2015/08/07
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2015
This is a paper that revisits Bernard Williams' discussion of moral luck and compares and contrasts it to Adam Smith's treatment of it. In this case we're talking about the moral luck of outcomes to actions-- how events can twist and turn in non-moral ways and yet influence our judgments about the moral worth of the intention or the actor who set the events in motion. Author first starts with laying out Smith's discussion, particularly focusing on the interesting requirement that third person sympathy is key to Smith's system (pg219).
Another discussion follows about how we have peculiar non-moral attachment to animals or objects that have been involved in a favorable endeavor: like a horse who, through remarkable swimming, saves a Turkish officer. Such a horse should have a kind-of non-moral bond with the officer and we would indeed be surprised if the officer then shot the horse (pg220). This non-moral gratitude or affection to inanimate objects or animals (taken to be non-moral agents) can also be influenced by the outcome-- by fortune. The objects that we might attach special significance to, or negative emotions to, seem to be exemplars of luck, as author discusses the "deodand" (pg221-2). For Smith (and for author), these are straightforward cases where the accidents of history should not color one's judgment. It is during this discussion, that author introduces the word Smith used "piacular", meaning involvement in a bad event and needing a kind of expiation, though not morally guilty. The distinction is that we can perhaps see the object or animal as not any worse or better qua object or animal, but our associations with it are so strong that this is an overriding concern. The moral judgment remains intact, but it may be drowned out by other sentiments (pg223-4).
Author then turns to discuss Williams and his interest in the agent's own self-assessment or attitude (agent-regret) toward her own decisions. Williams starts with the example of Gauguin abandoning his family to pursue the life of a painter-- a change in career. For Williams, this decision is justified only by success or failure criteria: if Gauguin is a poor painter he will be "unjustified with 'nothing to say'". Author disputes this because the agent might have some "quiet satisfaction" or "quiet pride" in taking a path that was heartfelt though a failure (pg226), though this response is complicated by inept or foolish decisions (pg226-7). More interestingly, author casts Williams' focus to be primarily about judging past decisions due to wanting analysis for prospective future decisions (pg227). Author argues that such a focus is unnecessarily narrow and that the first-person perspective has "got in the way" (pg227), since the question of whether your past decision is justified (whatever that means in this context) is open to public inspection and 3rd-person judgment too. Perhaps Williams accepts all this, but, author argues, the judgment heaped on poor decisions where no one suffered (e.g. a lucky positive outcome) does not deserve "reproach" (pg227).
The matter of self-understanding of a past decision is complex, since it involves going back into the state of mind the subject was in, author argues. But such a trip is "wearisome" and "futile" (pg229), if even possible at all. The trouble is that the context of such decisions might be unimaginable now that the passions that were involved in the decision have died out (pg228-9). The natural result, then, is that the external judgment of success or failure (even by the own-lights of the agent) is the "master of the field" (pg229). The conclusion is that if Williams is focused on self-assessment, then it is natural that the epistemic position of external factors will prevail on the judgment. However, using Smith's 3rd-party considerations, we could have the needed tools to separate out good decisions from good outcomes.
Author finishes up by discussing some strategies and distinctions that might be employed to deal with distinguishing cases of moral luck (pg230-1).
7/24/15
Blackburn, Simon - The Majesty of Reason
2015/07/24
Philosophers of Our Times, Edited by T Honderich, Oxford University Press, 2015
This paper tries to re-establish the use of reason and reasons as mind-dependent and flexible against two "phenomena" in philosophy that have combined reasoning and normativity in enthusiastic but misguided ways.
The first is the notion of the 'externality' of reasons: that they exist independent of agency or, perhaps, that they bear on agents independent of their knowledge of them. The second trouble is the insistence that means-ends reasoning is a normative exercise. Author sees this as a "Trojan horse for inserting rationality into practical life... through the breach in the Humean citadel that it has spearheaded." (pg173-4)
Author starts with a basic understanding of the terms involved: reason isn't a "magical faculty or structure" but is instead relational, a "reason for something" (pg174). The idea here is that reason involves "movement of the mind", going from a first mental state to a second by using reasoning. The strategy is to distinguish between a free association of one thing to another and reasoning from x to y, though "it may be hard to say in what the difference consists" (pg175). Author introduces another distinction, this time between "movements" that an agent accepts or endorses and those the agent doesn't know about or doesn't wish to acknowledge. This might roughly be similar to Gibbard's being in the grip of a norm and merely accepting one (pg175). Author offers some remarks about his use of terms: there must be a genuine cognition for there to be "movements" (of the mind), that we can talk about abstract representations without naming actual agents holding the ideas, and that aims and intentions can figure into reasoning just as much as beliefs do. The conclusion: we commend or endorse certain movements as reasonable, others as not, and yes indeed reasons are available to agents even without their knowledge, to be picked up upon (pg177). But this does not mean that there is no additional step needed after a reason is "apprehended", which author goes on to elaborate.
In section III, author discusses the sense in which reasons are "external"-- that there can be reasons for doing x that the agent does not appreciate or is not moved by. Failure to appreciate such reasons can deserve criticism, a point that was lost on Williams, but author accepts and reiterates (pg177). Author argues, however, that the connection in movements from x to y is based on "the contingent ways we are" (pg178), thus there is nothing gained by an externalist on the point that reasons can be considered external to a particular agent.
For author, good reasoning is a kind of guidance for movement, not "its end-points or its consequences": one can reason correctly that x will result in genocide, and this is good reasoning. There can also be bad reasons for doing y even if there are also good ones, as in the case of giving praise for political reasons rather than from admiration (pg178-9). This point is enmeshed in a general discussion about theoretical and practical reason. The trouble with ethical reasoning is, according to author, that "all we are given are moves within the ethical. We are not provided any independent methodology, or independent underwriting of the ethical as a domain." (pg180). The discussion then moves to questioning why some thinkers (eg Parfit) are given to claim that animals can't respond to reasons while only humans can. This is "pure fantasy", argues author, and gives the example of the identical response from a dog and a human when seeing a snake in the path (pg180-1). It similarly does no good to offer the "pain of irrationality" as a motivation to be guided by reasons.
