Blackburn, Simon - The Majesty of Reason

2015/07/24

Philosophers of Our Times, Edited by T Honderich, Oxford University Press, 2015

This paper tries to re-establish the use of reason and reasons as mind-dependent and flexible against two "phenomena" in philosophy that have combined reasoning and normativity in enthusiastic but misguided ways.
The first is the notion of the 'externality' of reasons: that they exist independent of agency or, perhaps, that they bear on agents independent of their knowledge of them. The second trouble is the insistence that means-ends reasoning is a normative exercise. Author sees this as a "Trojan horse for inserting rationality into practical life... through the breach in the Humean citadel that it has spearheaded." (pg173-4)

Author starts with a basic understanding of the terms involved: reason isn't a "magical faculty or structure" but is instead relational, a "reason for something" (pg174). The idea here is that reason involves "movement of the mind", going from a first mental state to a second by using reasoning. The strategy is to distinguish between a free association of one thing to another and reasoning from x to y, though "it may be hard to say in what the difference consists" (pg175). Author introduces another distinction, this time between "movements" that an agent accepts or endorses and those the agent doesn't know about or doesn't wish to acknowledge. This might roughly be similar to Gibbard's being in the grip of a norm and merely accepting one (pg175). Author offers some remarks about his use of terms: there must be a genuine cognition for there to be "movements" (of the mind), that we can talk about abstract representations without naming actual agents holding the ideas, and that aims and intentions can figure into reasoning just as much as beliefs do. The conclusion: we commend or endorse certain movements as reasonable, others as not, and yes indeed reasons are available to agents even without their knowledge, to be picked up upon (pg177). But this does not mean that there is no additional step needed after a reason is "apprehended", which author goes on to elaborate.

In section III, author discusses the sense in which reasons are "external"-- that there can be reasons for doing x that the agent does not appreciate or is not moved by. Failure to appreciate such reasons can deserve criticism, a point that was lost on Williams, but author accepts and reiterates (pg177). Author argues, however, that the connection in movements from x to y is based on "the contingent ways we are" (pg178), thus there is nothing gained by an externalist on the point that reasons can be considered external to a particular agent.

For author, good reasoning is a kind of guidance for movement, not "its end-points or its consequences": one can reason correctly that x will result in genocide, and this is good reasoning. There can also be bad reasons for doing y even if there are also good ones, as in the case of giving praise for political reasons rather than from admiration (pg178-9). This point is enmeshed in a general discussion about theoretical and practical reason. The trouble with ethical reasoning is, according to author, that "all we are given are moves within the ethical. We are not provided any independent methodology, or independent underwriting of the ethical as a domain." (pg180). The discussion then moves to questioning why some thinkers (eg Parfit) are given to claim that animals can't respond to reasons while only humans can. This is "pure fantasy", argues author, and gives the example of the identical response from a dog and a human when seeing a snake in the path (pg180-1). It similarly does no good to offer the "pain of irrationality" as a motivation to be guided by reasons.

Author moves to consider the "authority of reason", and generally disagrees with Quinn over the following item: having a pro-attitude toward y doesn't supply a reason x to do y (pg182). With some examples this seems acceptable, but author argues that is in indeed "strange" that being hungry doesn't rationalize eating a piece of pie. This leads to a fruitful discussion about reasoning from desires (pg182-3) and how to fulfill them, and also about justifying beliefs-- on a holistic level. In section VII, author goes on to argue that real philosophical questions (like a conflict between self-interest and justice) seem to wither unnecessarily when the good is identified with the reasonable (pg184-5).

Section VIII of the paper starts to attack the second phenomenon, that of normative guidance in means-ends practical reasoning. Author starts by quoting Kant, whom he claims did not believe that means-ends reasoning was normative in the sense some (wrongly) consider it to be. Author argues that there is no such thing as failing to conform to a "norm of means-ends rationality" (pg186), but instead a variety of related failures: incapability, weakness-of-the-will, and 'being a nuisance'. But the bigger issue is whether there is a norm of means-ends rationalist, and author gets to that next. First, author issues a word of caution regarding using intentions or desires are antecedents in a formulation: the best you should hope for are conditionals (pg186). [Important!] Second, author clarifies around the issue of bedeviling deontic logic and the paradox of the gentle murder (pg187-8). Lastly in this section, there is a clear explanation of the differences between being an efficient or rational means-ends planner and doing good things for good reasons (pg188-9), using Othello's Iago as an example.

The final conclusion is to avoid using the terms "irrational" because of the implication that such found faults are irredeemable.