2014/11/07
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts with two assumptions from Scheffler and then goes on to discuss the conclusions from them. Author focuses on the first assumption, mainly that:
A. Humans fear death not only because it deprives them of future goods, but also because it "extinguishes" them, making them, individually, extinct.
The problem is that Scheffler also believes that if humans never died, they would be unable to live value-laden lives and therefore fear something (death) about which the alternative isn't valuable. Author elaborates that the fear of extinction (the second reason) can't be an egoistic reason, like the fear of deprivation of future goods is (pg160). Hence, the fear of extinction isn't egoistical, or, rather, there isn't an egoistic reason to avoid extinction (not death, but the element of death that is extinction of the person). Trouble arises if there is a further assumption (by author), that:
I. If something would be in some way bad for one, then one has egoistic reason to avoid it.
The trouble here is that it brings the egoistic fear back into fearing something (extinction) that is not egoistically troubling, something author calls "J" (pg161). The discussion continues through Lucretius, who claims that because the pre-birth conditions of a human aren't troubling for said human, its post-mortem conditions should also be un-troubling. If this is the case, based on the principle of not fearing Y (in the future) if a similar X (in the past) wasn't feared, then Scheffler has a weird conclusion that we should not fear bad futures that are relevantly similar to bad pasts (pg162-3).
The second part of the paper involves the claim from Scheffler that the human wish for immortality is conceptually incoherent because it would destroy their value-laden lives. Author replies that even conceptual incoherence doesn't mean we can't wish for it, or regret that we can't have it (pg164-5). Or, perhaps, humans can at least continually wish for life to last just a bit longer, not necessarily 'forever'. But what is the case to be made that eternal life would be value-less? Author examines Scheffler's three main reasons:
1. Life must involve stages to be valuable. Answer: there can be an infinite number of stages
2. That life must have the risk of loss, injury, and danger to be valuable. Answer: those can still exist even with immortality, or perhaps they would be worse.
3. Temporal scarcity is a necessary condition for valuing. Answer: Scarcity, perhaps. But there are other kinds of scarcity than temporal.
At best, Scheffler's arguments might show that immortal beings wouldn't necessarily have human values (pg168-9).
Lastly, author discusses Scheffler's claims about the limits of egoism. Author believes, contrary to Scheffler, that humans are indeed motivated to see the survival of humanity over their own individual survivals (pg170-1). Author, however, needs to give a special definition of "motivation" where "we would (sincerely, and without needing special argument) see ourselves as having stronger reasons to choose it if given the opportunity." (pg172) In other words, not that a human could make the choice, but that a human would honestly see it as the better one from a rational perspective. Lastly, author suggests that perhaps the concern for the afterlife is, at bottom, egoistic.
11/7/14
Shiffrin, Seana Valentine - Preserving the Valued or Preserving Valuing?
2014/11/07
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author generally agrees with Scheffler's afterlife conjecture in how it gives an non-experientialist account of value and how humans have a limited egoistic self-conception that is deeply social Author wants to explore the conceptual connection between valuing something and wanting it sustained, and also the supposed human "interest in being a part of human history" (pg144).
Author starts with the "conservatism thesis" about preserving what we care about. Author posits that the dismay over losing an afterlife (doomsday) is not the destruction of valuable projects, but the general loss of the human practice of "acting on reasons and of valuing" (pg145). Author plays with the thought that a simple interpretation of the conservatism thesis is not correct, since some valuable things need to end, including our own lives (pg145-6). Thus a more nuanced understanding might be necessary, particularly around understanding the conservation of value as not necessarily temporal (pg147-8), or perhaps that values can change (pg149). The theme of changing values over time is what offers the separation between the conservatism thesis and an explanation for the despair over doomsday: while losing past values to present or future ones can be difficult, it isn't the loss of those values that is dispiriting; instead the problem of doomsday is that valuable things will go away "for no reason or for bad reasons" (pg151), which is an alternative explanation to the despair over doomsday (pg151-4).
The second portion of the paper talks about the value of being in a human history, or, perhaps, just in a history of rational value. If a different species came after humans and they were rational and had values, and "appreciated what we valued and why" (pg155), this seems less troubling to author than doomsday, even if humans were all to die out. Author also describes and explores an asymmetry over humans not being troubled about the lack of value pre-human species, but troubled by the same lack post-human existence (doomsday) (pg156-7). Author uses an example of being created by aliens very recently (but they leave evidence that we had a past, which we eventually discover was false). This example is meant to show that while discovering humans didn't have a rich history is unsettling, it isn't nearly as bad as discovering they don't have a future.
10/24/14
Frankfurt, Harry - How the Afterlife Matters
10/24/2014
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by complimenting Scheffler on an original philosophical thesis, but does not believe that Schffler got the role the afterlife plays "quite right". Firstly, author argues that there are many things that matter to us that are not predicated on an afterlife: Scheffler mentions pleasure, comfort, relief from pain, author adds music and friendship to that list and continues to argue that Scheffler underestimates what we might value independently of an afterlife (pg133-4). Here author argues that the activity, and the conclusion of it, might be worthy pursuits even if there is no future benefit: for instance doing research and trying to find a cure could be worth doing "happily", even though the product may benefit no future person. Author argues that what we might lose is that element of value that is future-oriented, although that might be a good thing, since it would allow us to focus on what value was "intrinsic" rather than instrumental (to a future) (pg135). With this argument, author casts the afterlife as an instrumental value, where future people would benefit (intrinsically) from present work.
The next discussion is speculation about how what we value might change if we had no contemporaries (not future-people, but present people). The idea here is that much of what we care about loses importance when the social element is removed, author concludes that what matters to us "is that there be other people, who are in some way aware of us-- whether those people exist at some point in the future or they exist right now." (pg137). While author grants is that there is a limit to individualism, but he also argues that this does not necessarily limit egoism by implying altruism, or caring about others for their own sake (pg137-8). The extended point is that we care about future humans that share our values, or perhaps if not share them entirely, will appreciate the work done in the past by us for them. Why do we care about this? Author suggests there is an evolutionary reason. Ultimately, author seeks to minimize the significance of Scheffler's conclusion that the elimination of a collective afterlife would diminish our values, much as the elimination of a personal afterlife did not. Lastly, author discusses two elements of Scheffler's work: (1) that it is primarily empirical, resting on conclusions from thought experiments that could be different given data, and (2) that Scheffler's definition of value as being partially believed to be valuable simpliciter, is mistaken. Here he has a quick interesting discussion in what "valuing something" consists (pg140-1).
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by complimenting Scheffler on an original philosophical thesis, but does not believe that Schffler got the role the afterlife plays "quite right". Firstly, author argues that there are many things that matter to us that are not predicated on an afterlife: Scheffler mentions pleasure, comfort, relief from pain, author adds music and friendship to that list and continues to argue that Scheffler underestimates what we might value independently of an afterlife (pg133-4). Here author argues that the activity, and the conclusion of it, might be worthy pursuits even if there is no future benefit: for instance doing research and trying to find a cure could be worth doing "happily", even though the product may benefit no future person. Author argues that what we might lose is that element of value that is future-oriented, although that might be a good thing, since it would allow us to focus on what value was "intrinsic" rather than instrumental (to a future) (pg135). With this argument, author casts the afterlife as an instrumental value, where future people would benefit (intrinsically) from present work.
