07/13/2007
Nous, Vol 4 Issue 2, 2007
This is a paper that tries establish that there are two interpretations of Quine, or perhaps more accurately, that Quine was of two minds when it came to the status of logical truths. Authors believe there was a 'logic-friendly' Quinean empiricism, one that placed the rules of truth-preserving inference (logic) outside of the possibility of revision by recalcitrant experience. There was also 'radical' Quinean empiricism, dating back to 'Two Dogmas', that did not exclude any of the rules of logic from possible revision. This is a concern because it could mean that the law of non-contradiction and 'ex falso quodlibet' (explosion) are subject to revision. Because authors are classical logicians, this is troubling to them. Authors first lay out the possible conflict between the logic-friendly Quine and the radical Quine, but then mostly focus on the implications for the radical Quine. The thesis for the paper is that if we are to take these rules of logic on using the radical Quine's own principles of empirical confirmation, these rules will not have the robust status of universal rationality that many (most) logicians want them to have.
The first part of the paper entails the authors go to the original sources often and trying to work out the radical Quine's theory (pg 279-281). Ultimately the authors conclude that it is part of Quine's holism that logic is included in the 'web' of beliefs. It just so happens that the 'theories' of logic go very far to the inside of the web, making recalcitrant experience more likely to change beliefs on the edges rather than closer to the insides. This is complicated by other claims made by Quine that seem to say that logic cannot be changed since, any change in logic is a 'change of subject'. This is Quine's reply to dialetheists-- 'you're just changing the subject'. So, is a change in the theory of logic change the meaning of the theory? Quine says yes. (pg 280-281) Now we might be left to wonder how theories of logic could be changed at all without changing everything altogether.
The next matter for consideration is how the rules of logic should be used within the web of belief. Should they be used everywhere? One problem here is that Quine does not like to engage with normativity when discussing belief. Talk of 'should' would mean that the rules of logic have some sort of force other than merely helping to make predictions and avoid recalcitrant experience. Authors interpret Quine as talking about using causation (or constant conjunction) for belief formation and ordering (pg 283-4), not using normative logical rules.
Lastly, we have a problem of what 'recalcitrant experience' really is. Does it mean there are contradictions between one belief and another? If so, then it appears the law of non-contradiction has some priority and is immune from alteration. The authors use the same talk of data causing assent to Belief A, and they previously would have assented Belief ~A, which is impossible to do. No real talk of contradictions, just of beliefs that cannot be taken together because they are impossible. (pg 285-286)
The second portion of the paper involves using only a descriptive picture of the realm of science and the realm of ordinary every-day beliefs in discovering the status of the law of non-contradiction and explosion. Authors look at two 'chunks' of belief: everyday beliefs, and scientific theories. In both cases, authors argue that the law of non-contradiction applies in some areas and not in others, and that (in the case of everyday beliefs) humans have a 'knack' for intuiting where to apply it and where not to, and that (in the case of science) often we are willing to accept contradictions as long as we get the predictions right (pg 286-292). The case for explosion (ex falso quodlibet) is even worse. There is no widespread acceptance of this in everyday usage or even in science.
The last part of the paper discusses that we are left with. The only hope of establishing a robust notion of the law of non-contradiction is to assert it's epistemic usefulness. Certainly it fits into a logical system (classical logic) that is disciplined, consistent and orderly. But so is a paraconsistent system! This does not save the law of non-contradiction. (pg 292-293) Lastly, we might hope that the Minimum Mutilation Thesis preserves the truths of logic. Unfortunately, this seems consistent with paraconsistent/dialetheists as well.
7/13/07
7/6/07
Blankenhorn, David - Ch 6 Deinstitutionalize Marriage?
07/06/2007
The Future of Marriage, Encounter Books, 2007
In this chapter author discusses what it means to deinstitutionalize marriage, and why he thinks SSM is going to do that. Author starts by discussing the claims of Jonathan Rauch, who thinks that SSM will actually strengthen marriage. Author criticizes this 'dream' as using a purile definition or conception of marriage, one that is essentially private. Author then moves on to citing various leftist activists who are generally against traditional marriage but very much in favor of SSM.
After reciting a bunch of leftist writers who want to transform marriage and favor SSM for that very reason, author presents his main claim about the leftist thinkers; there are those who:
1) think marriage is a good thing and gays deserve to be brought in
2) think marriage is a bad thing and why not bring gays into it
3) think marriage is a bad thing and SSM will help to transform it
Author claims that we need to get clear about the fundamentals of marriage-- what it is for, what it is essentially about-- so that we can get clear on it's public meanings. The real fight here is about the public meaning of marriage, because that is what the 'institution' of marriage really is-- what public meanings it has. Author claims that the arguments often used to support SSM talk about what marriage is fundamentally about, and these miss the point. (#1-5 on pg 139-140). Author claims that the definitions/conceptions of marriage used in these pro-SSM arguments are mainly about supporting 'close personal relationships', not marriage-- and there is a big difference between the two things.
Next are five claims that 'disconnect' the traditionalist view of marriage from what marriage is now. (#6-10 on pg 139-140) Author likens these to 'turning off the lights until it is dark enough to suit us' (pg 150), referring to taking out of the conception of marriage the following: monogamous sex, bridging the male-female divide, raising biological children with a mother and father, and having a 'natural parent'.
Lastly, author wants to reply to various leftist objections to marriage a religious institution: marriage came about before religion in any modern sense of the word. Also, author points out that some claim that marriage as an institution has become weaker, making it a reason to allow SSM. Author sees this as totally backward-- that if it is only a weakened institution of marriage that will accept SSM, we should strengthen marriage and then, of course, this would exclude SSM. Many of author's conclusion end with a dilemma-- choose SSM and the various ideas that support and go along with it, or go with the other choice, a pro-marriage as a robust institution, anti-SSM package. "We must choose".
The Future of Marriage, Encounter Books, 2007
In this chapter author discusses what it means to deinstitutionalize marriage, and why he thinks SSM is going to do that. Author starts by discussing the claims of Jonathan Rauch, who thinks that SSM will actually strengthen marriage. Author criticizes this 'dream' as using a purile definition or conception of marriage, one that is essentially private. Author then moves on to citing various leftist activists who are generally against traditional marriage but very much in favor of SSM.
After reciting a bunch of leftist writers who want to transform marriage and favor SSM for that very reason, author presents his main claim about the leftist thinkers; there are those who:
1) think marriage is a good thing and gays deserve to be brought in
2) think marriage is a bad thing and why not bring gays into it
3) think marriage is a bad thing and SSM will help to transform it
Author claims that we need to get clear about the fundamentals of marriage-- what it is for, what it is essentially about-- so that we can get clear on it's public meanings. The real fight here is about the public meaning of marriage, because that is what the 'institution' of marriage really is-- what public meanings it has. Author claims that the arguments often used to support SSM talk about what marriage is fundamentally about, and these miss the point. (#1-5 on pg 139-140). Author claims that the definitions/conceptions of marriage used in these pro-SSM arguments are mainly about supporting 'close personal relationships', not marriage-- and there is a big difference between the two things.
Next are five claims that 'disconnect' the traditionalist view of marriage from what marriage is now. (#6-10 on pg 139-140) Author likens these to 'turning off the lights until it is dark enough to suit us' (pg 150), referring to taking out of the conception of marriage the following: monogamous sex, bridging the male-female divide, raising biological children with a mother and father, and having a 'natural parent'.
Lastly, author wants to reply to various leftist objections to marriage a religious institution: marriage came about before religion in any modern sense of the word. Also, author points out that some claim that marriage as an institution has become weaker, making it a reason to allow SSM. Author sees this as totally backward-- that if it is only a weakened institution of marriage that will accept SSM, we should strengthen marriage and then, of course, this would exclude SSM. Many of author's conclusion end with a dilemma-- choose SSM and the various ideas that support and go along with it, or go with the other choice, a pro-marriage as a robust institution, anti-SSM package. "We must choose".
6/29/07
Blankenhorn, David - Defining Marriage Down... is no way to save it
06/29/2007
The Weekly Standard, Vol 12, Issue 28 04/02/2007
This is an article that is a shortened thesis of author's book The Future of Marriage. The claim is that marriage is a pro-child institution, perhaps the best pro-child institution that humans have ever created, and that this institution is declining. The problem for the author is that it seems that growing acceptance for the decline of marriage is correlated with beliefs that Same Sex Marriage (SSM) is acceptable as well. Author uses cross-cultural surveys that ask questions like the following:
1-People who want children ought to get married
2-One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together
3-Married people are generally happier than unmarried people
4-It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married
5-Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out their marriage problems
6-The main purpose of marriage these days is to have children
7-A child needs a home with both a father and a mother go grow up happily
8-It is all right for a woman to want a child but not a stable relationship with a man
9-Marriage is an outdated institution
The author wants to consider these questions as, generally, addressing the decline (or strengthening) of the institution of marriage. The issue for the author is that the countries whose populations generally agree to 2, 4, 5, 8, 9 also show support for SSM. This means, author concludes, that these ideas all go together, much like teenage drinking goes with teenage smoking, though perhaps neither causes the other-- they 'come in a bundle'.
The second argument author uses to support that SSM is generally related to the decline of the institution of marriage is that various leftist-socialists-poststructuralists who are generally against the institution of marriage are all for SSM, since they think that SSM will push traditional marriage off of its pedestal and open up a multiplicity of possible relationships.
REPLIES:
Rauch, Jonathan - Family Reunion
Democracy; A Journal of Ideas, Issue 5, Summer 2007
Rauch reviews the book by Blankenhorn The Future of Marriage and agrees with much of what author tries to prove about the history of marriage as an institution, and it's meaning as an institution. Rauch claims that Blankenhorn might appear to view marriage is a multidimensional personal, sexual, public, and child-bearing relationship, but Blankenhorn's main objection to SSM is that it hurts the child-bearing part. Rauch claims Blankehnorn needs to keep biological parents raising the biological child as the most central feature of marriage in order to get the argument he has to have any teeth at all. Since this is clearly not the sole, and perhaps not even the only central aspect of marriage, this argument falls.
Secondly, Rauch paints Blankenhorn as telling us we only have two choices. Go towards the 'bundle' of ideas that reinforce traditional marriage, or go toward the bundle of ideas (that include the permissibility of SSM) that deinstitutionalize it. Rauch claims this is a false dilemma. Why can't we blend and mix policies? Rauch predicts that we will be able to do this.
Carpenter, Dale - Blog
The Volokh Conspiracy
March 27th posting, and subsequent
Carpenter argues in a number of ways. He claims that while Blankenhorn is trying to avoid talk of causation, namely that is SSM causing the other beliefs about marriage to rise, that Blankenhorn is subtly sneaking causation into the mix. Of course claiming causation would be fallacious since correlation does not imply causation. Blankenhorn, in a side Blog (The Family Scholars Blog), seems to agree with him that he is in fact talking about causation, not correlation. [why?!?] Carpenter rightly discusses that correlation cannot prove causation, and that SSM comes after the rise in the other beliefs detrimental to marriage, so causation, unless it is somehow backwards, is impossible.
Secondly, a major argument of Blankenhorn's is that several liberal thinkers are all for SSM since it will deinstitutionalize it. Carpenter replies with several liberal thinkers that are worried that SSM will re-institutionalize marriage. Carpenter thinks that, probably, neither result will actually occur.
The Weekly Standard, Vol 12, Issue 28 04/02/2007
This is an article that is a shortened thesis of author's book The Future of Marriage. The claim is that marriage is a pro-child institution, perhaps the best pro-child institution that humans have ever created, and that this institution is declining. The problem for the author is that it seems that growing acceptance for the decline of marriage is correlated with beliefs that Same Sex Marriage (SSM) is acceptable as well. Author uses cross-cultural surveys that ask questions like the following:
1-People who want children ought to get married
2-One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together
3-Married people are generally happier than unmarried people
4-It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married
5-Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out their marriage problems
6-The main purpose of marriage these days is to have children
7-A child needs a home with both a father and a mother go grow up happily
8-It is all right for a woman to want a child but not a stable relationship with a man
9-Marriage is an outdated institution
The author wants to consider these questions as, generally, addressing the decline (or strengthening) of the institution of marriage. The issue for the author is that the countries whose populations generally agree to 2, 4, 5, 8, 9 also show support for SSM. This means, author concludes, that these ideas all go together, much like teenage drinking goes with teenage smoking, though perhaps neither causes the other-- they 'come in a bundle'.
The second argument author uses to support that SSM is generally related to the decline of the institution of marriage is that various leftist-socialists-poststructuralists who are generally against the institution of marriage are all for SSM, since they think that SSM will push traditional marriage off of its pedestal and open up a multiplicity of possible relationships.
REPLIES:
Rauch, Jonathan - Family Reunion
Democracy; A Journal of Ideas, Issue 5, Summer 2007
Rauch reviews the book by Blankenhorn The Future of Marriage and agrees with much of what author tries to prove about the history of marriage as an institution, and it's meaning as an institution. Rauch claims that Blankenhorn might appear to view marriage is a multidimensional personal, sexual, public, and child-bearing relationship, but Blankenhorn's main objection to SSM is that it hurts the child-bearing part. Rauch claims Blankehnorn needs to keep biological parents raising the biological child as the most central feature of marriage in order to get the argument he has to have any teeth at all. Since this is clearly not the sole, and perhaps not even the only central aspect of marriage, this argument falls.
Secondly, Rauch paints Blankenhorn as telling us we only have two choices. Go towards the 'bundle' of ideas that reinforce traditional marriage, or go toward the bundle of ideas (that include the permissibility of SSM) that deinstitutionalize it. Rauch claims this is a false dilemma. Why can't we blend and mix policies? Rauch predicts that we will be able to do this.
Carpenter, Dale - Blog
The Volokh Conspiracy
March 27th posting, and subsequent
Carpenter argues in a number of ways. He claims that while Blankenhorn is trying to avoid talk of causation, namely that is SSM causing the other beliefs about marriage to rise, that Blankenhorn is subtly sneaking causation into the mix. Of course claiming causation would be fallacious since correlation does not imply causation. Blankenhorn, in a side Blog (The Family Scholars Blog), seems to agree with him that he is in fact talking about causation, not correlation. [why?!?] Carpenter rightly discusses that correlation cannot prove causation, and that SSM comes after the rise in the other beliefs detrimental to marriage, so causation, unless it is somehow backwards, is impossible.
Secondly, a major argument of Blankenhorn's is that several liberal thinkers are all for SSM since it will deinstitutionalize it. Carpenter replies with several liberal thinkers that are worried that SSM will re-institutionalize marriage. Carpenter thinks that, probably, neither result will actually occur.
6/22/07
Sunstein, Cass & Vermeule, Adrian - Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs
06/22/2007
AEI-Brookings Joint Center For Regulatory Studies, March 2005
Authors argue that government legislation is always trafficking in courses of action that encourage and discourage in order, presumably, for social goods to be obtained. If it is the case that the death penalty is a deterrent for murder, then there is a life-life tradeoff in instituting the death penalty. It is a life-life tradeoff because a system of laws without the death penalty spares a few mostly guilty lives for numerous innocent lives, while a system of laws with the death penalty trades mostly guilty lives for numerous innocent ones.
The major thrust for this paper lies in recent studies that conclude that the death penalty does act as a deterrent, one such study claiming that there were, roughly, 18 murders deterred per legal execution. There is a 'threshold' effect that indicates that if not enough executions take place per year and/or are capricious enough, this deterrent effect doesn't work. Furthermore, even more murders are avoided as the time between the trial and the execution is shortened. The authors report this evidence and do not argue with the studies. They are interested in the moral issue if the studies are true, so they simply grant the evidence as true and start from there.
Authors want to avoid the reply that this only applies to a consequentalist and not to a deontologist. They argue that it applies to a consequentalist in a straightforward manner. For the deontologist, there may be a way out, but it is unpalatable. First off, authors frame the issue as a trade between numbers of lives: 1 vs 18. Under this trade, it seems that even the deontologist must hit a 'threshold override'. (pg 13-14) Authors claim that other objections from the deontologist are attributable to the acts/omissions distinction.
The biggest part of the paper involves replying to what they take to be the central principled objection to the death-penalty-as-deterrent argument. This argument goes as follows:
Central Objection: The death penalty is an affirmative action on the part of the state to kill another human being, while the deaths its absence allows are affirmative actions of citizens, not endorsed by the state at all. (This can be broken down into two separate objections: intentional and causal) (pg 15)
Intentional: under death penalty, the state intends to kill, while without death penalty, the state doesn't intend to kill, the citizenry does.
