10/24/2014
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by complimenting Scheffler on an original philosophical thesis, but does not believe that Schffler got the role the afterlife plays "quite right". Firstly, author argues that there are many things that matter to us that are not predicated on an afterlife: Scheffler mentions pleasure, comfort, relief from pain, author adds music and friendship to that list and continues to argue that Scheffler underestimates what we might value independently of an afterlife (pg133-4). Here author argues that the activity, and the conclusion of it, might be worthy pursuits even if there is no future benefit: for instance doing research and trying to find a cure could be worth doing "happily", even though the product may benefit no future person. Author argues that what we might lose is that element of value that is future-oriented, although that might be a good thing, since it would allow us to focus on what value was "intrinsic" rather than instrumental (to a future) (pg135). With this argument, author casts the afterlife as an instrumental value, where future people would benefit (intrinsically) from present work.
The next discussion is speculation about how what we value might change if we had no contemporaries (not future-people, but present people). The idea here is that much of what we care about loses importance when the social element is removed, author concludes that what matters to us "is that there be other people, who are in some way aware of us-- whether those people exist at some point in the future or they exist right now." (pg137). While author grants is that there is a limit to individualism, but he also argues that this does not necessarily limit egoism by implying altruism, or caring about others for their own sake (pg137-8). The extended point is that we care about future humans that share our values, or perhaps if not share them entirely, will appreciate the work done in the past by us for them. Why do we care about this? Author suggests there is an evolutionary reason. Ultimately, author seeks to minimize the significance of Scheffler's conclusion that the elimination of a collective afterlife would diminish our values, much as the elimination of a personal afterlife did not. Lastly, author discusses two elements of Scheffler's work: (1) that it is primarily empirical, resting on conclusions from thought experiments that could be different given data, and (2) that Scheffler's definition of value as being partially believed to be valuable simpliciter, is mistaken. Here he has a quick interesting discussion in what "valuing something" consists (pg140-1).
10/24/14
Wolf, Susan - The Significance of Doomsday
10/24/2014
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by acknowledging that "our confidence in the continuation of the human race plays an enormous... role in the way we conceive of our activities and understand their value." (pg113) However, author rightly takes a rather humble approach to 'how we would react' under the doomsday scenario, though also admitting she cannot divest how we should act from how we would (pg114-5). More interestingly, author claims that even rampant hedonists (Mike Tyson or Donald Trump) might easily lose interest in their activities and pursuits, though this could possibly be due instead to the social nature of value (pg116-8).
One obvious point is that when facts about the relevance of goals change, those goals are subject to being re-evaluated (pg118), which Scheffler wants to discount as a suitable explanation to the doomsday scenario. Author argues that it seems unlikely, though possible, that artists and scholars would discontinue their work: after all, many just aspire to make some small contribution to the current generation, without considering the afterlife (pg119-120). Author does spend some time questioning Sheffler's conclusions about the drain of meaning in the doomsday scenario (pg120-2), arguing that the care and comfort of others would not cease to be meaningful. Author shares Sheffler's belief, however, that people in the doomsday scenario would not be happy; the difference is that author does think people would have meaningful lives (pg122-3).
Author revisits the Alvey Singer example, the youngster who claims that homework is unimportant since the universe will explode and destroy humanity one day. The certainty of distant doomsday seems not to be the same as the certainty of immanent doomsday, which is a troubling asymmetry for Scheffler because author believes humans are rational (pg125-6). The commentary ends with author reminding us that the belief in an afterlife should give us renewed vigor to care about the future.
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by acknowledging that "our confidence in the continuation of the human race plays an enormous... role in the way we conceive of our activities and understand their value." (pg113) However, author rightly takes a rather humble approach to 'how we would react' under the doomsday scenario, though also admitting she cannot divest how we should act from how we would (pg114-5). More interestingly, author claims that even rampant hedonists (Mike Tyson or Donald Trump) might easily lose interest in their activities and pursuits, though this could possibly be due instead to the social nature of value (pg116-8).
One obvious point is that when facts about the relevance of goals change, those goals are subject to being re-evaluated (pg118), which Scheffler wants to discount as a suitable explanation to the doomsday scenario. Author argues that it seems unlikely, though possible, that artists and scholars would discontinue their work: after all, many just aspire to make some small contribution to the current generation, without considering the afterlife (pg119-120). Author does spend some time questioning Sheffler's conclusions about the drain of meaning in the doomsday scenario (pg120-2), arguing that the care and comfort of others would not cease to be meaningful. Author shares Sheffler's belief, however, that people in the doomsday scenario would not be happy; the difference is that author does think people would have meaningful lives (pg122-3).
Author revisits the Alvey Singer example, the youngster who claims that homework is unimportant since the universe will explode and destroy humanity one day. The certainty of distant doomsday seems not to be the same as the certainty of immanent doomsday, which is a troubling asymmetry for Scheffler because author believes humans are rational (pg125-6). The commentary ends with author reminding us that the belief in an afterlife should give us renewed vigor to care about the future.
8/22/14
Brink, David - Principles and Intuitions in Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives
2014/08/22
Ethics, Vol 124 No 4 (July 2014)
This paper sets out to revisit the contrast between Mill's moral naturalism and Sidgwick's Intuitionism from the 19th century and see how today's Intuitionism is more akin to Mill's naturalism. Author fist reviews the various historical -isms:
-Intuitionism: 19th and 20th century position that moral knowledge rests on precepts that are self-evident after proper reflection (pg666). Except for Sidgwick, mostof them had deontologist/teleological values.
-Naturalism, in contrast, is harder to define. Author takes an extended discussion about utilitarianism as, in Mill's case, the standard for right conduct, even if it isn't always a guide for action (pg667-8). The guides to action, at least according to Mill, can be "Secondary principles" such as honesty, fidelity, fairness. They may seem instrumental, but author argues Mill saw them as more important than that. These sorts of principles can be established when 1) following them generally leads to optimal results and 2) it can't be reliably determined when following the rule would lead to sub-optimal results (pg668).
When discussing the contrast between Naturalism and Intuitionism, author uses Sidgwick's tripartite discussion of moral judgment: particular actions (perceptual), action types (dogmatic), and, finally principles (philosophical) (pg669-70); Mill focuses on and rejects perceptual and dogmatic. Mill's critique is rooted in denying innate or infallible judgments to moral knowledge: the (dogmatic) acceptance of action types is rooted in their heretofore "acceptance value", which is actually justified by past utility (pg670-1). Mill's strategy here is to subsume intuitionist deontology or values into mid-level moral action types, which then get final justification from the first principle of utility (pg670-1,674). Finally, a general outline of Naturalist moral principles are: fallible, brought out by dialectically, and empirical a posteriori (pg671).
Sidgwick criticizes both perceptual and dogmatic forms of Intuitionism, but ultimately accepts philosophical Intuitionism, claiming that first principles are objects of genuine intuition (pg671-2). So the debate among Sidgwick and Mill comes down to whether first principles are matters of intuition (self-evidential, axiomatic) or some other way of knowing. Author replies that if the first principles are axiomatic, how could one decide which principles to adopt? The possible Naturalistic reply would be: adopt the principles that seem to account for (justify) more type and token moral judgments (pg673-5). This is considered "bottom-up epistemic justification" of "top-down metaphysical dependence"; Sidgwick and Mill both agree that utilitarianism gives the best "fit" for common sense morality.
Author moves on to the more modern day, and claims that the "contemporary heir" to Mill's naturalism about first principles is Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium. Author does not want the considered judgments, when reached during reflective equilibrium, to be considered rational intuitions because they are not innate or infallible (pg676-7). However, Rawls believes the best "fit" is his theory of justice, not utilitarianism. However, the naturalist quest for "fit" of philosophical principles can get complicated by the scope of the project. Should the principles pass a "publicity test", or be psychologically real, or fit with human nature? (pg678-9). Here, author discusses various biases that can enter into the moral judgment and discusses the difficulties with a "broad equilibrium" (pg680).
The next discussion seeks to distinguish the fitting of moral intuitions using Naturalism from Rational Intuitionist commitments. For this, author claims "it might be instructive to look at strands in recent empirical moral psychology". The idea here is that experimental work on moral intuitions uncovers a variety of biases and outcomes that cannot wholeheartedly underwrite moral principles. Instead, author argues, intuitions will have to be taken to be defeasible, or fallible, which will make a new Intuitionism look more like Naturalism. Author discusses Cass Sunstein's use of moral heuristics which are prone to error in tough cases, Jonathan Haidt's empirical work about supposed recalcitrant intuitions, and Kahneman & Tversky's work with the effects of framing on moral questions (pg681-691).
Ethics, Vol 124 No 4 (July 2014)
This paper sets out to revisit the contrast between Mill's moral naturalism and Sidgwick's Intuitionism from the 19th century and see how today's Intuitionism is more akin to Mill's naturalism. Author fist reviews the various historical -isms:
-Intuitionism: 19th and 20th century position that moral knowledge rests on precepts that are self-evident after proper reflection (pg666). Except for Sidgwick, mostof them had deontologist/teleological values.
-Naturalism, in contrast, is harder to define. Author takes an extended discussion about utilitarianism as, in Mill's case, the standard for right conduct, even if it isn't always a guide for action (pg667-8). The guides to action, at least according to Mill, can be "Secondary principles" such as honesty, fidelity, fairness. They may seem instrumental, but author argues Mill saw them as more important than that. These sorts of principles can be established when 1) following them generally leads to optimal results and 2) it can't be reliably determined when following the rule would lead to sub-optimal results (pg668).
When discussing the contrast between Naturalism and Intuitionism, author uses Sidgwick's tripartite discussion of moral judgment: particular actions (perceptual), action types (dogmatic), and, finally principles (philosophical) (pg669-70); Mill focuses on and rejects perceptual and dogmatic. Mill's critique is rooted in denying innate or infallible judgments to moral knowledge: the (dogmatic) acceptance of action types is rooted in their heretofore "acceptance value", which is actually justified by past utility (pg670-1). Mill's strategy here is to subsume intuitionist deontology or values into mid-level moral action types, which then get final justification from the first principle of utility (pg670-1,674). Finally, a general outline of Naturalist moral principles are: fallible, brought out by dialectically, and empirical a posteriori (pg671).
Sidgwick criticizes both perceptual and dogmatic forms of Intuitionism, but ultimately accepts philosophical Intuitionism, claiming that first principles are objects of genuine intuition (pg671-2). So the debate among Sidgwick and Mill comes down to whether first principles are matters of intuition (self-evidential, axiomatic) or some other way of knowing. Author replies that if the first principles are axiomatic, how could one decide which principles to adopt? The possible Naturalistic reply would be: adopt the principles that seem to account for (justify) more type and token moral judgments (pg673-5). This is considered "bottom-up epistemic justification" of "top-down metaphysical dependence"; Sidgwick and Mill both agree that utilitarianism gives the best "fit" for common sense morality.
Author moves on to the more modern day, and claims that the "contemporary heir" to Mill's naturalism about first principles is Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium. Author does not want the considered judgments, when reached during reflective equilibrium, to be considered rational intuitions because they are not innate or infallible (pg676-7). However, Rawls believes the best "fit" is his theory of justice, not utilitarianism. However, the naturalist quest for "fit" of philosophical principles can get complicated by the scope of the project. Should the principles pass a "publicity test", or be psychologically real, or fit with human nature? (pg678-9). Here, author discusses various biases that can enter into the moral judgment and discusses the difficulties with a "broad equilibrium" (pg680).
The next discussion seeks to distinguish the fitting of moral intuitions using Naturalism from Rational Intuitionist commitments. For this, author claims "it might be instructive to look at strands in recent empirical moral psychology". The idea here is that experimental work on moral intuitions uncovers a variety of biases and outcomes that cannot wholeheartedly underwrite moral principles. Instead, author argues, intuitions will have to be taken to be defeasible, or fallible, which will make a new Intuitionism look more like Naturalism. Author discusses Cass Sunstein's use of moral heuristics which are prone to error in tough cases, Jonathan Haidt's empirical work about supposed recalcitrant intuitions, and Kahneman & Tversky's work with the effects of framing on moral questions (pg681-691).
6/20/14
Aune, Bruce - On An Argument by Castañeda
2014/06/19
Unpublished Paper
This is a short paper that argues that Hector-Neri Castañeda's discussion of the sentence:
(1) The Editor of Soul believes that he (himself) is a millionaire.
is not revealing groundbreaking philosophical territory. In particular, Castañeda argues that this "indirect reflexive pronoun" (the "he"), is special because it refers using the first-person. Author first argues that (1) is not a sentence where the speaker is the same person as the subject, since nobody uses "he" to refer to oneself when speaking in the first person.
But perhaps the import of the sentence can be salvaged by claiming, as Gary Matthews did, that it picks out a referent without using either a name or a definite description (using instead, perhaps, a 'first personal' indexical). Author argues that (1) does not give any information as to how the subject of the sentence is being picked out. While some might use the "I" to pick themselves out with an unerring first-personal reference, others might use a favorite definite description or proper name, author argues. It is a contingent matter, not a priori. Further, not every use of the "I" relies on this special first-personal "from my own point of view", author argues. Consider: "Tom said I look sad"; here the "I" is being attached to a predicate "looks sad" by Tom, not by the first person. So the "I" in this case, while it unerringly refers, it does not seem to have any special first-personal connection to the speaker.
Perhaps Castañeda was trying to use (1) to underwrite what makes a speaker a person, but author proposes other criteria: humans are language-using animals that
(a) perceive from a certain vantage point
(b) identify their own attitudes and those of others
(c) alter both their environs and themselves to suit (within limits) their "wants"
These features of language-using animals, not any special "I" usage, is sufficient for personhood.
Finally, author closes with a discussion of whether a so-called 'personal point of view' contrasts with a scientific one, offered by Nagle as impersonal and "from nowhere in particular". Author argues that general relativity specifically and most scientific language uses specific reference points when talking about the external world and its objects, and that "Properly understood, a scientific view of the world must, in fact, be regarded as thoroughly perspectival".
Unpublished Paper
This is a short paper that argues that Hector-Neri Castañeda's discussion of the sentence:
(1) The Editor of Soul believes that he (himself) is a millionaire.
is not revealing groundbreaking philosophical territory. In particular, Castañeda argues that this "indirect reflexive pronoun" (the "he"), is special because it refers using the first-person. Author first argues that (1) is not a sentence where the speaker is the same person as the subject, since nobody uses "he" to refer to oneself when speaking in the first person.
But perhaps the import of the sentence can be salvaged by claiming, as Gary Matthews did, that it picks out a referent without using either a name or a definite description (using instead, perhaps, a 'first personal' indexical). Author argues that (1) does not give any information as to how the subject of the sentence is being picked out. While some might use the "I" to pick themselves out with an unerring first-personal reference, others might use a favorite definite description or proper name, author argues. It is a contingent matter, not a priori. Further, not every use of the "I" relies on this special first-personal "from my own point of view", author argues. Consider: "Tom said I look sad"; here the "I" is being attached to a predicate "looks sad" by Tom, not by the first person. So the "I" in this case, while it unerringly refers, it does not seem to have any special first-personal connection to the speaker.
Perhaps Castañeda was trying to use (1) to underwrite what makes a speaker a person, but author proposes other criteria: humans are language-using animals that
(a) perceive from a certain vantage point
(b) identify their own attitudes and those of others
(c) alter both their environs and themselves to suit (within limits) their "wants"
These features of language-using animals, not any special "I" usage, is sufficient for personhood.
Finally, author closes with a discussion of whether a so-called 'personal point of view' contrasts with a scientific one, offered by Nagle as impersonal and "from nowhere in particular". Author argues that general relativity specifically and most scientific language uses specific reference points when talking about the external world and its objects, and that "Properly understood, a scientific view of the world must, in fact, be regarded as thoroughly perspectival".
5/23/14
Smith, Malcolm - The Duty to Obey the Law
2014/05/23
A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2nd edition, Dennis Patterson ed.
This paper revisits previous discussions about the moral duty to obey a community or society's laws. Author starts with a brief history on the subject and makes the case that the disagreement over the duty to obey comes from differences in meta-ethical approaches.
The history of a prima facie duty to obey the law came with the development of the prima facie moral obligation, as pioneered by WD Ross. Ross's meta-ethics was a form of intuitionism, a theory that holds that humanity had a moral faculty and that exploration and elucidation of the judgments it issues would turn up moral values. The trouble is that Sidgwick had forcefully argued that no moral value didn't admit of exception. Thus Ross tried to formulate a "prima facie" moral value: one that "all things being equal" has moral authority, but could be overridden by some other compelling principles or circumstances. Ross put things like promise keeping, beneficence, and, without much argument, obeying the law, into the prima facie category. Later, other intuitionists rejected the duty to obey as even a prima facie obligation (pg459), arguing that:
1. law may have authority, but that doesn't necessarily compel a duty to obey
2. the thought that all of society's participants took some sort of oath of duty is a fiction
3. the law is not always coextensive with moral obligations
4. the obligation to obey moral laws is redundant due to the obligation obey morality
Author believes that the state of play is that few intuitionists still try to find a prima facie duty to obey, but instead those who argue for it are not intuitionists. Instead, they are "catechists", trying to formulate moral principles that, if followed, would be the best for humanity (pg460). Author discusses a prototypical example of the work of John Mackie in "Ethics: Inventing a Right and Wrong". Mackie does not believe in objective morality but instead goes about making a set of moral principles that he argues will contribute to human flourishing. Using this meta-ethical stance, Mackie argues that the duty to obey the law is a "reciprocal norm" (pg461).
Author considers the intuitionist moral theory to be a species of a meta-ethical view of "Commonalism", which argues, loosely: (pg463)
1. Moral intuitions are the source of moral authority, but need to be clarified and de-personalized
2. Moral knowledge is universal or near-universal
3. The work of moral theorists is to describe moral judgment, not to invent it
The trouble with the duty to obey is that it shows the conflict between Commonalists and Catechists in the meta-ethical sphere. Author promises to argue against the Catechist method in further work, but briefly points out that the Catechist method departs significantly from other philosophies, which mostly seek to describe, not prescribe (pg464-5).
A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2nd edition, Dennis Patterson ed.
This paper revisits previous discussions about the moral duty to obey a community or society's laws. Author starts with a brief history on the subject and makes the case that the disagreement over the duty to obey comes from differences in meta-ethical approaches.