Author moves to consider the "authority of reason", and generally disagrees with Quinn over the following item: having a pro-attitude toward y doesn't supply a reason x to do y (pg182). With some examples this seems acceptable, but author argues that is in indeed "strange" that being hungry doesn't rationalize eating a piece of pie. This leads to a fruitful discussion about reasoning from desires (pg182-3) and how to fulfill them, and also about justifying beliefs-- on a holistic level. In section VII, author goes on to argue that real philosophical questions (like a conflict between self-interest and justice) seem to wither unnecessarily when the good is identified with the reasonable (pg184-5).
Section VIII of the paper starts to attack the second phenomenon, that of normative guidance in means-ends practical reasoning. Author starts by quoting Kant, whom he claims did not believe that means-ends reasoning was normative in the sense some (wrongly) consider it to be. Author argues that there is no such thing as failing to conform to a "norm of means-ends rationality" (pg186), but instead a variety of related failures: incapability, weakness-of-the-will, and 'being a nuisance'. But the bigger issue is whether there is a norm of means-ends rationalist, and author gets to that next. First, author issues a word of caution regarding using intentions or desires are antecedents in a formulation: the best you should hope for are conditionals (pg186). [Important!] Second, author clarifies around the issue of bedeviling deontic logic and the paradox of the gentle murder (pg187-8). Lastly in this section, there is a clear explanation of the differences between being an efficient or rational means-ends planner and doing good things for good reasons (pg188-9), using Othello's Iago as an example.
The final conclusion is to avoid using the terms "irrational" because of the implication that such found faults are irredeemable.
Philosophers of Our Times, Edited by T Honderich, Oxford University Press, 2015
This paper tries to re-establish the use of reason and reasons as mind-dependent and flexible against two "phenomena" in philosophy that have combined reasoning and normativity in enthusiastic but misguided ways.
The first is the notion of the 'externality' of reasons: that they exist independent of agency or, perhaps, that they bear on agents independent of their knowledge of them. The second trouble is the insistence that means-ends reasoning is a normative exercise. Author sees this as a "Trojan horse for inserting rationality into practical life... through the breach in the Humean citadel that it has spearheaded." (pg173-4)
Author starts with a basic understanding of the terms involved: reason isn't a "magical faculty or structure" but is instead relational, a "reason for something" (pg174). The idea here is that reason involves "movement of the mind", going from a first mental state to a second by using reasoning. The strategy is to distinguish between a free association of one thing to another and reasoning from x to y, though "it may be hard to say in what the difference consists" (pg175). Author introduces another distinction, this time between "movements" that an agent accepts or endorses and those the agent doesn't know about or doesn't wish to acknowledge. This might roughly be similar to Gibbard's being in the grip of a norm and merely accepting one (pg175). Author offers some remarks about his use of terms: there must be a genuine cognition for there to be "movements" (of the mind), that we can talk about abstract representations without naming actual agents holding the ideas, and that aims and intentions can figure into reasoning just as much as beliefs do. The conclusion: we commend or endorse certain movements as reasonable, others as not, and yes indeed reasons are available to agents even without their knowledge, to be picked up upon (pg177). But this does not mean that there is no additional step needed after a reason is "apprehended", which author goes on to elaborate.
In section III, author discusses the sense in which reasons are "external"-- that there can be reasons for doing x that the agent does not appreciate or is not moved by. Failure to appreciate such reasons can deserve criticism, a point that was lost on Williams, but author accepts and reiterates (pg177). Author argues, however, that the connection in movements from x to y is based on "the contingent ways we are" (pg178), thus there is nothing gained by an externalist on the point that reasons can be considered external to a particular agent.
For author, good reasoning is a kind of guidance for movement, not "its end-points or its consequences": one can reason correctly that x will result in genocide, and this is good reasoning. There can also be bad reasons for doing y even if there are also good ones, as in the case of giving praise for political reasons rather than from admiration (pg178-9). This point is enmeshed in a general discussion about theoretical and practical reason. The trouble with ethical reasoning is, according to author, that "all we are given are moves within the ethical. We are not provided any independent methodology, or independent underwriting of the ethical as a domain." (pg180). The discussion then moves to questioning why some thinkers (eg Parfit) are given to claim that animals can't respond to reasons while only humans can. This is "pure fantasy", argues author, and gives the example of the identical response from a dog and a human when seeing a snake in the path (pg180-1). It similarly does no good to offer the "pain of irrationality" as a motivation to be guided by reasons.
Author moves to consider the "authority of reason", and generally disagrees with Quinn over the following item: having a pro-attitude toward y doesn't supply a reason x to do y (pg182). With some examples this seems acceptable, but author argues that is in indeed "strange" that being hungry doesn't rationalize eating a piece of pie. This leads to a fruitful discussion about reasoning from desires (pg182-3) and how to fulfill them, and also about justifying beliefs-- on a holistic level. In section VII, author goes on to argue that real philosophical questions (like a conflict between self-interest and justice) seem to wither unnecessarily when the good is identified with the reasonable (pg184-5).
Section VIII of the paper starts to attack the second phenomenon, that of normative guidance in means-ends practical reasoning. Author starts by quoting Kant, whom he claims did not believe that means-ends reasoning was normative in the sense some (wrongly) consider it to be. Author argues that there is no such thing as failing to conform to a "norm of means-ends rationality" (pg186), but instead a variety of related failures: incapability, weakness-of-the-will, and 'being a nuisance'. But the bigger issue is whether there is a norm of means-ends rationalist, and author gets to that next. First, author issues a word of caution regarding using intentions or desires are antecedents in a formulation: the best you should hope for are conditionals (pg186). [Important!] Second, author clarifies around the issue of bedeviling deontic logic and the paradox of the gentle murder (pg187-8). Lastly in this section, there is a clear explanation of the differences between being an efficient or rational means-ends planner and doing good things for good reasons (pg188-9), using Othello's Iago as an example.
The final conclusion is to avoid using the terms "irrational" because of the implication that such found faults are irredeemable.