Causal: under death penalty, the state causes a death, while without death penalty, the causal chain is much longer, and ultimately the cause isn't the state, it is its citizens.
Authors claim these objections, and a few like them, operate on a hidden principle of the distinction between actions and omissions to action. Authors argue this distinction does not apply to governments. Governments are always choosing what package of legal policies will optimize the goals of the state & citizenry. (pg 16-7) In this case, there is the imagined two packages that are entirely equal except one includes capital punishment and the other doesn't. The evidence suggests that capital punishment package will result in far fewer murders-- isn't that the one to go with?
Other objections about capital punishment are then addressed. Mainly authors reject them as failing to take seriously the idea that a regime of capital punishment, no matter how flawed, will still save numerous entirely innocent lives. Objections: the innocent convict, the randomly assigned execution, the racially motivated execution. These are three additional objections to capital punishment. Authors reply that these scenarios also apply to the innocent lives that are being killed because the would-be killers aren't being deterred (like they would be if capital punishment was used). (pg 20-24)
Arguments against capital punishment as a tool for deterrence now roll in: there are other ways to deter murder, do those instead. Authors say: fine, fine; but don't forget that these other ways actually have to be committed to, practical, feasible, and proven. So far, it seems capital punishment is a good policy, at least until other policies arrive. There is no reason to be against it, since the evidence (ex hypothesi) is supportive that it works. Authors peg this argument, like most of their previous ones, to the evidence. If the evidence turns out faulty or not based on the regime of capital punishment, the moral conclusion would change. But as the evidence suggests that a life-life trafeoff is 1 to 18, capital punishment is morally obligatory.
Lastly, because this is a life-life tradeoff, they can't be accused of a slippery slope (pg 27) or extending their arguments to other domains (pg 40). Executing someone for rape may deter, but it isn't a life-life tradeoff. Therefore the moral calculus is different, and it may not be morally requisite.
Authors suggest that failure to take the life-life tradeoff seriously might be a cognitive error of not taking 'statistical lives' as real ones. (pg 32-35)
AEI-Brookings Joint Center For Regulatory Studies, March 2005
Authors argue that government legislation is always trafficking in courses of action that encourage and discourage in order, presumably, for social goods to be obtained. If it is the case that the death penalty is a deterrent for murder, then there is a life-life tradeoff in instituting the death penalty. It is a life-life tradeoff because a system of laws without the death penalty spares a few mostly guilty lives for numerous innocent lives, while a system of laws with the death penalty trades mostly guilty lives for numerous innocent ones.
The major thrust for this paper lies in recent studies that conclude that the death penalty does act as a deterrent, one such study claiming that there were, roughly, 18 murders deterred per legal execution. There is a 'threshold' effect that indicates that if not enough executions take place per year and/or are capricious enough, this deterrent effect doesn't work. Furthermore, even more murders are avoided as the time between the trial and the execution is shortened. The authors report this evidence and do not argue with the studies. They are interested in the moral issue if the studies are true, so they simply grant the evidence as true and start from there.
Authors want to avoid the reply that this only applies to a consequentalist and not to a deontologist. They argue that it applies to a consequentalist in a straightforward manner. For the deontologist, there may be a way out, but it is unpalatable. First off, authors frame the issue as a trade between numbers of lives: 1 vs 18. Under this trade, it seems that even the deontologist must hit a 'threshold override'. (pg 13-14) Authors claim that other objections from the deontologist are attributable to the acts/omissions distinction.
The biggest part of the paper involves replying to what they take to be the central principled objection to the death-penalty-as-deterrent argument. This argument goes as follows:
Central Objection: The death penalty is an affirmative action on the part of the state to kill another human being, while the deaths its absence allows are affirmative actions of citizens, not endorsed by the state at all. (This can be broken down into two separate objections: intentional and causal) (pg 15)
Intentional: under death penalty, the state intends to kill, while without death penalty, the state doesn't intend to kill, the citizenry does.
Causal: under death penalty, the state causes a death, while without death penalty, the causal chain is much longer, and ultimately the cause isn't the state, it is its citizens.
Authors claim these objections, and a few like them, operate on a hidden principle of the distinction between actions and omissions to action. Authors argue this distinction does not apply to governments. Governments are always choosing what package of legal policies will optimize the goals of the state & citizenry. (pg 16-7) In this case, there is the imagined two packages that are entirely equal except one includes capital punishment and the other doesn't. The evidence suggests that capital punishment package will result in far fewer murders-- isn't that the one to go with?
Other objections about capital punishment are then addressed. Mainly authors reject them as failing to take seriously the idea that a regime of capital punishment, no matter how flawed, will still save numerous entirely innocent lives. Objections: the innocent convict, the randomly assigned execution, the racially motivated execution. These are three additional objections to capital punishment. Authors reply that these scenarios also apply to the innocent lives that are being killed because the would-be killers aren't being deterred (like they would be if capital punishment was used). (pg 20-24)
Arguments against capital punishment as a tool for deterrence now roll in: there are other ways to deter murder, do those instead. Authors say: fine, fine; but don't forget that these other ways actually have to be committed to, practical, feasible, and proven. So far, it seems capital punishment is a good policy, at least until other policies arrive. There is no reason to be against it, since the evidence (ex hypothesi) is supportive that it works. Authors peg this argument, like most of their previous ones, to the evidence. If the evidence turns out faulty or not based on the regime of capital punishment, the moral conclusion would change. But as the evidence suggests that a life-life trafeoff is 1 to 18, capital punishment is morally obligatory.
Lastly, because this is a life-life tradeoff, they can't be accused of a slippery slope (pg 27) or extending their arguments to other domains (pg 40). Executing someone for rape may deter, but it isn't a life-life tradeoff. Therefore the moral calculus is different, and it may not be morally requisite.
Authors suggest that failure to take the life-life tradeoff seriously might be a cognitive error of not taking 'statistical lives' as real ones. (pg 32-35)
6/15/07
Kent, Bonnie - Virtue Theory
06/15/2007
The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, A. McGrade ed.
Author begins paper with discussion of ancient virtue theories and the changes they underwent in the middle ages. The difficulty with virtue theory is that they appear circular-- in order to get virtue you need to perform right actions and get the right 'habitus', but in order for an action to be right you need to have virtue. This circularity was not lost on the medievals, who also made the entire virtue theory far more complex by adding religious virtues, ones only granted by god's grace, and by adding the concept of the Will, which could do whatever it pleased, regardless of virtuous 'habitus'.
Author gives summary of history of the thinking from the Medievals. Virtues became classified as a 'habitus' in the 12th century, a word for which there may not be a good english translation. It roughly approximates 'habit' or 'disposition'. This may have helped the Medievals distinguish between the habitus and the will. (pg 8)
Aquinas talked about two sets of virtues, 'civic' ones and 'divinely infused' ones. These were challenged. (pg 10) Divinely infused virtues were in many ways similar to civic ones, but they lacked being divinely inspired, gifts from God's charity. But even these divinely given virtues could be countermanded by an act of the free will, so what good were they anyway? Medievals began to even question this. Author believes that John Buridan rightly avoided the circularity that threatened virtue theory in his own commentary of Aristotle's Ethics. (pg 15)
The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, A. McGrade ed.
Author begins paper with discussion of ancient virtue theories and the changes they underwent in the middle ages. The difficulty with virtue theory is that they appear circular-- in order to get virtue you need to perform right actions and get the right 'habitus', but in order for an action to be right you need to have virtue. This circularity was not lost on the medievals, who also made the entire virtue theory far more complex by adding religious virtues, ones only granted by god's grace, and by adding the concept of the Will, which could do whatever it pleased, regardless of virtuous 'habitus'.
Author gives summary of history of the thinking from the Medievals. Virtues became classified as a 'habitus' in the 12th century, a word for which there may not be a good english translation. It roughly approximates 'habit' or 'disposition'. This may have helped the Medievals distinguish between the habitus and the will. (pg 8)
Aquinas talked about two sets of virtues, 'civic' ones and 'divinely infused' ones. These were challenged. (pg 10) Divinely infused virtues were in many ways similar to civic ones, but they lacked being divinely inspired, gifts from God's charity. But even these divinely given virtues could be countermanded by an act of the free will, so what good were they anyway? Medievals began to even question this. Author believes that John Buridan rightly avoided the circularity that threatened virtue theory in his own commentary of Aristotle's Ethics. (pg 15)
6/8/07
Aune, Bruce - An Empiricist Epistemology Ch 6 "Memory And A Priori Inference"
06/08/2007
Unpublished Manuscript
Author starts with a discussion of memory and how it is essential for any theory of knowledge, since what is presently observed quickly becomes the past, and the past is usually only accessible through memory. The issue with memory is more complex than it is with observational knowledge, since memory involves inference, e.g. the inference that what I'm remembering now is what I observed then (a fact about the past is inferred using the present). To be justified in making this inference we need some sort of backing for fallible inference in general, and this is the thrust of the chapter.
Author starts with Hume (pg 204) who considered this type of inference 'experimental', meaning that it is reasoning about cause and effect, specifically a similarity between examined causes and effects with unexamined causes and examined effects. This is general inductive reasoning, the kind of reasoning we now need support for.
The difficulty with giving a rational justification for induction first lies in giving the proper account of what needs to be justified. Generally, we want to think that induction is assuming that As are Bs in all cases based on seeing that As are Bs in the examined cases. This is obviously open to critique, and various fixes have been offered, prior to attempting the justification.
Lycan & Russell have attempted, but each time it appears there needs to be some prior known 'representative sample' or some general way of specifying how to get one. Neither is available, author claims, without further empirical considerations. Bonjour proposes an a priori answer that makes use of 'metaphysically robust' regularities that we observe, therefore are confident using induction on. Author considers this naive, since there are many cases where we use induction but aren't assuming 'metaphysically robust' regularities (e.g. pollsters). Also, the discussion of 'robustness' assumes a bias toward our predicates rather than 'grue-like' ones, as the author brings up the infamous 'grue' counterexample and argues that there is no principled way to exclude these cases from Bonjour's account: no good way to presume that the future will be like the past.
The next proposed justification for induction comes from using Inference to the Best Explanation, which argues that the best explanatory account of the evidence is the one most likely to be true. Author disagrees, since we do not consider all the relevant alternative explanations before we pick the one, nor do we know all the relevant alternative explanations before we pick the one we want to go with.
Author instead proposes using probability theory and Bayes as a way to justify induction (pg 221-4). Under this theory, we need to have priorly assigned probabilities to background beliefs before we can assign a probability to new hypotheses; however the system should, ultimately, be self-correcting, so improperly assigned probabilities will eventually be changed to reflect newly acquired evidence and supported hypotheses. The worry though, is what initial beliefs to accept to get the whole system running. Here author considers an attempt by Chisholm, (pg 230) which he amends to accept. Initial beliefs must be given 'weak acceptance on a trial basis'. Author offers Bayesean theory as the alternative to Inference to the Best Explanation (pg 234).
With a new Bayesean backbone for induction, we can revisit the skeptical BIV (Brain-in-vat) argument and assign a low probability to it, since no evidence counts directly in favor of the 'surplus content' that BIV asserts (pg 237).
Unpublished Manuscript
Author starts with a discussion of memory and how it is essential for any theory of knowledge, since what is presently observed quickly becomes the past, and the past is usually only accessible through memory. The issue with memory is more complex than it is with observational knowledge, since memory involves inference, e.g. the inference that what I'm remembering now is what I observed then (a fact about the past is inferred using the present). To be justified in making this inference we need some sort of backing for fallible inference in general, and this is the thrust of the chapter.
Author starts with Hume (pg 204) who considered this type of inference 'experimental', meaning that it is reasoning about cause and effect, specifically a similarity between examined causes and effects with unexamined causes and examined effects. This is general inductive reasoning, the kind of reasoning we now need support for.
The difficulty with giving a rational justification for induction first lies in giving the proper account of what needs to be justified. Generally, we want to think that induction is assuming that As are Bs in all cases based on seeing that As are Bs in the examined cases. This is obviously open to critique, and various fixes have been offered, prior to attempting the justification.
Lycan & Russell have attempted, but each time it appears there needs to be some prior known 'representative sample' or some general way of specifying how to get one. Neither is available, author claims, without further empirical considerations. Bonjour proposes an a priori answer that makes use of 'metaphysically robust' regularities that we observe, therefore are confident using induction on. Author considers this naive, since there are many cases where we use induction but aren't assuming 'metaphysically robust' regularities (e.g. pollsters). Also, the discussion of 'robustness' assumes a bias toward our predicates rather than 'grue-like' ones, as the author brings up the infamous 'grue' counterexample and argues that there is no principled way to exclude these cases from Bonjour's account: no good way to presume that the future will be like the past.
The next proposed justification for induction comes from using Inference to the Best Explanation, which argues that the best explanatory account of the evidence is the one most likely to be true. Author disagrees, since we do not consider all the relevant alternative explanations before we pick the one, nor do we know all the relevant alternative explanations before we pick the one we want to go with.
Author instead proposes using probability theory and Bayes as a way to justify induction (pg 221-4). Under this theory, we need to have priorly assigned probabilities to background beliefs before we can assign a probability to new hypotheses; however the system should, ultimately, be self-correcting, so improperly assigned probabilities will eventually be changed to reflect newly acquired evidence and supported hypotheses. The worry though, is what initial beliefs to accept to get the whole system running. Here author considers an attempt by Chisholm, (pg 230) which he amends to accept. Initial beliefs must be given 'weak acceptance on a trial basis'. Author offers Bayesean theory as the alternative to Inference to the Best Explanation (pg 234).
With a new Bayesean backbone for induction, we can revisit the skeptical BIV (Brain-in-vat) argument and assign a low probability to it, since no evidence counts directly in favor of the 'surplus content' that BIV asserts (pg 237).
6/1/07
Aune, Bruce - An Empiricist Epistemology Ch 5 "Observational Knowledge"
06/01/2007
Unpublished Manuscript
This is a chapter mainly focused on the foundations of knowledge, and dealing with brain-in-the-vat problems. Author eventually concludes that there is no empiricist proof against brain-in-vat (BIV) problems, and that the most recent answer to BIV problems given by Putnam fails as well, so this cannot be used as an argument against empiricism.
When dealing with prototypical empiricist foundations of knowledge, author claims there are two sources: observation and memory. This chapter deals with observation. The problem with observation is its fallibility: we have optical illusions, phantom sounds, hot things sometimes feel cold, etc. The commonplace reply to this is that we must be careful to question our observations, not to take them at face value, to examine their context, their sources, and so on (Locke). The philosophical problem with this reply is that it tries to correct empirical evidence with more empirical evidence-- a regress or vicious circle.
The answer proposed by people like Russell, Moore and Carnap was that there were immediately known 'sense-data' that we were infallible about that served as the inferential foundations of the rest of our knowledge. The problem with this response was that it eventually failed because it put a 'sensuous curtain' between perceivers and the real world. The real world becomes a Kantian 'thing-in-itself' that is unknowable. (pg 171) Arguments requiring the basis of empirical knowledge to be a non-inferential foundation go back to Aristotle, who showed an infinite regress if all our knowledge is inferential. (pg. 173)
However, author argues, we do not need sense-data for a non-inferential basis for our empirical knowledge. Author has developed a framework for what he calls 'imperfect' empirical knowledge, which is knowledge that could be false (ch 1). Working from this, we can accept that there is a non-inferential base from which empirical knowledge is made possible, but that non-inferential base can simply be (fallible) observational beliefs. Author tells a story of how, when we were young ,we took most of our observations at face value, particularly when they didn't conflict with the observations of others. As we became more critical, we began to form generalizations and theories, so our observations became subject to our theories. So the foundation for empirical knowledge is other empirical knowledge. No regress or vicious circle looms, since in all this 'knowledge' talk we are talking about 'imperfect' knowledge.
Author considers alternatives to the Russell/Carnap 'Foundationalism', that are also alternatives to his own theory. One such alternative is Bonjour's 'Coherentism', which asserts that knowledge is justified on the whole, and that particular beliefs are justified by their being able to fit (or not) into that coherent whole. Author claims this is too tough a standard to hold anyone to: everybody has gaps, even the scientific community does!