The history of a prima facie duty to obey the law came with the development of the prima facie moral obligation, as pioneered by WD Ross. Ross's meta-ethics was a form of intuitionism, a theory that holds that humanity had a moral faculty and that exploration and elucidation of the judgments it issues would turn up moral values. The trouble is that Sidgwick had forcefully argued that no moral value didn't admit of exception. Thus Ross tried to formulate a "prima facie" moral value: one that "all things being equal" has moral authority, but could be overridden by some other compelling principles or circumstances. Ross put things like promise keeping, beneficence, and, without much argument, obeying the law, into the prima facie category. Later, other intuitionists rejected the duty to obey as even a prima facie obligation (pg459), arguing that:
1. law may have authority, but that doesn't necessarily compel a duty to obey
2. the thought that all of society's participants took some sort of oath of duty is a fiction
3. the law is not always coextensive with moral obligations
4. the obligation to obey moral laws is redundant due to the obligation obey morality
Author believes that the state of play is that few intuitionists still try to find a prima facie duty to obey, but instead those who argue for it are not intuitionists. Instead, they are "catechists", trying to formulate moral principles that, if followed, would be the best for humanity (pg460). Author discusses a prototypical example of the work of John Mackie in "Ethics: Inventing a Right and Wrong". Mackie does not believe in objective morality but instead goes about making a set of moral principles that he argues will contribute to human flourishing. Using this meta-ethical stance, Mackie argues that the duty to obey the law is a "reciprocal norm" (pg461).
Author considers the intuitionist moral theory to be a species of a meta-ethical view of "Commonalism", which argues, loosely: (pg463)
1. Moral intuitions are the source of moral authority, but need to be clarified and de-personalized
2. Moral knowledge is universal or near-universal
3. The work of moral theorists is to describe moral judgment, not to invent it
The trouble with the duty to obey is that it shows the conflict between Commonalists and Catechists in the meta-ethical sphere. Author promises to argue against the Catechist method in further work, but briefly points out that the Catechist method departs significantly from other philosophies, which mostly seek to describe, not prescribe (pg464-5).
4/18/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds V
04/18/2014
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 5: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
In this chapter, which is thoroughly set in the context of the previous ones, White asserts that it is in principle, that is either logically or metaphysically, impossible to know another mind. This seems to be agreement with Black, the skeptic, but instead it is taken to be a pointless statement. White (and Wisdom) believe it isn't meaningless, but it is silly, or having no point to talk about. The paper starts with re-hashing the lesson from the failed attempt at telepathy from the last chapter: that even if a question has sense, and even if you can even describe what would affirm or negate the proposition, if you can't figure out a way to test (affirm/negate) the proposition, the question might still be "unreal" (pg123). Hence Gray's claim that the mind of another is hitherto invisible but could be discoverable is taken to be refuted.
The alternative to something so-far invisible is something invisible by nature, or in principle, which is what Black asserted in the first place. (pg123-4) Before White takes up this possibility, one final option is considered: that knowledge of another mind wouldn't be sensory but somehow some kind of "direct" knowledge (pg124-5). White rejects this because he sees it as not categorically different from "knowledge of future behavior from present behavior" (pg125-9) White somehow takes sharing direct knowledge of one mind to be on the same continuum as seeing a physical object, like a dagger (pg126). And this is disqualified from knowledge of a mind, due to White's "disinclination" (pg126-7). Or, rather, White puts words into Black's mouth that this isn't really knowledge of another's mind (pg127) since it is akin to predictions of future behavior due to shared (public) inputs (and Black affirms it on pg129). Thus if there isn't sensory knowledge of another's mind (ch IV) and there isn't direct knowledge of another's mind (ch V), then knowledge of another's mind is in-principle impossible, or the mind of another is by-nature invisible.
The main thrust of the argument is put by the thing-in-itself advocate Brown, who interrupts to assert there is some special way of knowing, but not of actual mental conditions but only of appearances of them: the infallible and direct way of knowing is knowledge of appearances, not necessarily of mental facts. Mental facts like "being in love" are known indirectly as well, though the first-personal perspective has a source of information that the 3rd-personal perspective may not share. White goes through what he considers to be the many cases of indirect knowledge (pg130-1), and then Gray challenges Brown to lay out his argument, which Brown does (pg133-5). What Brown amounts to saying is thus: our knowledge of our own minds comes from direct, infallible access to content-ful appearances [a pain, footly!], which leads us to indirect belief about our bodies [My foot nerves are twitching in pain], which can of course be fallible [it was a pain, but it wasn't in the foot].
Having laid out this picture, Brown claims that direct knowledge of the appearances of another's mental contents is possible (perhaps using telepathy). White asserts that it is an "absurd idea" (pg135), and that knowledge of another mind is impossible. This apparent agreement with Black confuses Gray, but White goes on to argue that it is necessarily impossible, thus far less threatening than it originally appeared (pg135-6). Black confesses that he did not realize that his statement was necessarily true when he made it, but nevertheless he was referring to what he now acknowledges is a necessary truth (pg136-9). White sums up the argument, put by Brown, but put back into an absurdity or a paradox, by claiming that knowledge, if taken to be of the sort that Brown (and, by extension, Black) think it is, is not applicable to not only other minds, but not applicable to the future, the past, even our own bodies, and, perhaps, finally, the whole world of things (pg140).
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 5: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
In this chapter, which is thoroughly set in the context of the previous ones, White asserts that it is in principle, that is either logically or metaphysically, impossible to know another mind. This seems to be agreement with Black, the skeptic, but instead it is taken to be a pointless statement. White (and Wisdom) believe it isn't meaningless, but it is silly, or having no point to talk about. The paper starts with re-hashing the lesson from the failed attempt at telepathy from the last chapter: that even if a question has sense, and even if you can even describe what would affirm or negate the proposition, if you can't figure out a way to test (affirm/negate) the proposition, the question might still be "unreal" (pg123). Hence Gray's claim that the mind of another is hitherto invisible but could be discoverable is taken to be refuted.
The alternative to something so-far invisible is something invisible by nature, or in principle, which is what Black asserted in the first place. (pg123-4) Before White takes up this possibility, one final option is considered: that knowledge of another mind wouldn't be sensory but somehow some kind of "direct" knowledge (pg124-5). White rejects this because he sees it as not categorically different from "knowledge of future behavior from present behavior" (pg125-9) White somehow takes sharing direct knowledge of one mind to be on the same continuum as seeing a physical object, like a dagger (pg126). And this is disqualified from knowledge of a mind, due to White's "disinclination" (pg126-7). Or, rather, White puts words into Black's mouth that this isn't really knowledge of another's mind (pg127) since it is akin to predictions of future behavior due to shared (public) inputs (and Black affirms it on pg129). Thus if there isn't sensory knowledge of another's mind (ch IV) and there isn't direct knowledge of another's mind (ch V), then knowledge of another's mind is in-principle impossible, or the mind of another is by-nature invisible.
The main thrust of the argument is put by the thing-in-itself advocate Brown, who interrupts to assert there is some special way of knowing, but not of actual mental conditions but only of appearances of them: the infallible and direct way of knowing is knowledge of appearances, not necessarily of mental facts. Mental facts like "being in love" are known indirectly as well, though the first-personal perspective has a source of information that the 3rd-personal perspective may not share. White goes through what he considers to be the many cases of indirect knowledge (pg130-1), and then Gray challenges Brown to lay out his argument, which Brown does (pg133-5). What Brown amounts to saying is thus: our knowledge of our own minds comes from direct, infallible access to content-ful appearances [a pain, footly!], which leads us to indirect belief about our bodies [My foot nerves are twitching in pain], which can of course be fallible [it was a pain, but it wasn't in the foot].
Having laid out this picture, Brown claims that direct knowledge of the appearances of another's mental contents is possible (perhaps using telepathy). White asserts that it is an "absurd idea" (pg135), and that knowledge of another mind is impossible. This apparent agreement with Black confuses Gray, but White goes on to argue that it is necessarily impossible, thus far less threatening than it originally appeared (pg135-6). Black confesses that he did not realize that his statement was necessarily true when he made it, but nevertheless he was referring to what he now acknowledges is a necessary truth (pg136-9). White sums up the argument, put by Brown, but put back into an absurdity or a paradox, by claiming that knowledge, if taken to be of the sort that Brown (and, by extension, Black) think it is, is not applicable to not only other minds, but not applicable to the future, the past, even our own bodies, and, perhaps, finally, the whole world of things (pg140).
4/11/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds IV
04/11/2014
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 4: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
This chapter is a continuation from the previous conversation that has been taking place between three fictitious personas, each with their own perspective on knowledge of other minds. In this chapter another character, Brown, who appears to believe in "noumenal bread"(pg102) is briefly introduced, however much of this chapter is a re-description and refinement of what was previously laid out. After some preliminary recap, Gray argues that there is a difference in knowledge-by-inference between an acknowledged, in-principle invisible germ and one that is sought but "hitherto" undetectable given our current methods (pg91). This is meant to be an analogy for mental states, which aren't, Gray says, "defined as detectable though their effects" (pg91). This leaves open the possibility of future discovery of mental states, directly somehow.
Brown briefly interjects that even if there is no more to be done to ascertain whether S is P, isn't there still a further question about whether S really is P? Here it seems the other three disagree (mainly Gray, and to some extent Black) and there is an interlude about the meaninglessness of asking whether S is P after all that is logically and conceivably be done to ascertain the relation has been exhausted. (pg91-5) The upshot of this discussion is Black revealing his view of philosophy (pg93-4) and White his (pg95-6). Black believes that there is no fine line between physical possibility, logical possibility, and conceiveability; White calls the further questioning from Brown "unpoetic" and "intolerable", though meaningful (pg97-101).
White picks up on the difficulty of understanding differences in beliefs without differences in expectations (pg100-1). [I see an analogy between these comments and some (I think mistaken) formulations of Goodman's Grue problem, see pg100] Subsequently, White offers an initial possibility of directly discovering Smith's mental states, using some kind of new technology, or telepathy (pg 103). The trouble here is that it is unclear this is actually possible and not a kind of regress of indirect knowledge, as White explores (pg103-109).
Black rejects the possibility of a regress but still asserts that knowledge of another mind "directly" would not be sensory but instead be a kind of extended introspection, similar to a heightened ability (but unfortunately picks another sensory ability as an analogy: someone with a heightened sense of touch being able to detect differences in weights between feathers that no one else can detect (pg109-10). This kicks off a discussion about how one would know that this extra-sensory power was reliable and so on (pg110-116), which comes back to the issue that Brown initially posed, of there being something to "weight" that is further than how things react on scales, and feel by comparison, etc (pg115). White decries this absurd result and lists the steps which got them there (pg116). Black takes back his analogy on pg 122 but insists on a difference between introspection and sensation relating to other minds.
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 4: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
This chapter is a continuation from the previous conversation that has been taking place between three fictitious personas, each with their own perspective on knowledge of other minds. In this chapter another character, Brown, who appears to believe in "noumenal bread"(pg102) is briefly introduced, however much of this chapter is a re-description and refinement of what was previously laid out. After some preliminary recap, Gray argues that there is a difference in knowledge-by-inference between an acknowledged, in-principle invisible germ and one that is sought but "hitherto" undetectable given our current methods (pg91). This is meant to be an analogy for mental states, which aren't, Gray says, "defined as detectable though their effects" (pg91). This leaves open the possibility of future discovery of mental states, directly somehow.
Brown briefly interjects that even if there is no more to be done to ascertain whether S is P, isn't there still a further question about whether S really is P? Here it seems the other three disagree (mainly Gray, and to some extent Black) and there is an interlude about the meaninglessness of asking whether S is P after all that is logically and conceivably be done to ascertain the relation has been exhausted. (pg91-5) The upshot of this discussion is Black revealing his view of philosophy (pg93-4) and White his (pg95-6). Black believes that there is no fine line between physical possibility, logical possibility, and conceiveability; White calls the further questioning from Brown "unpoetic" and "intolerable", though meaningful (pg97-101).
White picks up on the difficulty of understanding differences in beliefs without differences in expectations (pg100-1). [I see an analogy between these comments and some (I think mistaken) formulations of Goodman's Grue problem, see pg100] Subsequently, White offers an initial possibility of directly discovering Smith's mental states, using some kind of new technology, or telepathy (pg 103). The trouble here is that it is unclear this is actually possible and not a kind of regress of indirect knowledge, as White explores (pg103-109).
Black rejects the possibility of a regress but still asserts that knowledge of another mind "directly" would not be sensory but instead be a kind of extended introspection, similar to a heightened ability (but unfortunately picks another sensory ability as an analogy: someone with a heightened sense of touch being able to detect differences in weights between feathers that no one else can detect (pg109-10). This kicks off a discussion about how one would know that this extra-sensory power was reliable and so on (pg110-116), which comes back to the issue that Brown initially posed, of there being something to "weight" that is further than how things react on scales, and feel by comparison, etc (pg115). White decries this absurd result and lists the steps which got them there (pg116). Black takes back his analogy on pg 122 but insists on a difference between introspection and sensation relating to other minds.
4/4/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds III
04/04/2014
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 3: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
In this chapter, a continuation from the dialogue from the previous chapter, a new character, "Grey" is introduced. Grey wants to convince White that Black's skeptical position is not warranted, nor is the externalistic meaning of "S believes that P" exhausts it. Grey tries to tell White that we know what is in other minds by analogy to our own, similar to how we know by analogy about other in-principle invisible phenomena. Grey uses the example of germs, which are known to be causes of many maladies. If the measles fit all the criteria for a germ-based disease but, upon inspection, no germs were to be found, Grey argues that we could still reasonably believe the disease was caused by germs, just invisible ones. This is the analogy Grey tries to give to White regarding mental states and other minds.
White complains early (pg62) that there are three replies to the problems of induction, or the "step" taken from evidence of P to asserting Q: Skeptic: 'don't take the step', Phenomenalist: 'there is no step to take, don't worry', Intuitionist: 'there is another mode of knowing that Q from P; it's ok'. White argues that merely stating: 'we know Q from P, but we can't justify it' is not an answer, but merely restates the problem.
After Grey gives his analogy of the invisible germ case, White talks at length of the 'queerness' (pg72) of the analogy argument: that while we might agree that our knowledge is by analogy, it is a weird sort of analogy since it relies on "the peculiar grammar of the expression of 'invisible things'" (pg72-3). The knowledge by analogy argument, White claims, is "satisfying" (pg74) and "soothing" (pg79) but not a justification since the satisfaction is "unstable" (pg74). The instability comes as follows: looking for the visible germs in a measles patient seems to be the right thing to do using the argument by analogy: measles is germ-caused. But, after no germs are found, to say it is in-principle invisible germs is to go a further step-- to move the goal posts-- to change the analogy (pg74-8).
White agrees that perhaps it is somehow "correct" to use analogy to argue for other minds, but there is something "misleading or tiresome" (pg75) about it. White tries to summarize the way the argument by analogy fails on pg 80-81, by claiming that using normal inductive reasoning to answer skeptical arguments either allows for unintelligible or false premises, or just builds into the grammar a "logical principle" that would not take the form of induction (pg81). Later in the chapter, White argues that Grey is close to simply re-stating the initial conditions that are taken to give evidence, in other words, collapsing the meaning of "will be colorblind" to "will fail the relevant tests" (pg83-5). Grey ends the chapter by trying to salvage the argument by analogy by saying the measles/invisible germs analogy wasn't apt.
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 3: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
In this chapter, a continuation from the dialogue from the previous chapter, a new character, "Grey" is introduced. Grey wants to convince White that Black's skeptical position is not warranted, nor is the externalistic meaning of "S believes that P" exhausts it. Grey tries to tell White that we know what is in other minds by analogy to our own, similar to how we know by analogy about other in-principle invisible phenomena. Grey uses the example of germs, which are known to be causes of many maladies. If the measles fit all the criteria for a germ-based disease but, upon inspection, no germs were to be found, Grey argues that we could still reasonably believe the disease was caused by germs, just invisible ones. This is the analogy Grey tries to give to White regarding mental states and other minds.
White complains early (pg62) that there are three replies to the problems of induction, or the "step" taken from evidence of P to asserting Q: Skeptic: 'don't take the step', Phenomenalist: 'there is no step to take, don't worry', Intuitionist: 'there is another mode of knowing that Q from P; it's ok'. White argues that merely stating: 'we know Q from P, but we can't justify it' is not an answer, but merely restates the problem.
After Grey gives his analogy of the invisible germ case, White talks at length of the 'queerness' (pg72) of the analogy argument: that while we might agree that our knowledge is by analogy, it is a weird sort of analogy since it relies on "the peculiar grammar of the expression of 'invisible things'" (pg72-3). The knowledge by analogy argument, White claims, is "satisfying" (pg74) and "soothing" (pg79) but not a justification since the satisfaction is "unstable" (pg74). The instability comes as follows: looking for the visible germs in a measles patient seems to be the right thing to do using the argument by analogy: measles is germ-caused. But, after no germs are found, to say it is in-principle invisible germs is to go a further step-- to move the goal posts-- to change the analogy (pg74-8).
White agrees that perhaps it is somehow "correct" to use analogy to argue for other minds, but there is something "misleading or tiresome" (pg75) about it. White tries to summarize the way the argument by analogy fails on pg 80-81, by claiming that using normal inductive reasoning to answer skeptical arguments either allows for unintelligible or false premises, or just builds into the grammar a "logical principle" that would not take the form of induction (pg81). Later in the chapter, White argues that Grey is close to simply re-stating the initial conditions that are taken to give evidence, in other words, collapsing the meaning of "will be colorblind" to "will fail the relevant tests" (pg83-5). Grey ends the chapter by trying to salvage the argument by analogy by saying the measles/invisible germs analogy wasn't apt.
3/28/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds II
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 2: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
This chapter (which was also a paper in Mind Vol 50 No 197), is a continuation of the previous chapter which introduced the skepticism about other minds. In this chapter, author writes a dialogue between the skeptic "Black", who asserts the unknowability of another's mind/conscious-states, and the person who apparently wrote the first chapter, "White", who represents the view that such a question is a joke, or absurd.
In this chapter, Black ultimately gets to make the point that when Smith finds out he will go colorblind tomorrow, it means more to Smith than it will to the rest of us. Not only does it mean that Smith will fail the relevant discriminatory tests and so on (what it means to us), but Smith will also not be able to see e.g. red the same way: it will look grey to him. "'No more of this, only this' and he looks at a colorless engraving" (pg51). This is the crux of the difference that Black tries to get White to admit. The difference between understanding this (or any) description about mental states and other descriptions about invisible things (like leprechauns in watches or electric currents in copper wires) is that of different meaning on the subjective level, a meaning we readily understand since we know that we ourselves have qualia. [Yet don't we grant that Smith also has qualia if the statement that he'll be colorblind means anything extra to him too?]
3/21/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds I
03/21/2014
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 1: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
While this is the first chapter of a book, each unit was also published in Mind sequentially starting from Vol 49, No 196 (which is where this chapter appeared). This paper starts with the problem of other minds, taking as a starting point a concern from Isaiah Berlin about two kinds of questions one could apply to whether S believes that P. The first is whether S really believes that P. The second is whether S really truly believes P (or anything else), even given outward signs of believing P. This second interest, one dubbed "philosophical doubt" is discussed at length by author. Author acknowledges influence from Wittgenstein, and proceeds to discuss the weirdness of skepticism of the following kind: I know that S shows all signs of believing P, and that there are no further tests we could conduct to determine whether S believes P, but still I doubt or wonder whether S has a belief that P (or any belief at all). Author considers this kind of doubt not meaningless, but a "dead doubt" (pg7).
