11/21/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 5 Clarendon Press 1980
A landmark essay that begins with a distinction between having an intention and forming an intention. Author gives the first take on his idea of acting with an intention: you act for a reason. The difference is brought out in the following examples: (pg83-85)
1) His reason for boarding a plane marked 'London' was that he wanted to board a plane headed for London, England, and he believed the plane marked 'London' was going there.
2) His intention in boarding the plane marked 'London' was to board a plane headed for London, England.
Author comments that 1) entails 2), but not necessarily 2) entails 1). Also, the belief in 1) is opaque-- you can't substitute into it (for instance, if the plane marked 'London' was going to London, Ontario). Yet the plane in 2) is transparent. Author also suggests that the 'intention in boarding the plane marked...' is opaque. (pg85) Reasons comprised of beliefs and pro-attitude 'value judgments' (pg86) underwrite intentions, though many intentional actions aren't done by actively forming an intention. (pg85) The problem with this traditional account is intervening causation that manages to perform the action but not for the right reasons. (pg87) A more fruitful discussion of intention might be better served by looking at 'pure intending', that is, intending without accompanied by action. (pg88)
--Is pure intending an action? Not in the performative sense. (pg89-91)
--Is intending to act a belief that one will do so? This is tricky. Adding 'if I can' to an intention is superfluous, unless it is an overt speech act to reduce the probability of your intention happening. (pg92-3) Yet an intention might be formed even when you believe it will be difficult, or unlikely, that you'll complete the action. (pg95)
--Is intending to do something the same as wanting to do it? Here we have a problem from Anscombe where the desire to eat something sweet might be expressed as a law-like generalization that will make tons of variegated actions as desirable (e.g. eating candy laced with poison). 'The trouble about pure intending is that there is no action to judge simply good or desirable' (pg97) Author proposes that actions that are desirable in a certain attribute (e.g. sweet-eating) are prima facie judgments. There must be a further judgment that this attribute is enough to act on, an all-out judgment that results in 'This action is desirable' (pg98). Having specificity is very important because it picks from the class of possible actions one particular action that can be evaluated (pg96). Pure intending (an all-out judgment) for a certain action type is also possible if there are background beliefs and conditions that will avoid undesirable actions. (pg98)
Lastly, author clears up the earlier issue of 'if I can' and such: an all-out judgment about what is desirable is held 'given the rest of what I believe about the immediate future'. (pg99-100) Author also distinguishes from intentions and wishes, aside from wishes not consistent with what one believes is possible, there is little to distinguish them, except the assertion that intentions are 'not mere' wishes (pg101).
11/21/08
11/14/08
Davidson, Donald - How is Weakness of the Will Possible?
11/14/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 2 Clarendon Press 1980
A reprinting of a paper where author tries to deal with the logical problem of weakness of the will in intentional actions. Davidson first decides this is the same as incontinence (pg21-2), and gives a definition: (pg22)
A acts incontinently iff: A does x intentionally; A believes that y is open to him; A judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than x.
The problem is that an intentional action seems to be one done once all things are considered. There seems to be an inconsistent triad:
P1) If A wants x more than y and can do either and acts intentionally, A will do x over y
P2) If A judges that it's better to do x than y, A will want to do x more than y
P3) There are incontinent actions
Author doesn't want to pick away at these premises, but instead largely affirm them and also claim they aren't inconsistent. (pg23-4)
I. What follows is a discussion largely about the nature of intentional action, how it's opaque to substitution (pg25), how it is independent from moralizing (pg29-30), how it doesn't argue for any particular meta-ethical theory (pg26). Author also argues strongly that we must resist the temptation to reject P2 (pg27-8).
II. Author discusses Aristotle's practical syllogism and Aquinas' account of the incontinent man. (pg31-3) This leads to a specific point: even if we get rid of the multiple sources for desire, just within, say, the desire to act morally and only morally there can be conflict. Author rejects the 'single principle' solution. (pg34) In Aristotle, Aquinas and Hare, the battle is between two forces, one wins. In Plato and Butler and perhaps Dante, there are three actors: the two forces, and then another, 'the will' or 'conscience' that decides which wins. (pg35-6)
The solution to the problem of incontinence is to hold that there is a prima facie judgment based on a set of reasons that holds x desirable, but there is another, all-things-considered judgment based on a set of reasons (that includes the earlier set) that holds y more desirable. A performs x, and there is no logical contradition between an all-things-considered (universalized) judgment and a prima facie one. (pg37-39) 'If we are to have a coherent theory of practical reason, we must give up the idea that we can detacth conclusions about what is desirable ... from the principles that lend those conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things' (pg37)
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 2 Clarendon Press 1980
A reprinting of a paper where author tries to deal with the logical problem of weakness of the will in intentional actions. Davidson first decides this is the same as incontinence (pg21-2), and gives a definition: (pg22)
A acts incontinently iff: A does x intentionally; A believes that y is open to him; A judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than x.