The next discussion is speculation about how what we value might change if we had no contemporaries (not future-people, but present people). The idea here is that much of what we care about loses importance when the social element is removed, author concludes that what matters to us "is that there be other people, who are in some way aware of us-- whether those people exist at some point in the future or they exist right now." (pg137). While author grants is that there is a limit to individualism, but he also argues that this does not necessarily limit egoism by implying altruism, or caring about others for their own sake (pg137-8). The extended point is that we care about future humans that share our values, or perhaps if not share them entirely, will appreciate the work done in the past by us for them. Why do we care about this? Author suggests there is an evolutionary reason. Ultimately, author seeks to minimize the significance of Scheffler's conclusion that the elimination of a collective afterlife would diminish our values, much as the elimination of a personal afterlife did not. Lastly, author discusses two elements of Scheffler's work: (1) that it is primarily empirical, resting on conclusions from thought experiments that could be different given data, and (2) that Scheffler's definition of value as being partially believed to be valuable simpliciter, is mistaken. Here he has a quick interesting discussion in what "valuing something" consists (pg140-1).
Wolf, Susan - The Significance of Doomsday
10/24/2014
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by acknowledging that "our confidence in the continuation of the human race plays an enormous... role in the way we conceive of our activities and understand their value." (pg113) However, author rightly takes a rather humble approach to 'how we would react' under the doomsday scenario, though also admitting she cannot divest how we should act from how we would (pg114-5). More interestingly, author claims that even rampant hedonists (Mike Tyson or Donald Trump) might easily lose interest in their activities and pursuits, though this could possibly be due instead to the social nature of value (pg116-8).
One obvious point is that when facts about the relevance of goals change, those goals are subject to being re-evaluated (pg118), which Scheffler wants to discount as a suitable explanation to the doomsday scenario. Author argues that it seems unlikely, though possible, that artists and scholars would discontinue their work: after all, many just aspire to make some small contribution to the current generation, without considering the afterlife (pg119-120). Author does spend some time questioning Sheffler's conclusions about the drain of meaning in the doomsday scenario (pg120-2), arguing that the care and comfort of others would not cease to be meaningful. Author shares Sheffler's belief, however, that people in the doomsday scenario would not be happy; the difference is that author does think people would have meaningful lives (pg122-3).
Author revisits the Alvey Singer example, the youngster who claims that homework is unimportant since the universe will explode and destroy humanity one day. The certainty of distant doomsday seems not to be the same as the certainty of immanent doomsday, which is a troubling asymmetry for Scheffler because author believes humans are rational (pg125-6). The commentary ends with author reminding us that the belief in an afterlife should give us renewed vigor to care about the future.
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by acknowledging that "our confidence in the continuation of the human race plays an enormous... role in the way we conceive of our activities and understand their value." (pg113) However, author rightly takes a rather humble approach to 'how we would react' under the doomsday scenario, though also admitting she cannot divest how we should act from how we would (pg114-5). More interestingly, author claims that even rampant hedonists (Mike Tyson or Donald Trump) might easily lose interest in their activities and pursuits, though this could possibly be due instead to the social nature of value (pg116-8).
One obvious point is that when facts about the relevance of goals change, those goals are subject to being re-evaluated (pg118), which Scheffler wants to discount as a suitable explanation to the doomsday scenario. Author argues that it seems unlikely, though possible, that artists and scholars would discontinue their work: after all, many just aspire to make some small contribution to the current generation, without considering the afterlife (pg119-120). Author does spend some time questioning Sheffler's conclusions about the drain of meaning in the doomsday scenario (pg120-2), arguing that the care and comfort of others would not cease to be meaningful. Author shares Sheffler's belief, however, that people in the doomsday scenario would not be happy; the difference is that author does think people would have meaningful lives (pg122-3).
Author revisits the Alvey Singer example, the youngster who claims that homework is unimportant since the universe will explode and destroy humanity one day. The certainty of distant doomsday seems not to be the same as the certainty of immanent doomsday, which is a troubling asymmetry for Scheffler because author believes humans are rational (pg125-6). The commentary ends with author reminding us that the belief in an afterlife should give us renewed vigor to care about the future.
8/22/14
Brink, David - Principles and Intuitions in Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives
2014/08/22
Ethics, Vol 124 No 4 (July 2014)
This paper sets out to revisit the contrast between Mill's moral naturalism and Sidgwick's Intuitionism from the 19th century and see how today's Intuitionism is more akin to Mill's naturalism. Author fist reviews the various historical -isms:
-Intuitionism: 19th and 20th century position that moral knowledge rests on precepts that are self-evident after proper reflection (pg666). Except for Sidgwick, mostof them had deontologist/teleological values.
-Naturalism, in contrast, is harder to define. Author takes an extended discussion about utilitarianism as, in Mill's case, the standard for right conduct, even if it isn't always a guide for action (pg667-8). The guides to action, at least according to Mill, can be "Secondary principles" such as honesty, fidelity, fairness. They may seem instrumental, but author argues Mill saw them as more important than that. These sorts of principles can be established when 1) following them generally leads to optimal results and 2) it can't be reliably determined when following the rule would lead to sub-optimal results (pg668).
When discussing the contrast between Naturalism and Intuitionism, author uses Sidgwick's tripartite discussion of moral judgment: particular actions (perceptual), action types (dogmatic), and, finally principles (philosophical) (pg669-70); Mill focuses on and rejects perceptual and dogmatic. Mill's critique is rooted in denying innate or infallible judgments to moral knowledge: the (dogmatic) acceptance of action types is rooted in their heretofore "acceptance value", which is actually justified by past utility (pg670-1). Mill's strategy here is to subsume intuitionist deontology or values into mid-level moral action types, which then get final justification from the first principle of utility (pg670-1,674). Finally, a general outline of Naturalist moral principles are: fallible, brought out by dialectically, and empirical a posteriori (pg671).
Sidgwick criticizes both perceptual and dogmatic forms of Intuitionism, but ultimately accepts philosophical Intuitionism, claiming that first principles are objects of genuine intuition (pg671-2). So the debate among Sidgwick and Mill comes down to whether first principles are matters of intuition (self-evidential, axiomatic) or some other way of knowing. Author replies that if the first principles are axiomatic, how could one decide which principles to adopt? The possible Naturalistic reply would be: adopt the principles that seem to account for (justify) more type and token moral judgments (pg673-5). This is considered "bottom-up epistemic justification" of "top-down metaphysical dependence"; Sidgwick and Mill both agree that utilitarianism gives the best "fit" for common sense morality.
Author moves on to the more modern day, and claims that the "contemporary heir" to Mill's naturalism about first principles is Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium. Author does not want the considered judgments, when reached during reflective equilibrium, to be considered rational intuitions because they are not innate or infallible (pg676-7). However, Rawls believes the best "fit" is his theory of justice, not utilitarianism. However, the naturalist quest for "fit" of philosophical principles can get complicated by the scope of the project. Should the principles pass a "publicity test", or be psychologically real, or fit with human nature? (pg678-9). Here, author discusses various biases that can enter into the moral judgment and discusses the difficulties with a "broad equilibrium" (pg680).