During this paper, author introduces what he considers an analog to consider: that there are leprechauns in some grandfather clocks that sing fairy songs and disappear on midsummer evenings. Upon opening such clocks, leprechauns are discovered. Now imagine some watches also behave similarly, but when opened, reveal no leprechauns. In this circumstance it seems reasonable to claim there are invisible leprechauns within the watches, even though the operator "invisible" would otherwise signal a weird kind of assertion. An expansion of the analogy is whether there is a difference asserted that instead of invisible leprechauns, there are invisible brownies within the watches. Is this difference in assertions meaningful? Author seems to want to agree that two different images can be conjured. But, that doesn't mean the difference, or the assertion of a difference, isn't "idle" (pg13).
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 1: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
While this is the first chapter of a book, each unit was also published in Mind sequentially starting from Vol 49, No 196 (which is where this chapter appeared). This paper starts with the problem of other minds, taking as a starting point a concern from Isaiah Berlin about two kinds of questions one could apply to whether S believes that P. The first is whether S really believes that P. The second is whether S really truly believes P (or anything else), even given outward signs of believing P. This second interest, one dubbed "philosophical doubt" is discussed at length by author. Author acknowledges influence from Wittgenstein, and proceeds to discuss the weirdness of skepticism of the following kind: I know that S shows all signs of believing P, and that there are no further tests we could conduct to determine whether S believes P, but still I doubt or wonder whether S has a belief that P (or any belief at all). Author considers this kind of doubt not meaningless, but a "dead doubt" (pg7).
During this paper, author introduces what he considers an analog to consider: that there are leprechauns in some grandfather clocks that sing fairy songs and disappear on midsummer evenings. Upon opening such clocks, leprechauns are discovered. Now imagine some watches also behave similarly, but when opened, reveal no leprechauns. In this circumstance it seems reasonable to claim there are invisible leprechauns within the watches, even though the operator "invisible" would otherwise signal a weird kind of assertion. An expansion of the analogy is whether there is a difference asserted that instead of invisible leprechauns, there are invisible brownies within the watches. Is this difference in assertions meaningful? Author seems to want to agree that two different images can be conjured. But, that doesn't mean the difference, or the assertion of a difference, isn't "idle" (pg13).
1/10/14
Mankiw, Nicholas Gregory - Defending the One Percent
01/10/2014
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 27 No 3 Summer 2013
This paper starts with the author admitting that the question of what to do about income inequality is tangled up in political philosophy, which is outside the expertise of economists; nevertheless author will engage in it. The opening uses an abstract thought-experiment where a society had perfect income equality, but then an entrepreneur came along to make/sell something that everybody wanted, thereby generating new wealth for herself. This is supposed to "capture, in an extreme and stylized way" (pg22) the US for the past 40 years.
The first major section of the paper asks whether income inequality is somehow inefficient. Author believes that this could be possible if earnings from the top were based on "rent-seeking", but does not believe this is the case. Author does not agree with Stiglitz's argument in The Price of Inequality that rent-seeking is any more prevalent now than it was in the 1970s, though income inequality has risen significantly since then. Author instead uses Goldin & Katz in The Race between Education and Technology to argue that income inequality is due to the stagnation of education while a steady or increasing pace of technology placed a higher premium on skilled labor (pg23). Author does agree that rent-seeking should be limited or reduced if found, though argues that income inequality would be the symptom, not the disease in this case. Author also concedes that the financial industry, while it has a very important role to play in allocating capital and risk, also has socially questionable, unhelpful, or inefficient roles within it (e.g. high frequency trading). In this case, the judgment is that "the vast personal reward may well exceed the social value of what is produced" (pg24).
Continuing on the theme of inequality, author turns to the goal of equality of opportunity. This goal is seen not only as a counterpart to efficiency (unequal opportunity will lead to inefficiency), but also a valuable goal in itself. Stiglitz proposes "intergenerational transmission of income", meaning the same chance that a poor or wealthy child will make it to the top 10% of income earners. Author believes this metric is too simplistic. Author argues that the metric doesn't capture heredity, which likely influences success in life; author concludes from studies that IQ "has a large degree of heritability" (pg25), and so might other character traits and skills. Regardless, author suggests that it is best to focus on raising poor children from bad conditions. Author concludes from personal experience that the opportunities for the children of the 1% are similar to those of the middle class. Setting aside the needed investment in poor children and skilled education, then, is there more to dislike about income inequality? Author then considers it as a negative element of a society in and of itself (pg26).
Author reconstructs the outline of the Okun discussion about the "big tradeoff" between equality and efficiency, and uses Mirless' model for the calculus. In essence, income is a product of effort and productivity, and the government, as social planner with utilitarian goals, skims income using a "leaky bucket" until the effort of the productive income-earners declines to a certain point (pg26-7). This is called the "elasticity of the labor supply" (pg27). Author first doubts this model because "people have different tastes regarding consumption, leisure, and job attributes" (pg27), and uses the example of economics professors that could have taken higher-paying jobs instead. The next section deals with a more profound attack on this model, questioning the government's motivations in acting as a utilitarian social planner. The first point is that there is no interpersonal way to compare utility (yet/at all), and is a common point against utilitarianism. The second point is that utilitarianism is cosmopolitan, not national, though the government doesn't act in such a way to help all people across all nations (pg28). Another argument author has previously leveled, and repeats here, is that if there are character traits that correlate with productivity, those could reasonably be taxed as well. Thus the absurd conclusion that there might well be a utilitarian basis for taxing tall people, men, or other classes of people who have correlations with productivity or success. The final argument seems to grant the Mirless model and even give it the power to observe productivity directly, instead of just observing its product, income = productivity x effort. If one could observe productivity directly, then that could be taxed in itself to equalize consumption, but then, author argues, the most productive would have to work more than everyone else (pg29). This counter-intuitive conclusion is another reductio ad absurdum against utilitarianism.
Author turns to examine the actual arguments made recently by populist movements like Occupy Wall Street and some other books and policy proposals on income inequality. The first is that the tax code isn't progressive. Author: CBO numbers say that it is progressive, "highly" (pg30). The second is that the income that the 1% derive do not reflect their contributions to society, taking CEO pay for an example of cronyism. Author: Given that private equity firms pay CEOs even more than publicly held companies, the charge of cronyism is unlikely. Third: The 1% have benefited from public investment and infrastructure, which they should pay for. Author: this isn't an ability-to-pay argument, it's a get-what-you-pay-for argument, and it seems plausible that the 1% is paying enough; also most taxes go to other individuals, not better infrastructure.
Author concludes with arguing there is a need for an alternative philosophical framework to utilitarianism. Author considers Rawls' original position, but claims it is unintuitive because of the possibility of sacrifices that individuals (now no longer behind the veil of ignorance) would want to make (pg32). As an example, since kidney diseases mean sick people might need donors, it might make sense, while behind the veil of ignorance, to pledge your kidney in return for the assurance that if you got the disease yourself, you would receive one. But no one would want to have their kidney taken against their will, so author argues this undercuts Rawls' theory. Author proposes a "just deserts" theory, which seems to be: everyone gets income based on their productivity and effort (pg32-3).
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 27 No 3 Summer 2013
This paper starts with the author admitting that the question of what to do about income inequality is tangled up in political philosophy, which is outside the expertise of economists; nevertheless author will engage in it. The opening uses an abstract thought-experiment where a society had perfect income equality, but then an entrepreneur came along to make/sell something that everybody wanted, thereby generating new wealth for herself. This is supposed to "capture, in an extreme and stylized way" (pg22) the US for the past 40 years.
The first major section of the paper asks whether income inequality is somehow inefficient. Author believes that this could be possible if earnings from the top were based on "rent-seeking", but does not believe this is the case. Author does not agree with Stiglitz's argument in The Price of Inequality that rent-seeking is any more prevalent now than it was in the 1970s, though income inequality has risen significantly since then. Author instead uses Goldin & Katz in The Race between Education and Technology to argue that income inequality is due to the stagnation of education while a steady or increasing pace of technology placed a higher premium on skilled labor (pg23). Author does agree that rent-seeking should be limited or reduced if found, though argues that income inequality would be the symptom, not the disease in this case. Author also concedes that the financial industry, while it has a very important role to play in allocating capital and risk, also has socially questionable, unhelpful, or inefficient roles within it (e.g. high frequency trading). In this case, the judgment is that "the vast personal reward may well exceed the social value of what is produced" (pg24).
Continuing on the theme of inequality, author turns to the goal of equality of opportunity. This goal is seen not only as a counterpart to efficiency (unequal opportunity will lead to inefficiency), but also a valuable goal in itself. Stiglitz proposes "intergenerational transmission of income", meaning the same chance that a poor or wealthy child will make it to the top 10% of income earners. Author believes this metric is too simplistic. Author argues that the metric doesn't capture heredity, which likely influences success in life; author concludes from studies that IQ "has a large degree of heritability" (pg25), and so might other character traits and skills. Regardless, author suggests that it is best to focus on raising poor children from bad conditions. Author concludes from personal experience that the opportunities for the children of the 1% are similar to those of the middle class. Setting aside the needed investment in poor children and skilled education, then, is there more to dislike about income inequality? Author then considers it as a negative element of a society in and of itself (pg26).
Author reconstructs the outline of the Okun discussion about the "big tradeoff" between equality and efficiency, and uses Mirless' model for the calculus. In essence, income is a product of effort and productivity, and the government, as social planner with utilitarian goals, skims income using a "leaky bucket" until the effort of the productive income-earners declines to a certain point (pg26-7). This is called the "elasticity of the labor supply" (pg27). Author first doubts this model because "people have different tastes regarding consumption, leisure, and job attributes" (pg27), and uses the example of economics professors that could have taken higher-paying jobs instead. The next section deals with a more profound attack on this model, questioning the government's motivations in acting as a utilitarian social planner. The first point is that there is no interpersonal way to compare utility (yet/at all), and is a common point against utilitarianism. The second point is that utilitarianism is cosmopolitan, not national, though the government doesn't act in such a way to help all people across all nations (pg28). Another argument author has previously leveled, and repeats here, is that if there are character traits that correlate with productivity, those could reasonably be taxed as well. Thus the absurd conclusion that there might well be a utilitarian basis for taxing tall people, men, or other classes of people who have correlations with productivity or success. The final argument seems to grant the Mirless model and even give it the power to observe productivity directly, instead of just observing its product, income = productivity x effort. If one could observe productivity directly, then that could be taxed in itself to equalize consumption, but then, author argues, the most productive would have to work more than everyone else (pg29). This counter-intuitive conclusion is another reductio ad absurdum against utilitarianism.
Author turns to examine the actual arguments made recently by populist movements like Occupy Wall Street and some other books and policy proposals on income inequality. The first is that the tax code isn't progressive. Author: CBO numbers say that it is progressive, "highly" (pg30). The second is that the income that the 1% derive do not reflect their contributions to society, taking CEO pay for an example of cronyism. Author: Given that private equity firms pay CEOs even more than publicly held companies, the charge of cronyism is unlikely. Third: The 1% have benefited from public investment and infrastructure, which they should pay for. Author: this isn't an ability-to-pay argument, it's a get-what-you-pay-for argument, and it seems plausible that the 1% is paying enough; also most taxes go to other individuals, not better infrastructure.
Author concludes with arguing there is a need for an alternative philosophical framework to utilitarianism. Author considers Rawls' original position, but claims it is unintuitive because of the possibility of sacrifices that individuals (now no longer behind the veil of ignorance) would want to make (pg32). As an example, since kidney diseases mean sick people might need donors, it might make sense, while behind the veil of ignorance, to pledge your kidney in return for the assurance that if you got the disease yourself, you would receive one. But no one would want to have their kidney taken against their will, so author argues this undercuts Rawls' theory. Author proposes a "just deserts" theory, which seems to be: everyone gets income based on their productivity and effort (pg32-3).
11/22/13
Turing, Alan - Computing Machinery and Intelligence
11/22/2013
Mind, Vol 54 No 236, Oct 1950
This paper examines the question of whether machines can think. Since it was written when "machines" was still a broad term that could refer equally to a type-writer or an electronic computer, much of the work of the paper is clarifying, and exploring, what kind of machine could fit the bill for being able to learn, and, perhaps, think. Author works on re-phrasing the question to whether a machine (from here on, also "computer") can succeed at the "imitation game" as well as a man could. Here is the baseline game:
Interrogator (C) uses (probably) a keyboard and monitor to communicate with a separate, isolated, man (A), and a woman (B). Both A and B are trying to convince C that each is a woman. In other words, the man is trying to trick C into believing he is a woman. At some point, C makes the assessment on the gender of A and B. It is expected that C will have some degree of success at this.
Author's argument is that if a computer can take A's place and trick C as much of the time as A can, then a computer has played the imitation game as well as a man could, and thus was doing whatever a man was doing just as well. What is interesting is that author spends only a little time discussing the appropriateness of using this kind of game as an alternative to the "can machines think" question (pg435).
After discussing what kind of machine is envisioned (pg435-442), author considers objections (pg443-454):
1. The Theological objection: only humans with souls can think. Response: we're just making another vessel for a soul.
2. The 'Heads in the Sand' objection: if computers thought, humans would not be as special. Response: maybe so but it's possible, no?
3. The Mathematical objection: there are limits to the computing power of machines, cf Godel's proof. Response: and there aren't limits to the computing power of humans?
4. The Argument from Consciousness: thinking is part of understanding, which is part of consciousness, which machines do not have. Response: unless you're charitable, nobody else but you has consciousness. Thus, why not also be charitable about a machine that does what you can do equally well?
5. Arguments from Various Disabilities: machines can't do so many things that humans can do. Response: computers are getting better and much, and furthermore, arguments from disabilities don't hold up when comparing humans to each other. There is an interesting discussion on what kinds of mistakes computers can make (pg448-9) in this section. Author uses a distinction between "errors of functioning" and "errors of conclusion". You can program errors of functioning, but you may want to take that frailty away from computers to the extent possible. However, there is nothing that says a computer can't (and won't, often) make an error of conclusion, e.g. come up with the wrong answer through a flawless method. Author uses the example of inductive reasoning getting an outcome wrong even when used perfectly.
6. Lady Lovelace's Objection: machines do not have learning and cannot come up with anything new. Response: yes, but it isn't hard to see how they will be able to, someday. Furthermore, is novelty the mark of thinking? If so, even humans might not think very much.
7. Argument from Continuity in the Nervous System: the nervous system and a computer are too different, fundamentally. Response: this should not affect the imitation game, or the validity of conclusions, no matter which medium they were reasoned from.
8. The Argument from Informality of Behavior: there is no good way to possibly index all the appropriate behaviors for every situation for a computer, and since humans know the appropriate behaviors for every situation, humans cannot be the same as computers. Response: a computer can know what to do if given the right education and programming. There is also an interesting discussion on the difference between "rules of conduct" and "laws of behavior" here (pg452).
9. The Argument from Extra-Sensory Perception: humans have ESP. Response: since this may be true, to restrict the experiment to a "telepathy-proof room".
The remainder of the paper largely deals with what it would be like (theoretically) to create a learning computer. There includes an interesting discussion (pg454-5) about how the "real mind" is elusive, using a metaphor of the "skin of an onion".
Mind, Vol 54 No 236, Oct 1950
This paper examines the question of whether machines can think. Since it was written when "machines" was still a broad term that could refer equally to a type-writer or an electronic computer, much of the work of the paper is clarifying, and exploring, what kind of machine could fit the bill for being able to learn, and, perhaps, think. Author works on re-phrasing the question to whether a machine (from here on, also "computer") can succeed at the "imitation game" as well as a man could. Here is the baseline game:
Interrogator (C) uses (probably) a keyboard and monitor to communicate with a separate, isolated, man (A), and a woman (B). Both A and B are trying to convince C that each is a woman. In other words, the man is trying to trick C into believing he is a woman. At some point, C makes the assessment on the gender of A and B. It is expected that C will have some degree of success at this.
Author's argument is that if a computer can take A's place and trick C as much of the time as A can, then a computer has played the imitation game as well as a man could, and thus was doing whatever a man was doing just as well. What is interesting is that author spends only a little time discussing the appropriateness of using this kind of game as an alternative to the "can machines think" question (pg435).
After discussing what kind of machine is envisioned (pg435-442), author considers objections (pg443-454):
1. The Theological objection: only humans with souls can think. Response: we're just making another vessel for a soul.
2. The 'Heads in the Sand' objection: if computers thought, humans would not be as special. Response: maybe so but it's possible, no?
3. The Mathematical objection: there are limits to the computing power of machines, cf Godel's proof. Response: and there aren't limits to the computing power of humans?
4. The Argument from Consciousness: thinking is part of understanding, which is part of consciousness, which machines do not have. Response: unless you're charitable, nobody else but you has consciousness. Thus, why not also be charitable about a machine that does what you can do equally well?
5. Arguments from Various Disabilities: machines can't do so many things that humans can do. Response: computers are getting better and much, and furthermore, arguments from disabilities don't hold up when comparing humans to each other. There is an interesting discussion on what kinds of mistakes computers can make (pg448-9) in this section. Author uses a distinction between "errors of functioning" and "errors of conclusion". You can program errors of functioning, but you may want to take that frailty away from computers to the extent possible. However, there is nothing that says a computer can't (and won't, often) make an error of conclusion, e.g. come up with the wrong answer through a flawless method. Author uses the example of inductive reasoning getting an outcome wrong even when used perfectly.
6. Lady Lovelace's Objection: machines do not have learning and cannot come up with anything new. Response: yes, but it isn't hard to see how they will be able to, someday. Furthermore, is novelty the mark of thinking? If so, even humans might not think very much.
7. Argument from Continuity in the Nervous System: the nervous system and a computer are too different, fundamentally. Response: this should not affect the imitation game, or the validity of conclusions, no matter which medium they were reasoned from.
8. The Argument from Informality of Behavior: there is no good way to possibly index all the appropriate behaviors for every situation for a computer, and since humans know the appropriate behaviors for every situation, humans cannot be the same as computers. Response: a computer can know what to do if given the right education and programming. There is also an interesting discussion on the difference between "rules of conduct" and "laws of behavior" here (pg452).
9. The Argument from Extra-Sensory Perception: humans have ESP. Response: since this may be true, to restrict the experiment to a "telepathy-proof room".
The remainder of the paper largely deals with what it would be like (theoretically) to create a learning computer. There includes an interesting discussion (pg454-5) about how the "real mind" is elusive, using a metaphor of the "skin of an onion".
11/15/13
Proudfoot, Diane - Rethinking Turning's Test
11/15/2013
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 110 No 7, July 2013
Author starts by reviewing the history of Alan Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" paper in Mind. The central question is whether a computer could "be said to think", but it was replaced with the question: "are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game". For Turing, the criterion for thinking morphed into what could be taken for an imitation of human activity, and author sets to give a fresh interpretation of the test as a "response-dependence" approach (pg393).
