08/20/2010
The Theory of Morality Ch 3, University of Chicago Press, 1979
In this chapter author lays out the duties to oneself, duties to others in a non-institutional format, and finally duties to others through institutions, including both contractual and generic civil society duties. These are all precepts of the first-order, that is, regarding what it is permissible, impermissible, and required to perform. The second-order precepts are regarding intentions and are not covered in this chapter.
In section 3.2 author describes duties to oneself. The first is not to commit suicide at will: "it seems evident that if one is to respect oneself as a rational creature, one may not hold one's life cheap, as something to be taken at will."(pg76) However there are circumstances that make suicide permissible. The two cases author considers is where an individual is sick or affected such that she becomes dangerous to others (pg78), and the case where she is in an inescapable set of dehumanizing or tortuous conditions. (pg79) The extension of not killing oneself at will is not to mutilate or impair oneself at will, yet this precept author backs away from, claiming that it is not part of our traditional common morality. Becoming addicted to a drug isn't permissible, but general use that temporarily impairs judgment somehow is fine.(pg79-80) "For anybody to place any kind of drug-induced enjoyment before the full use of his capacities as a rational creature, is a plain case of failure to respect himself as the kind of being he is." For author, there is a positive duty to oneself, and that is to develop a life-plan, "a coherent plan of life according to which, by morally permissible actions, his mental and physical powers may be developed." (pg80) Author calls this the Principle of Culture. There are innumerable acceptable plans, e.g. soldier, professor, factor worker [?], provided its behavior is morally permissible. It is under this life-plan duty that an agent is required not to neglect her health, subject of course, to the risks inherent in her particular life plan.
Section 3.3 describes non-institutional duties to others. The Principle of Culture is transformed into the Principle of Beneficence, (pg85-6) where it is "impermissible not to promote the well-being of others by actions in themselves permissible, inasmuch as one can do so without proportionate inconvenience." This duty, author claims, "derives from their character as rational creatures, not from their desert."(pg85) The duty does not lay much claim from the well-developed to the well-developed, since it is each's obligation to flourish; the duty is rather more aimed at dependents, orphans, the sick, the injured, the incapacitated, the afflicted. (pg85) However, this duty also makes it impermissible to frustrate others' morally permissible projects, and to "[abstain] from actions that would foreseeably elicit responses by which others would be injured." (pg85) And of course it is impermissible to promote the morally permissible (or even praiseworthy) goals of another through impermissible actions (e.g. kidnapping the homeless for cancer research). (pg85-6) Part of the principle of beneficence is extended to combatants in war: it is impermissible to harm non-combatants in a just war (and of course an unjust war is impermissible...).(pg87) Another extension involves refraining from hurting the reputation or honor of another, or of disparaging another, even when accurate, unless it is to prevent a wrong from being committed (pg88).
Prior to the discussion of the Principle of Beneficence, author lays out one against harming or threatening to harm another at will. The justification for this is that respect for other rational beings entails "treating every normal adult as responsible for the conduct of his own affairs", and that "[interfering] by force with anybody else's conduct of his life, unless there is a special adequate reason, is not to respect him as a rational creature."(pg82) This does not immediately apply to children, the insane, and other quasi-rational (or not) agents. The rule is against "at-will" force, since presumably some force will be permissible in order to avoid greater harm to others. (pg82-3, pg85) Here author gives us a teaser about abortion. The extension of this precept of physical force is the force of will, that is a prohibition against slavery. (pg83-4) Author claims this is a fundamental principle of Judeo-Christian morality, even though both cultures lived with it for hundreds of years.(pg84)
The final non-institutional duty to others is the impermissibility of lying when one is purporting to give one's opinion. (pg88) The justification for this precept is that by lying to another "you deprive him of the opportunity of exercising his judgment on the best evidence available to him". (pg89)
Section 3.4 discusses contractual obligations, as part of an institution of giving and accepting promises and the creation of a bond from those activities. Author discusses the construction of a contract briefly and exposes it to be a fundamentally non-moral institution. Given that, author asks whether a contract can ever be a moral bond? (pg92) Author's answer is that the institution of a contract is morally legitimate, and so breaking it is akin to lying, which is already impermissible. (pg92) In extended discussion about this, author considers it permissible to break a contract if another, more pressing moral duty arises. (pg93) A last clarification involves keeping a promise made to those committing wrongs: author argues that one does not have to (e.g. pay a ransom, if promised, to secure the release of a hostage).