The next discussion seeks to distinguish the fitting of moral intuitions using Naturalism from Rational Intuitionist commitments. For this, author claims "it might be instructive to look at strands in recent empirical moral psychology". The idea here is that experimental work on moral intuitions uncovers a variety of biases and outcomes that cannot wholeheartedly underwrite moral principles. Instead, author argues, intuitions will have to be taken to be defeasible, or fallible, which will make a new Intuitionism look more like Naturalism. Author discusses Cass Sunstein's use of moral heuristics which are prone to error in tough cases, Jonathan Haidt's empirical work about supposed recalcitrant intuitions, and Kahneman & Tversky's work with the effects of framing on moral questions (pg681-691).
Ethics, Vol 124 No 4 (July 2014)
This paper sets out to revisit the contrast between Mill's moral naturalism and Sidgwick's Intuitionism from the 19th century and see how today's Intuitionism is more akin to Mill's naturalism. Author fist reviews the various historical -isms:
-Intuitionism: 19th and 20th century position that moral knowledge rests on precepts that are self-evident after proper reflection (pg666). Except for Sidgwick, mostof them had deontologist/teleological values.
-Naturalism, in contrast, is harder to define. Author takes an extended discussion about utilitarianism as, in Mill's case, the standard for right conduct, even if it isn't always a guide for action (pg667-8). The guides to action, at least according to Mill, can be "Secondary principles" such as honesty, fidelity, fairness. They may seem instrumental, but author argues Mill saw them as more important than that. These sorts of principles can be established when 1) following them generally leads to optimal results and 2) it can't be reliably determined when following the rule would lead to sub-optimal results (pg668).
When discussing the contrast between Naturalism and Intuitionism, author uses Sidgwick's tripartite discussion of moral judgment: particular actions (perceptual), action types (dogmatic), and, finally principles (philosophical) (pg669-70); Mill focuses on and rejects perceptual and dogmatic. Mill's critique is rooted in denying innate or infallible judgments to moral knowledge: the (dogmatic) acceptance of action types is rooted in their heretofore "acceptance value", which is actually justified by past utility (pg670-1). Mill's strategy here is to subsume intuitionist deontology or values into mid-level moral action types, which then get final justification from the first principle of utility (pg670-1,674). Finally, a general outline of Naturalist moral principles are: fallible, brought out by dialectically, and empirical a posteriori (pg671).
Sidgwick criticizes both perceptual and dogmatic forms of Intuitionism, but ultimately accepts philosophical Intuitionism, claiming that first principles are objects of genuine intuition (pg671-2). So the debate among Sidgwick and Mill comes down to whether first principles are matters of intuition (self-evidential, axiomatic) or some other way of knowing. Author replies that if the first principles are axiomatic, how could one decide which principles to adopt? The possible Naturalistic reply would be: adopt the principles that seem to account for (justify) more type and token moral judgments (pg673-5). This is considered "bottom-up epistemic justification" of "top-down metaphysical dependence"; Sidgwick and Mill both agree that utilitarianism gives the best "fit" for common sense morality.
Author moves on to the more modern day, and claims that the "contemporary heir" to Mill's naturalism about first principles is Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium. Author does not want the considered judgments, when reached during reflective equilibrium, to be considered rational intuitions because they are not innate or infallible (pg676-7). However, Rawls believes the best "fit" is his theory of justice, not utilitarianism. However, the naturalist quest for "fit" of philosophical principles can get complicated by the scope of the project. Should the principles pass a "publicity test", or be psychologically real, or fit with human nature? (pg678-9). Here, author discusses various biases that can enter into the moral judgment and discusses the difficulties with a "broad equilibrium" (pg680).
The next discussion seeks to distinguish the fitting of moral intuitions using Naturalism from Rational Intuitionist commitments. For this, author claims "it might be instructive to look at strands in recent empirical moral psychology". The idea here is that experimental work on moral intuitions uncovers a variety of biases and outcomes that cannot wholeheartedly underwrite moral principles. Instead, author argues, intuitions will have to be taken to be defeasible, or fallible, which will make a new Intuitionism look more like Naturalism. Author discusses Cass Sunstein's use of moral heuristics which are prone to error in tough cases, Jonathan Haidt's empirical work about supposed recalcitrant intuitions, and Kahneman & Tversky's work with the effects of framing on moral questions (pg681-691).
6/20/14
Aune, Bruce - On An Argument by Castañeda
2014/06/19
Unpublished Paper
This is a short paper that argues that Hector-Neri Castañeda's discussion of the sentence:
(1) The Editor of Soul believes that he (himself) is a millionaire.
is not revealing groundbreaking philosophical territory. In particular, Castañeda argues that this "indirect reflexive pronoun" (the "he"), is special because it refers using the first-person. Author first argues that (1) is not a sentence where the speaker is the same person as the subject, since nobody uses "he" to refer to oneself when speaking in the first person.
But perhaps the import of the sentence can be salvaged by claiming, as Gary Matthews did, that it picks out a referent without using either a name or a definite description (using instead, perhaps, a 'first personal' indexical). Author argues that (1) does not give any information as to how the subject of the sentence is being picked out. While some might use the "I" to pick themselves out with an unerring first-personal reference, others might use a favorite definite description or proper name, author argues. It is a contingent matter, not a priori. Further, not every use of the "I" relies on this special first-personal "from my own point of view", author argues. Consider: "Tom said I look sad"; here the "I" is being attached to a predicate "looks sad" by Tom, not by the first person. So the "I" in this case, while it unerringly refers, it does not seem to have any special first-personal connection to the speaker.
Perhaps Castañeda was trying to use (1) to underwrite what makes a speaker a person, but author proposes other criteria: humans are language-using animals that
(a) perceive from a certain vantage point
(b) identify their own attitudes and those of others
(c) alter both their environs and themselves to suit (within limits) their "wants"
These features of language-using animals, not any special "I" usage, is sufficient for personhood.
Finally, author closes with a discussion of whether a so-called 'personal point of view' contrasts with a scientific one, offered by Nagle as impersonal and "from nowhere in particular". Author argues that general relativity specifically and most scientific language uses specific reference points when talking about the external world and its objects, and that "Properly understood, a scientific view of the world must, in fact, be regarded as thoroughly perspectival".
Unpublished Paper
This is a short paper that argues that Hector-Neri Castañeda's discussion of the sentence:
(1) The Editor of Soul believes that he (himself) is a millionaire.
is not revealing groundbreaking philosophical territory. In particular, Castañeda argues that this "indirect reflexive pronoun" (the "he"), is special because it refers using the first-person. Author first argues that (1) is not a sentence where the speaker is the same person as the subject, since nobody uses "he" to refer to oneself when speaking in the first person.