The problem with empirical knowledge as Hume has sketched it is that it is susceptible to external world skepticism, or a more modern version, BIV. If there were a good answer to this, we would like to hear it. Putnam suggests the answer of Semantic Externalism: the reference relation involves a connection to the actual things referenced ('meanings just aren't in the head!'). Putnam got grist for this argument by successfully arguing that a Turing machine might be thinking, but it would never be referencing if it couldn't sense the objects it was talking about. So the anti-BIV argument runs as follows:
1) if someone S is a BIV, the reference of his words would be electrical impulses, not actual things
2) therefore S's claim 'I am BIV' is not referring to actual things like brains and vats, so he cannot be describing himself as a BIV
Author argues this fails, since it doesn't alleviate our concern: either S has an 'exotic' meaning, or S is saying something false about a real person. Author considers other problems with Semantic Externalism. The major problem is that there is no clear story about how references relations come about. Putnam describes 'language entry and exit rules' that should correspond to behavior and experience, but this fails to capture the full extent of our ability to reference. Author claims that these simplistic rules sound a lot like the verificationist's claim that everything with meaning must be verifiable. If there is room for unobservables to be referenced (like H2O), then it seems there is still no good story about cases of genuine reference in Semantic Externalism. Since there is no clear-cut winner in this, BIV is still an issue for both empiricists and non-empiricists alike.
Unpublished Manuscript
This is a chapter mainly focused on the foundations of knowledge, and dealing with brain-in-the-vat problems. Author eventually concludes that there is no empiricist proof against brain-in-vat (BIV) problems, and that the most recent answer to BIV problems given by Putnam fails as well, so this cannot be used as an argument against empiricism.
When dealing with prototypical empiricist foundations of knowledge, author claims there are two sources: observation and memory. This chapter deals with observation. The problem with observation is its fallibility: we have optical illusions, phantom sounds, hot things sometimes feel cold, etc. The commonplace reply to this is that we must be careful to question our observations, not to take them at face value, to examine their context, their sources, and so on (Locke). The philosophical problem with this reply is that it tries to correct empirical evidence with more empirical evidence-- a regress or vicious circle.
The answer proposed by people like Russell, Moore and Carnap was that there were immediately known 'sense-data' that we were infallible about that served as the inferential foundations of the rest of our knowledge. The problem with this response was that it eventually failed because it put a 'sensuous curtain' between perceivers and the real world. The real world becomes a Kantian 'thing-in-itself' that is unknowable. (pg 171) Arguments requiring the basis of empirical knowledge to be a non-inferential foundation go back to Aristotle, who showed an infinite regress if all our knowledge is inferential. (pg. 173)
However, author argues, we do not need sense-data for a non-inferential basis for our empirical knowledge. Author has developed a framework for what he calls 'imperfect' empirical knowledge, which is knowledge that could be false (ch 1). Working from this, we can accept that there is a non-inferential base from which empirical knowledge is made possible, but that non-inferential base can simply be (fallible) observational beliefs. Author tells a story of how, when we were young ,we took most of our observations at face value, particularly when they didn't conflict with the observations of others. As we became more critical, we began to form generalizations and theories, so our observations became subject to our theories. So the foundation for empirical knowledge is other empirical knowledge. No regress or vicious circle looms, since in all this 'knowledge' talk we are talking about 'imperfect' knowledge.
Author considers alternatives to the Russell/Carnap 'Foundationalism', that are also alternatives to his own theory. One such alternative is Bonjour's 'Coherentism', which asserts that knowledge is justified on the whole, and that particular beliefs are justified by their being able to fit (or not) into that coherent whole. Author claims this is too tough a standard to hold anyone to: everybody has gaps, even the scientific community does!
The problem with empirical knowledge as Hume has sketched it is that it is susceptible to external world skepticism, or a more modern version, BIV. If there were a good answer to this, we would like to hear it. Putnam suggests the answer of Semantic Externalism: the reference relation involves a connection to the actual things referenced ('meanings just aren't in the head!'). Putnam got grist for this argument by successfully arguing that a Turing machine might be thinking, but it would never be referencing if it couldn't sense the objects it was talking about. So the anti-BIV argument runs as follows:
1) if someone S is a BIV, the reference of his words would be electrical impulses, not actual things
2) therefore S's claim 'I am BIV' is not referring to actual things like brains and vats, so he cannot be describing himself as a BIV
Author argues this fails, since it doesn't alleviate our concern: either S has an 'exotic' meaning, or S is saying something false about a real person. Author considers other problems with Semantic Externalism. The major problem is that there is no clear story about how references relations come about. Putnam describes 'language entry and exit rules' that should correspond to behavior and experience, but this fails to capture the full extent of our ability to reference. Author claims that these simplistic rules sound a lot like the verificationist's claim that everything with meaning must be verifiable. If there is room for unobservables to be referenced (like H2O), then it seems there is still no good story about cases of genuine reference in Semantic Externalism. Since there is no clear-cut winner in this, BIV is still an issue for both empiricists and non-empiricists alike.
5/25/07
Aune, Bruce - An Empiricist Epistemology Ch 4 "Properties And Concepts"
05/25/2007
Unpublished Manuscript
Author begins chapter with a discussion of the three leading theories of properties. Properties can be considered a feature of an object, such as 'red' or 'spherical'. There are theories promoted by David Armstrong that claim that properties exist in some universal sense and that objects partake in the existence of them-- similarity exists therefore between objects with similar properties by virtue of their sharing the same property. There are 'trope' theorists like Donald Williams or Keith Campbell (and possibly Aristotle) who claim that each property is unique, but share a similarity that is more-or-less similar, depending on the context, object, etc. The final theory that author prefers is a conceptual theory (Kant, Frege), the theory that a property of an object is a concept that the object falls under.
Unpublished Manuscript
Author begins chapter with a discussion of the three leading theories of properties. Properties can be considered a feature of an object, such as 'red' or 'spherical'. There are theories promoted by David Armstrong that claim that properties exist in some universal sense and that objects partake in the existence of them-- similarity exists therefore between objects with similar properties by virtue of their sharing the same property. There are 'trope' theorists like Donald Williams or Keith Campbell (and possibly Aristotle) who claim that each property is unique, but share a similarity that is more-or-less similar, depending on the context, object, etc. The final theory that author prefers is a conceptual theory (Kant, Frege), the theory that a property of an object is a concept that the object falls under.
Author has two main criticisms of the first two theories. The first theory (Armstrong's A-theory) fails because it must include the object itself that has been stripped of all its properties, thus a 'bare particular'. If that wasn't bad enough, it seems that if properties exist, they too must have properties that distinguish them, which means that properties have 'bare particulars' too.
The second theory (trope theories) fail because we need to distinguish between all the different tropes out there, which means that each trope itself is made up of further tropes, and so on (pg 132-3).
Both theories fail, author suggests, because they have an incorrect view of predication as ascribing a property to an object. Author returns to the theory of properties he likes, the Fregean F-theory. In this theory, properties 'fall under' the concept of an object. Thus an object is red because the object itself is red, not because it has the property of redness. One upshot of this theory is that the concepts of an object can be used in propositions without much mutation. What is a concept? A concept is something associated with the thing it conceptualizes, and someone has a concept when she can use at the right times and in the right places. (pg 145)
One problem for the Fregean theory is that we are unclear what the 'falling under' relation actually is. For this, author uses the Sellarsian suggestion of distributive singular terms as a way to sort objects under concepts-- a token of a type that is distributed. There are some criticisms of Distributive Singular Terms (DSTs) that author deals with:
1) Not all lions are tawny. Response: that's fine, just restrict the DSTs to typical or ideal examples
2) DSTs sometimes are true due to their distribution, not due to the properties the objects have: 'the grizzly is found in North America'-- no one grizzly is all over North America. Response: those aren't DSTs!
Author makes sure to agree with Sellars that the concept 'red' and the word 'red' are expressing the same thing too. 'The concept "red"' is used as a DST to distribute to all proper times when 'the concept red' is employed.
Author revises the Fregean version of concepts being the connectors between predicates and objects. Now, predicates directly describe objects, or directly classify objects, without 'conceptual mediation'. This would be much like demonstratives or names. The problem now is where predicates get their conceptual function? Author: by usage (pg 154-5).
The next step is dealing with propositions. Author uses a Sellarsian 'distributive' treatment for propositions: propositions are similar because they distribute to, ultimately, beliefs about their proper usage. (pg 158-9)
This is an immensely fast-paced and difficult chapter that is the bulk of the sorting out between concepts, predicates, properties and propositions.
5/18/07
Aune, Bruce - An Empiricist Epistemology Ch 3 "Empiricism and the A Priori"
05/18/2007
Unpublished Manuscript
In this chapter author gives a positive account of analyticity and how it might work in relation to so-called propositional attitudes. The primary aim is to show that cases of supposed a priori knowledge are just cases of analyticity in language or in concepts.
The chapter begins with a brief survey of the origins of analytic truths as conceived by Kant. For Kant, an analytic truth (similar to Leibniz) is a truth where the predicate being ascribed to the object is already contained in the concept of the object itself. Author considers Kant's work to be acceptable, but only applicable to a limited class of judgments. (pg 82) Frege attempted to build on Kant by claiming that an analytic truth is a truth derivable only from general logical laws and definitions.
Frege and other empiricist philosophers were generally considered to be refuted by Quine in his paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Author describes the problem was that we cannot use the idea of synonymy without using 'analytic', and vice versa. The two are involved in a vicious circle of definition. Further, any attempt at lining up all the sentences containing supposedly synonymous terms will contain the term 'analytic'. Quine later retreated from his earlier attack and admitted that there was some common-sense appeal to analyticity. He gives a rough definition: something is analytic for a native speaker S if S learns the truth of P by learning the usage of one or more of the words in P. This truth must be deductively closed-- so the steps to analyticity must 'count as analytic in turn'. (pg 88) But still, as with Kant, Quine relegates analytic truths to logic ones and linguistic tautologies.
Author describes his version of analytic truth as one developed from Carnap's, which consists of the specification of a formal language-system that has semantic rules and definitions. Author uses the example of specifying how 'if...then' applies, a usage that is separate from common usage. Once these specifications are considered, then the supposed counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens are clarified and dismissed (pg 97-98).
Author lastly turns to the problems with necessary truths that Kripke has shown. One example is the origin claim: an item cannot have it's origins in a different hunk of matter than it does now. (pg 112-) Author goes about showing what the proof for this would be. Assuming that 'distinctness' is defined properly; author claims this Kripkean claim can be considered analytic.
Lastly, author considers psychological states, which are not the same as propositions. If propositions can be analytic, can psycholgical states like beliefs? Author review the classical notion of propositions as expressing the sense of a sentence, with words having conceptual content. With the theory of names being rigid designators this classical notion is undone. Author discusses the ramifications of this failure and also discusses conceptualism, which says that propositional attitudes have 'contents' rather than 'objects'. Using this method at least, the empiricist can have analyticity in psychological states.
Unpublished Manuscript
In this chapter author gives a positive account of analyticity and how it might work in relation to so-called propositional attitudes. The primary aim is to show that cases of supposed a priori knowledge are just cases of analyticity in language or in concepts.
The chapter begins with a brief survey of the origins of analytic truths as conceived by Kant. For Kant, an analytic truth (similar to Leibniz) is a truth where the predicate being ascribed to the object is already contained in the concept of the object itself. Author considers Kant's work to be acceptable, but only applicable to a limited class of judgments. (pg 82) Frege attempted to build on Kant by claiming that an analytic truth is a truth derivable only from general logical laws and definitions.
Frege and other empiricist philosophers were generally considered to be refuted by Quine in his paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Author describes the problem was that we cannot use the idea of synonymy without using 'analytic', and vice versa. The two are involved in a vicious circle of definition. Further, any attempt at lining up all the sentences containing supposedly synonymous terms will contain the term 'analytic'. Quine later retreated from his earlier attack and admitted that there was some common-sense appeal to analyticity. He gives a rough definition: something is analytic for a native speaker S if S learns the truth of P by learning the usage of one or more of the words in P. This truth must be deductively closed-- so the steps to analyticity must 'count as analytic in turn'. (pg 88) But still, as with Kant, Quine relegates analytic truths to logic ones and linguistic tautologies.
Author describes his version of analytic truth as one developed from Carnap's, which consists of the specification of a formal language-system that has semantic rules and definitions. Author uses the example of specifying how 'if...then' applies, a usage that is separate from common usage. Once these specifications are considered, then the supposed counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens are clarified and dismissed (pg 97-98).
Author lastly turns to the problems with necessary truths that Kripke has shown. One example is the origin claim: an item cannot have it's origins in a different hunk of matter than it does now. (pg 112-) Author goes about showing what the proof for this would be. Assuming that 'distinctness' is defined properly; author claims this Kripkean claim can be considered analytic.
Lastly, author considers psychological states, which are not the same as propositions. If propositions can be analytic, can psycholgical states like beliefs? Author review the classical notion of propositions as expressing the sense of a sentence, with words having conceptual content. With the theory of names being rigid designators this classical notion is undone. Author discusses the ramifications of this failure and also discusses conceptualism, which says that propositional attitudes have 'contents' rather than 'objects'. Using this method at least, the empiricist can have analyticity in psychological states.
5/11/07
Aune, Bruce - An Empiricist Epistemology Ch 2 "A Priori Knowledge and the Claims of Rationalism"
05/11/2007
Unpublished Manuscript
This chapter is devoted to giving doubts to the anti-empiricist rationalist philosophies that claim support of a priori knowledge like "nothing can be green or yellow at the same time" or 'not (P and not P)'.
Author wants to distinguish between a priori knowledge and analytic knowledge. At issue here is whether commonly thought of a priori claims (not necessary identity and contingent a priori claims made by Kripke, by the way) can be proved or verified. The proof would be possible given a combination of axioms and inference. But now we are given to another question: what axioms do we use? Here the rationalist believes the axioms used are knowable by direct intuition. Author complicates this picture by showing that axioms are superfluous because they are derivable from rules, and further that the claim that anything is knowable by direct intuition is dubious (pg 46-). The contrary view is the empiricist's, whose standard claims are that the rules of inference are underwritten by convention that aims at preserving truth using 'semantical rules' (pg 42, top).
Author discusses that it is true that sometimes things are immediately apprehendable; but these things are like recognizing faces, or my own hand. Author does not believe that recognizing that things are of a given kind is as intuitive. For instance, we need to recognize the appropriate application conditions of modus ponens before we can use it in inference. Without taking a situation (or set of propositions) to be an instance where modus ponens properly applies, we can easily go wrong. Author uses two examples of moral and geometrical cases.
Author then takes on the standard cases that make up the rationalist backbone. E.g., the law of non-contradiction is complicated by non-self-referential liar-like-paradoxes. The law of the excluded middle is complicated by supposedly vague predicates 'is bald', 'has a beard', 'is a tree/sapling', 'is a child/adult'. Author also discusses 'nothing can be both red and green all over at the same time' and indicates that this happens to be more a matter of physiology than a property of the world, as an exercise, change 'red/green' to 'yellow/green' and you can have 'yellowish-green' and 'greenish-yellow'.
Lastly, author reviews the more modern cases of Kripkean necessary identity and contingent a priori. He claims these can possibly be shown to be analytic, and he will try to do so in the next chapter.
Unpublished Manuscript
This chapter is devoted to giving doubts to the anti-empiricist rationalist philosophies that claim support of a priori knowledge like "nothing can be green or yellow at the same time" or 'not (P and not P)'.
Author wants to distinguish between a priori knowledge and analytic knowledge. At issue here is whether commonly thought of a priori claims (not necessary identity and contingent a priori claims made by Kripke, by the way) can be proved or verified. The proof would be possible given a combination of axioms and inference. But now we are given to another question: what axioms do we use? Here the rationalist believes the axioms used are knowable by direct intuition. Author complicates this picture by showing that axioms are superfluous because they are derivable from rules, and further that the claim that anything is knowable by direct intuition is dubious (pg 46-). The contrary view is the empiricist's, whose standard claims are that the rules of inference are underwritten by convention that aims at preserving truth using 'semantical rules' (pg 42, top).
Author discusses that it is true that sometimes things are immediately apprehendable; but these things are like recognizing faces, or my own hand. Author does not believe that recognizing that things are of a given kind is as intuitive. For instance, we need to recognize the appropriate application conditions of modus ponens before we can use it in inference. Without taking a situation (or set of propositions) to be an instance where modus ponens properly applies, we can easily go wrong. Author uses two examples of moral and geometrical cases.
Author then takes on the standard cases that make up the rationalist backbone. E.g., the law of non-contradiction is complicated by non-self-referential liar-like-paradoxes. The law of the excluded middle is complicated by supposedly vague predicates 'is bald', 'has a beard', 'is a tree/sapling', 'is a child/adult'. Author also discusses 'nothing can be both red and green all over at the same time' and indicates that this happens to be more a matter of physiology than a property of the world, as an exercise, change 'red/green' to 'yellow/green' and you can have 'yellowish-green' and 'greenish-yellow'.