First author reviews the "canonical" view, which employs behaviorism as the criterion: if the machine behaves as a thinking creature would in a given context, it is thinking. Author argues that Turing did not mean to give even sufficient (let alone necessary) conditions for thinking using behaviorism. The interrogator's (the human's) response to the behavior is a necessary part to success in the imitation game. Turing used a different game, one of a man trying to fool an interrogator into believing he was a woman, as the benchmark for how well a computer could fool an interrogator into believing it was thinking. Author discusses how puzzling this emphasis on the interrogator's response is for behaviorists. Instead of writing off this crucial element as misguided, author suggests that the behavoristic interpretation is what is misguided.
The new interpretation author puts forward starts with Turing considering the "idea of 'intelligence'" (pg396) as an "emotional" one, but meaning specifically that we apply the label "intelligent" partly due to our own mental state and perspective; it is response-dependent (pg397). The trick now is to indicate what kinds of subjects and what kinds of conditions are "normal" to elicit the prototypical response, which was Turing's point with the imitation game (pg398). Author argues that common objections to Turing's thesis is that it fails to capture response-independent notions of intelligence miss the point (pg399).
Author reviews an objection to Turing's test, first from Ned Block's "Aunt Bubbles" thought experiment (pg400-2). Block's thought experiment points out the logical possibility of a (very) large index of conversations, which would emulate intelligence if there was an (impossibly) fast search and probability mechanism. Author responds by putting the operator "actually" into the Turing schema.
Next discussed are rival views to the behavioristic one; the first is Moor's response-independent view (pg402-3). Moor wants the test to be evidence for thinking, which would be internal to the mechanism. Stuart Shieber argues that the test is an "interactive proof" of intelligence. Author also believes this view misses the response-dependence of the test (pg404).
Author talks about how response-dependence doesn't need to undermine objectivity, or that it is compatible with "qualified" realism (pg405). Author then talks about more the more recent understanding that "intelligence is in the eye of the observer", a form of (perhaps) illusionism, with comments on the Chinese Room from Jordan Pollack. Further discussion is about a problem with response-dependent concepts: that humans anthropomorphize (just about anything) (pg407-8) "the forensic problem of anthropomorphism". Author believes the Turing test has a two-part solution to this: (1) create a situation where there is a disincentive to anthropomorphize (the judge's accuracy would decline), and (2) making anthropomorphism into a controlled variable (pg409).
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 110 No 7, July 2013
Author starts by reviewing the history of Alan Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" paper in Mind. The central question is whether a computer could "be said to think", but it was replaced with the question: "are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game". For Turing, the criterion for thinking morphed into what could be taken for an imitation of human activity, and author sets to give a fresh interpretation of the test as a "response-dependence" approach (pg393).
First author reviews the "canonical" view, which employs behaviorism as the criterion: if the machine behaves as a thinking creature would in a given context, it is thinking. Author argues that Turing did not mean to give even sufficient (let alone necessary) conditions for thinking using behaviorism. The interrogator's (the human's) response to the behavior is a necessary part to success in the imitation game. Turing used a different game, one of a man trying to fool an interrogator into believing he was a woman, as the benchmark for how well a computer could fool an interrogator into believing it was thinking. Author discusses how puzzling this emphasis on the interrogator's response is for behaviorists. Instead of writing off this crucial element as misguided, author suggests that the behavoristic interpretation is what is misguided.
The new interpretation author puts forward starts with Turing considering the "idea of 'intelligence'" (pg396) as an "emotional" one, but meaning specifically that we apply the label "intelligent" partly due to our own mental state and perspective; it is response-dependent (pg397). The trick now is to indicate what kinds of subjects and what kinds of conditions are "normal" to elicit the prototypical response, which was Turing's point with the imitation game (pg398). Author argues that common objections to Turing's thesis is that it fails to capture response-independent notions of intelligence miss the point (pg399).
Author reviews an objection to Turing's test, first from Ned Block's "Aunt Bubbles" thought experiment (pg400-2). Block's thought experiment points out the logical possibility of a (very) large index of conversations, which would emulate intelligence if there was an (impossibly) fast search and probability mechanism. Author responds by putting the operator "actually" into the Turing schema.
Next discussed are rival views to the behavioristic one; the first is Moor's response-independent view (pg402-3). Moor wants the test to be evidence for thinking, which would be internal to the mechanism. Stuart Shieber argues that the test is an "interactive proof" of intelligence. Author also believes this view misses the response-dependence of the test (pg404).
Author talks about how response-dependence doesn't need to undermine objectivity, or that it is compatible with "qualified" realism (pg405). Author then talks about more the more recent understanding that "intelligence is in the eye of the observer", a form of (perhaps) illusionism, with comments on the Chinese Room from Jordan Pollack. Further discussion is about a problem with response-dependent concepts: that humans anthropomorphize (just about anything) (pg407-8) "the forensic problem of anthropomorphism". Author believes the Turing test has a two-part solution to this: (1) create a situation where there is a disincentive to anthropomorphize (the judge's accuracy would decline), and (2) making anthropomorphism into a controlled variable (pg409).
11/1/13
Lovejoy, Arthur - Plentitude and Sufficient Reason in Leibniz and Spinoza
11/01/2013
The Great Chain Of Being, Ch 5 Harvard University Press, 1936
Author sets out to discuss the relationship between Leibniz's principle of plenitude and his principle of sufficient reason, and whether Leibniz can avoid "absolute logical determinism" that characterizes Spinoza. Author starts by reminding us of Leibniz's writings on the 'single chain' of 'natural beings', that is a gradation and not strict species and genus divisions (pg145). The discussion moves to the principle of sufficient reason, and an inspection of the various (imprecise) formulations of it that Leibniz uses. Author argues that Leibniz's primary motivation is not to justify the particulars of the universe as "goods" but merely as non-arbitrary (pg146-8). Most thinkers of the time held a division between concepts (roughly, Platonic ideas) and objects, with concepts being maintained (for Leibniz) in the mind of God: it was here where ultimate reasons for existence "were to be sought" (pg147-8). The strategy here was to combine the two realms into one, and to add to the realm of objects the reason for their existence, in which case their existence would be self-justifying (pg148-9).
Author explores the thinking of the time relating to the origin of the universe and the "first cause", which must have been internal to itself and independent of other causes, in a word, God (pg149-151). The next question, answered in the affirmative by Spinoza, is whether only God's existence is justified, or whether such justification extends to all objects (pg151-3). The problem for Spinoza, as presented by author, is that the principle of plenitude should have resulted in all beings existing all at once, and not the creation and cessation of things over time (pg154-5). The alternative to Spinoza, according to author, is not to deny the necessary existence of God, but to deny the necessary existence of creation (pg156-165) (cf Duns Scotus, Aristotle, Augustine). In this conception, God creates the universe without motive. Author discusses Milton's struggles with these two ideas for some time (pg160-2).
Author turns back to Leibniz to explore his principle of sufficient reason (pg166-8). Leibniz agrees with Spinoza, against the previously discussed philosophers, that God must have some reason for creating things. Author imputes two reasons for Leibniz's beliefs: (1) as a principle of psychology all conscious choices must have motivating reasons and (2) practically, it is intolerable to believe that chance is the principle of the universe. Author reviews the challenge of Buridan's ass leveled by Clarke against Leibniz (pg168-9), and Leibniz's clumsily response. Author then introduces Leibniz's third alternative, between the determinism of Spinoza and the chance of his critics: that the world so created must not only be logically possible but also "compossible", consistent with each other. Thus the formation of "sets" of entities, and thus many different possible worlds, from which God chooses one, using God's will (a concept Spinoza seems to leave out from God) (pg170-1). The second feature that he needed, above the concept of compossibility, is that of "moral necessity" instead of metaphysical necessity (pg172-3). Author concludes this second distinction has no "logical substance" and that Leibniz is thus mostly equivalent to Spinoza (pg174-6).
Author goes on to argue that Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason "pass[es] over explicitly into the principle of plenitude"(pg177), which author discusses next (pg177-180). The problem for Leibniz is that sometimes he speaks of a degree of perfection in monads (in things), and thus might be caught into having to argue that a world with more eg, human monads, is better than one with eg, crocodile ones. But Leibniz needs to justify crocodiles, so he asserts that all monads have equal rights to existence (pg179). Instead, Leibniz places value on diversity of essence, not just quantity of more perfect ones. Author finally discusses Leibniz's response to those who believed in the possibility of a physical vacuum. Here Leibniz seems to eschew the principle of plenitude in favor of panpsychism and anti-materialism, which argues that minds, not matter, are the fundamentals of the universe (pg181-2).
The Great Chain Of Being, Ch 5 Harvard University Press, 1936
Author sets out to discuss the relationship between Leibniz's principle of plenitude and his principle of sufficient reason, and whether Leibniz can avoid "absolute logical determinism" that characterizes Spinoza. Author starts by reminding us of Leibniz's writings on the 'single chain' of 'natural beings', that is a gradation and not strict species and genus divisions (pg145). The discussion moves to the principle of sufficient reason, and an inspection of the various (imprecise) formulations of it that Leibniz uses. Author argues that Leibniz's primary motivation is not to justify the particulars of the universe as "goods" but merely as non-arbitrary (pg146-8). Most thinkers of the time held a division between concepts (roughly, Platonic ideas) and objects, with concepts being maintained (for Leibniz) in the mind of God: it was here where ultimate reasons for existence "were to be sought" (pg147-8). The strategy here was to combine the two realms into one, and to add to the realm of objects the reason for their existence, in which case their existence would be self-justifying (pg148-9).
Author explores the thinking of the time relating to the origin of the universe and the "first cause", which must have been internal to itself and independent of other causes, in a word, God (pg149-151). The next question, answered in the affirmative by Spinoza, is whether only God's existence is justified, or whether such justification extends to all objects (pg151-3). The problem for Spinoza, as presented by author, is that the principle of plenitude should have resulted in all beings existing all at once, and not the creation and cessation of things over time (pg154-5). The alternative to Spinoza, according to author, is not to deny the necessary existence of God, but to deny the necessary existence of creation (pg156-165) (cf Duns Scotus, Aristotle, Augustine). In this conception, God creates the universe without motive. Author discusses Milton's struggles with these two ideas for some time (pg160-2).
Author turns back to Leibniz to explore his principle of sufficient reason (pg166-8). Leibniz agrees with Spinoza, against the previously discussed philosophers, that God must have some reason for creating things. Author imputes two reasons for Leibniz's beliefs: (1) as a principle of psychology all conscious choices must have motivating reasons and (2) practically, it is intolerable to believe that chance is the principle of the universe. Author reviews the challenge of Buridan's ass leveled by Clarke against Leibniz (pg168-9), and Leibniz's clumsily response. Author then introduces Leibniz's third alternative, between the determinism of Spinoza and the chance of his critics: that the world so created must not only be logically possible but also "compossible", consistent with each other. Thus the formation of "sets" of entities, and thus many different possible worlds, from which God chooses one, using God's will (a concept Spinoza seems to leave out from God) (pg170-1). The second feature that he needed, above the concept of compossibility, is that of "moral necessity" instead of metaphysical necessity (pg172-3). Author concludes this second distinction has no "logical substance" and that Leibniz is thus mostly equivalent to Spinoza (pg174-6).
Author goes on to argue that Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason "pass[es] over explicitly into the principle of plenitude"(pg177), which author discusses next (pg177-180). The problem for Leibniz is that sometimes he speaks of a degree of perfection in monads (in things), and thus might be caught into having to argue that a world with more eg, human monads, is better than one with eg, crocodile ones. But Leibniz needs to justify crocodiles, so he asserts that all monads have equal rights to existence (pg179). Instead, Leibniz places value on diversity of essence, not just quantity of more perfect ones. Author finally discusses Leibniz's response to those who believed in the possibility of a physical vacuum. Here Leibniz seems to eschew the principle of plenitude in favor of panpsychism and anti-materialism, which argues that minds, not matter, are the fundamentals of the universe (pg181-2).
10/11/13
Westphal, Jonathan - Philosophical Investigations #693: "Meaning..."
10/11/2013 and 10/25/2013
Unpublished paper
Author's main point is to agree with Wittgenstein during his Philosophical Investigations that meaning and thinking are distinct, and to deny that "meaning" is a mental activity emanating from a speaker. Author starts with scholia #693 from the Investigations that talks about teaching the construction of a series and then 'meaning' that the student write the right number in the hundredth place of the series. This is taken to be a case of meaning something without thinking it.
Author starts with discussing the difference between teaching the construction of a series with the construction of a particular series (one without any tricks or traps). Author argues that Wittgenstein is unclear when he talks about teaching the construction of a particular series, if the student already knew how to construct series in general (cf #691, #143).
An additional problem that author introduces is the idiomatic use of "mean" in English compared to the German verb "meinen", which is more "dynamic" and therefore might have been a better target for Wittgenstein. In English, some uses of "mean" are commonly considered "stative".
The next problem is whether 'meaning to write' in this case means that the student write the series to the hundredth place, or does the teacher mean for the student to write the actual number at that place. In other words, does the teacher mean for the student to do the task, or for the student to write a particular number/calculation. Author takes Wittgenstein to mean the latter, which, while it encompasses the former, also implies meaning a specific answer.
To get greater clarity about what "to mean it" implies, author turns to #692, which turns to a criterion (behavioristic?) for accomplishing what was 'meant', rather than requiring the student's actions to match the teacher's mental state/activities. Author sees a favorable comparison with the activity of thinking, in this case thinking of a class does not mean thinking of each individual that makes up the class. So the resolution of the problem of what particularly is meant (the task or the number), can be resolved by claiming that the class of right answers was meant.
Author then turns to a positive account of what "to mean" in this case is doing: it is picking out a thing by "contrast or contraposition, in a non-logical sense". It is "removal of some definite ambiguity or some ignorance". For author, meaning in this sense is only required when things need to be distinguished for the sake of clarity or teaching. Author argues that "to mean" here mostly means "to pick" or "to choose". This picking is dynamic, but it is also subject to external criteria for whatever method we have of distinguishing (asking for clarification, pointing, showing, etc).
More broadly, however, author argues that Wittgenstein is trying to establish that the best understanding of "to mean" (not the ones where "meaning" is "picking"), is as a "stative or fientive" verb, not an active one. By contrast, "to think", has both dynamic and stative applications. Of course there are idiomatic uses of "meaning" that can be dynamic, but that is usually because the usage of "meaning" is filling in for another verb, like "picking", or, in some cases, for "intending" or "thinking".
Unpublished paper
Author's main point is to agree with Wittgenstein during his Philosophical Investigations that meaning and thinking are distinct, and to deny that "meaning" is a mental activity emanating from a speaker. Author starts with scholia #693 from the Investigations that talks about teaching the construction of a series and then 'meaning' that the student write the right number in the hundredth place of the series. This is taken to be a case of meaning something without thinking it.
Author starts with discussing the difference between teaching the construction of a series with the construction of a particular series (one without any tricks or traps). Author argues that Wittgenstein is unclear when he talks about teaching the construction of a particular series, if the student already knew how to construct series in general (cf #691, #143).
An additional problem that author introduces is the idiomatic use of "mean" in English compared to the German verb "meinen", which is more "dynamic" and therefore might have been a better target for Wittgenstein. In English, some uses of "mean" are commonly considered "stative".
The next problem is whether 'meaning to write' in this case means that the student write the series to the hundredth place, or does the teacher mean for the student to write the actual number at that place. In other words, does the teacher mean for the student to do the task, or for the student to write a particular number/calculation. Author takes Wittgenstein to mean the latter, which, while it encompasses the former, also implies meaning a specific answer.
To get greater clarity about what "to mean it" implies, author turns to #692, which turns to a criterion (behavioristic?) for accomplishing what was 'meant', rather than requiring the student's actions to match the teacher's mental state/activities. Author sees a favorable comparison with the activity of thinking, in this case thinking of a class does not mean thinking of each individual that makes up the class. So the resolution of the problem of what particularly is meant (the task or the number), can be resolved by claiming that the class of right answers was meant.
Author then turns to a positive account of what "to mean" in this case is doing: it is picking out a thing by "contrast or contraposition, in a non-logical sense". It is "removal of some definite ambiguity or some ignorance". For author, meaning in this sense is only required when things need to be distinguished for the sake of clarity or teaching. Author argues that "to mean" here mostly means "to pick" or "to choose". This picking is dynamic, but it is also subject to external criteria for whatever method we have of distinguishing (asking for clarification, pointing, showing, etc).
More broadly, however, author argues that Wittgenstein is trying to establish that the best understanding of "to mean" (not the ones where "meaning" is "picking"), is as a "stative or fientive" verb, not an active one. By contrast, "to think", has both dynamic and stative applications. Of course there are idiomatic uses of "meaning" that can be dynamic, but that is usually because the usage of "meaning" is filling in for another verb, like "picking", or, in some cases, for "intending" or "thinking".
9/20/13
Haslanger/Alcoff/Langton/Antony/O'Connor - The Stone
09/20/2013
The Stone (Blog) from The New York Times Sept 2, 2013
This is a series of 5 short pieces about women in philosophy, following the resignation of a well-known philosopher Colin McGinn. I'll briefly summarize the main points of each piece:
Haslanger: The stereotypical philosopher is an old man with a beard. The numbers of women in philosophy is dismal. With that low amount of fellowship, nothing as overt as sexual harassment is needed to keep women from the field since 'alienation, loneliness, bias, microaggression, discrimination, etc' are also effective.
Alcoff: One problem with philosophy is the "ultimate fighting" intellectual combat approach. It enhances social imbalance like gender, seniority, race.
Langton: The caricature and stereotype of the philosopher can become a "stereotype threat" that engenders under-performance in non-represented groups. But the history of philosophy, as it is selectively taught, does not include the women and other contributors.
Antony: There is a "male fog of anxiety that floats through the halls of academia" over sexual harassment and other politically-correct initiatives. But frankly most of it all amounts to a growing consensus that men will have to change their ways, and will possibly be subject to light discipline or public embarrassment if they don't. But please don't threaten that this will somehow damage effective pedagogy; such a claim seems hysterical.
O'Connor: It is difficult to encourage women to enter philosophy due to how unfriendly it can be to them. This is a "double bind". A double bind is a barrier for entrance for some, and then simultaneously difficult/impossible for those who have gained entrance to fix the problems. It's men who need to do much more.
The Stone (Blog) from The New York Times Sept 2, 2013
This is a series of 5 short pieces about women in philosophy, following the resignation of a well-known philosopher Colin McGinn. I'll briefly summarize the main points of each piece:
Haslanger: The stereotypical philosopher is an old man with a beard. The numbers of women in philosophy is dismal. With that low amount of fellowship, nothing as overt as sexual harassment is needed to keep women from the field since 'alienation, loneliness, bias, microaggression, discrimination, etc' are also effective.