But perhaps the import of the sentence can be salvaged by claiming, as Gary Matthews did, that it picks out a referent without using either a name or a definite description (using instead, perhaps, a 'first personal' indexical). Author argues that (1) does not give any information as to how the subject of the sentence is being picked out. While some might use the "I" to pick themselves out with an unerring first-personal reference, others might use a favorite definite description or proper name, author argues. It is a contingent matter, not a priori. Further, not every use of the "I" relies on this special first-personal "from my own point of view", author argues. Consider: "Tom said I look sad"; here the "I" is being attached to a predicate "looks sad" by Tom, not by the first person. So the "I" in this case, while it unerringly refers, it does not seem to have any special first-personal connection to the speaker.
Perhaps Castañeda was trying to use (1) to underwrite what makes a speaker a person, but author proposes other criteria: humans are language-using animals that
(a) perceive from a certain vantage point
(b) identify their own attitudes and those of others
(c) alter both their environs and themselves to suit (within limits) their "wants"
These features of language-using animals, not any special "I" usage, is sufficient for personhood.
Finally, author closes with a discussion of whether a so-called 'personal point of view' contrasts with a scientific one, offered by Nagle as impersonal and "from nowhere in particular". Author argues that general relativity specifically and most scientific language uses specific reference points when talking about the external world and its objects, and that "Properly understood, a scientific view of the world must, in fact, be regarded as thoroughly perspectival".
5/23/14
Smith, Malcolm - The Duty to Obey the Law
2014/05/23
A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2nd edition, Dennis Patterson ed.
This paper revisits previous discussions about the moral duty to obey a community or society's laws. Author starts with a brief history on the subject and makes the case that the disagreement over the duty to obey comes from differences in meta-ethical approaches.
The history of a prima facie duty to obey the law came with the development of the prima facie moral obligation, as pioneered by WD Ross. Ross's meta-ethics was a form of intuitionism, a theory that holds that humanity had a moral faculty and that exploration and elucidation of the judgments it issues would turn up moral values. The trouble is that Sidgwick had forcefully argued that no moral value didn't admit of exception. Thus Ross tried to formulate a "prima facie" moral value: one that "all things being equal" has moral authority, but could be overridden by some other compelling principles or circumstances. Ross put things like promise keeping, beneficence, and, without much argument, obeying the law, into the prima facie category. Later, other intuitionists rejected the duty to obey as even a prima facie obligation (pg459), arguing that:
1. law may have authority, but that doesn't necessarily compel a duty to obey
2. the thought that all of society's participants took some sort of oath of duty is a fiction
3. the law is not always coextensive with moral obligations
4. the obligation to obey moral laws is redundant due to the obligation obey morality
Author believes that the state of play is that few intuitionists still try to find a prima facie duty to obey, but instead those who argue for it are not intuitionists. Instead, they are "catechists", trying to formulate moral principles that, if followed, would be the best for humanity (pg460). Author discusses a prototypical example of the work of John Mackie in "Ethics: Inventing a Right and Wrong". Mackie does not believe in objective morality but instead goes about making a set of moral principles that he argues will contribute to human flourishing. Using this meta-ethical stance, Mackie argues that the duty to obey the law is a "reciprocal norm" (pg461).
Author considers the intuitionist moral theory to be a species of a meta-ethical view of "Commonalism", which argues, loosely: (pg463)
1. Moral intuitions are the source of moral authority, but need to be clarified and de-personalized
2. Moral knowledge is universal or near-universal
3. The work of moral theorists is to describe moral judgment, not to invent it
The trouble with the duty to obey is that it shows the conflict between Commonalists and Catechists in the meta-ethical sphere. Author promises to argue against the Catechist method in further work, but briefly points out that the Catechist method departs significantly from other philosophies, which mostly seek to describe, not prescribe (pg464-5).
A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2nd edition, Dennis Patterson ed.
This paper revisits previous discussions about the moral duty to obey a community or society's laws. Author starts with a brief history on the subject and makes the case that the disagreement over the duty to obey comes from differences in meta-ethical approaches.
The history of a prima facie duty to obey the law came with the development of the prima facie moral obligation, as pioneered by WD Ross. Ross's meta-ethics was a form of intuitionism, a theory that holds that humanity had a moral faculty and that exploration and elucidation of the judgments it issues would turn up moral values. The trouble is that Sidgwick had forcefully argued that no moral value didn't admit of exception. Thus Ross tried to formulate a "prima facie" moral value: one that "all things being equal" has moral authority, but could be overridden by some other compelling principles or circumstances. Ross put things like promise keeping, beneficence, and, without much argument, obeying the law, into the prima facie category. Later, other intuitionists rejected the duty to obey as even a prima facie obligation (pg459), arguing that:
1. law may have authority, but that doesn't necessarily compel a duty to obey
2. the thought that all of society's participants took some sort of oath of duty is a fiction
3. the law is not always coextensive with moral obligations
4. the obligation to obey moral laws is redundant due to the obligation obey morality
Author believes that the state of play is that few intuitionists still try to find a prima facie duty to obey, but instead those who argue for it are not intuitionists. Instead, they are "catechists", trying to formulate moral principles that, if followed, would be the best for humanity (pg460). Author discusses a prototypical example of the work of John Mackie in "Ethics: Inventing a Right and Wrong". Mackie does not believe in objective morality but instead goes about making a set of moral principles that he argues will contribute to human flourishing. Using this meta-ethical stance, Mackie argues that the duty to obey the law is a "reciprocal norm" (pg461).
Author considers the intuitionist moral theory to be a species of a meta-ethical view of "Commonalism", which argues, loosely: (pg463)
1. Moral intuitions are the source of moral authority, but need to be clarified and de-personalized
2. Moral knowledge is universal or near-universal
3. The work of moral theorists is to describe moral judgment, not to invent it
The trouble with the duty to obey is that it shows the conflict between Commonalists and Catechists in the meta-ethical sphere. Author promises to argue against the Catechist method in further work, but briefly points out that the Catechist method departs significantly from other philosophies, which mostly seek to describe, not prescribe (pg464-5).
4/18/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds V
04/18/2014
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 5: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
In this chapter, which is thoroughly set in the context of the previous ones, White asserts that it is in principle, that is either logically or metaphysically, impossible to know another mind. This seems to be agreement with Black, the skeptic, but instead it is taken to be a pointless statement. White (and Wisdom) believe it isn't meaningless, but it is silly, or having no point to talk about. The paper starts with re-hashing the lesson from the failed attempt at telepathy from the last chapter: that even if a question has sense, and even if you can even describe what would affirm or negate the proposition, if you can't figure out a way to test (affirm/negate) the proposition, the question might still be "unreal" (pg123). Hence Gray's claim that the mind of another is hitherto invisible but could be discoverable is taken to be refuted.
The alternative to something so-far invisible is something invisible by nature, or in principle, which is what Black asserted in the first place. (pg123-4) Before White takes up this possibility, one final option is considered: that knowledge of another mind wouldn't be sensory but somehow some kind of "direct" knowledge (pg124-5). White rejects this because he sees it as not categorically different from "knowledge of future behavior from present behavior" (pg125-9) White somehow takes sharing direct knowledge of one mind to be on the same continuum as seeing a physical object, like a dagger (pg126). And this is disqualified from knowledge of a mind, due to White's "disinclination" (pg126-7). Or, rather, White puts words into Black's mouth that this isn't really knowledge of another's mind (pg127) since it is akin to predictions of future behavior due to shared (public) inputs (and Black affirms it on pg129). Thus if there isn't sensory knowledge of another's mind (ch IV) and there isn't direct knowledge of another's mind (ch V), then knowledge of another's mind is in-principle impossible, or the mind of another is by-nature invisible.