Lastly, author reviews the more modern cases of Kripkean necessary identity and contingent a priori. He claims these can possibly be shown to be analytic, and he will try to do so in the next chapter.
5/3/07
Aune, Bruce - An Empiricist Epistemology Ch 1 "Knowledge and Analysis"
05/04/2007
Unpublished Manuscript
The author has introduced in the preface how he intends to do some work of defending the empiricist notion of the analytic (or at least Carnap's version of it) against Quine's assaults.
The first chapter is devoted to sorting out some of the different senses of knowledge, how the different senses sometimes work in everyday language, and then to give a 'rational reconstruction' of two senses of knowledge.
Author first points out the various disagreements regarding the actual method to employ when trying to answer the question 'what is knowledge?' Is it an analysis that points to necessary and sufficient conditions? Is it conceptual analysis that tries to capture all (or most of) our intuitions? Is it trying to identify a property that is true of us when we know something? This last approach seems to be taken by Chisholm's followers, which assumes that such a property exists, even before we can find one. Author reviews the rejection of 'essential properties' talk, e.g. the famous critique given by Wittgenstein regarding a 'game', and so on. Given the difficulty since the Gettier examples to show a property of knowledge, it is unlikely to be located.
Author review the Gettier cases and points out that if we have two senses of knowledge, one being an ancient traditional approach of 'rational certainty' and the other as one that is based on inconclusive evidence, the Gettier cases only refute the later cases, not the former. One reply to the Gettier cases for inconclusive knowledge is Lewis' contextualism. Contextualism is a positive account that says that a subject S knows P when S has eliminated all relevant alternatives to P that are reasonable to consider given the context that S is in. Author points out that his major problem with this theory is that it requires relevant alternatives to P to be eliminated, but sometimes there are none.
Author proposes to avoid Gettier-like counterexamples by having access to the evidence that makes the proposition true. This 'making-true' concept author wants to keep elementary enough to avoid endorsing Armstrong's elaborate notions of 'truth-makers'.
At the end of the chapter, author gives his rational reconstruction of inconclusive or imperfect knowledge: S has imperfect knowledge of P in a context C only when (i) P is true, (ii) S has the information that P, (iii) The evidence for P is high enough in C to be considered adequate, (iv) S has evidential access to a sufficient truth-maker for P.
Unpublished Manuscript
The author has introduced in the preface how he intends to do some work of defending the empiricist notion of the analytic (or at least Carnap's version of it) against Quine's assaults.
The first chapter is devoted to sorting out some of the different senses of knowledge, how the different senses sometimes work in everyday language, and then to give a 'rational reconstruction' of two senses of knowledge.
Author first points out the various disagreements regarding the actual method to employ when trying to answer the question 'what is knowledge?' Is it an analysis that points to necessary and sufficient conditions? Is it conceptual analysis that tries to capture all (or most of) our intuitions? Is it trying to identify a property that is true of us when we know something? This last approach seems to be taken by Chisholm's followers, which assumes that such a property exists, even before we can find one. Author reviews the rejection of 'essential properties' talk, e.g. the famous critique given by Wittgenstein regarding a 'game', and so on. Given the difficulty since the Gettier examples to show a property of knowledge, it is unlikely to be located.
Author review the Gettier cases and points out that if we have two senses of knowledge, one being an ancient traditional approach of 'rational certainty' and the other as one that is based on inconclusive evidence, the Gettier cases only refute the later cases, not the former. One reply to the Gettier cases for inconclusive knowledge is Lewis' contextualism. Contextualism is a positive account that says that a subject S knows P when S has eliminated all relevant alternatives to P that are reasonable to consider given the context that S is in. Author points out that his major problem with this theory is that it requires relevant alternatives to P to be eliminated, but sometimes there are none.
Author proposes to avoid Gettier-like counterexamples by having access to the evidence that makes the proposition true. This 'making-true' concept author wants to keep elementary enough to avoid endorsing Armstrong's elaborate notions of 'truth-makers'.
At the end of the chapter, author gives his rational reconstruction of inconclusive or imperfect knowledge: S has imperfect knowledge of P in a context C only when (i) P is true, (ii) S has the information that P, (iii) The evidence for P is high enough in C to be considered adequate, (iv) S has evidential access to a sufficient truth-maker for P.
4/27/07
Kennedy, Anthony - Gonzales v. Carhart
04/27/2007
No. 05-380, April 18, 2007
This is the opinion of the supreme court of the USA, regarding a federal 'partial birth' abortion ban that was legislated and then challenged 'facially' (before anyone was even arrested for violating the statute). The findings of the court was a 5-4 decision that the act was not facially unconstitutional.
Much has been said and already discussed on this opinion, so I shall stick to the outline.
Author first lays out the history of the case and previous rulings related to it, mentioning Stenberg v. Carhart in particular. Author also gives the history of the act and background information on the method of second trimester abortions that are commonly performed, one is D&E (dilation and evacuation) and D&X (dilation and extraction). Of the two, D&X mostly involves delivering most of the fetus, then piercing its skull and shrinking its head to get it out of the birth canal. Though D&X is far less utilized than other practices, it is used by many doctors who consider it a safer (health-wise for the woman) to use it. The act seeks to ban variations of D&X, and gives no health exemptions for the woman. Congress performed a finding of fact, which was mostly mixed and somewhat erroneous, but concluded that there is no medial necessity to perform D&X.
Author first claims that the act is not vague and lists the specific conditions that are punishable and the alternatives that are not. (III A, B) Author then considers whether vague language in the act creates an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion, since it could cover D&E; he rejects this (III C1). Author also rejects that some abortions that begin as D&E end by accident as D&X and that this would chill other abortion procedures, making an undue burden; author rejects this by affirming that the act calls for it to be an intentional D&X, not an unintentional one.
The only saving factor here, author claims, is that as-applied challenges are still possible.
No. 05-380, April 18, 2007
This is the opinion of the supreme court of the USA, regarding a federal 'partial birth' abortion ban that was legislated and then challenged 'facially' (before anyone was even arrested for violating the statute). The findings of the court was a 5-4 decision that the act was not facially unconstitutional.
Much has been said and already discussed on this opinion, so I shall stick to the outline.
Author first lays out the history of the case and previous rulings related to it, mentioning Stenberg v. Carhart in particular. Author also gives the history of the act and background information on the method of second trimester abortions that are commonly performed, one is D&E (dilation and evacuation) and D&X (dilation and extraction). Of the two, D&X mostly involves delivering most of the fetus, then piercing its skull and shrinking its head to get it out of the birth canal. Though D&X is far less utilized than other practices, it is used by many doctors who consider it a safer (health-wise for the woman) to use it. The act seeks to ban variations of D&X, and gives no health exemptions for the woman. Congress performed a finding of fact, which was mostly mixed and somewhat erroneous, but concluded that there is no medial necessity to perform D&X.
Author first claims that the act is not vague and lists the specific conditions that are punishable and the alternatives that are not. (III A, B) Author then considers whether vague language in the act creates an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion, since it could cover D&E; he rejects this (III C1). Author also rejects that some abortions that begin as D&E end by accident as D&X and that this would chill other abortion procedures, making an undue burden; author rejects this by affirming that the act calls for it to be an intentional D&X, not an unintentional one.
Author further affirms two claims: 1) that the state has a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity and ethics of physicians, and 2) that partial birth abortions are 'lade with the power to devalue human life'. The decision to have a D&X is so fraught with emotional consequences that some doctors do not disclose the details of the procedure: but how the procedure takes place is precisely the issue abhorrent to the state. Author thinks it might be possible that abortion doctors will develop new, less shocking methods, of aborting late-term fetuses. The state has an interest in preserving a bright line between good medicine and bad: it is tough to tell the difference between a D&X and infanticide.
The next issue is the lack of an exception for the preservation of the health of the mother. (IV B) Author claims there is medical testimony on both sides of the question of whether a D&X is ever medically necessary. According to the testimony of some doctors, a D&E is always just as safe. Author claims that because there is medical uncertainty, there is no reason to presume on the side of caution in a facial challenge. The state is permitted to pass a wide range of legislation where there is medical or scientific uncertainty. Author leaves open that an 'as-applied' challenge can be used here instead of a facial challenge.
Scalia & Thomas concur, also claiming that there is no basis in the US Constitution for Roe v Wade.
Ginsburg delivers the dissent
Author first points out that the claim of medical uncertainty is fallacious since, mostly, Congress ignored the testimony of good abortion doctors and listened to many non-abortion doctors who all claimed that D&X was not medically necessary. There is a strong body of evidence that for a small portion of women, D&X is less dangerous to the health of the mother than any other option.
Author claims Kennedy et al have not drawn the line for abortions at viability/non-viability but instead at a idea of resemblance to infanticide/abortions.The only saving factor here, author claims, is that as-applied challenges are still possible.
4/20/07
Houser, Marc et al - A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
04/20/2007
Mind & Language, Feb, 2007
Though this is a recent paper, it revisits the same studies that have been going on regarding 'trolley cases' where subjects are asked about the morally permissible action given a range of moral scenarios. There are four basic scenarios:
1) Redirect a trolley (bearing down on 5 people) onto a different track that kills one person instead.
2) Push one person in front of the trolley in order to stop it (successfully)
3) Redirect that same trolley so that it kills one person, but gives everyone else enough time to get out of the way
4) Redirect the trolley so that it is stopped by a heavy weight, but in the process of getting to that heavy weight, kills one person in the way.
There was a large number of respondents, due to the internet as the distribution method. The study done here was to examine a case where moral judgments are made without reference to explicit, conscious, reasoned rules. The contrast was drawn between three theories of moral psychology:
1) Cognitive: moral judgments are made with reference to explicit rules that are consciously considered
2) Emotive: moral judgments are made due to unconscious emotional responses to situations and also consciously using an 'intuitive' standard
3) Rule-following but still intuitive: this is the view of the author. He wants it to be the case that we do follow rules that in principle can be made explicit, but we don't necessarily usually have access to these rules when making moral judgments. This is made easier to understand by analogy to the linguistic case, where rules are followed but not necessarily made explicit in order to be followed.
In this study, the third theory was supported against the first by showing that a significant number of respondents adhered to particular moral principles but were unable to provide and coherent explanation for their judgment upon questioning. Furthermore, these judgments were made across all demographic groups identified. In this case the particular moral principle was the Principle of Double Effect, a principle that posits that contingent foreseen harm to another as a side-effect of some (greater) good is preferable to (the same) harm that is necessary to secure the same good.
Here was how the data broke down in response to the question: is it morally permissible to...
1) Yes 85%
2) Yes 12%
3) Yes 56%
4) Yes 72%
Author claims that this data shows that in the context of these cases of moral judgments, there aren't explicit moral principles that the subjects are consciously reasoning about, even though they may be following principles like the principle of double effect. There are two possible objections to the results of this study: a) the subjects weren't given enough time or b) if the subjects were given a set of principles to choose from, they would pick the relevant one. The replies author gives is that a) the subject had plenty of time and b) that these might just be post-hoc rationalizations, not identifying the principles of their reasoning.
Mind & Language, Feb, 2007
Though this is a recent paper, it revisits the same studies that have been going on regarding 'trolley cases' where subjects are asked about the morally permissible action given a range of moral scenarios. There are four basic scenarios:
1) Redirect a trolley (bearing down on 5 people) onto a different track that kills one person instead.
2) Push one person in front of the trolley in order to stop it (successfully)
3) Redirect that same trolley so that it kills one person, but gives everyone else enough time to get out of the way
4) Redirect the trolley so that it is stopped by a heavy weight, but in the process of getting to that heavy weight, kills one person in the way.
There was a large number of respondents, due to the internet as the distribution method. The study done here was to examine a case where moral judgments are made without reference to explicit, conscious, reasoned rules. The contrast was drawn between three theories of moral psychology:
1) Cognitive: moral judgments are made with reference to explicit rules that are consciously considered
2) Emotive: moral judgments are made due to unconscious emotional responses to situations and also consciously using an 'intuitive' standard
3) Rule-following but still intuitive: this is the view of the author. He wants it to be the case that we do follow rules that in principle can be made explicit, but we don't necessarily usually have access to these rules when making moral judgments. This is made easier to understand by analogy to the linguistic case, where rules are followed but not necessarily made explicit in order to be followed.
In this study, the third theory was supported against the first by showing that a significant number of respondents adhered to particular moral principles but were unable to provide and coherent explanation for their judgment upon questioning. Furthermore, these judgments were made across all demographic groups identified. In this case the particular moral principle was the Principle of Double Effect, a principle that posits that contingent foreseen harm to another as a side-effect of some (greater) good is preferable to (the same) harm that is necessary to secure the same good.
Here was how the data broke down in response to the question: is it morally permissible to...
1) Yes 85%
2) Yes 12%
3) Yes 56%
4) Yes 72%
Author claims that this data shows that in the context of these cases of moral judgments, there aren't explicit moral principles that the subjects are consciously reasoning about, even though they may be following principles like the principle of double effect. There are two possible objections to the results of this study: a) the subjects weren't given enough time or b) if the subjects were given a set of principles to choose from, they would pick the relevant one. The replies author gives is that a) the subject had plenty of time and b) that these might just be post-hoc rationalizations, not identifying the principles of their reasoning.
4/13/07
Priest, Graham - Truth And Contradiction
04/13/2007
The Philosophical Quaterly, Vol 50 Num 200 July 2000
Author begins by announcing that he is a dialethiest and believes that some contradictions can be true [or at least that not all contradictions are false?]. This is a claim about how to put together logic-- or what 'kind' of logic to endorse. [Logic is supposed to be a system of inferences that, if applied, are truth-preserving.] He doesn't argue directly for the appropriateness of dialetheism, instead is intent to show that the 6 front-running theories of truth (what makes something true if it is true) don't rule out dialethiesm. If none of the theories of truth particularly exclude dialetheism, then those who oppose such a logic will have to find some other resource to use to combat dialetheism. There are three traditional theories of truth, and three more modern ones. Author doesn't enumerate all the fine points of any of these theories, or even compare or contrast them; he simply gives minimal information about each and tries to show how it doesn't rule out dialetheism.
One caveat the author lays out is that there is a problem of what we're applying logic to: sentences, propositions, beliefs, statements, worldviews... what? Author says that nothing he talks about hinges on a specific restriction-- whatever the 'truth-bearers' are, that is what he will use-- he will use the Alpha symbol for this category.
(1) Deflationism
Deflationism says that was is true is the same thing as saying what is. This theory, author claims, has a tendency toward dialetheism, since certain paradoxes (the liar paradox) can lead to affirm a contradiction.
(2) Semantic Theory of Truth
This theory might have a problem in general if it uses a logic that allows anything to follow from a contradiction. For this, author suggests a paraconsistent logic that does not allow explosion. Once this happens, author claims this theory is consistent with dialetheism.
(3) Teleological Theory
We normally say 'x is true' to prove a point-- we aim at something when we say it. Author claims this is neutral when it comes to dialetheism.
(4) Pragmatist Theory
This theory says that something is true if it 'works', meaning perhaps it is verified in practice. This pragmatism can allow for inconsistent theories-- in fact ones that contain contradictions! Thus dialetheism is acceptable according to this theory as well.
(5) Coherence Theory
This one appears the most difficult, since 'consistency' in a model of truth seems to be immediately valuable. But here the author argues that there might be some virtues of a theory that are greater than consistency, and if so, the coherent theory must allow for an inconsistent but otherwise virtuous theory to be the true one.
(6) Correspondence Theory
Considered the most traditional theory, it says that something is true if it corresponds to reality. How exactly it can 'correspond' is the trouble here. Author sketches 'situational semantics', which is a system of logic that allows for context-specific truth values that might be ultimately contradictory if placed into a larger context, but avoid the difficulty by being contextual. The idea the author wants to avoid is the idea that the correspondence theory has to deal with a world or other maximally consistent set of objects to correspond to, not a smaller subset of things. The problem with this 'situational semantics' is that it allows for 'negative facts', or facts about what is not the case. This flies in the face of traditional correspondence theories like Wittgenstein's or Russell, since correspondence theories intuitively correspond to what is, not what isn't. But author argues that this is an arbitrary distinction.
The Philosophical Quaterly, Vol 50 Num 200 July 2000
Author begins by announcing that he is a dialethiest and believes that some contradictions can be true [or at least that not all contradictions are false?]. This is a claim about how to put together logic-- or what 'kind' of logic to endorse. [Logic is supposed to be a system of inferences that, if applied, are truth-preserving.] He doesn't argue directly for the appropriateness of dialetheism, instead is intent to show that the 6 front-running theories of truth (what makes something true if it is true) don't rule out dialethiesm. If none of the theories of truth particularly exclude dialetheism, then those who oppose such a logic will have to find some other resource to use to combat dialetheism. There are three traditional theories of truth, and three more modern ones. Author doesn't enumerate all the fine points of any of these theories, or even compare or contrast them; he simply gives minimal information about each and tries to show how it doesn't rule out dialetheism.