Alcoff: One problem with philosophy is the "ultimate fighting" intellectual combat approach. It enhances social imbalance like gender, seniority, race.
Langton: The caricature and stereotype of the philosopher can become a "stereotype threat" that engenders under-performance in non-represented groups. But the history of philosophy, as it is selectively taught, does not include the women and other contributors.
Antony: There is a "male fog of anxiety that floats through the halls of academia" over sexual harassment and other politically-correct initiatives. But frankly most of it all amounts to a growing consensus that men will have to change their ways, and will possibly be subject to light discipline or public embarrassment if they don't. But please don't threaten that this will somehow damage effective pedagogy; such a claim seems hysterical.
O'Connor: It is difficult to encourage women to enter philosophy due to how unfriendly it can be to them. This is a "double bind". A double bind is a barrier for entrance for some, and then simultaneously difficult/impossible for those who have gained entrance to fix the problems. It's men who need to do much more.
8/16/13
Fried, Barbara - Beyond Blame
08/16/2013
Boston Review & Forum, June 28, 2013
This article is a scholarly overview of the philosophical solutions (and challenges) to the problem of free will, with focus on the practical application of assigning blame. The article was then commented upon by other philosophers in the forum.
The article begins with the conundrum that moral philosophers pose to themselves as a hypothetical, in light of evidence about influencing factors in decision-making. The hypothetical is: if all choices are determined, can there be free will? Author looks at this specifically relating to blame and the cost of it: the prison system in the US, the perspective that people are at fault instead of being subjected to some sort of widespread social disorder, etc. Author reviews the state of debate: interest was reignited after Rawls' A Theory of Justice, followed by Nozick and Dworkin, shaking roughly into two camps:
-Capatibilism (free will and blame are compatible with determinism)
-Incompatibilism (free will and blame are incompatible with determinism)
Since Incompatibilism believes the two concepts cannot coexist, there are naturally proponents of either blameless determinism or free will. Author calls the first "Skeptical Incompatibilists" and the second "Libertarian Incompatibilists". Author first discusses the latter and concludes that Libertarian Incomaptibilists rest "profoundly consequential judgments on the insubstantial hook of abstract possibility" (pg4). Author moves then to Compatibilism, which continues to assign blame even after admitting (hypothetically) to determinism. This is an old problem, and author goes back to Jonathan Edwards to show the struggles with it. Author ultimately argues that Compatibilism does not give a normative basis for assigning blame, but first author gives an example of a bus driver that, even after exercising all proper care, is unfortunate enough to hit a child with his bus. Author believes we would blame this person, and this is unfair because "fate" intervened in the outcome of the situation (pg6). The "indigestible core" of Compatibilism is that it is all "fate" that determines every action. Author then acknowledges she is a Skeptical Incompatibilist.
The second part of the paper deals with the reasoning why most people are so intent to hold onto the concept of free will, and to "[make] the world safe for blame" (pg7). Here are the author's thoughts:
i. Humans naturally believe in their own agency, and that of others
ii. Blame is indispensable in controlling and normalizing human behavior (social benefits vs costs of a useful fiction)
iii. Belief in blame, ergo free will, treats each fairly, as you see yourself (a variation on i) (pg8-9) Author spends some time on this one, calling it "very Kantian" and troubling since it equates respect only with free will. Author channels Erin Kelly in outlining a different kind of respect: taking the perspective of the agent who committed the supposedly blameworthy action. Author also argues here that allowing for diminished responsibility due to diminished agency is "deeply problematic" for the Compatibilist since there is no logical stopping place until Incompatibilism.
iv. Blame is just part of the world (variation on i)
Author concludes that there is some hope in some places on the more practical level, moving the US criminal incarceration system away from being entirely focused on blame, which author believes is very harmful.
A forum from a variety of philosophers follows, here:
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/barbara-fried-beyond-blame-moral-responsibility-philosophy-law
Here is a brief summary from each response:
Christine Korsgaard:
Action is judged by a success/failure rubric, blame is the collective agency of a society assigning "failure" to actions. This is only useful if there is a collective view of success, a goal or telos to the society or other communal unit (family). When there is a fractured view, blame comes unhinged.
Erin Kelly:
Blame isn't rampant because of a misunderstanding in the metaphysics of free will and determinism; it's a misunderstanding that criminal justice is where blame should be assigned. Also, even on a personal level, there are many responses to a wrongdoing: blame is only one and is not even necessary.
Adriaan Lanni:
If the harm is the mass incarceration, better to focus on that and moral arguments against it, rather than a debate about free will, though Lanni is sympathetic to Fried's views.
Mike Konczal:
Though the harms regarding blame are agreed upon, a different system that relies on statistical models and assumes determinism might be more authoritarian than we would want.
Paul Bloom:
The elementary argument against blame (determinism) has to remember that not only blame is jettisoned, but all choice, which is too much to lose. Choice doesn't have to be free to be chosen during deliberation, for which we can hold people accountable. Blame and guilt can motivate good behavior.
Gideon Rosen:
Re-frame "choice" as "control" and remember that there are forms of control (like a standard of competence) that are consistent with determinism, as the compatibilist would have. Fried's claims are actually quite radical, meaning that all crimes only have victims (there is no blameworthy perpetrator).
Brian Leiter:
Fried has just hit the tip of the ice berg: this "blame fest" has been happening since (at least) Jesus. Nietzsche has tried to re-word the discussion: "villain" becomes "enemy", "scoundrel" becomes "sick", and "sinner" becomes "fool". This understands that bad thoughts and bad character are worth remedying and sanctioning, but can do without compatibilism.
George Sher:
Fried is mistaken to believe that compatibilism is on a slippery slope when excusing agents with diminished control. Diminished agents do not have sufficient connection to reality to have control; hence some of their actions can be excused. Blame, at the very least, gives power to our moral values.
TM Scanlon:
Fried's efforts to banish all responsibility in banishing blame is an overreaction. Since blame requires seeing the actor's attitudes, by necessity the blamer needs to take the point-of-view of the perpetrator. The trouble with today's "blame fest" is that it confuses substantive responsibility with moral responsibility.
Reply by Fried:
Of course there still needs to be a code of conduct that is enforceable, but for the sake of harm reduction, not to mete out moral responsibility. Compatibilism, even with deliberation, control, etc. built in, still has an indigestible core, and "common sense" is no benefit.
Boston Review & Forum, June 28, 2013
This article is a scholarly overview of the philosophical solutions (and challenges) to the problem of free will, with focus on the practical application of assigning blame. The article was then commented upon by other philosophers in the forum.
The article begins with the conundrum that moral philosophers pose to themselves as a hypothetical, in light of evidence about influencing factors in decision-making. The hypothetical is: if all choices are determined, can there be free will? Author looks at this specifically relating to blame and the cost of it: the prison system in the US, the perspective that people are at fault instead of being subjected to some sort of widespread social disorder, etc. Author reviews the state of debate: interest was reignited after Rawls' A Theory of Justice, followed by Nozick and Dworkin, shaking roughly into two camps:
-Capatibilism (free will and blame are compatible with determinism)
-Incompatibilism (free will and blame are incompatible with determinism)
Since Incompatibilism believes the two concepts cannot coexist, there are naturally proponents of either blameless determinism or free will. Author calls the first "Skeptical Incompatibilists" and the second "Libertarian Incompatibilists". Author first discusses the latter and concludes that Libertarian Incomaptibilists rest "profoundly consequential judgments on the insubstantial hook of abstract possibility" (pg4). Author moves then to Compatibilism, which continues to assign blame even after admitting (hypothetically) to determinism. This is an old problem, and author goes back to Jonathan Edwards to show the struggles with it. Author ultimately argues that Compatibilism does not give a normative basis for assigning blame, but first author gives an example of a bus driver that, even after exercising all proper care, is unfortunate enough to hit a child with his bus. Author believes we would blame this person, and this is unfair because "fate" intervened in the outcome of the situation (pg6). The "indigestible core" of Compatibilism is that it is all "fate" that determines every action. Author then acknowledges she is a Skeptical Incompatibilist.
The second part of the paper deals with the reasoning why most people are so intent to hold onto the concept of free will, and to "[make] the world safe for blame" (pg7). Here are the author's thoughts:
i. Humans naturally believe in their own agency, and that of others
ii. Blame is indispensable in controlling and normalizing human behavior (social benefits vs costs of a useful fiction)
iii. Belief in blame, ergo free will, treats each fairly, as you see yourself (a variation on i) (pg8-9) Author spends some time on this one, calling it "very Kantian" and troubling since it equates respect only with free will. Author channels Erin Kelly in outlining a different kind of respect: taking the perspective of the agent who committed the supposedly blameworthy action. Author also argues here that allowing for diminished responsibility due to diminished agency is "deeply problematic" for the Compatibilist since there is no logical stopping place until Incompatibilism.
iv. Blame is just part of the world (variation on i)
Author concludes that there is some hope in some places on the more practical level, moving the US criminal incarceration system away from being entirely focused on blame, which author believes is very harmful.
A forum from a variety of philosophers follows, here:
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/barbara-fried-beyond-blame-moral-responsibility-philosophy-law
Here is a brief summary from each response:
Christine Korsgaard:
Action is judged by a success/failure rubric, blame is the collective agency of a society assigning "failure" to actions. This is only useful if there is a collective view of success, a goal or telos to the society or other communal unit (family). When there is a fractured view, blame comes unhinged.
Erin Kelly:
Blame isn't rampant because of a misunderstanding in the metaphysics of free will and determinism; it's a misunderstanding that criminal justice is where blame should be assigned. Also, even on a personal level, there are many responses to a wrongdoing: blame is only one and is not even necessary.
Adriaan Lanni:
If the harm is the mass incarceration, better to focus on that and moral arguments against it, rather than a debate about free will, though Lanni is sympathetic to Fried's views.
Mike Konczal:
Though the harms regarding blame are agreed upon, a different system that relies on statistical models and assumes determinism might be more authoritarian than we would want.
Paul Bloom:
The elementary argument against blame (determinism) has to remember that not only blame is jettisoned, but all choice, which is too much to lose. Choice doesn't have to be free to be chosen during deliberation, for which we can hold people accountable. Blame and guilt can motivate good behavior.
Gideon Rosen:
Re-frame "choice" as "control" and remember that there are forms of control (like a standard of competence) that are consistent with determinism, as the compatibilist would have. Fried's claims are actually quite radical, meaning that all crimes only have victims (there is no blameworthy perpetrator).
Brian Leiter:
Fried has just hit the tip of the ice berg: this "blame fest" has been happening since (at least) Jesus. Nietzsche has tried to re-word the discussion: "villain" becomes "enemy", "scoundrel" becomes "sick", and "sinner" becomes "fool". This understands that bad thoughts and bad character are worth remedying and sanctioning, but can do without compatibilism.
George Sher:
Fried is mistaken to believe that compatibilism is on a slippery slope when excusing agents with diminished control. Diminished agents do not have sufficient connection to reality to have control; hence some of their actions can be excused. Blame, at the very least, gives power to our moral values.
TM Scanlon:
Fried's efforts to banish all responsibility in banishing blame is an overreaction. Since blame requires seeing the actor's attitudes, by necessity the blamer needs to take the point-of-view of the perpetrator. The trouble with today's "blame fest" is that it confuses substantive responsibility with moral responsibility.
Reply by Fried:
Of course there still needs to be a code of conduct that is enforceable, but for the sake of harm reduction, not to mete out moral responsibility. Compatibilism, even with deliberation, control, etc. built in, still has an indigestible core, and "common sense" is no benefit.
5/3/13
Putnam, Hilary - What Theories Are Not
05/03/2013
Mathematics, Matter and Method
This article tries to take apart the "received view" about the relationship between scientific theories and observations, and between theoretical terms and observational ones. For author, there are two two-part distinctions: observation/theoretical terms and then observational/theoretical statements. Author asserts that the supposed problems that these distinctions are meant to fix are not really problems: (1) how to understand theoretical terms? (2) how do you make sure theories aren't fulfilling the evidence, rather than how it's 'supposed' to go? (pg216). And finally, that the distinctions are "broken-backed", meaning that they fail to distinguish (pg216-7).
Author starts with Carnap in his Testability and Meaning. Carnap's idea is that there is an "observation language" or vocabulary, and that these correspond to observable qualities; author then pushes Carnap about whether the terms could also apply to unobservable qualities. The problem: if the observation terms can only refer to observable things, author argues that "there are no observable terms" (pg218); or if they can, then there isn't a problem with talking about unobservables that can be solved with vocabulary. What is really happening here, according to author, is that unobservables are being conflated with theoretical ones. This is a mistake (pg219) and misses what is important about theories.
Author then takes a small interlude to move to discuss the "notion of 'partial interpretation'", first giving Carnap's assertion about it and then discussing how it has been "applied indiscriminately" to terms, theories, and languages (pg220-1). Author discusses various ways a "partial interpretation" could be employed (pg221) and proceeds to dissect each possible understanding in the following pages (pg222-4). Author employs an extended discussion of a common understanding of "soluble". The discussion is meant to ridicule Carnap's understanding of a "partial interpretation": for Carnap, when sugar cubes dissolve in water, what we should do is respecify the meanings of theoretic terms based on observation.
Author returns to what he considers to be the ersatz problem: giving meanings for theoretic terms. Author asks: why assume they should get their meanings from only observation terms? The worry about circularity is a worry that occurs in any language. Perhaps the worry is about how theoretic terms become used in a language: author explores these worries as well (pg225). Interestingly, author claims that language can introduce more refined expressions using less refined ones: "we use less-refined tools to manufacture more-refined ones" (pg226). The argument here is that it is simply not possible to introduce a term into a language that neither relies on imprecise "primitives" or other terms whose precise definition at some point doesn't rest on primitives (pg226).
Mathematics, Matter and Method
This article tries to take apart the "received view" about the relationship between scientific theories and observations, and between theoretical terms and observational ones. For author, there are two two-part distinctions: observation/theoretical terms and then observational/theoretical statements. Author asserts that the supposed problems that these distinctions are meant to fix are not really problems: (1) how to understand theoretical terms? (2) how do you make sure theories aren't fulfilling the evidence, rather than how it's 'supposed' to go? (pg216). And finally, that the distinctions are "broken-backed", meaning that they fail to distinguish (pg216-7).
Author starts with Carnap in his Testability and Meaning. Carnap's idea is that there is an "observation language" or vocabulary, and that these correspond to observable qualities; author then pushes Carnap about whether the terms could also apply to unobservable qualities. The problem: if the observation terms can only refer to observable things, author argues that "there are no observable terms" (pg218); or if they can, then there isn't a problem with talking about unobservables that can be solved with vocabulary. What is really happening here, according to author, is that unobservables are being conflated with theoretical ones. This is a mistake (pg219) and misses what is important about theories.
Author then takes a small interlude to move to discuss the "notion of 'partial interpretation'", first giving Carnap's assertion about it and then discussing how it has been "applied indiscriminately" to terms, theories, and languages (pg220-1). Author discusses various ways a "partial interpretation" could be employed (pg221) and proceeds to dissect each possible understanding in the following pages (pg222-4). Author employs an extended discussion of a common understanding of "soluble". The discussion is meant to ridicule Carnap's understanding of a "partial interpretation": for Carnap, when sugar cubes dissolve in water, what we should do is respecify the meanings of theoretic terms based on observation.
Author returns to what he considers to be the ersatz problem: giving meanings for theoretic terms. Author asks: why assume they should get their meanings from only observation terms? The worry about circularity is a worry that occurs in any language. Perhaps the worry is about how theoretic terms become used in a language: author explores these worries as well (pg225). Interestingly, author claims that language can introduce more refined expressions using less refined ones: "we use less-refined tools to manufacture more-refined ones" (pg226). The argument here is that it is simply not possible to introduce a term into a language that neither relies on imprecise "primitives" or other terms whose precise definition at some point doesn't rest on primitives (pg226).
4/19/13
Schaffner, Kenneth - Ernest Nagel and Reduction
04/18/2013
The Journal of Philosophy, Aug/Sept 2012
This is a long paper that explores Nagel's theory of reduction; how it has changed over time and how it relates to a current example. The author first gives Nagel's theory of reduction and its motivations. Nagel was following in the scientific tradition that was able to "absorb" other branches of science into mechanical models. Nagel's prototypical example is the reduction of "classical thermodynamics to statistical mechanics (SM)" (pg535). There were two types of reduction:
-homogeneous: no novel properties are introduced
-heterogeneous: properties are explained in terms of other ones: e.g. temperature to molecular energy
It was the heterogeneous reductions that were the more interesting, though they do not eliminate the earlier "folk" categories. (pg535-6)
Author recaps the various conditions that Nagel placed on theory reduction:
-That hypotheses and axioms take the form of explicit statements whose meanings are fixed by the discipline (pg536-7) (these were Nagel's first and second conditions; author calls them "0").
-Deriviability: the laws of the reduced science are the logical consequence of the reducing science's "theoretical assumptions" (pg537).
-Connectability: terms in the reduced science must be connected somehow to the reducing science using additional "assumptions" (pg537-8).
Author then discusses the extensions and revisions to Nagel's model, first from his own work in creating the "Generic Reduction Replacement" system, in which obsolete or discredited theories could also be reduced (pg540). Also discussed were alternatives like Wimsatt's claims that it isn't theories that should be reduced but "mechanisms" (pg541-2) or a kind of eliminatist-reconstruction "New Wave" advocated by the Churchlands (pg542). Finally, author talks about the functionalist approach to mind and the complications brought on by arguments about multiple realizability (pg543-4). The next section talks about the response to Nagel's model in the 21st century, starting with Hartmann's and (separately) Butterfield's defense of Nagel. The first part of this discussion is about derivability where the concern is over whether the reducing theory's connections can be stronger than a "strong analogy" to the reduced theory (pg545-6). The emerging defenses mainly argue that there is no need to have an overarching concept or definition of "analogy", and that reducing theories need only have an analogy to the reduced (pg545-8). Next is a discussion of connectability, specifically about the nature of the "bridge-laws" or "connectability assumptions". Here author defends his own view that these are synthetic, extensional connections against the two-part analysis of Dizadji-Bahmani that argues that identity statements are internal to a reducing theory, but bridge laws are external to that reducing theory (pg548).
Because "actual reduction is hard to do", there has been a rise in discussions about partial reduction (pg549). Author advocates that the more common types of reduction are 'patchy/local/creeping', at least in the e.g. biological or neurosciences (pg550). However, author gives a lengthy summary in the next section of a systematic reduction of optics undertaken by Sommerfeld (pg551-9). The extended example begins with stressing the importance of Nagel's first condition, that the formulations for both reduced and reducing theories be explicitly stated and connected. Another primary take-away is that the equations used for reduction are more simple than the more "complex and rigorous" (pg556) Maxwell ones, and that in some places, notably when experimenting with diffraction, the Maxwell equations do not provide a rigorous reduction (pg557-8). But author's reading of this, backed up by successive analyses from e.g. Boooker & Jackson, Saatsi & Vicker is that this is a good case of his GRR, where the reducing theory corrects the reduced but does not give a rigorous reduction because it relies on analogy (pg558). However, all-told, even in sciences where there can be significant reduction, there are failures "at the margins" (pg559).
