Darwall, Stephen - Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics

02/16/2007

Nous, Vol 27 Issue 4 (1993)

Author sets about mostly an interpretative goal: to understand what Hume's conception of justice is and how it fits with the rest of his theory. There seem to be difficulties with a straight-forward reading due to some of Hume's commitments:

1) Justice is commonly established, artificial obligations made by social agreement and practice
2) Only characteristics and motives are deserving of moral approbation/disapprobation. Actions don't qualify!
3) The Will aims at some good or the avoidance of some evil

The difficulty is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts, except that obligation comes from the Will, and the Will aims at goods, and no acts are good! (motives are good/bad, not acts).

Hume conceives of Obligation as coming from natural obligation (self-interest) and moral obligation (the sentiment of approbation).

Author explains Hume's conception of justice as mostly about property rights, promises, proper transfer agreements, etc. This is a convention/common agreement social practice, artificially created so that society can function. Hume writes in the Treatise that it is through our natural obligation of self-interest that we adopt the rules of justice, since we see that it is ultimately best for us to have our property respected, and therefore to respect others'. But Hume eventually acknowledges that you can have many particular instances where it isn't in our considered, long-term self-interest to act justly.

The problem with this acknowledgement is that now we have to look for another source for the obligation for justice. It isn't natural obligation, so it must be a moral obligation. But the moral obligations require an internally good motive to give approbation to, and what is this in the case of justice? This is a problem, since Hume's conception of justice/equity is that it is socially constructed rules.

The answer, author suggests, is to take the internally good motive to be the motive of rule-regulation itself. Therefore we praise equitable persons because of their Will to be obliged by rule-regulation.

The only problem with this interpretation is that Hume often talks about the obligation to do just acts (not to have equitable motives). Author suggests Hume was confused in these passages.