One caveat the author lays out is that there is a problem of what we're applying logic to: sentences, propositions, beliefs, statements, worldviews... what? Author says that nothing he talks about hinges on a specific restriction-- whatever the 'truth-bearers' are, that is what he will use-- he will use the Alpha symbol for this category.
(1) Deflationism
Deflationism says that was is true is the same thing as saying what is. This theory, author claims, has a tendency toward dialetheism, since certain paradoxes (the liar paradox) can lead to affirm a contradiction.
(2) Semantic Theory of Truth
This theory might have a problem in general if it uses a logic that allows anything to follow from a contradiction. For this, author suggests a paraconsistent logic that does not allow explosion. Once this happens, author claims this theory is consistent with dialetheism.
(3) Teleological Theory
We normally say 'x is true' to prove a point-- we aim at something when we say it. Author claims this is neutral when it comes to dialetheism.
(4) Pragmatist Theory
This theory says that something is true if it 'works', meaning perhaps it is verified in practice. This pragmatism can allow for inconsistent theories-- in fact ones that contain contradictions! Thus dialetheism is acceptable according to this theory as well.
(5) Coherence Theory
This one appears the most difficult, since 'consistency' in a model of truth seems to be immediately valuable. But here the author argues that there might be some virtues of a theory that are greater than consistency, and if so, the coherent theory must allow for an inconsistent but otherwise virtuous theory to be the true one.
(6) Correspondence Theory
Considered the most traditional theory, it says that something is true if it corresponds to reality. How exactly it can 'correspond' is the trouble here. Author sketches 'situational semantics', which is a system of logic that allows for context-specific truth values that might be ultimately contradictory if placed into a larger context, but avoid the difficulty by being contextual. The idea the author wants to avoid is the idea that the correspondence theory has to deal with a world or other maximally consistent set of objects to correspond to, not a smaller subset of things. The problem with this 'situational semantics' is that it allows for 'negative facts', or facts about what is not the case. This flies in the face of traditional correspondence theories like Wittgenstein's or Russell, since correspondence theories intuitively correspond to what is, not what isn't. But author argues that this is an arbitrary distinction.
4/6/07
Koenigs, Michael et al - Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments
04/06/2007
Nature, 03/27/2007
This is a short study done by moral psychologists who studied subjects with Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, a part of the brain that is considered important for executing emotional responses and also encoding the emotional value of sensory stimuli. There has been previous work done that connects emotions to moral judgments, but it is unclear whether this is cause, effect, or correlational. This study tries to show that the emotive value of certain situations exerts influence on the moral judgments most non-VMPC damaged subjects.
In this study three groups were examined: VMPC subjects, other brain damaged subjects whose damage isn't considered to be relevant to emotion generation or moral judgments, and non-brain damaged subjects. Each group was given a number of circumstances with questions at the end of them with yes/no answers attached. Some of the scenarios were non-moral in nature, and two sets were moral. Of the moral, some were judged (by an independent group of non-damaged subjects) to be more or less 'emotionally salient', corresponding to 'personal' and 'impersonal' divisions.
The hypothesis is: If emotions have a role in influencing moral judgments, those who have difficulty generating emotions (VMPC) will not have their moral judgments influenced.
In the testing, the VMPC subjects were more apt to judge the personal and impersonal moral scenarios equally, or at least far more equally, than the other groups. Thus there is an absence of a 'personal/impersonal' distinction in VMPC subjects. The ability to apply explicit rules of max/min in moral scenarios is still retained by VMPC subjects (pg 3, top right side), suggesting that these judgments are 'utilitarian'.
Wade, Nicholas - Scientists Finds the Beginnings of Morality in Primate Behavior, New York Times, 03/20/2007
This is a popular article that talks about primatologists, biologists and so on finding elementary 'morality' in other animals. The big conflict is between Dr. de Waal, who has recently taken a few tough positions. The one most grand is that human moral decisions derive 'above all' from 'fast, automated, emotional judgments'. De Waal also is in favor of the claim that this is a group-level adaptation, primarily to deal with in-group and out-group situations (e.g. warfare).
The evidence points to the ability of other primates to learn social rules, reciprocity, peacemaking, and their capacity for empathy. The next step is to claim this is the bedrock of moral judgments [see article above this one].
The debate is poorly framed between rationalists and scientists.
Nature, 03/27/2007
This is a short study done by moral psychologists who studied subjects with Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, a part of the brain that is considered important for executing emotional responses and also encoding the emotional value of sensory stimuli. There has been previous work done that connects emotions to moral judgments, but it is unclear whether this is cause, effect, or correlational. This study tries to show that the emotive value of certain situations exerts influence on the moral judgments most non-VMPC damaged subjects.
In this study three groups were examined: VMPC subjects, other brain damaged subjects whose damage isn't considered to be relevant to emotion generation or moral judgments, and non-brain damaged subjects. Each group was given a number of circumstances with questions at the end of them with yes/no answers attached. Some of the scenarios were non-moral in nature, and two sets were moral. Of the moral, some were judged (by an independent group of non-damaged subjects) to be more or less 'emotionally salient', corresponding to 'personal' and 'impersonal' divisions.
The hypothesis is: If emotions have a role in influencing moral judgments, those who have difficulty generating emotions (VMPC) will not have their moral judgments influenced.
In the testing, the VMPC subjects were more apt to judge the personal and impersonal moral scenarios equally, or at least far more equally, than the other groups. Thus there is an absence of a 'personal/impersonal' distinction in VMPC subjects. The ability to apply explicit rules of max/min in moral scenarios is still retained by VMPC subjects (pg 3, top right side), suggesting that these judgments are 'utilitarian'.
Wade, Nicholas - Scientists Finds the Beginnings of Morality in Primate Behavior, New York Times, 03/20/2007
This is a popular article that talks about primatologists, biologists and so on finding elementary 'morality' in other animals. The big conflict is between Dr. de Waal, who has recently taken a few tough positions. The one most grand is that human moral decisions derive 'above all' from 'fast, automated, emotional judgments'. De Waal also is in favor of the claim that this is a group-level adaptation, primarily to deal with in-group and out-group situations (e.g. warfare).
The evidence points to the ability of other primates to learn social rules, reciprocity, peacemaking, and their capacity for empathy. The next step is to claim this is the bedrock of moral judgments [see article above this one].
The debate is poorly framed between rationalists and scientists.
3/30/07
Mosley, Albert - Witchcraft, Science, and the Paranormal in Contemporary African Philosophy
03/30/2007
African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, L. Brown, ed., Oxford University Press, 2004
Author is concerned with the study of the paranormal, and the widespread refusal to countenance it as a legitimate fact in the world by some western philosophers. Author takes some time in enumerating the various supposed occurrences: telepathy, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, and precognition. Author points out that there is some problem in distinguishing these, given the possibility of one or the other. For example, is precognition just subconscious psychokinesis? Is telepathy the same as clairvoyance? Given different manners of describing the same phenomena, it may be possible to reduce these attributes.
The debate about whether such paranormal abilities can be a source of knowledge was taken on by Bodunrin. His claim was that this might be a way to get a belief, but certainly not a justified one. Author first says that this approach conflates being able to justify a belief and having it be justified. A 'knowing how/knowing that' distinction. Further, if you're a reliabilist, then perhaps that belief can be justified, if the relationship between the belief and the paranormal ability is of the kind that tends to produce true beliefs.
The reliabilist position is attacked by Bonjour, who offers various (4) counterexamples, all of which are designed to show that even if paranormal traits could ascertain true beliefs, nobody would be justified in believing them. But in each case, author replies, this is in a culture where nobody believes in the paranormal anyway, so it 'intuitively' seems unjustified to believe in them.
Another problem for the paranormal in the general atmosphere in the west is that most believe all claims about paranormal beliefs have been debunked 'in the laboratory'. Author gives examples of higher-than-chance occurrences that have been produced in the lab. Author also suggests that it might be more useful to study these processes 'in the field', as a field biologist would. (pg 145-6)
Horton argues that the spiritual beliefs in Africa take the place of naturalistic explanations that the west has given over to germs, molecules, and a modern scientific worldview. The rest of the paper is a survey of various different beliefs about the paranormal found in Africa.
African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, L. Brown, ed., Oxford University Press, 2004
Author is concerned with the study of the paranormal, and the widespread refusal to countenance it as a legitimate fact in the world by some western philosophers. Author takes some time in enumerating the various supposed occurrences: telepathy, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, and precognition. Author points out that there is some problem in distinguishing these, given the possibility of one or the other. For example, is precognition just subconscious psychokinesis? Is telepathy the same as clairvoyance? Given different manners of describing the same phenomena, it may be possible to reduce these attributes.
The debate about whether such paranormal abilities can be a source of knowledge was taken on by Bodunrin. His claim was that this might be a way to get a belief, but certainly not a justified one. Author first says that this approach conflates being able to justify a belief and having it be justified. A 'knowing how/knowing that' distinction. Further, if you're a reliabilist, then perhaps that belief can be justified, if the relationship between the belief and the paranormal ability is of the kind that tends to produce true beliefs.
The reliabilist position is attacked by Bonjour, who offers various (4) counterexamples, all of which are designed to show that even if paranormal traits could ascertain true beliefs, nobody would be justified in believing them. But in each case, author replies, this is in a culture where nobody believes in the paranormal anyway, so it 'intuitively' seems unjustified to believe in them.
Another problem for the paranormal in the general atmosphere in the west is that most believe all claims about paranormal beliefs have been debunked 'in the laboratory'. Author gives examples of higher-than-chance occurrences that have been produced in the lab. Author also suggests that it might be more useful to study these processes 'in the field', as a field biologist would. (pg 145-6)
Horton argues that the spiritual beliefs in Africa take the place of naturalistic explanations that the west has given over to germs, molecules, and a modern scientific worldview. The rest of the paper is a survey of various different beliefs about the paranormal found in Africa.
3/23/07
Henig, Robin - Darwin’s God
03/23/2007
New York Times Magazine, March 4, 2007
This is an article about the two sides in the debate about the science of belief, specifically about the possible biological origin of the belief in god and other religiosity. The argument proceeds roughly that belief in spirits, supernatural forces, omnipresent, omniscient or omnipotent is a universal component of human culture. This is prima facie evidence that it has a biological component. To start off, this article misses a few major distinctions at the outset that are important: religion vs. belief in god, and old-time religion vs. modern-day theologically souped-up religions.
The big debate is between 'spandrelists' (Atran) and 'adaptationists' (Wilson). The spandrelists claim that it is a mixture of other adaptive traits that, when working in conjunction, make it very easy to believe in a god. The three main candidates are the aspects of our brains that deal with 'agent detection', 'causal reasoning' and 'theory of mind'.
'Agent Detection' the default assumption is the presence of agency (a creature with beliefs/desires) when dealing with events or things.
'Causal Reasoning' the belief that things happen because of previous causes, rather than at random.
'Theory of Mind' another term used is 'folkpsychology', but it is the intuition that other individuals have beliefs and desires similar to how we do.
The argument is that the conjunction of these adaptive biases 'primes' us to believe in god-- a causal force with agency behind the occurrences in the world. The adaptationists claim that belief in god is itself adaptive. This claim immediately finds objections, since acting religiously (when there is no basis in reality) would likely hurt an individual agent's survival prospects. Yet this view is championed by Wilson, who claims that this might be the best example of group selection. Group selection is an out-of-favor theory that claims that some adaptations can take place at the level of the group, or, perhaps more appropriately, that genetic adaptations that take place across generations of individuals will be responsive to the relative fitness of the group those genes evolved in, not the individual's fitness.
3/16/07
Graukroger, Stephen - Home Alone: Cognitive Solipsism in the Early-Modern Era
03/16/2007
APA Proceedings and Addresses, Vol. 80, No. 2, 2006
Author makes a distinction between cognitive solipsism and epistemological or skeptical solipsism. Cognitive solipsism involves not realizing that there is an external world at all, where it is true of an animal that sensations are presented to it as though they are modification/changes in it's mind. Of course we are using 'mind' loosely here-- it could be just a place were perceptions come together, the 'sensus communis', a medieval hold-over into early modern philosophy where it was assumed the five senses came together to form a full representation.
Author discusses two neurological disorders that pull apart the cognitive and the affective: Capgras syndrome and Cotard syndrome.
Capgras: patient recognizes faces but feels no affective connection, often therefore thinking they are impostors
Cotard: patient doesn't think it lives in the external world, thinking instead it is dead (thinking there is no external world?)
Author's main point is that we might be looking for answers to the skeptical arguments in the wrong place: don't just start with the epistemological, also look at the affective. Author traces this dual approach back to the early moderns, who had a dialectic about the affective aspects of cognitive solipsism.
Once the science of perception developed, thinkers began to shrug off the old aristotelean claim that perception was just taking in resemblance and realized that perception was re-presentations, or representation. But now that we know it is a re-presentation, the threat of skepticism and solipsism arises.
Descartes, claimed that in order for us to be free of cognitive solipsism, we had to have both sensation and conscious judgment, which humans have, but he claimed that animals did not have the judgment part, so they were, for the most part, cognitive solipsists. They see, he thought, 'as we do when our mind is elsewhere'. [Blindsight?] The interesting thing here is that having the judgment capacity to overcome all forms of solipsism is also the feature that gives us our moral agency and personhood. It is that self-reflective capacity that Descartes identifies that unifies our cognitive life and gives us ability to reason morally (pg 70).
Locke claimed instead that perception is just successful sensation, not sensation+judgment. The difficulty here is that personal unification cannot be tied into the perceptual capacity like Descartes did. But Locke is an empiricist-- any moral agency from humans will likely come from experience one way or another.
Diderot enters the picture and realizes that if the empiricist picture is right, then someone with impaired sensation might have impaired moral agency. This was the gist of his Letter on the Blind. Diderot began to try to create a basis for morality based on the senses (pg 72). So here is an example of cognitive solipsism (or a leaning toward it) affecting our affections and moral sensibilities. [But we have two skepticisms!? One about the external world, one about other minds!]
So one of the issues is how we can have morality and ethics once we eliminate the rationalist picture and are empiricist. The other issue is whether skeptical/empirical solipsism represents a sort of bad moral fiber, or someone who is intellectually dishonest with himself.
APA Proceedings and Addresses, Vol. 80, No. 2, 2006
Author makes a distinction between cognitive solipsism and epistemological or skeptical solipsism. Cognitive solipsism involves not realizing that there is an external world at all, where it is true of an animal that sensations are presented to it as though they are modification/changes in it's mind. Of course we are using 'mind' loosely here-- it could be just a place were perceptions come together, the 'sensus communis', a medieval hold-over into early modern philosophy where it was assumed the five senses came together to form a full representation.
Author discusses two neurological disorders that pull apart the cognitive and the affective: Capgras syndrome and Cotard syndrome.
Capgras: patient recognizes faces but feels no affective connection, often therefore thinking they are impostors
Cotard: patient doesn't think it lives in the external world, thinking instead it is dead (thinking there is no external world?)
Author's main point is that we might be looking for answers to the skeptical arguments in the wrong place: don't just start with the epistemological, also look at the affective. Author traces this dual approach back to the early moderns, who had a dialectic about the affective aspects of cognitive solipsism.
Once the science of perception developed, thinkers began to shrug off the old aristotelean claim that perception was just taking in resemblance and realized that perception was re-presentations, or representation. But now that we know it is a re-presentation, the threat of skepticism and solipsism arises.
Descartes, claimed that in order for us to be free of cognitive solipsism, we had to have both sensation and conscious judgment, which humans have, but he claimed that animals did not have the judgment part, so they were, for the most part, cognitive solipsists. They see, he thought, 'as we do when our mind is elsewhere'. [Blindsight?] The interesting thing here is that having the judgment capacity to overcome all forms of solipsism is also the feature that gives us our moral agency and personhood. It is that self-reflective capacity that Descartes identifies that unifies our cognitive life and gives us ability to reason morally (pg 70).
Locke claimed instead that perception is just successful sensation, not sensation+judgment. The difficulty here is that personal unification cannot be tied into the perceptual capacity like Descartes did. But Locke is an empiricist-- any moral agency from humans will likely come from experience one way or another.