In the penultimate section author talks about the conditions for partial reduction. Author gives a general suggestion: partial reductions should be treated as completed reductions but ones that have exceptions (pg562-3). Author also adds another condition to his GRR that is much like Nagel's original condition of explicit formulations, roughly, that there must be enough codification of hypotheses and theories that can allow for a judgment about whether reduction is successful (pg563).
The Journal of Philosophy, Aug/Sept 2012
This is a long paper that explores Nagel's theory of reduction; how it has changed over time and how it relates to a current example. The author first gives Nagel's theory of reduction and its motivations. Nagel was following in the scientific tradition that was able to "absorb" other branches of science into mechanical models. Nagel's prototypical example is the reduction of "classical thermodynamics to statistical mechanics (SM)" (pg535). There were two types of reduction:
-homogeneous: no novel properties are introduced
-heterogeneous: properties are explained in terms of other ones: e.g. temperature to molecular energy
It was the heterogeneous reductions that were the more interesting, though they do not eliminate the earlier "folk" categories. (pg535-6)
Author recaps the various conditions that Nagel placed on theory reduction:
-That hypotheses and axioms take the form of explicit statements whose meanings are fixed by the discipline (pg536-7) (these were Nagel's first and second conditions; author calls them "0").
-Deriviability: the laws of the reduced science are the logical consequence of the reducing science's "theoretical assumptions" (pg537).
-Connectability: terms in the reduced science must be connected somehow to the reducing science using additional "assumptions" (pg537-8).
Author then discusses the extensions and revisions to Nagel's model, first from his own work in creating the "Generic Reduction Replacement" system, in which obsolete or discredited theories could also be reduced (pg540). Also discussed were alternatives like Wimsatt's claims that it isn't theories that should be reduced but "mechanisms" (pg541-2) or a kind of eliminatist-reconstruction "New Wave" advocated by the Churchlands (pg542). Finally, author talks about the functionalist approach to mind and the complications brought on by arguments about multiple realizability (pg543-4). The next section talks about the response to Nagel's model in the 21st century, starting with Hartmann's and (separately) Butterfield's defense of Nagel. The first part of this discussion is about derivability where the concern is over whether the reducing theory's connections can be stronger than a "strong analogy" to the reduced theory (pg545-6). The emerging defenses mainly argue that there is no need to have an overarching concept or definition of "analogy", and that reducing theories need only have an analogy to the reduced (pg545-8). Next is a discussion of connectability, specifically about the nature of the "bridge-laws" or "connectability assumptions". Here author defends his own view that these are synthetic, extensional connections against the two-part analysis of Dizadji-Bahmani that argues that identity statements are internal to a reducing theory, but bridge laws are external to that reducing theory (pg548).
Because "actual reduction is hard to do", there has been a rise in discussions about partial reduction (pg549). Author advocates that the more common types of reduction are 'patchy/local/creeping', at least in the e.g. biological or neurosciences (pg550). However, author gives a lengthy summary in the next section of a systematic reduction of optics undertaken by Sommerfeld (pg551-9). The extended example begins with stressing the importance of Nagel's first condition, that the formulations for both reduced and reducing theories be explicitly stated and connected. Another primary take-away is that the equations used for reduction are more simple than the more "complex and rigorous" (pg556) Maxwell ones, and that in some places, notably when experimenting with diffraction, the Maxwell equations do not provide a rigorous reduction (pg557-8). But author's reading of this, backed up by successive analyses from e.g. Boooker & Jackson, Saatsi & Vicker is that this is a good case of his GRR, where the reducing theory corrects the reduced but does not give a rigorous reduction because it relies on analogy (pg558). However, all-told, even in sciences where there can be significant reduction, there are failures "at the margins" (pg559).
In the penultimate section author talks about the conditions for partial reduction. Author gives a general suggestion: partial reductions should be treated as completed reductions but ones that have exceptions (pg562-3). Author also adds another condition to his GRR that is much like Nagel's original condition of explicit formulations, roughly, that there must be enough codification of hypotheses and theories that can allow for a judgment about whether reduction is successful (pg563).
4/12/13
Suppes, Patrick - Reflections on Ernest Nagel's 1977 Dewey Lectures Teleology Revisited
04/12/2013
The Journal of Philosophy, Aug/Sept 2012
This paper is a summary and examination of Nagel's 1961 chapters on biological teleology and Nagel's further arguments in the 1977 Dewey lectures. In the first section, author reviews Nagel's 1961 arguments against teleological explanation being "essential" to biology: (1) the teleological can be given analogues with the mechanical, (2) the teleological used to be the account for most physical processes, which have since been replaced by the mechanical (thus teleology in biology might be only provisional). Nagel's point is that a type of system theory will also do for biological explanation, that that biology doesn't require "a radically distinctive logic of inquiry". (pg506)
In the next section, author skips to Nagel's 1977 discussions of the various shortcomings of newer theories about explanation in biology. One analysis is of Mayr's "program" view, which separates some biological functions into the "teleomatic" and the "teleonomic" (pg507). The teleomatic is "automatic, as is the case for many human habits" and the teleonomic is more in line with the teleological. Author summarizes Nagel's main objections: That just because a process is controlled by a program does not mean it's teleological, and finding a good criterion to distinguish between the supposed two kinds of programs is not possible. The last part of this section includes Nagel's restatement of his theory which is now called the "system-property view", which includes a difficulty with variables that are not "determinantly connected by known laws of nature" (pg508).
Section III examines the second half of chapter 12 in Nagel's The Structure of Science. In it, Nagel responds to the arguments offered by biologists resisting reduction of biology to physics. Nagel concludes that though this is not possible (yet), there must remain this possibility (pg509). The next section author shows Nagel's discussion of functional explanations and focuses on Nagel's criticisms of functional explanations that may smuggle in teleology, such as: "blood contains leucocytes for the sake of defending the body against invading bacteria." (pg510). Nagel deals with Hempel's analysis of the possibility of multiple causes (pg511) and also a view Nagel is sympathetic to in Michael Ruse's "welfare" view. Nagel's views are summarized on the bottom of pg512. The final section of the paper is author's comments on biological explanation with particular extended discussion on how solving the problem of consciousness will lead to ever more intermixing of physics, chemistry, and biology.
The Journal of Philosophy, Aug/Sept 2012
This paper is a summary and examination of Nagel's 1961 chapters on biological teleology and Nagel's further arguments in the 1977 Dewey lectures. In the first section, author reviews Nagel's 1961 arguments against teleological explanation being "essential" to biology: (1) the teleological can be given analogues with the mechanical, (2) the teleological used to be the account for most physical processes, which have since been replaced by the mechanical (thus teleology in biology might be only provisional). Nagel's point is that a type of system theory will also do for biological explanation, that that biology doesn't require "a radically distinctive logic of inquiry". (pg506)
In the next section, author skips to Nagel's 1977 discussions of the various shortcomings of newer theories about explanation in biology. One analysis is of Mayr's "program" view, which separates some biological functions into the "teleomatic" and the "teleonomic" (pg507). The teleomatic is "automatic, as is the case for many human habits" and the teleonomic is more in line with the teleological. Author summarizes Nagel's main objections: That just because a process is controlled by a program does not mean it's teleological, and finding a good criterion to distinguish between the supposed two kinds of programs is not possible. The last part of this section includes Nagel's restatement of his theory which is now called the "system-property view", which includes a difficulty with variables that are not "determinantly connected by known laws of nature" (pg508).
Section III examines the second half of chapter 12 in Nagel's The Structure of Science. In it, Nagel responds to the arguments offered by biologists resisting reduction of biology to physics. Nagel concludes that though this is not possible (yet), there must remain this possibility (pg509). The next section author shows Nagel's discussion of functional explanations and focuses on Nagel's criticisms of functional explanations that may smuggle in teleology, such as: "blood contains leucocytes for the sake of defending the body against invading bacteria." (pg510). Nagel deals with Hempel's analysis of the possibility of multiple causes (pg511) and also a view Nagel is sympathetic to in Michael Ruse's "welfare" view. Nagel's views are summarized on the bottom of pg512. The final section of the paper is author's comments on biological explanation with particular extended discussion on how solving the problem of consciousness will lead to ever more intermixing of physics, chemistry, and biology.
4/5/13
Adams, Robert Merrihew - Involuntary Sins
04/05/2013
The Philosophical Review, Vol 44, No 1 (Jan 1985)
Author has a thesis that there can be moral wrongdoing that is non-voluntary. The paradigm example is of improper or disproportionate anger, that doesn't manifest itself in voluntary action. Just the mental state itself is morally culpable or wrong.
Author first addresses the alternatives to the theory that there are "involuntary sins". The first alternative is that involuntary acts like disproportionate anger is only wrong due to tending to be displayed in voluntary actions (pg 4-6). If this were possible then the counter-example of (involuntary) self-righteousness would not be morally offensive because the voluntary actions stemming from those motivations are all exemplary. It is instead the attitude or motivation that is offensive, and author argues that such an attitude for self-righteousness is non-voluntary (pg6).
The second alternative understands mental states to be blameworthy, but re-interprets all such states to be voluntary (pg6-11). For author, this argument may possibly work if one equates operations of the will to be the same as "voluntary", but really what author is getting at is activity under the subject's control-- a subset of the will but one author finds no "simple matter" to explain (pg6-7). Author undertakes this explanation (pg 8-9) and the analysis contains as its key a "trying" or meaning to do something; in other words: you can't try to do something you don't have any control over. Of course this analysis largely excludes desires and emotions since such are commonly understood as reactive and not apt to be tried to be had (pg9-10). After this understanding, author talks about the virtues of having a soul to be ordered like the American system of government: with checks, balances, and different parts working independently but all for the benefit of the same entity.
The third alternative is that we can be blameworthy for mental states only due to the indirect control we have over them: through "self-culture" (pg11-14). Author uses an example of unconscious ingratitude toward a benefactress as being blameworthy despite no indirect control or even consciousness over the attitude (pg12-13).
Author next tries to clarify the affirmative position: it does not preclude moral approbation for striving to have the right attitudes, but it does go further to find it morally wrong to have the wrong ones-- even when they are out of a subject's control (pg14-15). Interestingly, author talks about taking responsibility for having a bad attitude, as a kind of ownership-taking, not essentially tied to voluntary action (pg15-16). The next section explores the nature of "cognitive sins": it doesn't matter if you're conscious of having them, or that you may be ignorant of your propensity or having of them (pg17-18). Author takes some time to combat Donagan's claims about negligence around moral beliefs and attitudes (pg19-20).
Author tries to confront what seems like a reasonable account from Blum, which argues that while attitudes can be morally bad/good, involuntary ones aren't blameworthy but do underwrite being thought of "poorly". In other words, the ingrate isn't blameworthy but considered poorly. (pg21- ) Author believes that the theory can accommodate some of this intuition by varying the kinds of appropriate responses to involuntary sins: they aren't punishable as voluntary ones are (pg21), but instead subject to reproach, which is a form of blaming (pg22).
Another objection comes from a kind of slippery slope argument, that asserts that if humans can be blameworthy for non-voluntary factors, why can't we also be blameworthy for things that don't seem moral: like not being athletic or musical. Author suggests that a cognition of moral relevance will partly do the work, and also proposes some general guidelines: (1) these are states of mind (2) directed at intentional object(s) (3) that have their causes within a rich-enough psychology to appreciate moral relevance, (4) and have alternatives that can be grasped by the intellect. (pg25-7). What is also part of this theory is that it is not wrong to desire something that is not inherently bad-- in other words bad only if acted upon, or due to bad consequences (pg27-8). Next, author tries to clarify his theory with determinism; the theory would fit with both compatibilism or incompatibilism with some sort of agent or "substance" causation.
The Philosophical Review, Vol 44, No 1 (Jan 1985)
Author has a thesis that there can be moral wrongdoing that is non-voluntary. The paradigm example is of improper or disproportionate anger, that doesn't manifest itself in voluntary action. Just the mental state itself is morally culpable or wrong.
Author first addresses the alternatives to the theory that there are "involuntary sins". The first alternative is that involuntary acts like disproportionate anger is only wrong due to tending to be displayed in voluntary actions (pg 4-6). If this were possible then the counter-example of (involuntary) self-righteousness would not be morally offensive because the voluntary actions stemming from those motivations are all exemplary. It is instead the attitude or motivation that is offensive, and author argues that such an attitude for self-righteousness is non-voluntary (pg6).
The second alternative understands mental states to be blameworthy, but re-interprets all such states to be voluntary (pg6-11). For author, this argument may possibly work if one equates operations of the will to be the same as "voluntary", but really what author is getting at is activity under the subject's control-- a subset of the will but one author finds no "simple matter" to explain (pg6-7). Author undertakes this explanation (pg 8-9) and the analysis contains as its key a "trying" or meaning to do something; in other words: you can't try to do something you don't have any control over. Of course this analysis largely excludes desires and emotions since such are commonly understood as reactive and not apt to be tried to be had (pg9-10). After this understanding, author talks about the virtues of having a soul to be ordered like the American system of government: with checks, balances, and different parts working independently but all for the benefit of the same entity.
The third alternative is that we can be blameworthy for mental states only due to the indirect control we have over them: through "self-culture" (pg11-14). Author uses an example of unconscious ingratitude toward a benefactress as being blameworthy despite no indirect control or even consciousness over the attitude (pg12-13).
Author next tries to clarify the affirmative position: it does not preclude moral approbation for striving to have the right attitudes, but it does go further to find it morally wrong to have the wrong ones-- even when they are out of a subject's control (pg14-15). Interestingly, author talks about taking responsibility for having a bad attitude, as a kind of ownership-taking, not essentially tied to voluntary action (pg15-16). The next section explores the nature of "cognitive sins": it doesn't matter if you're conscious of having them, or that you may be ignorant of your propensity or having of them (pg17-18). Author takes some time to combat Donagan's claims about negligence around moral beliefs and attitudes (pg19-20).
Author tries to confront what seems like a reasonable account from Blum, which argues that while attitudes can be morally bad/good, involuntary ones aren't blameworthy but do underwrite being thought of "poorly". In other words, the ingrate isn't blameworthy but considered poorly. (pg21- ) Author believes that the theory can accommodate some of this intuition by varying the kinds of appropriate responses to involuntary sins: they aren't punishable as voluntary ones are (pg21), but instead subject to reproach, which is a form of blaming (pg22).
Another objection comes from a kind of slippery slope argument, that asserts that if humans can be blameworthy for non-voluntary factors, why can't we also be blameworthy for things that don't seem moral: like not being athletic or musical. Author suggests that a cognition of moral relevance will partly do the work, and also proposes some general guidelines: (1) these are states of mind (2) directed at intentional object(s) (3) that have their causes within a rich-enough psychology to appreciate moral relevance, (4) and have alternatives that can be grasped by the intellect. (pg25-7). What is also part of this theory is that it is not wrong to desire something that is not inherently bad-- in other words bad only if acted upon, or due to bad consequences (pg27-8). Next, author tries to clarify his theory with determinism; the theory would fit with both compatibilism or incompatibilism with some sort of agent or "substance" causation.
3/29/13
Dworkin, Ronald - Religion Without God
03/29/2013
The New York Review, April 4, 2013
This is an excerpt of the first chapter of author's posthumously published book. Author starts by arguing that the divide between the non-religious and the religious is too crude. Plenty of people who don't believe in a personal god have beliefs that there is a "force" that is "bigger than themselves". This can be available to the atheist as well as the theist. Author argues that there can be such a thing as a religious atheist, and uses Einstein as an example: "It was Einstein's faith that some transcendental and objective value permeates the universe, value that is neither a natural phenomenon nor a subjective reaction to natural phenomena." But then if there is a religious atheist, there needs to be a good definition of "religion", which is difficult, according to author, since use of the word is partially meant to define it-- an "interpretative concept". Instead, author opts to look for a "revealing" ideal use of the word. What is the point of such an exercise? For author, it could perhaps help separate questions of science from questions of value; shrinking the impetus for cultural and value wars.
Author attempts to give some structure to a "religious attitude" by claiming it involves making both the "biological and biographical" sources of intrinsic value: that to be religious entails believing there are intrinsic values relating to both human life and the world we inhabit. Of course the problem now is to find out what those values are, and how they are known (hint: traditionally, a god told them to us).
First off, there is a dichotomy between the religious and the naturalist-- for author-- someone who believes that all there is can be revealed by the natural sciences. Another thing the religious attitude is not: it isn't "grounded realism", which takes values to be real but only due to some natural capacity to reason about them. For author, the religious means that value is both "self contained and self-certifying". During this discussion, author defines the term "faith" as well, as, in the first order, that "we accept a felt, inescapable conviction rather than the benediction of some independent means of verification as the final arbiter of what we are entitled to responsibly believe". Author means to include mathematics, logic, and science into what is fundamentally taken on faith. Faith when it comes to value contains another layer, since emotion is part of convictions about value. The point here for author is that the realm of value is about objectively true things (for the religious person) and it is self-justifying. It is not, as some theists believe, that god underwrites values. Author embarks on a description of the 3 abrahamic religions as two-parted: one is a science part and the other is a value part. The science part gives answers to tough questions, and god is included in the story. But, author claims, the science part cannot ground the value part, since they are conceptually distinct. "The universe cannot be intrinsically beautiful just because it was created to be beautiful". Ultimately, author says that values justify themselves within a larger scheme of value, and that a god is conceptually distinct from this.
The New York Review, April 4, 2013
This is an excerpt of the first chapter of author's posthumously published book. Author starts by arguing that the divide between the non-religious and the religious is too crude. Plenty of people who don't believe in a personal god have beliefs that there is a "force" that is "bigger than themselves". This can be available to the atheist as well as the theist. Author argues that there can be such a thing as a religious atheist, and uses Einstein as an example: "It was Einstein's faith that some transcendental and objective value permeates the universe, value that is neither a natural phenomenon nor a subjective reaction to natural phenomena." But then if there is a religious atheist, there needs to be a good definition of "religion", which is difficult, according to author, since use of the word is partially meant to define it-- an "interpretative concept". Instead, author opts to look for a "revealing" ideal use of the word. What is the point of such an exercise? For author, it could perhaps help separate questions of science from questions of value; shrinking the impetus for cultural and value wars.
Author attempts to give some structure to a "religious attitude" by claiming it involves making both the "biological and biographical" sources of intrinsic value: that to be religious entails believing there are intrinsic values relating to both human life and the world we inhabit. Of course the problem now is to find out what those values are, and how they are known (hint: traditionally, a god told them to us).