The problem is that an intentional action seems to be one done once all things are considered. There seems to be an inconsistent triad:
P1) If A wants x more than y and can do either and acts intentionally, A will do x over y
P2) If A judges that it's better to do x than y, A will want to do x more than y
P3) There are incontinent actions
Author doesn't want to pick away at these premises, but instead largely affirm them and also claim they aren't inconsistent. (pg23-4)
I. What follows is a discussion largely about the nature of intentional action, how it's opaque to substitution (pg25), how it is independent from moralizing (pg29-30), how it doesn't argue for any particular meta-ethical theory (pg26). Author also argues strongly that we must resist the temptation to reject P2 (pg27-8).
II. Author discusses Aristotle's practical syllogism and Aquinas' account of the incontinent man. (pg31-3) This leads to a specific point: even if we get rid of the multiple sources for desire, just within, say, the desire to act morally and only morally there can be conflict. Author rejects the 'single principle' solution. (pg34) In Aristotle, Aquinas and Hare, the battle is between two forces, one wins. In Plato and Butler and perhaps Dante, there are three actors: the two forces, and then another, 'the will' or 'conscience' that decides which wins. (pg35-6)
The solution to the problem of incontinence is to hold that there is a prima facie judgment based on a set of reasons that holds x desirable, but there is another, all-things-considered judgment based on a set of reasons (that includes the earlier set) that holds y more desirable. A performs x, and there is no logical contradition between an all-things-considered (universalized) judgment and a prima facie one. (pg37-39) 'If we are to have a coherent theory of practical reason, we must give up the idea that we can detacth conclusions about what is desirable ... from the principles that lend those conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things' (pg37)
11/7/08
Davidson, Donald - Actions, Reasons, and Causes
11/07/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 23 1963
An oldie where the main argument is that reasons for action are causes for action. Reasons 'rationalize' action by showing: (pg685)
a) a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind
b) believing one's actions are of this kind
These two combine to form a 'primary reason' for why an agent performed an action. (pg686) The paper then describes how to construct a primary reason, and then argues that a primary reason for an action is the action's cause.
Author discusses how, in general, primary reasons are given and how they should be given. (pg686-690) Further discussion is spent defending against some small technicalities: justifying isn't the same as giving reasons (pg691), and that re-describing reasons doesn't rule out reasons being causes. (pg691-3)
Lastly is the defense for the thesis that a primary reason for an action is its cause.
The objections:
A. Causes are events, and mental states aren't events.
Reply: there are mental events that are almost always part of primary reasons
B. Effects and Causes must be logically distinct, primary reasons aren't distinct from their actions
Reply: logically they are, even though, perhaps, they aren't always distinct grammatically (see pg687-8)
C. Causes relate to Effects by a lawlike generality, there are no such available in actions
Reply: true, but the trouble here is that you're looking for laws among the wrong kinds of things
D. Knowledge of Cause and Effect is inductive, but self-knowledge about reasons isn't
Reply: this isn't essential to causes and effects
E. Talking about causes of actions is weird, either removing the agent or involving infinite regress
Reply: not when you use reasons as causes!
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 23 1963
An oldie where the main argument is that reasons for action are causes for action. Reasons 'rationalize' action by showing: (pg685)
a) a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind
b) believing one's actions are of this kind
These two combine to form a 'primary reason' for why an agent performed an action. (pg686) The paper then describes how to construct a primary reason, and then argues that a primary reason for an action is the action's cause.
Author discusses how, in general, primary reasons are given and how they should be given. (pg686-690) Further discussion is spent defending against some small technicalities: justifying isn't the same as giving reasons (pg691), and that re-describing reasons doesn't rule out reasons being causes. (pg691-3)
Lastly is the defense for the thesis that a primary reason for an action is its cause.
The objections:
A. Causes are events, and mental states aren't events.
Reply: there are mental events that are almost always part of primary reasons
B. Effects and Causes must be logically distinct, primary reasons aren't distinct from their actions
Reply: logically they are, even though, perhaps, they aren't always distinct grammatically (see pg687-8)
C. Causes relate to Effects by a lawlike generality, there are no such available in actions
Reply: true, but the trouble here is that you're looking for laws among the wrong kinds of things
D. Knowledge of Cause and Effect is inductive, but self-knowledge about reasons isn't
Reply: this isn't essential to causes and effects
E. Talking about causes of actions is weird, either removing the agent or involving infinite regress
Reply: not when you use reasons as causes!
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