Diderot enters the picture and realizes that if the empiricist picture is right, then someone with impaired sensation might have impaired moral agency. This was the gist of his Letter on the Blind. Diderot began to try to create a basis for morality based on the senses (pg 72). So here is an example of cognitive solipsism (or a leaning toward it) affecting our affections and moral sensibilities. [But we have two skepticisms!? One about the external world, one about other minds!]
So one of the issues is how we can have morality and ethics once we eliminate the rationalist picture and are empiricist. The other issue is whether skeptical/empirical solipsism represents a sort of bad moral fiber, or someone who is intellectually dishonest with himself.
3/9/07
Wolf-Devine, Celia - Preferential Policies Have Become Toxic
03/09/2007
Cohen and Wellman, eds., "Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics," Blackwell, 2005
Author's major struggle is against Albert Mosley and 'preferential' or 'strong' affirmative action. This can be contrasted to 'procedural' affirmative action, where members of the targeted groups are encouraged to apply and receive fair consideration for jobs. Author claims that preferential affirmative action is in play when you get a 'yes' answer to the following question: "If another black person had applied whose credentials matched those of the rejected white candidate, would that person have gotten the job over the black candidate who was in fact chosen?"
The author sets the stage about the difficulty in discussing this issue. Calling it 'politics of inclusion' is misleading because the job market is a zero-sum game-- one is included, necessarily the other is excluded. Furthermore, there is an entanglement of race and sex in these policies, author spends some discussion to try to distinguish that many of the arguments for race don't work for sex (women).
Author evaluates the various affirmative action arguments:
1) Compensatory argument
2) Corrective argument
3) Consequentialist argument
1) Compensatory: one party has harmed another, that other need to recover damages. There could be material damages, or cultural damage.
First considered is material damage. This argument is hard to apply to entry-level workers, most of whom are born in 1970-1980, and therefore missed much of the overtly racist Jim Crow and other overt racial institutions. Also, it is hard to claim in the specific instance of one white person turned down, a black person hired, whether that one white person ever had the advantages and that one black person had the disadvantages. Also, there is a difficult moral question of whether an innocent, unaware beneficiary of an unjust action is obliged to give the advantage back. Author also objects to "projecting moral intuitions that concern one-on-one interactions onto a large and complex society".
Next is cultural damage. Well, whatever the black culture is, it is tough to say that it is 'worse' than white culture. Second, if you claim that your culture makes you disabled for a certain job, why is it reasonable that you should have it?
Two final problems with the compensatory project:
Origin problem: 'you can't blame your mother', because if it weren't for her, you wouldn't have been born. If we hadn't brought you over, you would have had to immigrate.
Completion problem: 'when are we over with this'? without a good answer (which author thinks there is none) you'll have 'endless turf war'. Mosley assumes proportional representation is fair, but author denies this due to the fact that you may never have that, for cultural reasons.
2) Corrective: stop the existing bias in hiring practices. Author replies to the argument that there are existing biases against blacks in the hiring process. Author concedes there could be some shown bias and that would allow for corrective action. But when applied on a grand scale, bias is assumed, not shown.
3) Consequentialist arguments are 2:
A) Role Models: we need blacks as role models. Author: you already have them; and you don't need the 'mixed message' of affirmative action.
B) Diversity and representation: diversity is good! Author: not all diversity is good, and don't assume that more black means more diversity. About representation, author claims that people just represent themselves, not anything else, so this argument has a false premise.
Positive account
Author argues that we should instead focus on programs to elevate the poor from the cycle of poverty, and this would disproportionally help blacks, since the poor are disproportionately black. Author also claims that affirmative action has led to more black drop-outs and failed lawyer/doctor exams. Author ultimately claims that she wants racial categories eliminated, as opposed to Mosley, who wants to preserve them.
Cohen and Wellman, eds., "Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics," Blackwell, 2005
Author's major struggle is against Albert Mosley and 'preferential' or 'strong' affirmative action. This can be contrasted to 'procedural' affirmative action, where members of the targeted groups are encouraged to apply and receive fair consideration for jobs. Author claims that preferential affirmative action is in play when you get a 'yes' answer to the following question: "If another black person had applied whose credentials matched those of the rejected white candidate, would that person have gotten the job over the black candidate who was in fact chosen?"
The author sets the stage about the difficulty in discussing this issue. Calling it 'politics of inclusion' is misleading because the job market is a zero-sum game-- one is included, necessarily the other is excluded. Furthermore, there is an entanglement of race and sex in these policies, author spends some discussion to try to distinguish that many of the arguments for race don't work for sex (women).
Author evaluates the various affirmative action arguments:
1) Compensatory argument
2) Corrective argument
3) Consequentialist argument
1) Compensatory: one party has harmed another, that other need to recover damages. There could be material damages, or cultural damage.
First considered is material damage. This argument is hard to apply to entry-level workers, most of whom are born in 1970-1980, and therefore missed much of the overtly racist Jim Crow and other overt racial institutions. Also, it is hard to claim in the specific instance of one white person turned down, a black person hired, whether that one white person ever had the advantages and that one black person had the disadvantages. Also, there is a difficult moral question of whether an innocent, unaware beneficiary of an unjust action is obliged to give the advantage back. Author also objects to "projecting moral intuitions that concern one-on-one interactions onto a large and complex society".
Next is cultural damage. Well, whatever the black culture is, it is tough to say that it is 'worse' than white culture. Second, if you claim that your culture makes you disabled for a certain job, why is it reasonable that you should have it?
Two final problems with the compensatory project:
Origin problem: 'you can't blame your mother', because if it weren't for her, you wouldn't have been born. If we hadn't brought you over, you would have had to immigrate.
Completion problem: 'when are we over with this'? without a good answer (which author thinks there is none) you'll have 'endless turf war'. Mosley assumes proportional representation is fair, but author denies this due to the fact that you may never have that, for cultural reasons.
2) Corrective: stop the existing bias in hiring practices. Author replies to the argument that there are existing biases against blacks in the hiring process. Author concedes there could be some shown bias and that would allow for corrective action. But when applied on a grand scale, bias is assumed, not shown.
3) Consequentialist arguments are 2:
A) Role Models: we need blacks as role models. Author: you already have them; and you don't need the 'mixed message' of affirmative action.
B) Diversity and representation: diversity is good! Author: not all diversity is good, and don't assume that more black means more diversity. About representation, author claims that people just represent themselves, not anything else, so this argument has a false premise.
Positive account
Author argues that we should instead focus on programs to elevate the poor from the cycle of poverty, and this would disproportionally help blacks, since the poor are disproportionately black. Author also claims that affirmative action has led to more black drop-outs and failed lawyer/doctor exams. Author ultimately claims that she wants racial categories eliminated, as opposed to Mosley, who wants to preserve them.
3/2/07
Orr, Allen - A Mission To Convert (book review of The God Delusion)
03/02/2007
The New York Review of Books, Vol. 54 Num 1 January 11, 2007
Author is critiquing Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion as the most ambitious and the most public of the recent publications by biologists and philosophers in the area of the science of evolution as it relates to religion and the belief that a creator is necessary for the explanation of life.
Dawkins, author argues, has written a fantastic book in The Selfish Gene, but The God Delusion is much less. The major issue from author is that Dawkins doesn't really engage with some of the intricate reasoning from theology. Author claims Dawkins can't distinguish 'unitarians from abortion clinic bombers'.
Dawkins presents 'the ultimate argument' against creationism that is couched in non-deistic terms: Intelligent Design demands an intelligent designer, but the designer needs to be more complicated than the design. Therefore the designer needs to have been designed by an even more intelligent designer, thus an infinite regress. Of course infinite regress might be avoided by a 'brute fact' of an earlier designer. Any claim that stipulating a brute fact is unscientific should have to account for the 'brute fact' of 'matter' and 'laws of nature', author claims.
Dawkins also makes an empirical claim; that religion has made our world worse, not better. He cites crime rates, persecution, terrorism, and the closing of children's minds, etc. Most of the evidence, author claims, is anecdotal. Author replies that most of the history of the 20th century has been an experiment in institutional atheism and has shed a lot of blood. Author also argues that religion is worse compared to what. Most of our value/moral and aesthetic judgments come from a society that is deeply shaped by Judeo/Christian teachings, so this is a problem of circularity. Dawkins' ethical claim looks a lot like Mill's Harm Principle, which, author argues, wouldn't be the ideal in a traditional Confusion culture, which would suppress individualism.
Author's final argument is that Dawkins is making a big stink over a particular part of history that pitted the church against Darwinism and science. Believers might have said 'so what?' and we wouldn't see this conflict as important. Of course saying they have nothing to do with each other is over-simplistic, but Dawkins is also over-simplistic with his book.
Daniel Dennett replies to Orr in 'The God Delusion' Letter to the Editors, The New York Review of Books, Vol. 54 Num 3 March 1, 2007.
Orr replies, and Dennet replies again on a Blog.
The New York Review of Books, Vol. 54 Num 1 January 11, 2007
Author is critiquing Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion as the most ambitious and the most public of the recent publications by biologists and philosophers in the area of the science of evolution as it relates to religion and the belief that a creator is necessary for the explanation of life.
Dawkins, author argues, has written a fantastic book in The Selfish Gene, but The God Delusion is much less. The major issue from author is that Dawkins doesn't really engage with some of the intricate reasoning from theology. Author claims Dawkins can't distinguish 'unitarians from abortion clinic bombers'.
Dawkins presents 'the ultimate argument' against creationism that is couched in non-deistic terms: Intelligent Design demands an intelligent designer, but the designer needs to be more complicated than the design. Therefore the designer needs to have been designed by an even more intelligent designer, thus an infinite regress. Of course infinite regress might be avoided by a 'brute fact' of an earlier designer. Any claim that stipulating a brute fact is unscientific should have to account for the 'brute fact' of 'matter' and 'laws of nature', author claims.
Dawkins also makes an empirical claim; that religion has made our world worse, not better. He cites crime rates, persecution, terrorism, and the closing of children's minds, etc. Most of the evidence, author claims, is anecdotal. Author replies that most of the history of the 20th century has been an experiment in institutional atheism and has shed a lot of blood. Author also argues that religion is worse compared to what. Most of our value/moral and aesthetic judgments come from a society that is deeply shaped by Judeo/Christian teachings, so this is a problem of circularity. Dawkins' ethical claim looks a lot like Mill's Harm Principle, which, author argues, wouldn't be the ideal in a traditional Confusion culture, which would suppress individualism.
Author's final argument is that Dawkins is making a big stink over a particular part of history that pitted the church against Darwinism and science. Believers might have said 'so what?' and we wouldn't see this conflict as important. Of course saying they have nothing to do with each other is over-simplistic, but Dawkins is also over-simplistic with his book.
Daniel Dennett replies to Orr in 'The God Delusion' Letter to the Editors, The New York Review of Books, Vol. 54 Num 3 March 1, 2007.
Orr replies, and Dennet replies again on a Blog.
2/23/07
Hitchcock, Christopher - Conceptual Analysis Naturalized: A Metaphilosophical Case Study
02/23/2007
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 103, #9 Sep 2006
Author distinguishes between conceptual analysis that tries to find necessary and sufficient conditions of concepts, and a conceptual analysis that tries to locate the 'theoretical role' of a concept-- that is, tries identify its role 'in facilitating inferences of various kinds'. Author claims that this second task of conceptual analysis can be informed by empirical studies in psychology and elsewhere. He uses an example of causation as his 'case study' of how the studies in psychology will bear on philosophy.
Section I
Gives a survey of the theories of causation:
1. Regularity theories- causation just is constant conjunction (Hume)
2. Mechanical theories- causation is the transfer of a substance or concept (energy, momentum, etc.)
3. Manipulability theories- casual knowledge comes from our ability to affect the world
4. Counterfactual theories- if not for p, no q e.g. counterfactual dependence and so on
Section II
This section provides the basis for the usefulness of an analysis of a concept using it's theoretical role. While this kind of analysis doesn't provide us with a solid explanation of the concept, it will give a deeper understanding because it helps us understand when the concept is appropriately applied.
Section III
Psychology about causation: it appears primates/chimps have trouble with simple tasks where a robust concept of causation might be necessary, but children around the age of 3-4 don't have the same trouble. These studies seem scattered. From them, author tries to construct a 3-part theory of causal reasoning:
1) full causal understanding, where knowledge gained from watching others manipulate can be applied to regularities/machinations in the world
3) Egoistic causal understanding, where the agent can use causal forces only when it is done personally, by the agent himself-- only using manipulation
2) Social causal understanding, where the agent's understanding of causal forces may be influenced by what other creatures do, but may not be able to see the mechanistic causal factors.
The key claim here is that the different proposals for analysis of causality in section I are considered to be modes, or modalities, and chimps are seen as understanding the modality of regularity and possibly manipulation, but perhaps not of mechanical causation. The author uses the different accounts of causation to construct possible theoretical explanations for the scientific data. Thus conceptual analysis of the concept of causation is brought into the empirical realm of theory-- conceptual analysis 'naturalized'. Author also argues that psychology can help philosophy.
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 103, #9 Sep 2006
Author distinguishes between conceptual analysis that tries to find necessary and sufficient conditions of concepts, and a conceptual analysis that tries to locate the 'theoretical role' of a concept-- that is, tries identify its role 'in facilitating inferences of various kinds'. Author claims that this second task of conceptual analysis can be informed by empirical studies in psychology and elsewhere. He uses an example of causation as his 'case study' of how the studies in psychology will bear on philosophy.
Section I
Gives a survey of the theories of causation:
1. Regularity theories- causation just is constant conjunction (Hume)
2. Mechanical theories- causation is the transfer of a substance or concept (energy, momentum, etc.)
3. Manipulability theories- casual knowledge comes from our ability to affect the world
4. Counterfactual theories- if not for p, no q e.g. counterfactual dependence and so on
Section II
This section provides the basis for the usefulness of an analysis of a concept using it's theoretical role. While this kind of analysis doesn't provide us with a solid explanation of the concept, it will give a deeper understanding because it helps us understand when the concept is appropriately applied.
Section III
Psychology about causation: it appears primates/chimps have trouble with simple tasks where a robust concept of causation might be necessary, but children around the age of 3-4 don't have the same trouble. These studies seem scattered. From them, author tries to construct a 3-part theory of causal reasoning:
1) full causal understanding, where knowledge gained from watching others manipulate can be applied to regularities/machinations in the world
3) Egoistic causal understanding, where the agent can use causal forces only when it is done personally, by the agent himself-- only using manipulation
2) Social causal understanding, where the agent's understanding of causal forces may be influenced by what other creatures do, but may not be able to see the mechanistic causal factors.
The key claim here is that the different proposals for analysis of causality in section I are considered to be modes, or modalities, and chimps are seen as understanding the modality of regularity and possibly manipulation, but perhaps not of mechanical causation. The author uses the different accounts of causation to construct possible theoretical explanations for the scientific data. Thus conceptual analysis of the concept of causation is brought into the empirical realm of theory-- conceptual analysis 'naturalized'. Author also argues that psychology can help philosophy.
2/16/07
Darwall, Stephen - Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics
02/16/2007
Nous, Vol 27 Issue 4 (1993)
Author sets about mostly an interpretative goal: to understand what Hume's conception of justice is and how it fits with the rest of his theory. There seem to be difficulties with a straight-forward reading due to some of Hume's commitments:
1) Justice is commonly established, artificial obligations made by social agreement and practice
2) Only characteristics and motives are deserving of moral approbation/disapprobation. Actions don't qualify!
3) The Will aims at some good or the avoidance of some evil
The difficulty is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts, except that obligation comes from the Will, and the Will aims at goods, and no acts are good! (motives are good/bad, not acts).
Hume conceives of Obligation as coming from natural obligation (self-interest) and moral obligation (the sentiment of approbation).
Author explains Hume's conception of justice as mostly about property rights, promises, proper transfer agreements, etc. This is a convention/common agreement social practice, artificially created so that society can function. Hume writes in the Treatise that it is through our natural obligation of self-interest that we adopt the rules of justice, since we see that it is ultimately best for us to have our property respected, and therefore to respect others'. But Hume eventually acknowledges that you can have many particular instances where it isn't in our considered, long-term self-interest to act justly.
The problem with this acknowledgement is that now we have to look for another source for the obligation for justice. It isn't natural obligation, so it must be a moral obligation. But the moral obligations require an internally good motive to give approbation to, and what is this in the case of justice? This is a problem, since Hume's conception of justice/equity is that it is socially constructed rules.
The answer, author suggests, is to take the internally good motive to be the motive of rule-regulation itself. Therefore we praise equitable persons because of their Will to be obliged by rule-regulation.
The only problem with this interpretation is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts (not to have equitable motives). Author suggests Hume was confused in these passages.