7/17/15
Putnam, Hilary - Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity
2015/07/17
Journal of American Philosophical Association, 2015
This article is a review of three positions that author holds, that of "liberal naturalism", metaphysical realism, and normative realism. Author first starts with an elucidation of the term "liberal naturalism"; it emerged first from reading Naturalism in Question, edited by De Caro and Macarthur. In that collection, author wrote an essay that attacked Boyd, Casper and Trout's The Philosophy of Science, which had a disjunctive definition of the natural that was too vague to work. The example author used is how to understand Shakespeare's Julius Caesar (the play). Was it "subject to natural laws", and if so, did that capture the "phenomenon"? (pg312-3) The method of resolving this that author prefers is to rely on the naturalism of John Dewey, which does not allow supernatural entities, but also does not reduce ethics and aesthetics to the natural sciences or as meaningless-- a kind of liberal naturalism (pg313). Author also relies on Burge to argue that psychological terms like "representation" do not need reduction to the physical to be empirically valuable or explanatory, and so reduction is dispensable even as a hope. Yet author believes that liberal naturalism covers a broad range of positions, which he does not share, so further refinement is necessary: author is also a metaphysical and normative realist, which he discusses in the next sections.
Author first takes time to distinguish between his criticisms of a particular kind of metaphysical realism from the more broad view, which he has finally come to understand that he holds (on his 80th birthday) (pg213-5). Author quotes his previous lecture and Maudlin's reaction to it: author attacked the idea that there is a mind-independent reality and that an ideal theory of it could be technically false, and Maudlin agreed that this is indeed a feature, not a fault, of 'Metaphysical Realism'. Author has now come to accept that there could be an assertible, warranted, theory that is technically false (pg315-6), and that his attack of it in Realism and Reason was wrong. But "a responsible metaphysical realist needs to say something about what truth is and not simply what it isn't", so author continues to the next section. (pg316)
Author turns to Tarski's contribution to the concept of "True" in a formal language, as applied to a sentence within that language (pg316). In particular, author thinks that Field, in his Tarski's Theory of Truth, correctly interpreted Tarski's work as connecting the concepts of reference (or denotation) to truth. Author goes into specific elaboration with a formal language "Bob" and a "meta-Bob", which is "set-theoretically more powerful than Bob" in the way Tarski would need it (pg317), using "Snow is white" as an example sentence. Author takes a good amount of time dealing with the proposed Tarskian link between reference and truth (pg318-320). What comes out of this technical re-creation of the meta-Bob language is author's claim that neither the correspondence nor the deflationary theory of truth are supported by Tarski (pg321-2), though one can easily interpret Tarski as presupposing the deflationary theory. The bottom line is that the concept of true depends on successful reference (pg322).
The discussion now moves to the oddity of possibly understanding a claim about the world to be true but not be about the entities (asteroids or daises or marsupials) referred to (pg323). It does no good to understand a sentence to refer in a causal way-- for instance that I learned about asteroids from a textbook-- since the truth of the matter is dependent on my reference, not the causal connection that put me in the position to assert the truth. In this attack, deflationists need to revise their approach, particularly when it comes to translating sentences between languages (pg323-4), and verificationists are also targeted. The ultimate nemesis is Quine with his theory of radical translation, which author takes on next (pg324-5). The response basically is that Quine misses "a liberal naturalist understanding of what natural-scientific explanations are", and doesn't take seriously "relations between the basic needs and activities of animals and the ecological facts about their environments" (pg325). In other words, we refer to what we perceive, and we happen to perceive in a rather regular physio-psychological manner across languages.
The third position of normative realism is now discussed, but is ultimately given short shrift. Author claims that morality evolves according to human needs and interests, and that Kantian categorical-imperative-like claims (Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other as a stand-in) aren't good foundations for ethics. Instead, they are good tools to use, similar to using utilitarianism as a tool, in recognizing the implications of action (pg326). The final conclusion is liberating: "One can learn from pragmatists and Wittgensteinians and philosophers of so many other kinds without becoming a card-carrying member of any philosophical sect." (pg327)
Journal of American Philosophical Association, 2015
This article is a review of three positions that author holds, that of "liberal naturalism", metaphysical realism, and normative realism. Author first starts with an elucidation of the term "liberal naturalism"; it emerged first from reading Naturalism in Question, edited by De Caro and Macarthur. In that collection, author wrote an essay that attacked Boyd, Casper and Trout's The Philosophy of Science, which had a disjunctive definition of the natural that was too vague to work. The example author used is how to understand Shakespeare's Julius Caesar (the play). Was it "subject to natural laws", and if so, did that capture the "phenomenon"? (pg312-3) The method of resolving this that author prefers is to rely on the naturalism of John Dewey, which does not allow supernatural entities, but also does not reduce ethics and aesthetics to the natural sciences or as meaningless-- a kind of liberal naturalism (pg313). Author also relies on Burge to argue that psychological terms like "representation" do not need reduction to the physical to be empirically valuable or explanatory, and so reduction is dispensable even as a hope. Yet author believes that liberal naturalism covers a broad range of positions, which he does not share, so further refinement is necessary: author is also a metaphysical and normative realist, which he discusses in the next sections.
Author first takes time to distinguish between his criticisms of a particular kind of metaphysical realism from the more broad view, which he has finally come to understand that he holds (on his 80th birthday) (pg213-5). Author quotes his previous lecture and Maudlin's reaction to it: author attacked the idea that there is a mind-independent reality and that an ideal theory of it could be technically false, and Maudlin agreed that this is indeed a feature, not a fault, of 'Metaphysical Realism'. Author has now come to accept that there could be an assertible, warranted, theory that is technically false (pg315-6), and that his attack of it in Realism and Reason was wrong. But "a responsible metaphysical realist needs to say something about what truth is and not simply what it isn't", so author continues to the next section. (pg316)
Author turns to Tarski's contribution to the concept of "True" in a formal language, as applied to a sentence within that language (pg316). In particular, author thinks that Field, in his Tarski's Theory of Truth, correctly interpreted Tarski's work as connecting the concepts of reference (or denotation) to truth. Author goes into specific elaboration with a formal language "Bob" and a "meta-Bob", which is "set-theoretically more powerful than Bob" in the way Tarski would need it (pg317), using "Snow is white" as an example sentence. Author takes a good amount of time dealing with the proposed Tarskian link between reference and truth (pg318-320). What comes out of this technical re-creation of the meta-Bob language is author's claim that neither the correspondence nor the deflationary theory of truth are supported by Tarski (pg321-2), though one can easily interpret Tarski as presupposing the deflationary theory. The bottom line is that the concept of true depends on successful reference (pg322).