Section 3.5 regards the institution of property. This author considers to also be a non-moral institution, so the question is whether there are any morally impermissible (or permissible) forms of property. After a discussion on the different types of property and different types of rights (pg95), author settles on two moral precepts from Judeo-Christian morality: not to despoil the earth so that future generations cannot provide for themselves, and not to "disfigure" the earth so that it cannot be enjoyed as an object of contemplation. (pg96). Generally speaking too, the Right of Appropriation exists: things affording appropriation must be mixed with some labor to signify the intention of exclusive use, which must commence within a reasonable period of time. And finally, the appropriation of things for property mustn't leave nothing for others to similarly appropriate. (pg97-8) This final requirement (leaving "enough and as good" for others) is, author admits, almost never fully possible. Author argues that being born into a society where 'all property is already distributed' leaves the requirement to provide for the education of such a person to allow her to earn her way through society and afford to purchase the resources necessary for a 'fully human life'. (pg99-100) As an addendum to all this, author argues that civil anarchy and solitude are both 'human evils' and that if there are unjust or defective laws regarding property, one is obliged to respect them for the sake of keeping civil society in place. (pg100)
3.6 is a section on family and familial construction. Author considers a family as essentially a matter of parenthood. Thus respecting familial ties mostly related to respecting children as rational beings (or growing-into rational beings). Thus the duties in a family are to the upbringing of the children and it is "impermissible for human beings voluntarily to become parents of a child, and yet refuse to rear it to a stage of development at which it can independently take part in social life" (pg101) Adoption is considered inferior to biological parentage. (pg102) Author considers 4 forms of family life: monogamy, polyandry, polygyny, and free-love/exogamous. Author has contingent, historical problems with polyandry and polygyny (pg102) but argues that there could be a form of marriage other than monogamy that properly respected the children to be raised and yet involved marriage of more than one male to more than one female.(pg103) Author argues that marriage can be dissolved without moral objection, and, interestingly: 'since the only objection to [divorce or staying married] is the suffering it causes, neither can be condemned as failing to respect every human being as a rational creature.' (pg104)
The final topic here is the permissibility of extra-marital sexual relations, or of 'deviant' sexual acts within a marriage. Author reviews the traditional arguments e.g. from Kant and Thomas Aquinas. Author also considers the side that considers them permissible, simply because they are mere physical acts not affecting respect for rational agents. Author rejects this, claiming 'it is ... wrong to think of the sexual gratification obtained from physical acts as deriving from them solely as physical'. (pg106) "Non-significant purely physical sexuality is virtually inconceivable" (pg107) Author considers 'one's imaginative awareness' and 'emotional response' as morally significant, similar to Augustine's theft of the pears. (pg107) Author forms two morally good aspects of sexual acts: 'life-affirming' and 'non-exploitative'. Any act that is 'life-denying' in its 'imaginative significance' or is exploitative is impermissible.