First off, there is a dichotomy between the religious and the naturalist-- for author-- someone who believes that all there is can be revealed by the natural sciences. Another thing the religious attitude is not: it isn't "grounded realism", which takes values to be real but only due to some natural capacity to reason about them. For author, the religious means that value is both "self contained and self-certifying". During this discussion, author defines the term "faith" as well, as, in the first order, that "we accept a felt, inescapable conviction rather than the benediction of some independent means of verification as the final arbiter of what we are entitled to responsibly believe". Author means to include mathematics, logic, and science into what is fundamentally taken on faith. Faith when it comes to value contains another layer, since emotion is part of convictions about value. The point here for author is that the realm of value is about objectively true things (for the religious person) and it is self-justifying. It is not, as some theists believe, that god underwrites values. Author embarks on a description of the 3 abrahamic religions as two-parted: one is a science part and the other is a value part. The science part gives answers to tough questions, and god is included in the story. But, author claims, the science part cannot ground the value part, since they are conceptually distinct. "The universe cannot be intrinsically beautiful just because it was created to be beautiful". Ultimately, author says that values justify themselves within a larger scheme of value, and that a god is conceptually distinct from this.
3/22/13
Guyer, Paul - Passion for Reason: Hume, Kant, and the Motivation for Morality
03/22/2013
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA Vol 86 Issue 2 (Eastern Div)
This is a paper that tries to find some common ground between Hume's conception of morality as grounded in the passions and Kant's as grounded in a duty to law. The first part starts with an examination and summary of Hume's conception of moral principles as motivational, and thus not the sort of thing that reason, analyzed as "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" is suited to provide (pg5-6). In order to be moved to action we must first have a preference; reason doesn't play that part (pg6).
After this familiar distinction between reasoning and moral sentiment, Hume still tries to explain why we elide them so much: it is because reasoning is a calm activity, as is the realization of moral sentiment-- it too is mostly done calmly (pg7). Author argues further that Hume is offering a more substantive theory: that humans deeply prefer calm and tranquility. Here author reasons that the opposite of a calm passion is a violent one, and a preference for calm would be a preference for freedom from a violent passion, hence humans can have a calm preference for calm freedom (pg7). Author then takes some time to unpack Hume's discussion on the different preferential qualities, focusing specifically on "tranquility" as very highly regarded. Hume means to have the passion for tranquility as both other- and self-regarding, and also argues that this passion must be a calm passion, since it seems absurd to have a violent passion for tranquility (pg8). Thus, according to Hume, we have a strong calm passion for tranquility, the freedom from importune passions.
The next discussion is about Kant, and starts with his famous claim about moral motivation having nothing to do with personal gratification or inclination (pg9). But author argues that Kant believed that reason was not an ultimate end but an instrumental one to attain freedom (pg10-11). The idea author argues for is that, for Kant, we have a passion for our own individual freedom, but reason recognizes that this is universalizeable and thus the passion for (individual) freedom is transformed through reason into some kind of non-passionate motivation for universal freedom (pg11-2). Author first reads Kant's two major formulations in the Groundwork to be relating to securing freedom of choice for all rational actors (pg13). Interestingly, author acknowledges that Kant's version of freedom isn't the negative version of freedom from urgent passions but a positive version of freedom to set one's own ends (pg14). Then, author reads portions of Kant's Critique to suggest that once reason has determined the will to the proper course, it has to pass through the eye of pleasure/pain in motivation before it gets to action (pg14-5). Author goes on to talk about how Kant lists a 'panoply' of aesthetic and/or emotional ways in which humans susceptible to duty (reason) in action (pg15-6). The conclusion is that, for Kant, the self-regarding passion in freedom is molded by reason into a universal concern for the freedom of all (pg17), and becomes a type of "enthusiasm".
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA Vol 86 Issue 2 (Eastern Div)
This is a paper that tries to find some common ground between Hume's conception of morality as grounded in the passions and Kant's as grounded in a duty to law. The first part starts with an examination and summary of Hume's conception of moral principles as motivational, and thus not the sort of thing that reason, analyzed as "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" is suited to provide (pg5-6). In order to be moved to action we must first have a preference; reason doesn't play that part (pg6).
After this familiar distinction between reasoning and moral sentiment, Hume still tries to explain why we elide them so much: it is because reasoning is a calm activity, as is the realization of moral sentiment-- it too is mostly done calmly (pg7). Author argues further that Hume is offering a more substantive theory: that humans deeply prefer calm and tranquility. Here author reasons that the opposite of a calm passion is a violent one, and a preference for calm would be a preference for freedom from a violent passion, hence humans can have a calm preference for calm freedom (pg7). Author then takes some time to unpack Hume's discussion on the different preferential qualities, focusing specifically on "tranquility" as very highly regarded. Hume means to have the passion for tranquility as both other- and self-regarding, and also argues that this passion must be a calm passion, since it seems absurd to have a violent passion for tranquility (pg8). Thus, according to Hume, we have a strong calm passion for tranquility, the freedom from importune passions.
The next discussion is about Kant, and starts with his famous claim about moral motivation having nothing to do with personal gratification or inclination (pg9). But author argues that Kant believed that reason was not an ultimate end but an instrumental one to attain freedom (pg10-11). The idea author argues for is that, for Kant, we have a passion for our own individual freedom, but reason recognizes that this is universalizeable and thus the passion for (individual) freedom is transformed through reason into some kind of non-passionate motivation for universal freedom (pg11-2). Author first reads Kant's two major formulations in the Groundwork to be relating to securing freedom of choice for all rational actors (pg13). Interestingly, author acknowledges that Kant's version of freedom isn't the negative version of freedom from urgent passions but a positive version of freedom to set one's own ends (pg14). Then, author reads portions of Kant's Critique to suggest that once reason has determined the will to the proper course, it has to pass through the eye of pleasure/pain in motivation before it gets to action (pg14-5). Author goes on to talk about how Kant lists a 'panoply' of aesthetic and/or emotional ways in which humans susceptible to duty (reason) in action (pg15-6). The conclusion is that, for Kant, the self-regarding passion in freedom is molded by reason into a universal concern for the freedom of all (pg17), and becomes a type of "enthusiasm".
3/15/13
Railton, Peter - That Obscure Object, Desire
03/15/2013
American Philosophical Association Proceedings, Vol 86 Issue 2 (2012)
Author starts by recounting some damaging attacks on the concept of desire. It used to be thought that desire + belief could rationalize action, but Quinn, Scanlon, and Parfit all attacked this notion, saying it was too primitive to be counted: a desire as a disposition to bring about P (if the appropriate beliefs were true), is not enough to give a reason for the action: there needs to be something more, something about the P or the subject that explains or gives reason for P (a "desirability characteristic")(pg22-3). Author aims to reply to these attacks here.
Author first considers whether a desire as merely a disposition to act is too bare, and revisits Hume's original formulation of a non-normative passion, something not subject to reasoning (pg23). Author takes a biographical interlude to discuss advertising and how it hopes to affect its viewer: "by liking an image, we could come to want what it represents" (pg24). This first formulation is the simple Humean or neo-Humean model of having a disposition toward effecting P (pg25). One upshot of this understanding of the installation of a disposition toward P (through advertising) is that, to author, desire is "creative". Not just in the instrumental sense but in the sense that thoughts, beliefs, and experiences can create new desires in the subject. Secondly, contra the behaviorists, desire is teleological (pg26-7). Thus, this first formulation is rationally intelligible. Author goes over the etymology of the words desire, want, and like (pg28). Upon revisiting the counterexample offered by Quinn, the Radio Man, who has a "desire" by having the disposition to turn on radios whenever he is near them, author seems to agree with Quinn that what is lacking is the desire (pg29). Author proceeds to the instrumental elements of desire that rhyme with an Aristotelian schema (pg30-1), calling it "appetitive intellect" or "intellectual appetition". But author also shows the two-fold character of desire: one is the "positive affective attraction" and the other is "focused appetitive striving" (pg31).
Author comes around again to the problem with the formulation of desire as a disposition toward P: it fails to capture that desire is a "pro-attitude" (pg32). It is an attitude that is like other emotions, it is regulative on our actions, and also our actions provide feedback to our emotions. Author explores this feed-back relationship through a proxy discussion of fear and confidence (pg33-5). Author incorporates the feedback related to desire into a newer formulation (pg36).
After the more inclusive focumlation, author takes a look at the empirical side of desire in a modern-day psychology course. There, the old categories of want/preference/desire and models of drives and satiation were significantly outdated (pg36-7). The inadequacy of the philosophical formulation, even the prospective/retrospective one author had come to recently, was brought out in the discussion of addiction. In addiction, the pleasure in the experience attenuates and even can become nil but the compulsion to engage in the experience persists. There was a distinction between affect and "incentive salience" (pg37), or wanting (a difference between appreciating P and wanting P). Addictive drugs operate directly on the 'wanting' system, skipping the recalibration and influence of the 'liking' system (pg37). Author goes further into the science of affect, and comes away with 2 broad conclusions: (1) Affect permeates perception and cognition, as well as decision-making (pg38), and (2) any possible distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive affect is not possible. "Cognitive appraisal" is relevant to all affective states, and affect itself is information-giving and proto-normative (pg39).
Returning to meld the psychology of desire with its updated philosophy, author first talks about a 'prospective model' of the world that (constitutionally?) involves affect (pg39-40). Another lesson brought out by talking about modeling the environment to shape expectations and affect, is that desire does not aim baldly, but "under a favorable representation" (pg41). What emerges is that desire is good at aiming at (evolutionary) goods, just like perception is good at aiming at (evolutionarily relevant) truths (pg41). Author walks through a series of disputes in the philosophy of desire and motivation using the prospective model formulated earlier, discussing Parfit, Frankfurt, Williams and finally squaring it with Hume (pg42-5).
American Philosophical Association Proceedings, Vol 86 Issue 2 (2012)
Author starts by recounting some damaging attacks on the concept of desire. It used to be thought that desire + belief could rationalize action, but Quinn, Scanlon, and Parfit all attacked this notion, saying it was too primitive to be counted: a desire as a disposition to bring about P (if the appropriate beliefs were true), is not enough to give a reason for the action: there needs to be something more, something about the P or the subject that explains or gives reason for P (a "desirability characteristic")(pg22-3). Author aims to reply to these attacks here.
Author first considers whether a desire as merely a disposition to act is too bare, and revisits Hume's original formulation of a non-normative passion, something not subject to reasoning (pg23). Author takes a biographical interlude to discuss advertising and how it hopes to affect its viewer: "by liking an image, we could come to want what it represents" (pg24). This first formulation is the simple Humean or neo-Humean model of having a disposition toward effecting P (pg25). One upshot of this understanding of the installation of a disposition toward P (through advertising) is that, to author, desire is "creative". Not just in the instrumental sense but in the sense that thoughts, beliefs, and experiences can create new desires in the subject. Secondly, contra the behaviorists, desire is teleological (pg26-7). Thus, this first formulation is rationally intelligible. Author goes over the etymology of the words desire, want, and like (pg28). Upon revisiting the counterexample offered by Quinn, the Radio Man, who has a "desire" by having the disposition to turn on radios whenever he is near them, author seems to agree with Quinn that what is lacking is the desire (pg29). Author proceeds to the instrumental elements of desire that rhyme with an Aristotelian schema (pg30-1), calling it "appetitive intellect" or "intellectual appetition". But author also shows the two-fold character of desire: one is the "positive affective attraction" and the other is "focused appetitive striving" (pg31).
Author comes around again to the problem with the formulation of desire as a disposition toward P: it fails to capture that desire is a "pro-attitude" (pg32). It is an attitude that is like other emotions, it is regulative on our actions, and also our actions provide feedback to our emotions. Author explores this feed-back relationship through a proxy discussion of fear and confidence (pg33-5). Author incorporates the feedback related to desire into a newer formulation (pg36).
After the more inclusive focumlation, author takes a look at the empirical side of desire in a modern-day psychology course. There, the old categories of want/preference/desire and models of drives and satiation were significantly outdated (pg36-7). The inadequacy of the philosophical formulation, even the prospective/retrospective one author had come to recently, was brought out in the discussion of addiction. In addiction, the pleasure in the experience attenuates and even can become nil but the compulsion to engage in the experience persists. There was a distinction between affect and "incentive salience" (pg37), or wanting (a difference between appreciating P and wanting P). Addictive drugs operate directly on the 'wanting' system, skipping the recalibration and influence of the 'liking' system (pg37). Author goes further into the science of affect, and comes away with 2 broad conclusions: (1) Affect permeates perception and cognition, as well as decision-making (pg38), and (2) any possible distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive affect is not possible. "Cognitive appraisal" is relevant to all affective states, and affect itself is information-giving and proto-normative (pg39).
Returning to meld the psychology of desire with its updated philosophy, author first talks about a 'prospective model' of the world that (constitutionally?) involves affect (pg39-40). Another lesson brought out by talking about modeling the environment to shape expectations and affect, is that desire does not aim baldly, but "under a favorable representation" (pg41). What emerges is that desire is good at aiming at (evolutionary) goods, just like perception is good at aiming at (evolutionarily relevant) truths (pg41). Author walks through a series of disputes in the philosophy of desire and motivation using the prospective model formulated earlier, discussing Parfit, Frankfurt, Williams and finally squaring it with Hume (pg42-5).
2/22/13
Dewey, John - What I Believe
02/22/2013
The Forum, Living Philosophies VII, March 1930
This article was written as a summary of Dewey's outlook and perspective, not necessarily the development of a particular argument. Author starts by discussing the change in connotation that the concept of "faith" has taken on, from an acceptance of a definite body of beliefs-- a creed-- to a "tendency toward action". This is reflective, author argues, of the change in the culture from the search for unchangeable, immutable substance to an acceptance of change and context-dependent values. This was started with the scientific method and was outwardly manifested with the industrial revolution. Author's pitch is to use the broad term "experience" as the basis for a new set of human values. Interesting: "Search for a single, inclusive good is doomed to failure. Such happiness as life is capable comes from the full participation of all our powers in the endeavor to wrest from each changing situation of experience its own full and unique meaning." (pg179).
Author does not believe that this change in perspective will be a death-knell for religion. Instead, religion will adapt and form onto this new way of approaching values and still be a source of meaning. The main problem, as author sees it, is that religion has become "so respectable", that is, largely ensconced in the social construction. Author takes some time to decry the current system of economic organization, from wage-slavery to the unhealthy distribution of wealth, and further talks about how cynicism or modernity has imperiled the possibility of a systematic philosophy.
The Forum, Living Philosophies VII, March 1930
This article was written as a summary of Dewey's outlook and perspective, not necessarily the development of a particular argument. Author starts by discussing the change in connotation that the concept of "faith" has taken on, from an acceptance of a definite body of beliefs-- a creed-- to a "tendency toward action". This is reflective, author argues, of the change in the culture from the search for unchangeable, immutable substance to an acceptance of change and context-dependent values. This was started with the scientific method and was outwardly manifested with the industrial revolution. Author's pitch is to use the broad term "experience" as the basis for a new set of human values. Interesting: "Search for a single, inclusive good is doomed to failure. Such happiness as life is capable comes from the full participation of all our powers in the endeavor to wrest from each changing situation of experience its own full and unique meaning." (pg179).
Author does not believe that this change in perspective will be a death-knell for religion. Instead, religion will adapt and form onto this new way of approaching values and still be a source of meaning. The main problem, as author sees it, is that religion has become "so respectable", that is, largely ensconced in the social construction. Author takes some time to decry the current system of economic organization, from wage-slavery to the unhealthy distribution of wealth, and further talks about how cynicism or modernity has imperiled the possibility of a systematic philosophy.
2/8/13
Dewey, John - Philosophies of Freedom
02/08/2013
On Experience, Nature, and Freedom: Representative Selections, Richard Bernstein, ed. Bobbs-Merrill, 1960
This article was originally published in 1928 and uses as its starting point a "recent book on sovereignty" as a springboard for an investigation into the concept of freedom and choice. Author first makes the point from the book, that political ideas (like "freedom" or "sovereignty") are not necessarily "true" but expedient or serve a utility in a social context (pg262). From here author explores a rough, abstract recounting of the association between the concepts of choice and freedom, claiming that freedom is used to underwrite choice so that norms of behavior can be enforced using punishment and liability (pg262-3). To provide the link between punishment and choice, or more broadly just deserts and choice, author argues there was the development of freedom of the will, or the concept that humans had the power to make indifferent choice; the morally wrong one being blameworthy due to the right one being available to the will. Author finds these acrobatics still not up to the challenge of justifying liability, since the punishment is meted to the concrete individual, when it is the will that is supposed to be punished (pg264).
Author instead looks at responsibility as a forward-looking enforcement, meaning that the concept should be employed to influence future behavior, not to punish past. But then without the doctrine of free will, how is the concept of choice to be understood? Author takes that up next, first starting at a very basic level, discriminating between random and selective behavior. Selective behavior, even in inorganic matter, is "evidence of at least a rudimentary individuality or uniqueness in things" (pg265). The starting point is that selective behavior is an expression of the nature a thing. The next step involves the psychology of humans, and author claims that humans have a greater sensitivity to varied and opposing experiences; humans collect them into complexes of experience, which contributes to responses to situations by varying them and not making them deterministic or mechanical (pg266). The point here is that because humans witness and collect and experience varied responses to situations, there is no one determined behavior for any particular set of circumstances. With the variation of experience, author asserts that human choice is the individual's formation of a new preference from competing and varied ones (pg266-7).
Author takes a break from this discussion to go through the political concept of freedom as being free from external constraints (pg267-8) and ties it to the classic Lockean Liberal economic concept of property and freedom of constraint over types of industry. These economic notions invaded the psychological realm with the philosophy of "self-expression", author argues. Despite one's self-expression conceivably at odds with another's, author argues there is a pernicious link between human's instincts and impulses (self-expression) and naturalness or "native" originality (pg269). Author's conclusion here: classical Liberalism is flawed if it was to suppose that individuals simply needed to be set free from external constraints in order to solve political and economic problems (pg270), while it also simultaneously provided important emancipating work. The work of emancipation, however, was also flawed in that it freed up the economic interests of some emerging classes (merchants, industrialists) at the expense of failing to free individuals across classes (pg271). This failure is traceable to the idea that individuals have powers and rights that simply need to be "freed" in order to be exercised properly, without regard to prior economic conditions, education levels, or other forms of capital. The response, then, to a call for political freedom and for individual freedom of choice, is in "positive and constructive changes in social arrangements" (pg272).
Author then examines the conception of freedom as it relates to power in action, and uses Spinoza as a lens. In Spinoza, author interprets a certain powerlessness in action, but a power to bend one's actions into conformity with the whole, which humans can understand through the intellect (pg273-4). This seed germinated in Hegel, whom author explores next (pg274-5). The point is to unpack a different notion of freedom: power in action, in accordance with law or "manifestation".