The discussion now moves to the oddity of possibly understanding a claim about the world to be true but not be about the entities (asteroids or daises or marsupials) referred to (pg323). It does no good to understand a sentence to refer in a causal way-- for instance that I learned about asteroids from a textbook-- since the truth of the matter is dependent on my reference, not the causal connection that put me in the position to assert the truth. In this attack, deflationists need to revise their approach, particularly when it comes to translating sentences between languages (pg323-4), and verificationists are also targeted. The ultimate nemesis is Quine with his theory of radical translation, which author takes on next (pg324-5). The response basically is that Quine misses "a liberal naturalist understanding of what natural-scientific explanations are", and doesn't take seriously "relations between the basic needs and activities of animals and the ecological facts about their environments" (pg325). In other words, we refer to what we perceive, and we happen to perceive in a rather regular physio-psychological manner across languages.
The third position of normative realism is now discussed, but is ultimately given short shrift. Author claims that morality evolves according to human needs and interests, and that Kantian categorical-imperative-like claims (Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other as a stand-in) aren't good foundations for ethics. Instead, they are good tools to use, similar to using utilitarianism as a tool, in recognizing the implications of action (pg326). The final conclusion is liberating: "One can learn from pragmatists and Wittgensteinians and philosophers of so many other kinds without becoming a card-carrying member of any philosophical sect." (pg327)
7/10/15
Kennedy, Anthony - Obergefell v. Hodges
7/10/2015
No. 14-574, June 26, 2015
This is a SCOTUS decision that overturns various state prohibitions on same-sex marriage. This is undoubtedly going to be summarized more extensively and adroitly elsewhere, so I'll stick to the basic outline.
A. Author briefly discusses the institution of marriage and denies that the petitioners for same-sex marriage are seeking to devalue it. Instead, petitioners would like to take part in its privileges and responsibilities.
B. Marriage has both 'continued and changed' throughout time, most especially recently as women became equal in the marriage and laws against miscegenation were struck down. Such changes to the concept of marriage worked "deep [essential] transformations in its structure". Thus the understanding of marriage is dynamic. Author reviews the changing understanding of homosexuality as well, and then its relation to marriage. The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution is posited to extend to "certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs". While the original ratifiers of the amendment may not have known the "extent of freedom in all of its dimensions... they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning".
III. The right to same-sex marriage starts with the right to marry, protected by the Constitution, for example in Loving v. Virginia, Zablocki v. Redhail, and Turney v. Safley. Author acknowledges that the court assumed these to be opposite-sex marriages, however the "essential attributes of that right [are] based in history, tradition, and other constitutional liberties" that now must be applied to considering a proscription to same-sex marriage. This application uses four "principles and traditions" that demonstrate that "marriage is fundamental" with "equal force" to same-sex couples.
The four principles and traditions:
-Whom to marry is inherent in the "concept of individual autonomy", an "abiding connection between liberty and marriage", and part of the right to privacy.
-The right to marry is "fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals", and is an "intimate association".
-Marriage is a protection for children, and is therefore connected to related rights regarding childrearing, procreation, and education. These rights are protected in the Due Process clause of the Constitution, according to the precedent from Zablocki v Redhail. Author reasons that the rights of children being raised by same-sex couples need protecting by allowing same-sex marriage of the parents-- the rights of the children not to be stigmatized or suffer "significant material losses" mean that marriage for the parents must be possible.
-Marriage is the keystone of the US social order and there is "no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle". Locking same-sex couples out of this "central institution" provided by the states is demeaning.
Author responds to criticism that the right to same-sex marriage is a new right, not the fundamental right to marry. Response: previous cases didn't talk about the right to interracial marriage, just the right to marry in the "comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right". Furthermore, we understand rights do not get their meaning from who had them in the past, but "rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era." Here, the connection between the Constitution and the right to same-sex marriage is given by the author somewhat cryptically: "The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet in some instances each my be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other". Author does go on to show how these two clauses were used sometimes in conjunction in the precedent-building cases of Loving, Zablocki, in multiple cases involving coverture, Eisenstadt, Skinner, and Lawrence.
Roberts delivers the dissent
Roberts' main point is that the court "is not a legislature" and that the right to same-sex marriage isn't in the constitution. "The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage". Thus states can stick to "the historic definition" of marriage, which Roberts argues is between one man and one woman. Roberts separately claims that the court does harm to same-sex couples by "stealing the issue" from them and not letting them convince the minds of their fellow citizens through a democratic process. Roberts argues for judicial restraint, and acknowledges that there is no serious dispute about a right to marry. The real question he asks is for the definition of marriage, and, especially, who decides on that definition.
A. Roberts argues that the term marriage only and forever has referred to one relationship: between one woman and one man. This is not a coincidence but had a background in ensuring children were raised in stable lifelong conditions. Since the US Constitution says nothing about marriage, Roberts argues the states were entrusted with questions of domestic relations, and the reference of the term marriage either "went without saying" or was understood as opposite-sex. Roberts argues that while marriage did change over time, most especially by removing coverture and bans on miscegenation, that didn't do anything to transform the fundamental "core meaning" as Kennedy argues it did.
B. Roberts give some history on the struggle for same-sex marriage in both the courts and the states and agrees with the "carefully reasoned" decision of the Court of Appeals.
II. Roberts attacks the Due Process basis for the decision, particularly the reasoning behind the Four principles and traditions. He argues this a case where the court employed "substantive" Due Process, as it did in Lochner v. New York; Roberts expressly disavows reasoning about Due Process this way and considers it judicial excess. In the pages that follow, Roberts argues that the court should not be in the business of being a kind of super-legislature, being the final arbiter of whether a law was in the public good or not (the "substantive" Due Process reading which allows this kind of error). While Roberts accepts the notion that some fundamental rights can be implied and not enumerated, his real target is the substantive Due Process and judicial excess, quoting, at one point, Kennedy himself urging the same principles (Glucksberg).