The main thrust of the argument is put by the thing-in-itself advocate Brown, who interrupts to assert there is some special way of knowing, but not of actual mental conditions but only of appearances of them: the infallible and direct way of knowing is knowledge of appearances, not necessarily of mental facts. Mental facts like "being in love" are known indirectly as well, though the first-personal perspective has a source of information that the 3rd-personal perspective may not share. White goes through what he considers to be the many cases of indirect knowledge (pg130-1), and then Gray challenges Brown to lay out his argument, which Brown does (pg133-5). What Brown amounts to saying is thus: our knowledge of our own minds comes from direct, infallible access to content-ful appearances [a pain, footly!], which leads us to indirect belief about our bodies [My foot nerves are twitching in pain], which can of course be fallible [it was a pain, but it wasn't in the foot].
Having laid out this picture, Brown claims that direct knowledge of the appearances of another's mental contents is possible (perhaps using telepathy). White asserts that it is an "absurd idea" (pg135), and that knowledge of another mind is impossible. This apparent agreement with Black confuses Gray, but White goes on to argue that it is necessarily impossible, thus far less threatening than it originally appeared (pg135-6). Black confesses that he did not realize that his statement was necessarily true when he made it, but nevertheless he was referring to what he now acknowledges is a necessary truth (pg136-9). White sums up the argument, put by Brown, but put back into an absurdity or a paradox, by claiming that knowledge, if taken to be of the sort that Brown (and, by extension, Black) think it is, is not applicable to not only other minds, but not applicable to the future, the past, even our own bodies, and, perhaps, finally, the whole world of things (pg140).
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 5: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
In this chapter, which is thoroughly set in the context of the previous ones, White asserts that it is in principle, that is either logically or metaphysically, impossible to know another mind. This seems to be agreement with Black, the skeptic, but instead it is taken to be a pointless statement. White (and Wisdom) believe it isn't meaningless, but it is silly, or having no point to talk about. The paper starts with re-hashing the lesson from the failed attempt at telepathy from the last chapter: that even if a question has sense, and even if you can even describe what would affirm or negate the proposition, if you can't figure out a way to test (affirm/negate) the proposition, the question might still be "unreal" (pg123). Hence Gray's claim that the mind of another is hitherto invisible but could be discoverable is taken to be refuted.
The alternative to something so-far invisible is something invisible by nature, or in principle, which is what Black asserted in the first place. (pg123-4) Before White takes up this possibility, one final option is considered: that knowledge of another mind wouldn't be sensory but somehow some kind of "direct" knowledge (pg124-5). White rejects this because he sees it as not categorically different from "knowledge of future behavior from present behavior" (pg125-9) White somehow takes sharing direct knowledge of one mind to be on the same continuum as seeing a physical object, like a dagger (pg126). And this is disqualified from knowledge of a mind, due to White's "disinclination" (pg126-7). Or, rather, White puts words into Black's mouth that this isn't really knowledge of another's mind (pg127) since it is akin to predictions of future behavior due to shared (public) inputs (and Black affirms it on pg129). Thus if there isn't sensory knowledge of another's mind (ch IV) and there isn't direct knowledge of another's mind (ch V), then knowledge of another's mind is in-principle impossible, or the mind of another is by-nature invisible.
The main thrust of the argument is put by the thing-in-itself advocate Brown, who interrupts to assert there is some special way of knowing, but not of actual mental conditions but only of appearances of them: the infallible and direct way of knowing is knowledge of appearances, not necessarily of mental facts. Mental facts like "being in love" are known indirectly as well, though the first-personal perspective has a source of information that the 3rd-personal perspective may not share. White goes through what he considers to be the many cases of indirect knowledge (pg130-1), and then Gray challenges Brown to lay out his argument, which Brown does (pg133-5). What Brown amounts to saying is thus: our knowledge of our own minds comes from direct, infallible access to content-ful appearances [a pain, footly!], which leads us to indirect belief about our bodies [My foot nerves are twitching in pain], which can of course be fallible [it was a pain, but it wasn't in the foot].
Having laid out this picture, Brown claims that direct knowledge of the appearances of another's mental contents is possible (perhaps using telepathy). White asserts that it is an "absurd idea" (pg135), and that knowledge of another mind is impossible. This apparent agreement with Black confuses Gray, but White goes on to argue that it is necessarily impossible, thus far less threatening than it originally appeared (pg135-6). Black confesses that he did not realize that his statement was necessarily true when he made it, but nevertheless he was referring to what he now acknowledges is a necessary truth (pg136-9). White sums up the argument, put by Brown, but put back into an absurdity or a paradox, by claiming that knowledge, if taken to be of the sort that Brown (and, by extension, Black) think it is, is not applicable to not only other minds, but not applicable to the future, the past, even our own bodies, and, perhaps, finally, the whole world of things (pg140).
4/11/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds IV
04/11/2014
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 4: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
This chapter is a continuation from the previous conversation that has been taking place between three fictitious personas, each with their own perspective on knowledge of other minds. In this chapter another character, Brown, who appears to believe in "noumenal bread"(pg102) is briefly introduced, however much of this chapter is a re-description and refinement of what was previously laid out. After some preliminary recap, Gray argues that there is a difference in knowledge-by-inference between an acknowledged, in-principle invisible germ and one that is sought but "hitherto" undetectable given our current methods (pg91). This is meant to be an analogy for mental states, which aren't, Gray says, "defined as detectable though their effects" (pg91). This leaves open the possibility of future discovery of mental states, directly somehow.
Brown briefly interjects that even if there is no more to be done to ascertain whether S is P, isn't there still a further question about whether S really is P? Here it seems the other three disagree (mainly Gray, and to some extent Black) and there is an interlude about the meaninglessness of asking whether S is P after all that is logically and conceivably be done to ascertain the relation has been exhausted. (pg91-5) The upshot of this discussion is Black revealing his view of philosophy (pg93-4) and White his (pg95-6). Black believes that there is no fine line between physical possibility, logical possibility, and conceiveability; White calls the further questioning from Brown "unpoetic" and "intolerable", though meaningful (pg97-101).
White picks up on the difficulty of understanding differences in beliefs without differences in expectations (pg100-1). [I see an analogy between these comments and some (I think mistaken) formulations of Goodman's Grue problem, see pg100] Subsequently, White offers an initial possibility of directly discovering Smith's mental states, using some kind of new technology, or telepathy (pg 103). The trouble here is that it is unclear this is actually possible and not a kind of regress of indirect knowledge, as White explores (pg103-109).
Black rejects the possibility of a regress but still asserts that knowledge of another mind "directly" would not be sensory but instead be a kind of extended introspection, similar to a heightened ability (but unfortunately picks another sensory ability as an analogy: someone with a heightened sense of touch being able to detect differences in weights between feathers that no one else can detect (pg109-10). This kicks off a discussion about how one would know that this extra-sensory power was reliable and so on (pg110-116), which comes back to the issue that Brown initially posed, of there being something to "weight" that is further than how things react on scales, and feel by comparison, etc (pg115). White decries this absurd result and lists the steps which got them there (pg116). Black takes back his analogy on pg 122 but insists on a difference between introspection and sensation relating to other minds.