The final section 3.7 has to do with civil societies. Civil societies have territorial boundaries within which there is a system of justice or jurisdiction. Author scaffolds an argument that goes as follows: most of the laws within civil society are about nonmoral institutions like contracts and property. Everybody needs civil society in order for their human potentialities to be fully cultivated. As long as 'the legal-political system does not seriously violate anybody's moral rights', everybody must obey the laws of the civil society they are a part of. (pg109) Even when there is a rights infringement, disobeying the laws should be 'passive', since the breakdown of civil society would not allow for human potentialities to be cultivated, and therefore is morally bad. Finally, in defending civil society from an internal or external threat, it may become morally justified to use violence against the aggressors as a defense. In such a circumstance, author argues that conscription is morally permissible and it is impermissible to avoid being drafted. (pg110-111)
8/6/10
Donagan, Alan - Presuppositions and Principles
08/06/2010
The Theory of Morality Ch 2, University of Chicago Press 1979
This chapter promises to lay bare the presuppositions of Judeo-Christian conceptions of the world and of human agency. Author starts with discounting exotic thought-experiment contrasts, e.g. how would human morality work in a world with very different metaphysics, or if humans had different powers (like mind-reading) (pg32,36). What can be gained from comparison is to reveal our own presuppositions that are so fundamental that we hardly recognize them as open to variation. For this, author looks at the Hindu conception of human existence and agency. According to author:
-Hindus do not have much (if anything) for general (that is, extra-caste) obligations. E.g. a Hindu is obliged to obey the precepts her caste puts forward for her, but not the precepts of any other caste, and not much else other than what is her duty as given by her caste. (pg33) In other words, there is no general obligation to each other as humans or as bearers of rights.
-Hindus believe that human essence is a soul that is reincarnated from previous lives and has accumulated good- or bad-fortune, or 'karma'. Bad karma can only be reduced by undergoing suffering or purifying your soul through particular actions. With this conception, there doesn't appear to be any unnecessary suffering-- just the appearance of such. (pg34) And as such, there is no prescription to reduce the suffering of another unless required to do so by the duties set forth in one's caste's prescriptions or 'dharma'.
Author then formulates two principles of the Judeo-Christian tradition that stand in contrast to the Hindu tradition:
(1) Man, considered as amoral agent, is a rational animal.
(2) The world man inhabits is a system of nature, in which events occur according to morally neutral laws.
These two metaphysical concepts underpin the moral agency of humans and humans alone. (pg35) That is, the 'world' doesn't conspire to punish us or to reward us-- the natural laws (and therefore natural events that are un-mixed with agency) are morally neutral.
The next section (2.2) is a prolonged discussion of event-causation and lays out a basic theory of human action. The first distinction author makes is between human actions considered objectively, and those considered subjectively. Objectivity considers the deeds done and assigns permissibility, subjectivity considers the doings of the agents and assigns culpability (pg37). Author talks about the theory of action from (mostly) the objective perspective. Here is a rough summary:
-Events cause other events in the world.
-Events can fall under different kinds of description. (Event-Descriptions and Action-Descriptions) (pg38-41)
-Events are caused by either other events or agents. (Actions are only caused by agents)
-Events cannot cause agent-actions.
On this last principle author spends much time. The jumping off point is the discussion of a new action intervening, or 'novus actus interveniens' (pg42-44). Consider the case of the careless cigarette that might or might not ignite a forest fire. Once a second agent pours gasoline onto the ash, the original smoker's actions do not 'reach through' the chain of events leading to a forest fire. (pg42) This is the case even though you can construct a reasonable 'but for' sentence that includes the first agent: 'but for her throwing the cigarette on the bracken, the forest fire wouldn't have occurred' might be true, but because there was the informed, free and deliberate intervention of a second agent pouring gasoline on the fire, the first agent's causal chain is broken there. (pg44)
Even with these basic principles there is a bifurcation in the approaches to their defense. For it must be admitted that humans are part of the natural world, they are animals, even if rational ones, and that the attempt to separate them from the rest of the world by giving only them autonomous action is problematic. One response is to admit humans are part of the natural world but still assign moral blame even though there is no ontological/metaphysical responsibility through the chain of events. (pg44) The second response seems to be the author's preference: there is a difference between the events caused by humans and the events caused by the natural world. This is Aristotle's distinction between "event-causation" and "action-causation" (pg45). [Is this question-begging?]