B. Roberts then goes through the majority's decision to try to show its weaknesses.
1. First is a discussion of how previous precedent-relevant cases did not change the "core definition" of marriage, as "traditionally defined".
2. Roberts takes the majority to also be arguing that the implied right to privacy links up with the right to marry to support same-sex marriage. Roberts argues there is no such connection and continues to urge for judicial restraint and seems to imply that the procreative purposes of marriage should be an guide to understanding its meaning.
3. Roberts returns to rail against the majority's decision by again comparing it to Lochner v. New York, and calling it "free-wheeling". The judicial excess that Roberts argues the majority has enjoyed is then subject to further questions, most notably: why is it only that two people can be married, under this decision? Why not plural unions?
4. Roberts dissects the majority's argument that same-sex marriage would "pose no risk of harm" to be a matter of moral philosophy, not constitutional law. The argument from the previous section is expanded: if a tradition such as opposite-sex marriage can be overruled by the court, what other social institution could be too?
III. Roberts now discusses the Equal Protection Clause as a basis for the majority decision. Roberts asks for the usual framework that uses means-ends reasoning regarding the laws and the proposed social benefits, and argues it isn't there in the majority's decision. He argues the discussion is "difficult to follow". It is here that Roberts discusses the lack of precision in the decision: he might be inclined to agree if specific harms, like hospital visitation, were being challenged.
IV. To wrap things up, Roberts rails against judicial excess as undercutting the judiciary's fundamental role and the respect it is afforded in the US. Roberts argues that this question should have been decided democratically and the court is a "blunt instrument" for "creating rights". Roberts also opens up the question of the collision of religious practice with this ruling.
Scalia also dissents
Scalia mostly discusses the loss to US democracy by the decision, and the abuse of power the court exercised. Furthermore, Scalia argues that because at the time of ratification of the 14th Amendment (which the majority argues is the basis for the right), marriage was understood as between one woman and one man, this fact alone "resolves these cases". Scalia decries that a decision that should have been legislative was made instead by a non-representative group of judges. Scalia also attacks the reasoning behind using the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, in an unusually sarcastic manner.
Thomas also dissents
Justice Thomas offers (in IIA1-2) a lengthy reconstruction of what the term "liberty" was taken to mean at the crafting of the US Constitution (plus amendments). Under his reading, drawing primarily from Locke, Blackstone, and the Magna Carta, "liberty" as enumerated in the 14th Amendment was taken to be freedom from external imposition on one's body-- a negative liberty. More importantly, Thomas argues that the right to liberty is a natural right, not one granted by the government. This is considered a "freedom from, not freedom to". For Thomas, to use the term liberty not as a shield against government imposition but instead as a sword to acquire new rights is backwards. The idea here is expressed thus: "Petitioners cannot claim, under the most plausible definition of 'liberty', that they have been imprisoned or physically restrained by the States for participating in same-sex relationships" (B). Thomas sees states refusing to grant same-sex marriage as in no way restricting petitioners lives, but instead it's just petitioners asking for government entitlements. Thomas needs to justify striking down anti-miscegenation laws, which he does so because slavery was "invidious" (footnote 5).
Thomas also complains about not settling this argument through a democratic method, and brings up the question of religious practices as well.
IV. Lastly, Thomas argues that while human dignity is innate and important, there is no "dignity clause" in the Constitution and no government law can deprive anyone of their innate dignity. This is where Thomas has to concede, in a weird way, that "Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their humanity) because the government allowed them to be enslaved." The meaning here seems to be that the slaves still had innate dignity, even if it wasn't being recognized due to being enslaved.
Alito also dissents
Alito argues that there is no right to same-sex marriage in the US Constitution (it is left to the States) and that "liberty is a term of many meanings". Alito discusses the traditional understanding of marriage as a way to get at stable procreative relationships. Whether same-sex marriage will undermine that-- or it has already been undermined-- is not a question for the court. It is for the legislature. Alito quotes himself at length from Windsor. Alito finishes by claiming, as did previous dissenters, that the court is doing a grave disservice to its authority and the separation of powers and democracy.
No. 14-574, June 26, 2015
This is a SCOTUS decision that overturns various state prohibitions on same-sex marriage. This is undoubtedly going to be summarized more extensively and adroitly elsewhere, so I'll stick to the basic outline.
A. Author briefly discusses the institution of marriage and denies that the petitioners for same-sex marriage are seeking to devalue it. Instead, petitioners would like to take part in its privileges and responsibilities.
B. Marriage has both 'continued and changed' throughout time, most especially recently as women became equal in the marriage and laws against miscegenation were struck down. Such changes to the concept of marriage worked "deep [essential] transformations in its structure". Thus the understanding of marriage is dynamic. Author reviews the changing understanding of homosexuality as well, and then its relation to marriage. The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution is posited to extend to "certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs". While the original ratifiers of the amendment may not have known the "extent of freedom in all of its dimensions... they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning".
III. The right to same-sex marriage starts with the right to marry, protected by the Constitution, for example in Loving v. Virginia, Zablocki v. Redhail, and Turney v. Safley. Author acknowledges that the court assumed these to be opposite-sex marriages, however the "essential attributes of that right [are] based in history, tradition, and other constitutional liberties" that now must be applied to considering a proscription to same-sex marriage. This application uses four "principles and traditions" that demonstrate that "marriage is fundamental" with "equal force" to same-sex couples.
The four principles and traditions:
-Whom to marry is inherent in the "concept of individual autonomy", an "abiding connection between liberty and marriage", and part of the right to privacy.
-The right to marry is "fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals", and is an "intimate association".
-Marriage is a protection for children, and is therefore connected to related rights regarding childrearing, procreation, and education. These rights are protected in the Due Process clause of the Constitution, according to the precedent from Zablocki v Redhail. Author reasons that the rights of children being raised by same-sex couples need protecting by allowing same-sex marriage of the parents-- the rights of the children not to be stigmatized or suffer "significant material losses" mean that marriage for the parents must be possible.
-Marriage is the keystone of the US social order and there is "no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle". Locking same-sex couples out of this "central institution" provided by the states is demeaning.