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 4: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
This chapter is a continuation from the previous conversation that has been taking place between three fictitious personas, each with their own perspective on knowledge of other minds. In this chapter another character, Brown, who appears to believe in "noumenal bread"(pg102) is briefly introduced, however much of this chapter is a re-description and refinement of what was previously laid out. After some preliminary recap, Gray argues that there is a difference in knowledge-by-inference between an acknowledged, in-principle invisible germ and one that is sought but "hitherto" undetectable given our current methods (pg91). This is meant to be an analogy for mental states, which aren't, Gray says, "defined as detectable though their effects" (pg91). This leaves open the possibility of future discovery of mental states, directly somehow.
Brown briefly interjects that even if there is no more to be done to ascertain whether S is P, isn't there still a further question about whether S really is P? Here it seems the other three disagree (mainly Gray, and to some extent Black) and there is an interlude about the meaninglessness of asking whether S is P after all that is logically and conceivably be done to ascertain the relation has been exhausted. (pg91-5) The upshot of this discussion is Black revealing his view of philosophy (pg93-4) and White his (pg95-6). Black believes that there is no fine line between physical possibility, logical possibility, and conceiveability; White calls the further questioning from Brown "unpoetic" and "intolerable", though meaningful (pg97-101).
White picks up on the difficulty of understanding differences in beliefs without differences in expectations (pg100-1). [I see an analogy between these comments and some (I think mistaken) formulations of Goodman's Grue problem, see pg100] Subsequently, White offers an initial possibility of directly discovering Smith's mental states, using some kind of new technology, or telepathy (pg 103). The trouble here is that it is unclear this is actually possible and not a kind of regress of indirect knowledge, as White explores (pg103-109).
Black rejects the possibility of a regress but still asserts that knowledge of another mind "directly" would not be sensory but instead be a kind of extended introspection, similar to a heightened ability (but unfortunately picks another sensory ability as an analogy: someone with a heightened sense of touch being able to detect differences in weights between feathers that no one else can detect (pg109-10). This kicks off a discussion about how one would know that this extra-sensory power was reliable and so on (pg110-116), which comes back to the issue that Brown initially posed, of there being something to "weight" that is further than how things react on scales, and feel by comparison, etc (pg115). White decries this absurd result and lists the steps which got them there (pg116). Black takes back his analogy on pg 122 but insists on a difference between introspection and sensation relating to other minds.
4/4/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds III
04/04/2014
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 3: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
In this chapter, a continuation from the dialogue from the previous chapter, a new character, "Grey" is introduced. Grey wants to convince White that Black's skeptical position is not warranted, nor is the externalistic meaning of "S believes that P" exhausts it. Grey tries to tell White that we know what is in other minds by analogy to our own, similar to how we know by analogy about other in-principle invisible phenomena. Grey uses the example of germs, which are known to be causes of many maladies. If the measles fit all the criteria for a germ-based disease but, upon inspection, no germs were to be found, Grey argues that we could still reasonably believe the disease was caused by germs, just invisible ones. This is the analogy Grey tries to give to White regarding mental states and other minds.
White complains early (pg62) that there are three replies to the problems of induction, or the "step" taken from evidence of P to asserting Q: Skeptic: 'don't take the step', Phenomenalist: 'there is no step to take, don't worry', Intuitionist: 'there is another mode of knowing that Q from P; it's ok'. White argues that merely stating: 'we know Q from P, but we can't justify it' is not an answer, but merely restates the problem.
After Grey gives his analogy of the invisible germ case, White talks at length of the 'queerness' (pg72) of the analogy argument: that while we might agree that our knowledge is by analogy, it is a weird sort of analogy since it relies on "the peculiar grammar of the expression of 'invisible things'" (pg72-3). The knowledge by analogy argument, White claims, is "satisfying" (pg74) and "soothing" (pg79) but not a justification since the satisfaction is "unstable" (pg74). The instability comes as follows: looking for the visible germs in a measles patient seems to be the right thing to do using the argument by analogy: measles is germ-caused. But, after no germs are found, to say it is in-principle invisible germs is to go a further step-- to move the goal posts-- to change the analogy (pg74-8).
White agrees that perhaps it is somehow "correct" to use analogy to argue for other minds, but there is something "misleading or tiresome" (pg75) about it. White tries to summarize the way the argument by analogy fails on pg 80-81, by claiming that using normal inductive reasoning to answer skeptical arguments either allows for unintelligible or false premises, or just builds into the grammar a "logical principle" that would not take the form of induction (pg81). Later in the chapter, White argues that Grey is close to simply re-stating the initial conditions that are taken to give evidence, in other words, collapsing the meaning of "will be colorblind" to "will fail the relevant tests" (pg83-5). Grey ends the chapter by trying to salvage the argument by analogy by saying the measles/invisible germs analogy wasn't apt.
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 3: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
In this chapter, a continuation from the dialogue from the previous chapter, a new character, "Grey" is introduced. Grey wants to convince White that Black's skeptical position is not warranted, nor is the externalistic meaning of "S believes that P" exhausts it. Grey tries to tell White that we know what is in other minds by analogy to our own, similar to how we know by analogy about other in-principle invisible phenomena. Grey uses the example of germs, which are known to be causes of many maladies. If the measles fit all the criteria for a germ-based disease but, upon inspection, no germs were to be found, Grey argues that we could still reasonably believe the disease was caused by germs, just invisible ones. This is the analogy Grey tries to give to White regarding mental states and other minds.
White complains early (pg62) that there are three replies to the problems of induction, or the "step" taken from evidence of P to asserting Q: Skeptic: 'don't take the step', Phenomenalist: 'there is no step to take, don't worry', Intuitionist: 'there is another mode of knowing that Q from P; it's ok'. White argues that merely stating: 'we know Q from P, but we can't justify it' is not an answer, but merely restates the problem.
After Grey gives his analogy of the invisible germ case, White talks at length of the 'queerness' (pg72) of the analogy argument: that while we might agree that our knowledge is by analogy, it is a weird sort of analogy since it relies on "the peculiar grammar of the expression of 'invisible things'" (pg72-3). The knowledge by analogy argument, White claims, is "satisfying" (pg74) and "soothing" (pg79) but not a justification since the satisfaction is "unstable" (pg74). The instability comes as follows: looking for the visible germs in a measles patient seems to be the right thing to do using the argument by analogy: measles is germ-caused. But, after no germs are found, to say it is in-principle invisible germs is to go a further step-- to move the goal posts-- to change the analogy (pg74-8).
White agrees that perhaps it is somehow "correct" to use analogy to argue for other minds, but there is something "misleading or tiresome" (pg75) about it. White tries to summarize the way the argument by analogy fails on pg 80-81, by claiming that using normal inductive reasoning to answer skeptical arguments either allows for unintelligible or false premises, or just builds into the grammar a "logical principle" that would not take the form of induction (pg81). Later in the chapter, White argues that Grey is close to simply re-stating the initial conditions that are taken to give evidence, in other words, collapsing the meaning of "will be colorblind" to "will fail the relevant tests" (pg83-5). Grey ends the chapter by trying to salvage the argument by analogy by saying the measles/invisible germs analogy wasn't apt.