The next discussion regarding this distinction relates to the unwitting accomplice(s), for instance a cook who unwittingly serves food previously poisoned by an assassin. Here the cook took an action, but author analyzes this as the cook being the unwitting agent of the assassin. "He does not cease to be the doer of what he does; but because he acts as the agent of the other, that other is also held to be an agent in his action, and the principal agent" (pg47)
Author then spends some time responding to an objection to the concept of autonomous agent/action-causation, leveled by Feinberg and augmented by Bennett. In effect, they wish to object to novus actus interveniens; in the Feinberg case, an agent announces widely his conditional intentions: 'stop or I'll shoot', and when another conducts the antecedent, the promised consequent commences. Feinberg wants to pump intuitions to see the second agent as causing the first agent. (pg49) Bennett formulates a notion of agent action for causing consequences by trying to restrict how one describes 'causal consequences in action descriptions' (pg49), claiming three guidelines for understanding the effects of agency:
i) the more confident the agent was that the consequence would ensue
ii) the more certain or inevitable it was that the consequence would ensue
iii) the higher the degree of immediacy there was between the action and its consequence
Author responds to this with an argument to absurdity: if threatened with either death or committing some abhorrent act, by refusing to commit the abhorrent act, you could be the cause of your own suicide. (pg49-50) Author sees this as conflating the term 'consequences' with the concept of causation-- consequences are sometimes used to indicate alternate states of affairs that aren't causally related but are nevertheless consequents. (pg51-2)
Author moves on to the principle underpinning Judeo-Christian morality, but first discusses the form it will take-- it will rely on there being principles of practical reason that are unconditionally inviolable. (pg53) Author defines a "precept" as "any universal proposition of common morality with respect to the permissibility of any kind of human action considered objectively." (pg54) As such, precepts of common morality specify either: (1) what kind of action is morally permissible, (2) what kind of action is morally impermissible, (3) what kind of action is permissible and obligatory given the appropriate circumstance. (pg54) Author then takes care to make a distinction between 'first-order' moral questions and 'second-order' ones, since much of the Judeo-Christian tradition has to do with the spirit with which actions are performed, the intentions and will of the agent. Since author is more concerned now with the permissibility of the deed (to be) done, objectively considered, that is 'first-order'; the culpability of the agent is considered 'second-order'. (pg55) This is much like author's earlier discussion of agent causation and agent responsibility. Author also briefly denies that there are two additional sets of moral considerations: those for supererogatory actions and those for morally permissible actions that are somehow demeritorious, e.g. in poor taste or some other consideration. (pg56-7)
Author finally commits to the underlying principle of Judeo-Christian common morality:
"Do not do to your fellow what you hate to have done to you" (pg57). Author gives considerable discussion about the different formulations of the golden rule, from the first books of the bible and into the new Testament. Author rejects Thomas Aquinas' version in favor of Kant's since Kant's takes humans themselves as the ultimate entities to respect (rather than the Thomistic version that takes fundamental human goods as the ultimate ends).(pg63-5) The distinction here is the culmination of a clarifying discussion of what Kant meant when he wrote that humans were to be treated as ends, not means.(pg63-4) As an aside, author demeans one of the protestant alternatives to the golden rule which author designates as: 'Love, and do what you will' (pg62-3) The formulation of the common morality that Donagan uses:
"It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature."