Author responds to criticism that the right to same-sex marriage is a new right, not the fundamental right to marry. Response: previous cases didn't talk about the right to interracial marriage, just the right to marry in the "comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right". Furthermore, we understand rights do not get their meaning from who had them in the past, but "rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era." Here, the connection between the Constitution and the right to same-sex marriage is given by the author somewhat cryptically: "The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet in some instances each my be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other". Author does go on to show how these two clauses were used sometimes in conjunction in the precedent-building cases of Loving, Zablocki, in multiple cases involving coverture, Eisenstadt, Skinner, and Lawrence.
Roberts delivers the dissent
Roberts' main point is that the court "is not a legislature" and that the right to same-sex marriage isn't in the constitution. "The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage". Thus states can stick to "the historic definition" of marriage, which Roberts argues is between one man and one woman. Roberts separately claims that the court does harm to same-sex couples by "stealing the issue" from them and not letting them convince the minds of their fellow citizens through a democratic process. Roberts argues for judicial restraint, and acknowledges that there is no serious dispute about a right to marry. The real question he asks is for the definition of marriage, and, especially, who decides on that definition.
A. Roberts argues that the term marriage only and forever has referred to one relationship: between one woman and one man. This is not a coincidence but had a background in ensuring children were raised in stable lifelong conditions. Since the US Constitution says nothing about marriage, Roberts argues the states were entrusted with questions of domestic relations, and the reference of the term marriage either "went without saying" or was understood as opposite-sex. Roberts argues that while marriage did change over time, most especially by removing coverture and bans on miscegenation, that didn't do anything to transform the fundamental "core meaning" as Kennedy argues it did.
B. Roberts give some history on the struggle for same-sex marriage in both the courts and the states and agrees with the "carefully reasoned" decision of the Court of Appeals.
II. Roberts attacks the Due Process basis for the decision, particularly the reasoning behind the Four principles and traditions. He argues this a case where the court employed "substantive" Due Process, as it did in Lochner v. New York; Roberts expressly disavows reasoning about Due Process this way and considers it judicial excess. In the pages that follow, Roberts argues that the court should not be in the business of being a kind of super-legislature, being the final arbiter of whether a law was in the public good or not (the "substantive" Due Process reading which allows this kind of error). While Roberts accepts the notion that some fundamental rights can be implied and not enumerated, his real target is the substantive Due Process and judicial excess, quoting, at one point, Kennedy himself urging the same principles (Glucksberg).
B. Roberts then goes through the majority's decision to try to show its weaknesses.
1. First is a discussion of how previous precedent-relevant cases did not change the "core definition" of marriage, as "traditionally defined".
2. Roberts takes the majority to also be arguing that the implied right to privacy links up with the right to marry to support same-sex marriage. Roberts argues there is no such connection and continues to urge for judicial restraint and seems to imply that the procreative purposes of marriage should be an guide to understanding its meaning.
3. Roberts returns to rail against the majority's decision by again comparing it to Lochner v. New York, and calling it "free-wheeling". The judicial excess that Roberts argues the majority has enjoyed is then subject to further questions, most notably: why is it only that two people can be married, under this decision? Why not plural unions?
4. Roberts dissects the majority's argument that same-sex marriage would "pose no risk of harm" to be a matter of moral philosophy, not constitutional law. The argument from the previous section is expanded: if a tradition such as opposite-sex marriage can be overruled by the court, what other social institution could be too?
III. Roberts now discusses the Equal Protection Clause as a basis for the majority decision. Roberts asks for the usual framework that uses means-ends reasoning regarding the laws and the proposed social benefits, and argues it isn't there in the majority's decision. He argues the discussion is "difficult to follow". It is here that Roberts discusses the lack of precision in the decision: he might be inclined to agree if specific harms, like hospital visitation, were being challenged.
IV. To wrap things up, Roberts rails against judicial excess as undercutting the judiciary's fundamental role and the respect it is afforded in the US. Roberts argues that this question should have been decided democratically and the court is a "blunt instrument" for "creating rights". Roberts also opens up the question of the collision of religious practice with this ruling.
Scalia also dissents
Scalia mostly discusses the loss to US democracy by the decision, and the abuse of power the court exercised. Furthermore, Scalia argues that because at the time of ratification of the 14th Amendment (which the majority argues is the basis for the right), marriage was understood as between one woman and one man, this fact alone "resolves these cases". Scalia decries that a decision that should have been legislative was made instead by a non-representative group of judges. Scalia also attacks the reasoning behind using the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, in an unusually sarcastic manner.
Thomas also dissents
Justice Thomas offers (in IIA1-2) a lengthy reconstruction of what the term "liberty" was taken to mean at the crafting of the US Constitution (plus amendments). Under his reading, drawing primarily from Locke, Blackstone, and the Magna Carta, "liberty" as enumerated in the 14th Amendment was taken to be freedom from external imposition on one's body-- a negative liberty. More importantly, Thomas argues that the right to liberty is a natural right, not one granted by the government. This is considered a "freedom from, not freedom to". For Thomas, to use the term liberty not as a shield against government imposition but instead as a sword to acquire new rights is backwards. The idea here is expressed thus: "Petitioners cannot claim, under the most plausible definition of 'liberty', that they have been imprisoned or physically restrained by the States for participating in same-sex relationships" (B). Thomas sees states refusing to grant same-sex marriage as in no way restricting petitioners lives, but instead it's just petitioners asking for government entitlements. Thomas needs to justify striking down anti-miscegenation laws, which he does so because slavery was "invidious" (footnote 5).
Thomas also complains about not settling this argument through a democratic method, and brings up the question of religious practices as well.
IV. Lastly, Thomas argues that while human dignity is innate and important, there is no "dignity clause" in the Constitution and no government law can deprive anyone of their innate dignity. This is where Thomas has to concede, in a weird way, that "Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their humanity) because the government allowed them to be enslaved." The meaning here seems to be that the slaves still had innate dignity, even if it wasn't being recognized due to being enslaved.
Alito also dissents
Alito argues that there is no right to same-sex marriage in the US Constitution (it is left to the States) and that "liberty is a term of many meanings". Alito discusses the traditional understanding of marriage as a way to get at stable procreative relationships. Whether same-sex marriage will undermine that-- or it has already been undermined-- is not a question for the court. It is for the legislature. Alito quotes himself at length from Windsor. Alito finishes by claiming, as did previous dissenters, that the court is doing a grave disservice to its authority and the separation of powers and democracy.