3/28/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds II
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 2: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
This chapter (which was also a paper in Mind Vol 50 No 197), is a continuation of the previous chapter which introduced the skepticism about other minds. In this chapter, author writes a dialogue between the skeptic "Black", who asserts the unknowability of another's mind/conscious-states, and the person who apparently wrote the first chapter, "White", who represents the view that such a question is a joke, or absurd.
In this chapter, Black ultimately gets to make the point that when Smith finds out he will go colorblind tomorrow, it means more to Smith than it will to the rest of us. Not only does it mean that Smith will fail the relevant discriminatory tests and so on (what it means to us), but Smith will also not be able to see e.g. red the same way: it will look grey to him. "'No more of this, only this' and he looks at a colorless engraving" (pg51). This is the crux of the difference that Black tries to get White to admit. The difference between understanding this (or any) description about mental states and other descriptions about invisible things (like leprechauns in watches or electric currents in copper wires) is that of different meaning on the subjective level, a meaning we readily understand since we know that we ourselves have qualia. [Yet don't we grant that Smith also has qualia if the statement that he'll be colorblind means anything extra to him too?]
3/21/14
Wisdom, John - Other Minds I
03/21/2014
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 1: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
While this is the first chapter of a book, each unit was also published in Mind sequentially starting from Vol 49, No 196 (which is where this chapter appeared). This paper starts with the problem of other minds, taking as a starting point a concern from Isaiah Berlin about two kinds of questions one could apply to whether S believes that P. The first is whether S really believes that P. The second is whether S really truly believes P (or anything else), even given outward signs of believing P. This second interest, one dubbed "philosophical doubt" is discussed at length by author. Author acknowledges influence from Wittgenstein, and proceeds to discuss the weirdness of skepticism of the following kind: I know that S shows all signs of believing P, and that there are no further tests we could conduct to determine whether S believes P, but still I doubt or wonder whether S has a belief that P (or any belief at all). Author considers this kind of doubt not meaningless, but a "dead doubt" (pg7).
During this paper, author introduces what he considers an analog to consider: that there are leprechauns in some grandfather clocks that sing fairy songs and disappear on midsummer evenings. Upon opening such clocks, leprechauns are discovered. Now imagine some watches also behave similarly, but when opened, reveal no leprechauns. In this circumstance it seems reasonable to claim there are invisible leprechauns within the watches, even though the operator "invisible" would otherwise signal a weird kind of assertion. An expansion of the analogy is whether there is a difference asserted that instead of invisible leprechauns, there are invisible brownies within the watches. Is this difference in assertions meaningful? Author seems to want to agree that two different images can be conjured. But, that doesn't mean the difference, or the assertion of a difference, isn't "idle" (pg13).
Other Minds, by John Wisdom, Chapter 1: Basil Blackwell (pub), 1965
[This is a brief summary]
While this is the first chapter of a book, each unit was also published in Mind sequentially starting from Vol 49, No 196 (which is where this chapter appeared). This paper starts with the problem of other minds, taking as a starting point a concern from Isaiah Berlin about two kinds of questions one could apply to whether S believes that P. The first is whether S really believes that P. The second is whether S really truly believes P (or anything else), even given outward signs of believing P. This second interest, one dubbed "philosophical doubt" is discussed at length by author. Author acknowledges influence from Wittgenstein, and proceeds to discuss the weirdness of skepticism of the following kind: I know that S shows all signs of believing P, and that there are no further tests we could conduct to determine whether S believes P, but still I doubt or wonder whether S has a belief that P (or any belief at all). Author considers this kind of doubt not meaningless, but a "dead doubt" (pg7).
During this paper, author introduces what he considers an analog to consider: that there are leprechauns in some grandfather clocks that sing fairy songs and disappear on midsummer evenings. Upon opening such clocks, leprechauns are discovered. Now imagine some watches also behave similarly, but when opened, reveal no leprechauns. In this circumstance it seems reasonable to claim there are invisible leprechauns within the watches, even though the operator "invisible" would otherwise signal a weird kind of assertion. An expansion of the analogy is whether there is a difference asserted that instead of invisible leprechauns, there are invisible brownies within the watches. Is this difference in assertions meaningful? Author seems to want to agree that two different images can be conjured. But, that doesn't mean the difference, or the assertion of a difference, isn't "idle" (pg13).
1/10/14
Mankiw, Nicholas Gregory - Defending the One Percent
01/10/2014
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 27 No 3 Summer 2013
This paper starts with the author admitting that the question of what to do about income inequality is tangled up in political philosophy, which is outside the expertise of economists; nevertheless author will engage in it. The opening uses an abstract thought-experiment where a society had perfect income equality, but then an entrepreneur came along to make/sell something that everybody wanted, thereby generating new wealth for herself. This is supposed to "capture, in an extreme and stylized way" (pg22) the US for the past 40 years.
The first major section of the paper asks whether income inequality is somehow inefficient. Author believes that this could be possible if earnings from the top were based on "rent-seeking", but does not believe this is the case. Author does not agree with Stiglitz's argument in The Price of Inequality that rent-seeking is any more prevalent now than it was in the 1970s, though income inequality has risen significantly since then. Author instead uses Goldin & Katz in The Race between Education and Technology to argue that income inequality is due to the stagnation of education while a steady or increasing pace of technology placed a higher premium on skilled labor (pg23). Author does agree that rent-seeking should be limited or reduced if found, though argues that income inequality would be the symptom, not the disease in this case. Author also concedes that the financial industry, while it has a very important role to play in allocating capital and risk, also has socially questionable, unhelpful, or inefficient roles within it (e.g. high frequency trading). In this case, the judgment is that "the vast personal reward may well exceed the social value of what is produced" (pg24).
Continuing on the theme of inequality, author turns to the goal of equality of opportunity. This goal is seen not only as a counterpart to efficiency (unequal opportunity will lead to inefficiency), but also a valuable goal in itself. Stiglitz proposes "intergenerational transmission of income", meaning the same chance that a poor or wealthy child will make it to the top 10% of income earners. Author believes this metric is too simplistic. Author argues that the metric doesn't capture heredity, which likely influences success in life; author concludes from studies that IQ "has a large degree of heritability" (pg25), and so might other character traits and skills. Regardless, author suggests that it is best to focus on raising poor children from bad conditions. Author concludes from personal experience that the opportunities for the children of the 1% are similar to those of the middle class. Setting aside the needed investment in poor children and skilled education, then, is there more to dislike about income inequality? Author then considers it as a negative element of a society in and of itself (pg26).