In the next section 2.5, author launches into a prolonged discussion of how to setup 'specificatory premises', that is, premises that fill-in what action kinds are permissible, impermissible, and obligatory. [This seems to be an arcane problem, even for a philosopher.] The trouble (as I can see it), is about a question of refinement. Should the fundamental principle be refined, or even scrapped, as tough cases arise? Or should the principle remain unchanged and the precepts be followed even in awkward cases? The analogue to law is a tricky one, since typically case law involves extracting principles from legislation, then applying the principles to a tough case, and possibly slightly altering the principles to get the case to come out right. (pg68-9) This is an example of the 'circular motion' of common law. The insight the author adds is that moral precepts are different from legislation-- legislation is often ends-based, that is, focusing on how to write rules that will promote specific ends. The moral precepts author has in mind are about principles of action-- in other words-- it is deontological. (pg73)
The Theory of Morality Ch 2, University of Chicago Press 1979
This chapter promises to lay bare the presuppositions of Judeo-Christian conceptions of the world and of human agency. Author starts with discounting exotic thought-experiment contrasts, e.g. how would human morality work in a world with very different metaphysics, or if humans had different powers (like mind-reading) (pg32,36). What can be gained from comparison is to reveal our own presuppositions that are so fundamental that we hardly recognize them as open to variation. For this, author looks at the Hindu conception of human existence and agency. According to author:
-Hindus do not have much (if anything) for general (that is, extra-caste) obligations. E.g. a Hindu is obliged to obey the precepts her caste puts forward for her, but not the precepts of any other caste, and not much else other than what is her duty as given by her caste. (pg33) In other words, there is no general obligation to each other as humans or as bearers of rights.
-Hindus believe that human essence is a soul that is reincarnated from previous lives and has accumulated good- or bad-fortune, or 'karma'. Bad karma can only be reduced by undergoing suffering or purifying your soul through particular actions. With this conception, there doesn't appear to be any unnecessary suffering-- just the appearance of such. (pg34) And as such, there is no prescription to reduce the suffering of another unless required to do so by the duties set forth in one's caste's prescriptions or 'dharma'.
Author then formulates two principles of the Judeo-Christian tradition that stand in contrast to the Hindu tradition:
(1) Man, considered as amoral agent, is a rational animal.
(2) The world man inhabits is a system of nature, in which events occur according to morally neutral laws.
These two metaphysical concepts underpin the moral agency of humans and humans alone. (pg35) That is, the 'world' doesn't conspire to punish us or to reward us-- the natural laws (and therefore natural events that are un-mixed with agency) are morally neutral.
The next section (2.2) is a prolonged discussion of event-causation and lays out a basic theory of human action. The first distinction author makes is between human actions considered objectively, and those considered subjectively. Objectivity considers the deeds done and assigns permissibility, subjectivity considers the doings of the agents and assigns culpability (pg37). Author talks about the theory of action from (mostly) the objective perspective. Here is a rough summary:
-Events cause other events in the world.
-Events can fall under different kinds of description. (Event-Descriptions and Action-Descriptions) (pg38-41)
-Events are caused by either other events or agents. (Actions are only caused by agents)
-Events cannot cause agent-actions.
On this last principle author spends much time. The jumping off point is the discussion of a new action intervening, or 'novus actus interveniens' (pg42-44). Consider the case of the careless cigarette that might or might not ignite a forest fire. Once a second agent pours gasoline onto the ash, the original smoker's actions do not 'reach through' the chain of events leading to a forest fire. (pg42) This is the case even though you can construct a reasonable 'but for' sentence that includes the first agent: 'but for her throwing the cigarette on the bracken, the forest fire wouldn't have occurred' might be true, but because there was the informed, free and deliberate intervention of a second agent pouring gasoline on the fire, the first agent's causal chain is broken there. (pg44)
Even with these basic principles there is a bifurcation in the approaches to their defense. For it must be admitted that humans are part of the natural world, they are animals, even if rational ones, and that the attempt to separate them from the rest of the world by giving only them autonomous action is problematic. One response is to admit humans are part of the natural world but still assign moral blame even though there is no ontological/metaphysical responsibility through the chain of events. (pg44) The second response seems to be the author's preference: there is a difference between the events caused by humans and the events caused by the natural world. This is Aristotle's distinction between "event-causation" and "action-causation" (pg45). [Is this question-begging?]