6/26/15
Feinberg, Joel - The Nature and Value of Rights
2015/06/26
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 1979
This paper might be considered a foundational explanation of what rights are and what it means to have them. Author starts with a thought experiment about a fictional place called "Nowheresville", a place where there are people who live together but have no concept of rights and/or obligations. People there could be considered morally virtuous, filled with compassion, benevolence, sympathy, and pity, but they wouldn't have rights and therefore no claim against another if they were wronged or harmed. This is because, as author goes on to argue, duties toward each other are bound up with the rights we are said to have. On the other hand, there is a second usage of "duty" which allows for a generalized requirement of action, but one that isn't directed for the benefit or due any one particular person (pg143-4). This kind of abstract duty to, perhaps, "the Law", would be allowed in Nowheresville, but it would be, author argues, odd. For instance, if a driver ran a red light and crashed into another, she may have failed her duty, but not toward the other driver she crashed into (since each driver owes the other driver, technically, nothing) (pg144).
The citizens of Nowheresville therefore have both moral virtue (which is generally undefined by author), an abstract duty to the state or law, and even duties created by conscience. Related to this sort of duty are two additional ones, those relating to "personal desert" and "sovereign monopoly of rights". These are interesting, the first one relating to not a right that a musician has for applause, but instead that there is a sort of "fittingness" between actions and desert, or between character traits and rewards (pg145). Author goes on to discuss this kind of desert and our conceptions of it outside of Nowheresville (pg145-6), for instance in the practice of "tipping" and gratuities. The second kind of duty is the "sovereign monopoly of rights", which author analogizes to Hobbes' Levithian (pg146-7). The duty to keep a promise, or to repay debts is owed not to the promisee or to the creditor, but instead to a kind of single sovereign, or (again) an abstract law or god. The role-based duties and obligations (and, perhaps, the rights conferred by being in the role), are necessary for exchange, but they aren't owed to anyone in particular. This is intended to be a counter-intuitive outcome for Nowheresville, and is further analogized with the duties children sometimes take to owe to their parents but not to their siblings (pg147).
The next section of the paper tries to explicate the notion of rights, but admits that a true definition is elusive and must be co-definitional with the concept of "claims against" others, or just "claims" simpliciter (pg148-150). Author distinguishes between asserting a claim, having a claim, and recognizing a claim (pg149-150). Author argues it is the rights, and the claiming against each other, that allows for full dignity and self-respect (pg151), which the citizens of Nowheresville lack. Interestingly, while claims can differ in degree, rights do not (pg152), and also interestingly, there is a way in which someone can have a claim for, or right for X without anyone in particular being under the obligation or duty to provide or perform that X. This might be the case of the right to a decent education, or birth control, in places where no one is in a position to provide such things (pg152-3). Author also takes a stand against McCloskey's conception of rights as "rights to", not "claims against" (pg154). McCloskey seems to find a generalized individual right against all other actors, current and possible, as absurd. Instead, the right inheres to the owner and others are duty-bound to recognize it. Author finds no absurdity in this "vague" generalized claim against the actions of others, so rejects McCloskey's objections.
In the postscript, author clarifies that the citizens of Nowheresville would have rights, but they just wouldn't know it. But further, author suggests that there is something wrong with a world where everyone acts according to their duties and enforces their rights unerringly (pg156). Only with the concept of rights is magnanimity (and, by implication and earlier argument, supererogation) possible, author claims. Finally, some technical issues with rights that one must exercise is clarified, such as, perhaps, the right to an education by someone who isn't mature or educated enough to claim this right for themselves (pg157-8).
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 1979
This paper might be considered a foundational explanation of what rights are and what it means to have them. Author starts with a thought experiment about a fictional place called "Nowheresville", a place where there are people who live together but have no concept of rights and/or obligations. People there could be considered morally virtuous, filled with compassion, benevolence, sympathy, and pity, but they wouldn't have rights and therefore no claim against another if they were wronged or harmed. This is because, as author goes on to argue, duties toward each other are bound up with the rights we are said to have. On the other hand, there is a second usage of "duty" which allows for a generalized requirement of action, but one that isn't directed for the benefit or due any one particular person (pg143-4). This kind of abstract duty to, perhaps, "the Law", would be allowed in Nowheresville, but it would be, author argues, odd. For instance, if a driver ran a red light and crashed into another, she may have failed her duty, but not toward the other driver she crashed into (since each driver owes the other driver, technically, nothing) (pg144).
The citizens of Nowheresville therefore have both moral virtue (which is generally undefined by author), an abstract duty to the state or law, and even duties created by conscience. Related to this sort of duty are two additional ones, those relating to "personal desert" and "sovereign monopoly of rights". These are interesting, the first one relating to not a right that a musician has for applause, but instead that there is a sort of "fittingness" between actions and desert, or between character traits and rewards (pg145). Author goes on to discuss this kind of desert and our conceptions of it outside of Nowheresville (pg145-6), for instance in the practice of "tipping" and gratuities. The second kind of duty is the "sovereign monopoly of rights", which author analogizes to Hobbes' Levithian (pg146-7). The duty to keep a promise, or to repay debts is owed not to the promisee or to the creditor, but instead to a kind of single sovereign, or (again) an abstract law or god. The role-based duties and obligations (and, perhaps, the rights conferred by being in the role), are necessary for exchange, but they aren't owed to anyone in particular. This is intended to be a counter-intuitive outcome for Nowheresville, and is further analogized with the duties children sometimes take to owe to their parents but not to their siblings (pg147).
The next section of the paper tries to explicate the notion of rights, but admits that a true definition is elusive and must be co-definitional with the concept of "claims against" others, or just "claims" simpliciter (pg148-150). Author distinguishes between asserting a claim, having a claim, and recognizing a claim (pg149-150). Author argues it is the rights, and the claiming against each other, that allows for full dignity and self-respect (pg151), which the citizens of Nowheresville lack. Interestingly, while claims can differ in degree, rights do not (pg152), and also interestingly, there is a way in which someone can have a claim for, or right for X without anyone in particular being under the obligation or duty to provide or perform that X. This might be the case of the right to a decent education, or birth control, in places where no one is in a position to provide such things (pg152-3). Author also takes a stand against McCloskey's conception of rights as "rights to", not "claims against" (pg154). McCloskey seems to find a generalized individual right against all other actors, current and possible, as absurd. Instead, the right inheres to the owner and others are duty-bound to recognize it. Author finds no absurdity in this "vague" generalized claim against the actions of others, so rejects McCloskey's objections.