Author reconstructs the outline of the Okun discussion about the "big tradeoff" between equality and efficiency, and uses Mirless' model for the calculus. In essence, income is a product of effort and productivity, and the government, as social planner with utilitarian goals, skims income using a "leaky bucket" until the effort of the productive income-earners declines to a certain point (pg26-7). This is called the "elasticity of the labor supply" (pg27). Author first doubts this model because "people have different tastes regarding consumption, leisure, and job attributes" (pg27), and uses the example of economics professors that could have taken higher-paying jobs instead. The next section deals with a more profound attack on this model, questioning the government's motivations in acting as a utilitarian social planner. The first point is that there is no interpersonal way to compare utility (yet/at all), and is a common point against utilitarianism. The second point is that utilitarianism is cosmopolitan, not national, though the government doesn't act in such a way to help all people across all nations (pg28). Another argument author has previously leveled, and repeats here, is that if there are character traits that correlate with productivity, those could reasonably be taxed as well. Thus the absurd conclusion that there might well be a utilitarian basis for taxing tall people, men, or other classes of people who have correlations with productivity or success. The final argument seems to grant the Mirless model and even give it the power to observe productivity directly, instead of just observing its product, income = productivity x effort. If one could observe productivity directly, then that could be taxed in itself to equalize consumption, but then, author argues, the most productive would have to work more than everyone else (pg29). This counter-intuitive conclusion is another reductio ad absurdum against utilitarianism.
Author turns to examine the actual arguments made recently by populist movements like Occupy Wall Street and some other books and policy proposals on income inequality. The first is that the tax code isn't progressive. Author: CBO numbers say that it is progressive, "highly" (pg30). The second is that the income that the 1% derive do not reflect their contributions to society, taking CEO pay for an example of cronyism. Author: Given that private equity firms pay CEOs even more than publicly held companies, the charge of cronyism is unlikely. Third: The 1% have benefited from public investment and infrastructure, which they should pay for. Author: this isn't an ability-to-pay argument, it's a get-what-you-pay-for argument, and it seems plausible that the 1% is paying enough; also most taxes go to other individuals, not better infrastructure.
Author concludes with arguing there is a need for an alternative philosophical framework to utilitarianism. Author considers Rawls' original position, but claims it is unintuitive because of the possibility of sacrifices that individuals (now no longer behind the veil of ignorance) would want to make (pg32). As an example, since kidney diseases mean sick people might need donors, it might make sense, while behind the veil of ignorance, to pledge your kidney in return for the assurance that if you got the disease yourself, you would receive one. But no one would want to have their kidney taken against their will, so author argues this undercuts Rawls' theory. Author proposes a "just deserts" theory, which seems to be: everyone gets income based on their productivity and effort (pg32-3).
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 27 No 3 Summer 2013
This paper starts with the author admitting that the question of what to do about income inequality is tangled up in political philosophy, which is outside the expertise of economists; nevertheless author will engage in it. The opening uses an abstract thought-experiment where a society had perfect income equality, but then an entrepreneur came along to make/sell something that everybody wanted, thereby generating new wealth for herself. This is supposed to "capture, in an extreme and stylized way" (pg22) the US for the past 40 years.
The first major section of the paper asks whether income inequality is somehow inefficient. Author believes that this could be possible if earnings from the top were based on "rent-seeking", but does not believe this is the case. Author does not agree with Stiglitz's argument in The Price of Inequality that rent-seeking is any more prevalent now than it was in the 1970s, though income inequality has risen significantly since then. Author instead uses Goldin & Katz in The Race between Education and Technology to argue that income inequality is due to the stagnation of education while a steady or increasing pace of technology placed a higher premium on skilled labor (pg23). Author does agree that rent-seeking should be limited or reduced if found, though argues that income inequality would be the symptom, not the disease in this case. Author also concedes that the financial industry, while it has a very important role to play in allocating capital and risk, also has socially questionable, unhelpful, or inefficient roles within it (e.g. high frequency trading). In this case, the judgment is that "the vast personal reward may well exceed the social value of what is produced" (pg24).
Continuing on the theme of inequality, author turns to the goal of equality of opportunity. This goal is seen not only as a counterpart to efficiency (unequal opportunity will lead to inefficiency), but also a valuable goal in itself. Stiglitz proposes "intergenerational transmission of income", meaning the same chance that a poor or wealthy child will make it to the top 10% of income earners. Author believes this metric is too simplistic. Author argues that the metric doesn't capture heredity, which likely influences success in life; author concludes from studies that IQ "has a large degree of heritability" (pg25), and so might other character traits and skills. Regardless, author suggests that it is best to focus on raising poor children from bad conditions. Author concludes from personal experience that the opportunities for the children of the 1% are similar to those of the middle class. Setting aside the needed investment in poor children and skilled education, then, is there more to dislike about income inequality? Author then considers it as a negative element of a society in and of itself (pg26).
Author reconstructs the outline of the Okun discussion about the "big tradeoff" between equality and efficiency, and uses Mirless' model for the calculus. In essence, income is a product of effort and productivity, and the government, as social planner with utilitarian goals, skims income using a "leaky bucket" until the effort of the productive income-earners declines to a certain point (pg26-7). This is called the "elasticity of the labor supply" (pg27). Author first doubts this model because "people have different tastes regarding consumption, leisure, and job attributes" (pg27), and uses the example of economics professors that could have taken higher-paying jobs instead. The next section deals with a more profound attack on this model, questioning the government's motivations in acting as a utilitarian social planner. The first point is that there is no interpersonal way to compare utility (yet/at all), and is a common point against utilitarianism. The second point is that utilitarianism is cosmopolitan, not national, though the government doesn't act in such a way to help all people across all nations (pg28). Another argument author has previously leveled, and repeats here, is that if there are character traits that correlate with productivity, those could reasonably be taxed as well. Thus the absurd conclusion that there might well be a utilitarian basis for taxing tall people, men, or other classes of people who have correlations with productivity or success. The final argument seems to grant the Mirless model and even give it the power to observe productivity directly, instead of just observing its product, income = productivity x effort. If one could observe productivity directly, then that could be taxed in itself to equalize consumption, but then, author argues, the most productive would have to work more than everyone else (pg29). This counter-intuitive conclusion is another reductio ad absurdum against utilitarianism.
Author turns to examine the actual arguments made recently by populist movements like Occupy Wall Street and some other books and policy proposals on income inequality. The first is that the tax code isn't progressive. Author: CBO numbers say that it is progressive, "highly" (pg30). The second is that the income that the 1% derive do not reflect their contributions to society, taking CEO pay for an example of cronyism. Author: Given that private equity firms pay CEOs even more than publicly held companies, the charge of cronyism is unlikely. Third: The 1% have benefited from public investment and infrastructure, which they should pay for. Author: this isn't an ability-to-pay argument, it's a get-what-you-pay-for argument, and it seems plausible that the 1% is paying enough; also most taxes go to other individuals, not better infrastructure.
Author concludes with arguing there is a need for an alternative philosophical framework to utilitarianism. Author considers Rawls' original position, but claims it is unintuitive because of the possibility of sacrifices that individuals (now no longer behind the veil of ignorance) would want to make (pg32). As an example, since kidney diseases mean sick people might need donors, it might make sense, while behind the veil of ignorance, to pledge your kidney in return for the assurance that if you got the disease yourself, you would receive one. But no one would want to have their kidney taken against their will, so author argues this undercuts Rawls' theory. Author proposes a "just deserts" theory, which seems to be: everyone gets income based on their productivity and effort (pg32-3).
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