The next discussion regarding this distinction relates to the unwitting accomplice(s), for instance a cook who unwittingly serves food previously poisoned by an assassin. Here the cook took an action, but author analyzes this as the cook being the unwitting agent of the assassin. "He does not cease to be the doer of what he does; but because he acts as the agent of the other, that other is also held to be an agent in his action, and the principal agent" (pg47)
Author then spends some time responding to an objection to the concept of autonomous agent/action-causation, leveled by Feinberg and augmented by Bennett. In effect, they wish to object to novus actus interveniens; in the Feinberg case, an agent announces widely his conditional intentions: 'stop or I'll shoot', and when another conducts the antecedent, the promised consequent commences. Feinberg wants to pump intuitions to see the second agent as causing the first agent. (pg49) Bennett formulates a notion of agent action for causing consequences by trying to restrict how one describes 'causal consequences in action descriptions' (pg49), claiming three guidelines for understanding the effects of agency:
i) the more confident the agent was that the consequence would ensue
ii) the more certain or inevitable it was that the consequence would ensue
iii) the higher the degree of immediacy there was between the action and its consequence
Author responds to this with an argument to absurdity: if threatened with either death or committing some abhorrent act, by refusing to commit the abhorrent act, you could be the cause of your own suicide. (pg49-50) Author sees this as conflating the term 'consequences' with the concept of causation-- consequences are sometimes used to indicate alternate states of affairs that aren't causally related but are nevertheless consequents. (pg51-2)
Author moves on to the principle underpinning Judeo-Christian morality, but first discusses the form it will take-- it will rely on there being principles of practical reason that are unconditionally inviolable. (pg53) Author defines a "precept" as "any universal proposition of common morality with respect to the permissibility of any kind of human action considered objectively." (pg54) As such, precepts of common morality specify either: (1) what kind of action is morally permissible, (2) what kind of action is morally impermissible, (3) what kind of action is permissible and obligatory given the appropriate circumstance. (pg54) Author then takes care to make a distinction between 'first-order' moral questions and 'second-order' ones, since much of the Judeo-Christian tradition has to do with the spirit with which actions are performed, the intentions and will of the agent. Since author is more concerned now with the permissibility of the deed (to be) done, objectively considered, that is 'first-order'; the culpability of the agent is considered 'second-order'. (pg55) This is much like author's earlier discussion of agent causation and agent responsibility. Author also briefly denies that there are two additional sets of moral considerations: those for supererogatory actions and those for morally permissible actions that are somehow demeritorious, e.g. in poor taste or some other consideration. (pg56-7)
Author finally commits to the underlying principle of Judeo-Christian common morality:
"Do not do to your fellow what you hate to have done to you" (pg57). Author gives considerable discussion about the different formulations of the golden rule, from the first books of the bible and into the new Testament. Author rejects Thomas Aquinas' version in favor of Kant's since Kant's takes humans themselves as the ultimate entities to respect (rather than the Thomistic version that takes fundamental human goods as the ultimate ends).(pg63-5) The distinction here is the culmination of a clarifying discussion of what Kant meant when he wrote that humans were to be treated as ends, not means.(pg63-4) As an aside, author demeans one of the protestant alternatives to the golden rule which author designates as: 'Love, and do what you will' (pg62-3) The formulation of the common morality that Donagan uses:
"It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature."
In the next section 2.5, author launches into a prolonged discussion of how to setup 'specificatory premises', that is, premises that fill-in what action kinds are permissible, impermissible, and obligatory. [This seems to be an arcane problem, even for a philosopher.] The trouble (as I can see it), is about a question of refinement. Should the fundamental principle be refined, or even scrapped, as tough cases arise? Or should the principle remain unchanged and the precepts be followed even in awkward cases? The analogue to law is a tricky one, since typically case law involves extracting principles from legislation, then applying the principles to a tough case, and possibly slightly altering the principles to get the case to come out right. (pg68-9) This is an example of the 'circular motion' of common law. The insight the author adds is that moral precepts are different from legislation-- legislation is often ends-based, that is, focusing on how to write rules that will promote specific ends. The moral precepts author has in mind are about principles of action-- in other words-- it is deontological. (pg73)
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