In the postscript, author clarifies that the citizens of Nowheresville would have rights, but they just wouldn't know it. But further, author suggests that there is something wrong with a world where everyone acts according to their duties and enforces their rights unerringly (pg156). Only with the concept of rights is magnanimity (and, by implication and earlier argument, supererogation) possible, author claims. Finally, some technical issues with rights that one must exercise is clarified, such as, perhaps, the right to an education by someone who isn't mature or educated enough to claim this right for themselves (pg157-8).
5/1/15
Audi, Robert - Intuition and Its Place in Ethics
2015/05/01
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol 1 Issue 1 2015
This paper starts with a discussion of how William Ross has been revived by new intuitionist philosophers to try to develop the concept of self-evident moral propositions. The twentieth century featured unresolved struggles in ethics between realists and non-realists and between naturalists and non-naturalists. Ross was a realist non-naturalist talked about how one can "just see" the truth of some moral principles, though the relation between that property or ability and intuition was unclear. Throughout the century further work has been done here, author argues, to underwrite moral ontology and the conception of the self-evident.
Author takes us through different types of "intuition" in the philosophical literature (pg59-61), focusing on a sixth case of intuition being like cognitive perception or apprehension. Are these beliefs (doxastic), or just intellectual "seemings" (episodic), which could lead to a belief but aren't such as of yet? This is a phenomenological question that author explores next, specifically how episodic intuitions can lead to beliefs (pg62-3). One conclusion is that non-inferential "intuitive" beliefs are dispositions to have episodic (seeming) intuitions about the same propositional content, "evoking a sense of non-inferential credibility" (pg63). With this distinction in place, author sheds some light on the differences between how moral philosophers and epistemologists treat intuitions (pg64).
The intuitive and the self-evident have often been associated, and author takes time to discuss self-evident propositions (pg65-6). For author, the self-evident can also be justified through inference, proof, or other method, like an indirect one through intuition. So while self-evidence can become less dogmatic, the trouble then for intuitionists can be skepticism or denial over the truth of intuitive propositions: how does one prove something that is largely self-evident? (pg67) Author distinguishes between being justified in believing self-evident propositions and actually believing them (pg67), arguing that you can understand the proposition in question, therefore have justification in believing it, but fail to believe it. This is a curious outcome, so author considers what could lead to it: thorough skepticism or prior commitment to an alternate theory that denies the proposition (pg68-9). Furthermore, people can disagree in their reasons for believing p, but still both believe p; a higher-order issue is if they disagree "on reasons" (pg69-70). This kicks off a lengthy discussion on reason-giving and self-evidence (pg70-2), where author leaves room-- especially in philosophy-- for congruence on low-level intuition but not on higher-level disagreements on reasons. This discussion intends to leave self-evidence in tact despite rational disagreement. With self-evidence moderately salvaged, intuitionism in ethics is not "significantly worse off than any other major view in moral philosophy" (pg72).
Author goes on to talk about how intuitions could be data for moral reasoning similar to how perceptions are in epistemic contexts (pg73-4), but a crucial difference is that intuitions can be reviewed later and the propositions they are about can be affirmed or denied. As such, intuitions are good cases for being data in the work of moral philosophy.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol 1 Issue 1 2015
This paper starts with a discussion of how William Ross has been revived by new intuitionist philosophers to try to develop the concept of self-evident moral propositions. The twentieth century featured unresolved struggles in ethics between realists and non-realists and between naturalists and non-naturalists. Ross was a realist non-naturalist talked about how one can "just see" the truth of some moral principles, though the relation between that property or ability and intuition was unclear. Throughout the century further work has been done here, author argues, to underwrite moral ontology and the conception of the self-evident.
Author takes us through different types of "intuition" in the philosophical literature (pg59-61), focusing on a sixth case of intuition being like cognitive perception or apprehension. Are these beliefs (doxastic), or just intellectual "seemings" (episodic), which could lead to a belief but aren't such as of yet? This is a phenomenological question that author explores next, specifically how episodic intuitions can lead to beliefs (pg62-3). One conclusion is that non-inferential "intuitive" beliefs are dispositions to have episodic (seeming) intuitions about the same propositional content, "evoking a sense of non-inferential credibility" (pg63). With this distinction in place, author sheds some light on the differences between how moral philosophers and epistemologists treat intuitions (pg64).
The intuitive and the self-evident have often been associated, and author takes time to discuss self-evident propositions (pg65-6). For author, the self-evident can also be justified through inference, proof, or other method, like an indirect one through intuition. So while self-evidence can become less dogmatic, the trouble then for intuitionists can be skepticism or denial over the truth of intuitive propositions: how does one prove something that is largely self-evident? (pg67) Author distinguishes between being justified in believing self-evident propositions and actually believing them (pg67), arguing that you can understand the proposition in question, therefore have justification in believing it, but fail to believe it. This is a curious outcome, so author considers what could lead to it: thorough skepticism or prior commitment to an alternate theory that denies the proposition (pg68-9). Furthermore, people can disagree in their reasons for believing p, but still both believe p; a higher-order issue is if they disagree "on reasons" (pg69-70). This kicks off a lengthy discussion on reason-giving and self-evidence (pg70-2), where author leaves room-- especially in philosophy-- for congruence on low-level intuition but not on higher-level disagreements on reasons. This discussion intends to leave self-evidence in tact despite rational disagreement. With self-evidence moderately salvaged, intuitionism in ethics is not "significantly worse off than any other major view in moral philosophy" (pg72).
Author goes on to talk about how intuitions could be data for moral reasoning similar to how perceptions are in epistemic contexts (pg73-4), but a crucial difference is that intuitions can be reviewed later and the propositions they are about can be affirmed or denied. As such, intuitions are good cases for being data in the work of moral philosophy.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