Nous, Vol 27 Issue 4 (1993)
Author sets about mostly an interpretative goal: to understand what Hume's conception of justice is and how it fits with the rest of his theory. There seem to be difficulties with a straight-forward reading due to some of Hume's commitments:
1) Justice is commonly established, artificial obligations made by social agreement and practice
2) Only characteristics and motives are deserving of moral approbation/disapprobation. Actions don't qualify!
3) The Will aims at some good or the avoidance of some evil
The difficulty is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts, except that obligation comes from the Will, and the Will aims at goods, and no acts are good! (motives are good/bad, not acts).
Hume conceives of Obligation as coming from natural obligation (self-interest) and moral obligation (the sentiment of approbation).
Author explains Hume's conception of justice as mostly about property rights, promises, proper transfer agreements, etc. This is a convention/common agreement social practice, artificially created so that society can function. Hume writes in the Treatise that it is through our natural obligation of self-interest that we adopt the rules of justice, since we see that it is ultimately best for us to have our property respected, and therefore to respect others'. But Hume eventually acknowledges that you can have many particular instances where it isn't in our considered, long-term self-interest to act justly.
The problem with this acknowledgement is that now we have to look for another source for the obligation for justice. It isn't natural obligation, so it must be a moral obligation. But the moral obligations require an internally good motive to give approbation to, and what is this in the case of justice? This is a problem, since Hume's conception of justice/equity is that it is socially constructed rules.
The answer, author suggests, is to take the internally good motive to be the motive of rule-regulation itself. Therefore we praise equitable persons because of their Will to be obliged by rule-regulation.
The only problem with this interpretation is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts (not to have equitable motives). Author suggests Hume was confused in these passages.
2/9/07
Shriver, Adam - Minding Mammals
02/09/2007
Philosophical Psychology Vol 19 No 4 August 2006
Author mainly replies to one major objection in the ethics of humane treatment of animals. Proponents of treating animals as worthy of moral consideration often takes an 'analogy' argument: some animals are similar to us in the relevant ways, we deserve moral consideration, therefore animals do. First of all, for this to work with the prima facia badness of 'pain', we need to use a vaguely utilitarian model, not (probably) in a Kantian deontological model. The next problem is about how similar we want to get. This becomes difficult when dealing with 'pain', since there are varieties of pain-like responses that all sorts of animals display, but we don't want to give them moral consideration. (pg 435) A more sophisticaed objection is that it isn't just 'pain' that is prima facie morally bad, but pain that is attended to as unpleasantly painful. This might seem redundant but there are common psychological phenomena of dissociation between a painful feeling and an unpleasant feeling. For instance morphine users may report feeling pain but not 'minding' it. (Dennett points out how this is trouble for our folk conception of qualia)
Author uses science to reply. Recent work on pain pathways have found at least two, one 'lateral' and one 'medial'. The theory is that the lateral plays the part of reporting on a pain-like feeling (pain) and the medial, using the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), reports the unpleasantness of pain (suffering). Crudely, a distinction between pain and suffering. Data from various experiments are held to support this higher-level theory. Mammals have both pathways, therefore strengthening the argument by analogy. These two pathways are probably absent in birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish since those species lack neocortices, but there might be some sort of analogue we might discover.
The ACC also gets excited at a variety of times, example: social exclusion, human mothers hearing a baby cry, at the expectation of pain. Suffering without physical pain.
Author finally considers other skeptical arguments that animals aren't worthy of moral consideration because they don't have 'higher-order' conscisousness (Carruthers, Tye). This is not relevant.
Philosophical Psychology Vol 19 No 4 August 2006
Author mainly replies to one major objection in the ethics of humane treatment of animals. Proponents of treating animals as worthy of moral consideration often takes an 'analogy' argument: some animals are similar to us in the relevant ways, we deserve moral consideration, therefore animals do. First of all, for this to work with the prima facia badness of 'pain', we need to use a vaguely utilitarian model, not (probably) in a Kantian deontological model. The next problem is about how similar we want to get. This becomes difficult when dealing with 'pain', since there are varieties of pain-like responses that all sorts of animals display, but we don't want to give them moral consideration. (pg 435) A more sophisticaed objection is that it isn't just 'pain' that is prima facie morally bad, but pain that is attended to as unpleasantly painful. This might seem redundant but there are common psychological phenomena of dissociation between a painful feeling and an unpleasant feeling. For instance morphine users may report feeling pain but not 'minding' it. (Dennett points out how this is trouble for our folk conception of qualia)
Author uses science to reply. Recent work on pain pathways have found at least two, one 'lateral' and one 'medial'. The theory is that the lateral plays the part of reporting on a pain-like feeling (pain) and the medial, using the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), reports the unpleasantness of pain (suffering). Crudely, a distinction between pain and suffering. Data from various experiments are held to support this higher-level theory. Mammals have both pathways, therefore strengthening the argument by analogy. These two pathways are probably absent in birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish since those species lack neocortices, but there might be some sort of analogue we might discover.
The ACC also gets excited at a variety of times, example: social exclusion, human mothers hearing a baby cry, at the expectation of pain. Suffering without physical pain.
Author finally considers other skeptical arguments that animals aren't worthy of moral consideration because they don't have 'higher-order' conscisousness (Carruthers, Tye). This is not relevant.
2/2/07
White, Morton - Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology, And Quine's Holism
02/02/2007
The Philosophy of WV Quine, Hehn & Schlipp eds, 1986
Terribly written paper. Addressed toward Quine, but not exactly-- trying to convince him of something-- but clunky.
Author's main point is that if Quine allows for normative epistemology, he should also allow for normative ethics.
Author tries to incorporate a positive account of ethics and fit it into Quine's holism. Quine's holism includes the following: if a set of theory and observation sentences lead to an expectation for observation A and you get observation not-A (recalcitrant data), it is open about which sentence to revise/scrap. This employed just scientific theories and observation sentences. Author wants to add another dimension: feelings. A scientist can get a recalcitrant feeling about accepting a hypothesis-- even if the evidence is for it. This she should adjust, since if she didn't, she wouldn't be following a normative epistemology to adjust belief to evidence and theory. But if we add 'feelings', then a moral agent needs to adjust her normative beliefs, or the facts in the situation in order to avoid a recalcitrant feeling.
Quine replies to White after the paper, saying that observation sentences should command nearly universal acceptance if true, whereas sentences of moral evaluation will not, since they depend on a lot of outside information that not all the witnesses will have.
The Philosophy of WV Quine, Hehn & Schlipp eds, 1986
Terribly written paper. Addressed toward Quine, but not exactly-- trying to convince him of something-- but clunky.
Author's main point is that if Quine allows for normative epistemology, he should also allow for normative ethics.
Author tries to incorporate a positive account of ethics and fit it into Quine's holism. Quine's holism includes the following: if a set of theory and observation sentences lead to an expectation for observation A and you get observation not-A (recalcitrant data), it is open about which sentence to revise/scrap. This employed just scientific theories and observation sentences. Author wants to add another dimension: feelings. A scientist can get a recalcitrant feeling about accepting a hypothesis-- even if the evidence is for it. This she should adjust, since if she didn't, she wouldn't be following a normative epistemology to adjust belief to evidence and theory. But if we add 'feelings', then a moral agent needs to adjust her normative beliefs, or the facts in the situation in order to avoid a recalcitrant feeling.
Quine replies to White after the paper, saying that observation sentences should command nearly universal acceptance if true, whereas sentences of moral evaluation will not, since they depend on a lot of outside information that not all the witnesses will have.
1/26/07
Quine, Willard Van Orman - On the Nature of Moral Values
01/26/2007
Values and Morals, Goldman & Kim eds 1978
Author discusses the two parts of action: belief and desire. Discusses moral training as coming to associate positive ends with positive means-- that is, 'transmutation of means into ends'.
Author cannot pinpoint actual 'moral values' but instead discusses two more easily identified ones: Altruistic values and Ceremonial values. Altruistic means being satisfied when someone else is, and Ceremonial means attaching value to the practices of one's social/societal group.
Author considers 'moral sentiment' to be based from sympathy for one's fellow man.
[Interesting paper: worth re-reading and this is a sub-standard summary]
Values and Morals, Goldman & Kim eds 1978
Author discusses the two parts of action: belief and desire. Discusses moral training as coming to associate positive ends with positive means-- that is, 'transmutation of means into ends'.
Author cannot pinpoint actual 'moral values' but instead discusses two more easily identified ones: Altruistic values and Ceremonial values. Altruistic means being satisfied when someone else is, and Ceremonial means attaching value to the practices of one's social/societal group.
Author considers 'moral sentiment' to be based from sympathy for one's fellow man.
[Interesting paper: worth re-reading and this is a sub-standard summary]
1/19/07
Frankfurt, Harry - On Truth
01/19/2007
Alfred Knopf, New York 2006
This is a short book of 100 pages, really light in philosophy with big type-face and wide margins. Author introduces by talking about his assumption in his "On Bullshit" book-- the assumption was that truth was good. Now he is backing up that truth is, well, good.
I- Author describes the inestimable practical value of true facts in the conduct of business, social, technical, medical, engineering and other matter. He briefly confronts two 'postmodern' replies, one is that there is no objective reality, or another that we only call those things as true those that are the subject to a constraint (perhaps socially constructed) we have from economic, political, etc. forces. Author rejects this as too 'glib' and obtuse and refers to engineers, architects and physicians-- there may be many different methods that will work, but many more that simply will not. Thus the opposite of falsity is needed, at least. He admits this may constrain objectivity in the social sciences, history.
II- Even if normative claims are neither true nor false, at least they must have a basis in the factual-- in what things someone did or didn't do-- in order to make the judgments in the first place. This is what being reasonable is about-- being responsive to reasons that are facts.
III- Description of Spinoza's account of loving truth, you cannot help but love it. Things that help you find yourself, discover yourself, and make you grow, expand your capabilities, etc, are what you cannot help but love.
IV- Why is truth so good? We need to cope with reality in order to make our way. We need to know some of the properties of reality so that we can adjust ourselves accordingly. We can feel at home when we are confident we know the truth about something. Ignorance leaves us in the dark, to 'mindless groping' (pg61).
V- We are rational beings-- we need truth in order for our rationality to be meaningful (pg65) because we need facts to be responsive to.
VI-VII Lying separates you from the truth, and since we all dwell in reality (the true), then you are being separated from reality, you are being isolated. We also don't like lying because, if we don't detect it, we are undercutting our confidence in find the truth after all.
VIII- Shakespeare talks of pleasant lies that make us feel better but we know to be lies in a sonnet (pg87). If you can do this, go for it.
IX- We need the truth because we wouldn't know our limitations, our abilities, or much about the world. We wouldn't be able to find ourselves!
Alfred Knopf, New York 2006
This is a short book of 100 pages, really light in philosophy with big type-face and wide margins. Author introduces by talking about his assumption in his "On Bullshit" book-- the assumption was that truth was good. Now he is backing up that truth is, well, good.
I- Author describes the inestimable practical value of true facts in the conduct of business, social, technical, medical, engineering and other matter. He briefly confronts two 'postmodern' replies, one is that there is no objective reality, or another that we only call those things as true those that are the subject to a constraint (perhaps socially constructed) we have from economic, political, etc. forces. Author rejects this as too 'glib' and obtuse and refers to engineers, architects and physicians-- there may be many different methods that will work, but many more that simply will not. Thus the opposite of falsity is needed, at least. He admits this may constrain objectivity in the social sciences, history.
II- Even if normative claims are neither true nor false, at least they must have a basis in the factual-- in what things someone did or didn't do-- in order to make the judgments in the first place. This is what being reasonable is about-- being responsive to reasons that are facts.
III- Description of Spinoza's account of loving truth, you cannot help but love it. Things that help you find yourself, discover yourself, and make you grow, expand your capabilities, etc, are what you cannot help but love.
IV- Why is truth so good? We need to cope with reality in order to make our way. We need to know some of the properties of reality so that we can adjust ourselves accordingly. We can feel at home when we are confident we know the truth about something. Ignorance leaves us in the dark, to 'mindless groping' (pg61).
V- We are rational beings-- we need truth in order for our rationality to be meaningful (pg65) because we need facts to be responsive to.
VI-VII Lying separates you from the truth, and since we all dwell in reality (the true), then you are being separated from reality, you are being isolated. We also don't like lying because, if we don't detect it, we are undercutting our confidence in find the truth after all.
VIII- Shakespeare talks of pleasant lies that make us feel better but we know to be lies in a sonnet (pg87). If you can do this, go for it.
IX- We need the truth because we wouldn't know our limitations, our abilities, or much about the world. We wouldn't be able to find ourselves!
1/12/07
Quine, Willard Van Orman - Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist
01/12/2007
Future Pasts, Floyd & Shieh eds., Oxford Univ Press
Author introduces himself as an extensionalist. He defines what coextensive means for various parts of speech:
-2 Closed Sentences: coextensive if both true or both false
-2 Predicates/General Terms/Open Sentences: coextensive if true of just the same objects or sequences of objects
-2 Singular Terms: coextensive if they designate the same object
An expression is extensional if replacing one of its parts with a coextensive part preserves truth.
Two main problems for extensionalism:
1) intentional claims about beliefs with more than one mode of presentation.
2) Using a term for fictitious objects like 'pegasus', then using 'flies if existent' and 'flies and exists', using existence as a property. The two predicates are coextensive, but one is true and the other false. Author fixes this problem by translating 'flies if existent' to 'exists, then flies', which is false too.
Author talks of the problem of Principia Mathematica was to use "Propositional Functions", which led back to properties and intentions rather than individuated extensional items. The other issue was 'material implication', which got seriously confused in Principia Mathematica by using 'p implies q' to suggest 'p entails q'. This leads to confusion because it can seem as though 'p entails q' is a necessary truth between p and q, which author refuses.
The first problem of extensionalism is intentions-- 'Tully' and 'Cicero'. If we mention, not use, the sentence 'Cicero denounced Catiline' in the sentence 'Tom believes "...". Then since the sentence 'Cicero...' is mentioned, you cannot substitute into it.
This is 'semantic ascent', which can be very useful. "The quoted sentence is the ascriber's expression of what he would be prompted to assert if he were in the state of mind in which he takes the subject to be." This has no internal component, just external 'assent', etc.
Later, in the meeting, a big complaint of semantic assent was the lack of translation (into other languages, for instance)-- you need meanings for this.
Future Pasts, Floyd & Shieh eds., Oxford Univ Press
Author introduces himself as an extensionalist. He defines what coextensive means for various parts of speech:
-2 Closed Sentences: coextensive if both true or both false
-2 Predicates/General Terms/Open Sentences: coextensive if true of just the same objects or sequences of objects
-2 Singular Terms: coextensive if they designate the same object
An expression is extensional if replacing one of its parts with a coextensive part preserves truth.
Two main problems for extensionalism:
1) intentional claims about beliefs with more than one mode of presentation.
2) Using a term for fictitious objects like 'pegasus', then using 'flies if existent' and 'flies and exists', using existence as a property. The two predicates are coextensive, but one is true and the other false. Author fixes this problem by translating 'flies if existent' to 'exists, then flies', which is false too.
Author talks of the problem of Principia Mathematica was to use "Propositional Functions", which led back to properties and intentions rather than individuated extensional items. The other issue was 'material implication', which got seriously confused in Principia Mathematica by using 'p implies q' to suggest 'p entails q'. This leads to confusion because it can seem as though 'p entails q' is a necessary truth between p and q, which author refuses.
The first problem of extensionalism is intentions-- 'Tully' and 'Cicero'. If we mention, not use, the sentence 'Cicero denounced Catiline' in the sentence 'Tom believes "...". Then since the sentence 'Cicero...' is mentioned, you cannot substitute into it.
This is 'semantic ascent', which can be very useful. "The quoted sentence is the ascriber's expression of what he would be prompted to assert if he were in the state of mind in which he takes the subject to be." This has no internal component, just external 'assent', etc.
Later, in the meeting, a big complaint of semantic assent was the lack of translation (into other languages, for instance)-- you need meanings for this.
1/5/07
Buss, Sarah - Needs (Someone Else's), Projects (My Own), and Reasons
01/05/2007
Journal of Philosophy August 2006
Note: In this paper much of the academic argument against Susan Wolf, Harry Frankfurt, Shelly Kagan, and Bernard Williams is done in the footnotes, along with much more contentious argumentation.
Author begins by noting that she could have picked an occupation that was more 'helpful'. 'Helpful' is undefined, other than something that does more to help those in need. She contrasts this on a very personal level, with her choice of philosophy. She immediately claims that any profession she chose would provide the same level of personal satisfaction, thereby dispelling any 'tradeoff' between being helpful and being happy. She concludes that there are very minor, 'messy' reasons for her choice of a 'relatively unhelpful' profession.