The resolution between the two conceptions, freedom from external constraint to make choices or freedom as having power behind one's actions, is what author gives next (pg275-6): an intelligent choice that manifests individuality enlarges the range of action from an individual, increasing her power. Even if a plan of action is thwarted by external events, author holds that the subject who performs the action gains power and freedom. If one does not believe this, author enlists the help of the "moralists" who claim that freedom and personal power can always be exercised in the realm of the moral, no matter what external circumstances do (pg278). Author uses an example of a child who could have her preferences all attended to, or inhibited. Neither is the way to develop personal freedom (pg278-80).
Author assesses this formula against Kant, who found a particular problem with freedom because his belief that all behavior is causally determined. Author finds this a misguided problem too focused on antecedents rather than consequences (pg281-2). In other words, if intelligent choice is the product of causal forces, who cares? Author also looks at what kind of information science gives about causation and claims it gives how things relate to each other, not how they are, intrinsically (pg283). The individuality of things in themselves is open to house choice (pg284), apart from "scientific law". Author ends with a thorough take-down of classical Liberalism.
On Experience, Nature, and Freedom: Representative Selections, Richard Bernstein, ed. Bobbs-Merrill, 1960
This article was originally published in 1928 and uses as its starting point a "recent book on sovereignty" as a springboard for an investigation into the concept of freedom and choice. Author first makes the point from the book, that political ideas (like "freedom" or "sovereignty") are not necessarily "true" but expedient or serve a utility in a social context (pg262). From here author explores a rough, abstract recounting of the association between the concepts of choice and freedom, claiming that freedom is used to underwrite choice so that norms of behavior can be enforced using punishment and liability (pg262-3). To provide the link between punishment and choice, or more broadly just deserts and choice, author argues there was the development of freedom of the will, or the concept that humans had the power to make indifferent choice; the morally wrong one being blameworthy due to the right one being available to the will. Author finds these acrobatics still not up to the challenge of justifying liability, since the punishment is meted to the concrete individual, when it is the will that is supposed to be punished (pg264).
Author instead looks at responsibility as a forward-looking enforcement, meaning that the concept should be employed to influence future behavior, not to punish past. But then without the doctrine of free will, how is the concept of choice to be understood? Author takes that up next, first starting at a very basic level, discriminating between random and selective behavior. Selective behavior, even in inorganic matter, is "evidence of at least a rudimentary individuality or uniqueness in things" (pg265). The starting point is that selective behavior is an expression of the nature a thing. The next step involves the psychology of humans, and author claims that humans have a greater sensitivity to varied and opposing experiences; humans collect them into complexes of experience, which contributes to responses to situations by varying them and not making them deterministic or mechanical (pg266). The point here is that because humans witness and collect and experience varied responses to situations, there is no one determined behavior for any particular set of circumstances. With the variation of experience, author asserts that human choice is the individual's formation of a new preference from competing and varied ones (pg266-7).
Author takes a break from this discussion to go through the political concept of freedom as being free from external constraints (pg267-8) and ties it to the classic Lockean Liberal economic concept of property and freedom of constraint over types of industry. These economic notions invaded the psychological realm with the philosophy of "self-expression", author argues. Despite one's self-expression conceivably at odds with another's, author argues there is a pernicious link between human's instincts and impulses (self-expression) and naturalness or "native" originality (pg269). Author's conclusion here: classical Liberalism is flawed if it was to suppose that individuals simply needed to be set free from external constraints in order to solve political and economic problems (pg270), while it also simultaneously provided important emancipating work. The work of emancipation, however, was also flawed in that it freed up the economic interests of some emerging classes (merchants, industrialists) at the expense of failing to free individuals across classes (pg271). This failure is traceable to the idea that individuals have powers and rights that simply need to be "freed" in order to be exercised properly, without regard to prior economic conditions, education levels, or other forms of capital. The response, then, to a call for political freedom and for individual freedom of choice, is in "positive and constructive changes in social arrangements" (pg272).
Author then examines the conception of freedom as it relates to power in action, and uses Spinoza as a lens. In Spinoza, author interprets a certain powerlessness in action, but a power to bend one's actions into conformity with the whole, which humans can understand through the intellect (pg273-4). This seed germinated in Hegel, whom author explores next (pg274-5). The point is to unpack a different notion of freedom: power in action, in accordance with law or "manifestation".
The resolution between the two conceptions, freedom from external constraint to make choices or freedom as having power behind one's actions, is what author gives next (pg275-6): an intelligent choice that manifests individuality enlarges the range of action from an individual, increasing her power. Even if a plan of action is thwarted by external events, author holds that the subject who performs the action gains power and freedom. If one does not believe this, author enlists the help of the "moralists" who claim that freedom and personal power can always be exercised in the realm of the moral, no matter what external circumstances do (pg278). Author uses an example of a child who could have her preferences all attended to, or inhibited. Neither is the way to develop personal freedom (pg278-80).
Author assesses this formula against Kant, who found a particular problem with freedom because his belief that all behavior is causally determined. Author finds this a misguided problem too focused on antecedents rather than consequences (pg281-2). In other words, if intelligent choice is the product of causal forces, who cares? Author also looks at what kind of information science gives about causation and claims it gives how things relate to each other, not how they are, intrinsically (pg283). The individuality of things in themselves is open to house choice (pg284), apart from "scientific law". Author ends with a thorough take-down of classical Liberalism.
2/1/13
Smith, John - The Reconception of Experience in Peirce, James and Dewey
02/01/2013
America's Philosophical Vision, Ch 1, University of Chicago, 1992
This is a paper given as an address at a conference and is basically a summary of the three conceptions of the concept of experience given by Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The goal is to show their reactions to and departures from the British Empiricist tradition and Kant. Author first gives a summary (or caricature) of traditional empiricism (pg18-19) and then a congealed response from the Pragmatists (pg19-20).
Author reviews and condenses the views on "experience" starting with Peirce (pg20-25), then James (pg25-29), and then Dewey (pg29-34). Generally, the main contentions against British Empiricists are as follows: "experience" isn't a passive exercise but an active process between the self and the world, perhaps even eliminating the subject/object distinction, and: "experience" is best conceptualized not as atomistic bits to be used as a foundation for knowledge but instead as a rich mix of the sensory and the rational.
America's Philosophical Vision, Ch 1, University of Chicago, 1992
This is a paper given as an address at a conference and is basically a summary of the three conceptions of the concept of experience given by Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The goal is to show their reactions to and departures from the British Empiricist tradition and Kant. Author first gives a summary (or caricature) of traditional empiricism (pg18-19) and then a congealed response from the Pragmatists (pg19-20).
Author reviews and condenses the views on "experience" starting with Peirce (pg20-25), then James (pg25-29), and then Dewey (pg29-34). Generally, the main contentions against British Empiricists are as follows: "experience" isn't a passive exercise but an active process between the self and the world, perhaps even eliminating the subject/object distinction, and: "experience" is best conceptualized not as atomistic bits to be used as a foundation for knowledge but instead as a rich mix of the sensory and the rational.
1/25/13
Dewey, John - An Empirical Survey of Empiricisms
01/25/2013
This article is an examination of the concept of experience, as it evolves throughout philosophical history: Plato & Aristotle, Locke, and the more modern view. Author sets as the goal to actually be reviewing the different notions of empiricism, but takes the firm subject matter to be the concept of experience (pg71).
Author takes the Greek philosophers to consider experience as a 'know-how', not a 'know-why' matter. Experience can give you the know-how, but the know-why was reserved for reason, and/or understanding causal forces. (pg71-3) Author reviews Aristotle's theory on the progression of experiential knowledge: first there's sensation, then perception, then memory and imagination, finally ending in knowledge in generality, and habituation regarding the subject matter. (pg73) But this is all without applying reason or method to experience: reason was reserved for the pure intellect and universal or necessary truths. In this light, author discusses a difference between Plato and Aristotle in that Aristotle was willing to let politics and society be subject to generalities and intricacies only noticed by the wise and those with practical knowledge, while Plato attempted to sketch out what a rational basis for these institutions would be in The Republic (pg74-5). Author summarizes the Greek thinking on pg77: the contrast is between knowledge (intellect) and opinion or belief (experience), and experience is limited to a subject matter (e.g. farming, crafting) while theoretical knowledge is not. These distinctions are underpinned by the distinction between phenomena and a deeper reality.
The second conception of experience author considers is propounded by Locke. Author admits to skipping intermediary steps, but wants to capture a "typical" conceptual difference from the Greeks. Locke reshaped experience as observation, which gave it a much more direct connection to nature (pg79). Locke then argued that observation is the test of knowledge, thus making the ideas that came from observation the fundamental sources of knowledge. Author summarizes Locke's argument against innate ideas (pg79-80), but shows that Locke did admit to some universals, for instance in the realm of mathematics and morals (pg80-1). The next "stage" author discusses was Locke's move to reduce much of human mentality to sensations or associations with sensations (pg81). Author reviews the effect that this philosophy had on institutions and culture (pg82-3), specifically the skeptical and critical demands it had on old, established institutions, and also on creating new ideals in education and legislation. Author then talks about JS Mill's further refinements on this kind of associational empiricism (pg84-5) and Mill's interest in logic taken from the natural sciences into the social ones.
The last discussion is about some of the primary differences the third "view" of experience has had from the past one(s). Author starts with James and illustrates the pragmatist approach to confirming the validity of ideas: through their consequences (pg86). This directly conflicts with Locke, who wanted ideas to be justified through their antecedents: through what implanted or begat them. Another difference is the development of a biological basis for psychology rather than an introspective or phenomenological one (pg86-7). This seems to be a move back toward Aristotle, author suggests. Author concludes this new view of experience is still "inchoate", and in progress.
This article is an examination of the concept of experience, as it evolves throughout philosophical history: Plato & Aristotle, Locke, and the more modern view. Author sets as the goal to actually be reviewing the different notions of empiricism, but takes the firm subject matter to be the concept of experience (pg71).
Author takes the Greek philosophers to consider experience as a 'know-how', not a 'know-why' matter. Experience can give you the know-how, but the know-why was reserved for reason, and/or understanding causal forces. (pg71-3) Author reviews Aristotle's theory on the progression of experiential knowledge: first there's sensation, then perception, then memory and imagination, finally ending in knowledge in generality, and habituation regarding the subject matter. (pg73) But this is all without applying reason or method to experience: reason was reserved for the pure intellect and universal or necessary truths. In this light, author discusses a difference between Plato and Aristotle in that Aristotle was willing to let politics and society be subject to generalities and intricacies only noticed by the wise and those with practical knowledge, while Plato attempted to sketch out what a rational basis for these institutions would be in The Republic (pg74-5). Author summarizes the Greek thinking on pg77: the contrast is between knowledge (intellect) and opinion or belief (experience), and experience is limited to a subject matter (e.g. farming, crafting) while theoretical knowledge is not. These distinctions are underpinned by the distinction between phenomena and a deeper reality.
The second conception of experience author considers is propounded by Locke. Author admits to skipping intermediary steps, but wants to capture a "typical" conceptual difference from the Greeks. Locke reshaped experience as observation, which gave it a much more direct connection to nature (pg79). Locke then argued that observation is the test of knowledge, thus making the ideas that came from observation the fundamental sources of knowledge. Author summarizes Locke's argument against innate ideas (pg79-80), but shows that Locke did admit to some universals, for instance in the realm of mathematics and morals (pg80-1). The next "stage" author discusses was Locke's move to reduce much of human mentality to sensations or associations with sensations (pg81). Author reviews the effect that this philosophy had on institutions and culture (pg82-3), specifically the skeptical and critical demands it had on old, established institutions, and also on creating new ideals in education and legislation. Author then talks about JS Mill's further refinements on this kind of associational empiricism (pg84-5) and Mill's interest in logic taken from the natural sciences into the social ones.
The last discussion is about some of the primary differences the third "view" of experience has had from the past one(s). Author starts with James and illustrates the pragmatist approach to confirming the validity of ideas: through their consequences (pg86). This directly conflicts with Locke, who wanted ideas to be justified through their antecedents: through what implanted or begat them. Another difference is the development of a biological basis for psychology rather than an introspective or phenomenological one (pg86-7). This seems to be a move back toward Aristotle, author suggests. Author concludes this new view of experience is still "inchoate", and in progress.
1/18/13
Strawson, Galen - Real Naturalism
01/18/2013
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, Vol 86 Issue 2 Nov 2012
Author starts by claiming that author is a thorough-going naturalist. But what is the substantive conception of the natural? For author, it is that all reality is entirely physical. So this makes author a physicalist or materialist naturalist (pg126). Author takes there to be a conflict, however, with other sorts of physicalists/naturalists when it comes to the philosophy of mind. The problem is that humans are directly knowledgeable about experience, and only indirectly knowledgeable about non-experiential properties of physical objects. Author thinks the move in 20th century philosophy to question whether experience is real when compared to other physical properties has been a wrongheaded evolution, going from a methodological commitment to behaviorism to a ontological commitment against experience (pg127). Author highlights Quine and Smart here.
In section 2, author treats the term "physical" as a natural-kind term, one that denotes a natural kind, and one whose content we can be wrong about. Author briefly discusses the persistent ignorance about the world that plagues physicalism, but also acknowledges that equations like f = ma are likely good approximations of the truth. But the problem with such equations is that they are structural descriptions, where content still needs to be cashed out (pg128-130). Author considers the structural and mathematical elements of the physical sciences to be their strong suit, not because humans know so much about the world, but because they know so little. Author distinguishes between the "intrinsic nature" of reality and its structure, and that logico-mathematical representations of the world do not illuminate its intrinsic nature. In other words, physics has structural descriptive content, and even structural transcendent referential content, but does it have structural transcendent descriptive content? (pg130) If a self-professed physicalist/naturalist is tempted to say "yes", then author objects that physicalism, thus far, has left out consciousness, or qualia, from it description (pg131-2). So, the dilemma is as follows: (1) admit that physics only has Purely Logico-Mathematical Structural Description (PLM) and thus misses the non-structural intrinsic nature of reality, or (2) argue that the Causal-Spatio-Temporal Structural Description given by physics is all that remains to reality and thereby deny that experience is part of reality.
Author briefly summarizes the points made: that physicalism doesn't escape the Locke-Hume-Kant arguments about not knowing the thing-in-itself or understanding causation only by constant conjunction (pg133). Author considers those who think physics is the full fundamental description of the universe to be "not serious ... physicSalists". (pg134) Author uses the concepts of ignorance and knowledge-- what humans are ignorant about and what they know about-- in this discussion. The first and most certainly generally known fact is that there is experience. Naturalism must be "realistic", in that it must include this known fact (pg135). Author discusses prototypical examples of pre-philosophical understandings of experience: the kind of stuff you have when you're 6 years old: in short, having an experience is the knowing of the experience. (pg135-6) Author argues that there is no is/seems distinction when it comes to qualia, and that there are no arguments that can destroy the "real realism" of experience (pg137-8).
Interestingly, author claims that a "reduction" for the identity theorist, who claims that experiential states are identical to brain states, isn't reducing two entities to one in the ontological sense, just the epistemological one (pg138-9). The next discussion changes from defense to offense: is it known that anything non-experiential exists? To assume it does is unwarranted, according to author (pg140-1). Here, physicalism is compatible with panpsychism, which author explores (pg141-2). In conclusion, author asserts that if indeed this was widely accepted by philosophers, panpsychism would be widely acknowledged as a real possibility, which does not seem to be the case (pg143). Author runs through the arguments against false naturalists and finishes by asserting that it is not theoretically or ontologically cheaper to postulate the fundamental constituents of reality aren't experiential; it's either more expensive or, at best, equally pricey (pg146).
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, Vol 86 Issue 2 Nov 2012
Author starts by claiming that author is a thorough-going naturalist. But what is the substantive conception of the natural? For author, it is that all reality is entirely physical. So this makes author a physicalist or materialist naturalist (pg126). Author takes there to be a conflict, however, with other sorts of physicalists/naturalists when it comes to the philosophy of mind. The problem is that humans are directly knowledgeable about experience, and only indirectly knowledgeable about non-experiential properties of physical objects. Author thinks the move in 20th century philosophy to question whether experience is real when compared to other physical properties has been a wrongheaded evolution, going from a methodological commitment to behaviorism to a ontological commitment against experience (pg127). Author highlights Quine and Smart here.
In section 2, author treats the term "physical" as a natural-kind term, one that denotes a natural kind, and one whose content we can be wrong about. Author briefly discusses the persistent ignorance about the world that plagues physicalism, but also acknowledges that equations like f = ma are likely good approximations of the truth. But the problem with such equations is that they are structural descriptions, where content still needs to be cashed out (pg128-130). Author considers the structural and mathematical elements of the physical sciences to be their strong suit, not because humans know so much about the world, but because they know so little. Author distinguishes between the "intrinsic nature" of reality and its structure, and that logico-mathematical representations of the world do not illuminate its intrinsic nature. In other words, physics has structural descriptive content, and even structural transcendent referential content, but does it have structural transcendent descriptive content? (pg130) If a self-professed physicalist/naturalist is tempted to say "yes", then author objects that physicalism, thus far, has left out consciousness, or qualia, from it description (pg131-2). So, the dilemma is as follows: (1) admit that physics only has Purely Logico-Mathematical Structural Description (PLM) and thus misses the non-structural intrinsic nature of reality, or (2) argue that the Causal-Spatio-Temporal Structural Description given by physics is all that remains to reality and thereby deny that experience is part of reality.
Author briefly summarizes the points made: that physicalism doesn't escape the Locke-Hume-Kant arguments about not knowing the thing-in-itself or understanding causation only by constant conjunction (pg133). Author considers those who think physics is the full fundamental description of the universe to be "not serious ... physicSalists". (pg134) Author uses the concepts of ignorance and knowledge-- what humans are ignorant about and what they know about-- in this discussion. The first and most certainly generally known fact is that there is experience. Naturalism must be "realistic", in that it must include this known fact (pg135). Author discusses prototypical examples of pre-philosophical understandings of experience: the kind of stuff you have when you're 6 years old: in short, having an experience is the knowing of the experience. (pg135-6) Author argues that there is no is/seems distinction when it comes to qualia, and that there are no arguments that can destroy the "real realism" of experience (pg137-8).
Interestingly, author claims that a "reduction" for the identity theorist, who claims that experiential states are identical to brain states, isn't reducing two entities to one in the ontological sense, just the epistemological one (pg138-9). The next discussion changes from defense to offense: is it known that anything non-experiential exists? To assume it does is unwarranted, according to author (pg140-1). Here, physicalism is compatible with panpsychism, which author explores (pg141-2). In conclusion, author asserts that if indeed this was widely accepted by philosophers, panpsychism would be widely acknowledged as a real possibility, which does not seem to be the case (pg143). Author runs through the arguments against false naturalists and finishes by asserting that it is not theoretically or ontologically cheaper to postulate the fundamental constituents of reality aren't experiential; it's either more expensive or, at best, equally pricey (pg146).
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