds this last disjunct (#21), but that Aquinas cannot due to orthodoxy.
The final portion of the chapter gives Aquinas' rejection of the divine component of the human soul, saying that any similarity between God and humans should be taken to be by analogy, not by sharing the same property. (#23-24)
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