Author doesn't believe her only reason is to be moral, or to subsume all her needs/desires for others. But given the prima facie truth that she has good reason to help another in pressing need, doesn't she have good reason to change her commitments so that she does help others in pressing need? The main point is that she is asking for justification for her current commitments that are relatively unhelpful. [Justification calls for reason-giving and standards-holding-- what if, on this level of structuring commitments, there are no substantive reasons, only structural ones?]
Author examines other possible replies to there is a good reason to be helpful. First is that there is no strong reason to help those in pressing need, or that this strong reason is overridden easily by one's own needs, whatever they may be, because of some special status they have by virtue of being mine. This argument tends to assume there is a contrast between a 'subjective' and 'objective' reasoning, and that there should be some special bridge ('why be moral?') that one has to cross in order to go from the subjective to the objective form of reasoning, and that there is no good reason to do that. Author tries to stay away from this talk of 'subjective' and 'objective' by framing everything in the subjective.
What doesn't work 1: 'There is normative force behind our commitments because they are what we favor.' Author: this doesn't answer our question, since we are asking what we think gives us reasons to do, what interests we find reason-giving for action. And surely being helpful to those in need is reason-giving. [not if we do not rationally decide on what we favor-- what if what we favor is arbitrarily defined, then repeated, then reinforced?]
What doesn't work 2: 'Our commitments make us who we are in a substantive way. To alter them is to abandon oneself, and to question them may be unintelligible.' Author: people can radically change. Offering 'I am what I am' is a cop-out since it doesn't account for the ability to rationally question the justification of what you are. Author: I am a living thing, and then I have commitments. I have reason enough to go on living, and from there to make commitments. If I abandon my commitments, I am still a living thing (the grounds for living aren't gone), so I can form new commitments. (Weird arguments going on pgs 386-387-- this part involves a supposed 'transcendental argument' made on 387 and footnoted in footnote 30. The transcendental argument goes as follows: 'since I believe that life is worth living, I have good reason to make commitments in my life.' Contrast this to: 'It is the commitments in my life that make it worth living.'
What doesn't work 3: 'There is inherent value in variety.' (Wolf?) Author: get over yourself.
What doesn't work 4: There is no over-arching standard by which various commitments can be held up and scrutinized. Just about any commitment is ok. Author: (391) Just because there is no final, ultimate criterion doesn't give us license just to chose willy-nilly. There are reasoned choices to be made, relative weights to be measured, and some will be better than others, even though there is no final scale. Sometimes we can pick the relative merit of some commitments vs others, even if sometimes we can't. Also, the above argument now justifies evil commitments!
Author: beware the trick of our own desires. They are reason-giving, but not especially reason-giving for me just because I happen to have them. The things we rational agents need in order to start to examine our commitments is magnanimity and forgiveness (400). [This could be possibly the weirdest ending to a strong paper.]
Journal of Philosophy August 2006
Note: In this paper much of the academic argument against Susan Wolf, Harry Frankfurt, Shelly Kagan, and Bernard Williams is done in the footnotes, along with much more contentious argumentation.
Author begins by noting that she could have picked an occupation that was more 'helpful'. 'Helpful' is undefined, other than something that does more to help those in need. She contrasts this on a very personal level, with her choice of philosophy. She immediately claims that any profession she chose would provide the same level of personal satisfaction, thereby dispelling any 'tradeoff' between being helpful and being happy. She concludes that there are very minor, 'messy' reasons for her choice of a 'relatively unhelpful' profession.
Author doesn't believe her only reason is to be moral, or to subsume all her needs/desires for others. But given the prima facie truth that she has good reason to help another in pressing need, doesn't she have good reason to change her commitments so that she does help others in pressing need? The main point is that she is asking for justification for her current commitments that are relatively unhelpful. [Justification calls for reason-giving and standards-holding-- what if, on this level of structuring commitments, there are no substantive reasons, only structural ones?]
Author examines other possible replies to there is a good reason to be helpful. First is that there is no strong reason to help those in pressing need, or that this strong reason is overridden easily by one's own needs, whatever they may be, because of some special status they have by virtue of being mine. This argument tends to assume there is a contrast between a 'subjective' and 'objective' reasoning, and that there should be some special bridge ('why be moral?') that one has to cross in order to go from the subjective to the objective form of reasoning, and that there is no good reason to do that. Author tries to stay away from this talk of 'subjective' and 'objective' by framing everything in the subjective.
What doesn't work 1: 'There is normative force behind our commitments because they are what we favor.' Author: this doesn't answer our question, since we are asking what we think gives us reasons to do, what interests we find reason-giving for action. And surely being helpful to those in need is reason-giving. [not if we do not rationally decide on what we favor-- what if what we favor is arbitrarily defined, then repeated, then reinforced?]
What doesn't work 2: 'Our commitments make us who we are in a substantive way. To alter them is to abandon oneself, and to question them may be unintelligible.' Author: people can radically change. Offering 'I am what I am' is a cop-out since it doesn't account for the ability to rationally question the justification of what you are. Author: I am a living thing, and then I have commitments. I have reason enough to go on living, and from there to make commitments. If I abandon my commitments, I am still a living thing (the grounds for living aren't gone), so I can form new commitments. (Weird arguments going on pgs 386-387-- this part involves a supposed 'transcendental argument' made on 387 and footnoted in footnote 30. The transcendental argument goes as follows: 'since I believe that life is worth living, I have good reason to make commitments in my life.' Contrast this to: 'It is the commitments in my life that make it worth living.'
What doesn't work 3: 'There is inherent value in variety.' (Wolf?) Author: get over yourself.
What doesn't work 4: There is no over-arching standard by which various commitments can be held up and scrutinized. Just about any commitment is ok. Author: (391) Just because there is no final, ultimate criterion doesn't give us license just to chose willy-nilly. There are reasoned choices to be made, relative weights to be measured, and some will be better than others, even though there is no final scale. Sometimes we can pick the relative merit of some commitments vs others, even if sometimes we can't. Also, the above argument now justifies evil commitments!
Author: beware the trick of our own desires. They are reason-giving, but not especially reason-giving for me just because I happen to have them. The things we rational agents need in order to start to examine our commitments is magnanimity and forgiveness (400). [This could be possibly the weirdest ending to a strong paper.]
12/15/06
Fodor, Jerry - What is Universally Quantified and Necessary and A Posteriori and It Flies South in the Winter?
12/15/2006
Presidential Address
The Jerry Fodor Over-used Latin Glossary:
Mutatis Mutandis: 'with the necessary changes having been made'
Ipso Facto: 'by the fact itself'
A Fortiori: 'from the stronger reason'
Ceteris Paribus: 'all else being equal'
Inter Alia: 'among other things'
Author begins with a review of the 'baptismal' account of fixing the names of natural kinds terms; fixing the referents for names.
1, the word 'water' lacks descriptive content.
2, baptism occurs when the speaker has the intention to name something. The flow of explanation goes from the mental state to the linguistic expression. The way author indicates it goes is as follows: "Let's call this kind of stuff: 'water'.".
3, the name 'water' is a rigid designator for possible worlds (modality), designating the same kind of stuff in all worlds where it exists at all.
Author claims that you need the modal to get necessary a posteriori facts. The modal is underwritten by the baptismal account of naming, since this account of naming designates rigidly and doesn't seek to describe the kind it designates, just designates the kind as 'water'.
Author then claims that the baptism intention can't match up to rigid designation. There are some possibilities:
1. You need the concept of water before you baptize that stuff as 'water'. Author likes this, but nobody else does. This still falls short, because you have to let people know that you're using the concept WATER when you're baptizing water as 'water', so you have to have 'water' be in the language prior to baptizing it as 'water'. Nobody likes this outcome. But as a solution, you have to baptize a natural kind using a representation that doesn't involve a concept. See next...
2. You try to say "this kind of stuff is 'water'." This uses a demonstrative, not a concept to baptize. The new problem, author points out, is that nobody really knows what you're pointing out when you say 'this kind of stuff'. Do you mean the stuff granny uses for brushing teeth? Do you mean the kind of stuff that fills a glass? Each token refers to multiple kinds.
Author considers various 'NP-- Not-Pooh' fixes to this problem and rejects them. He closes with a 'deeper problem' in trying to secure nomological necessity with semantic necessity.
Presidential Address
The Jerry Fodor Over-used Latin Glossary:
Mutatis Mutandis: 'with the necessary changes having been made'
Ipso Facto: 'by the fact itself'
A Fortiori: 'from the stronger reason'
Ceteris Paribus: 'all else being equal'
Inter Alia: 'among other things'
Author begins with a review of the 'baptismal' account of fixing the names of natural kinds terms; fixing the referents for names.
1, the word 'water' lacks descriptive content.
2, baptism occurs when the speaker has the intention to name something. The flow of explanation goes from the mental state to the linguistic expression. The way author indicates it goes is as follows: "Let's call this kind of stuff: 'water'.".
3, the name 'water' is a rigid designator for possible worlds (modality), designating the same kind of stuff in all worlds where it exists at all.
Author claims that you need the modal to get necessary a posteriori facts. The modal is underwritten by the baptismal account of naming, since this account of naming designates rigidly and doesn't seek to describe the kind it designates, just designates the kind as 'water'.
Author then claims that the baptism intention can't match up to rigid designation. There are some possibilities:
1. You need the concept of water before you baptize that stuff as 'water'. Author likes this, but nobody else does. This still falls short, because you have to let people know that you're using the concept WATER when you're baptizing water as 'water', so you have to have 'water' be in the language prior to baptizing it as 'water'. Nobody likes this outcome. But as a solution, you have to baptize a natural kind using a representation that doesn't involve a concept. See next...
2. You try to say "this kind of stuff is 'water'." This uses a demonstrative, not a concept to baptize. The new problem, author points out, is that nobody really knows what you're pointing out when you say 'this kind of stuff'. Do you mean the stuff granny uses for brushing teeth? Do you mean the kind of stuff that fills a glass? Each token refers to multiple kinds.
Author considers various 'NP-- Not-Pooh' fixes to this problem and rejects them. He closes with a 'deeper problem' in trying to secure nomological necessity with semantic necessity.
12/8/06
Kim, Jaegwon - The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn
12/08/2006
The Future of Philosophy, Brian Leiter, editor. 2004
Author begins with claming that physicalism is close enough to the right answer, and better than substance dualism and property dualism.
Substance dualism: the idea that Cartesian minds of a different substance can act causally on the physical plain cannot be supported. Causation needs spatial relations, or relational properties that can be laid out in space. Space, at least, is the thing that allows us to 'pair' causes with their effects. Author argues that since cartesian minds are non-spatial, we have no possibility of pairing them with spatially allocated items. There is also way that we can think of for non-spatial objects to cause and effect each other, let alone spatial objects.
Property dualism: most famous version of 'nonreductive materialism'. Beliefs, desires, feelings and so on cannot be reduced to the physical. They play a causal role. But how, author questions? Brings same arguments to bear, since now we're wondering how beliefs and desires move our physical bodies to do anything at all.
"If mentality is to have any causal efficacy at all-- it must be physically reducible" pg 138.
Mental Residue: Inverted qualia is a genuine possibility. Author concedes that the nature of qualia might be non-reducible, but also, luckily, causally impotent. The similarities and differences between qualia ought to be causally potent, and also reducible, but the feel and nature of this or that quale cannot be explained.
The subjective is the first-personal aspect of the mind, and is currently incompatible with the reductive program. The cogito 'I exist' is not the same proposition as 'Descartes exists', or 'that man exists', and so on. The special status of this proposition [is it a proposition?] and the privileged access we have to our mentality is lost on reduction, and is different from the mind-body problem, but needs attention. Review pg 149.
The Future of Philosophy, Brian Leiter, editor. 2004
Author begins with claming that physicalism is close enough to the right answer, and better than substance dualism and property dualism.
Substance dualism: the idea that Cartesian minds of a different substance can act causally on the physical plain cannot be supported. Causation needs spatial relations, or relational properties that can be laid out in space. Space, at least, is the thing that allows us to 'pair' causes with their effects. Author argues that since cartesian minds are non-spatial, we have no possibility of pairing them with spatially allocated items. There is also way that we can think of for non-spatial objects to cause and effect each other, let alone spatial objects.
Property dualism: most famous version of 'nonreductive materialism'. Beliefs, desires, feelings and so on cannot be reduced to the physical. They play a causal role. But how, author questions? Brings same arguments to bear, since now we're wondering how beliefs and desires move our physical bodies to do anything at all.
"If mentality is to have any causal efficacy at all-- it must be physically reducible" pg 138.
Mental Residue: Inverted qualia is a genuine possibility. Author concedes that the nature of qualia might be non-reducible, but also, luckily, causally impotent. The similarities and differences between qualia ought to be causally potent, and also reducible, but the feel and nature of this or that quale cannot be explained.
The subjective is the first-personal aspect of the mind, and is currently incompatible with the reductive program. The cogito 'I exist' is not the same proposition as 'Descartes exists', or 'that man exists', and so on. The special status of this proposition [is it a proposition?] and the privileged access we have to our mentality is lost on reduction, and is different from the mind-body problem, but needs attention. Review pg 149.
12/1/06
Stump, Eleonore - Love, By All Accounts
12/01/2006
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA
Author briefly reviews the three general approaches to the nature of love. The responsiveness account, the volitional account, and the relational account. Each has faults:
Responsiveness account: the features possessed by the beloved are also possessed by others, undercutting the non-substitutivity of love. Also love may alter when the intrinsic features of the beloved alter.
Volitional account: the will to love a the beloved could be equally applied to anyone else, for no good reason one way or another. Example: I do love you, but for no good reason.
Relational account: we value a relationship, a history, a connection, ongoing and interactive-- but Dante doesn't satisfy this account, since he loved Beatrice from afar and also had a wife Gemma Donati, who lived in another town (that he made no efforts to be close to). [This 'Dante Argument' is a poor reply to the relational account.]
Author turns to Thomas Acquinas' account of love, which is two-fold:
1) the desire the objective good of the beloved
2) the desire for union with the beloved
To desire the objective good of the beloved: you don't always know what you're desiring, since it is an objective matter what the good of the beloved is. This could mean that you think you love A, but you actually don't.
'Union' isn't well defined in Acquinas, but author argues that it provides for multiple 'offices of love', because different unions are appropriate due to different relational and intrinsic aspects of the beloved and the lover. Ex: friend, lover, parent. It also makes it possible to abuse an office of love by desiring a union that is outside of the appropriate office. Ex: incest, molesting priests
Self-love means you want to be integrated (union) and that you want the best for yourself.
The claim is that this account responds to much of the difficulties earlier found. The lover can list intrinsic/relational aspects of the beloved that fit into an office of love, and the volitional account is satisfied in spirit, since at it's backbone is the desire for the good of another.
Finally, this can give an account of forgiveness as trying to find an appropriate office of love.
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA
Author briefly reviews the three general approaches to the nature of love. The responsiveness account, the volitional account, and the relational account. Each has faults:
Responsiveness account: the features possessed by the beloved are also possessed by others, undercutting the non-substitutivity of love. Also love may alter when the intrinsic features of the beloved alter.
Volitional account: the will to love a the beloved could be equally applied to anyone else, for no good reason one way or another. Example: I do love you, but for no good reason.
Relational account: we value a relationship, a history, a connection, ongoing and interactive-- but Dante doesn't satisfy this account, since he loved Beatrice from afar and also had a wife Gemma Donati, who lived in another town (that he made no efforts to be close to). [This 'Dante Argument' is a poor reply to the relational account.]
Author turns to Thomas Acquinas' account of love, which is two-fold:
1) the desire the objective good of the beloved
2) the desire for union with the beloved
To desire the objective good of the beloved: you don't always know what you're desiring, since it is an objective matter what the good of the beloved is. This could mean that you think you love A, but you actually don't.
'Union' isn't well defined in Acquinas, but author argues that it provides for multiple 'offices of love', because different unions are appropriate due to different relational and intrinsic aspects of the beloved and the lover. Ex: friend, lover, parent. It also makes it possible to abuse an office of love by desiring a union that is outside of the appropriate office. Ex: incest, molesting priests
Self-love means you want to be integrated (union) and that you want the best for yourself.
The claim is that this account responds to much of the difficulties earlier found. The lover can list intrinsic/relational aspects of the beloved that fit into an office of love, and the volitional account is satisfied in spirit, since at it's backbone is the desire for the good of another.
Finally, this can give an account of forgiveness as trying to find an appropriate office of love.
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