4/11/14

Wisdom, John - Other Minds IV

04/11/2014

Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 4: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965

[This is a brief summary]

This chapter is a continuation from the previous conversation that has been taking place between three fictitious personas, each with their own perspective on knowledge of other minds. In this chapter another character, Brown, who appears to believe in "noumenal bread"(pg102) is briefly introduced, however much of this chapter is a re-description and refinement of what was previously laid out. After some preliminary recap, Gray argues that there is a difference in knowledge-by-inference between an acknowledged, in-principle invisible germ and one that is sought but "hitherto" undetectable given our current methods (pg91). This is meant to be an analogy for mental states, which aren't, Gray says, "defined as detectable though their effects" (pg91). This leaves open the possibility of future discovery of mental states, directly somehow.

Brown briefly interjects that even if there is no more to be done to ascertain whether S is P, isn't there still a further question about whether S really is P? Here it seems the other three disagree (mainly Gray, and to some extent Black) and there is an interlude about the meaninglessness of asking whether S is P after all that is logically and conceivably be done to ascertain the relation has been exhausted. (pg91-5) The upshot of this discussion is Black revealing his view of philosophy (pg93-4) and White his (pg95-6). Black believes that there is no fine line between physical possibility, logical possibility, and conceiveability; White calls the further questioning from Brown "unpoetic" and "intolerable", though meaningful (pg97-101).   

White picks up on the difficulty of understanding differences in beliefs without differences in expectations (pg100-1). [I see an analogy between these comments and some (I think mistaken) formulations of Goodman's Grue problem, see pg100] Subsequently, White offers an initial possibility of directly discovering Smith's mental states, using some kind of new technology, or telepathy (pg 103). The trouble here is that it is unclear this is actually possible and not a kind of regress of indirect knowledge, as White explores (pg103-109).

Black rejects the possibility of a regress but still asserts that knowledge of another mind "directly" would not be sensory but instead be a kind of extended introspection, similar to a heightened ability (but unfortunately picks another sensory ability as an analogy: someone with a heightened sense of touch being able to detect differences in weights between feathers that no one else can detect (pg109-10). This kicks off a discussion about how one would know that this extra-sensory power was reliable and so on (pg110-116), which comes back to the issue that Brown initially posed, of there being something to "weight" that is further than how things react on scales, and feel by comparison, etc (pg115). White decries this absurd result and lists the steps which got them there (pg116). Black takes back his analogy on pg 122 but insists on a difference between introspection and sensation relating to other minds.





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