07/27/2012
New York Times, March 23, 2012
Review of A Universe From Nothing by Lawrence Krauss
Author (Albert) reviews a cosmology book by Krauss and disputes that it actually does explain why there is something rather than nothing. Apparently Krauss claims the laws of quantum physics explain why there isn't nothing. The first question author asks is where the laws of quantum mechanics come from-- what makes them true and laws of nature-- and why those laws are the way they are. Furthermore, author argues that even quantum fields need to be explained as to why they even exist too, a feat Krauss does not do.
The explanation for why Krauss thought that his cosmological explanation was superior to previous ones was that quantum fields can theoretically be arranged to reflect a "vacuum" state, in other words, be 'nothing' (in terms of particles). Thus the arrangement of quantum fields can produce no particles, which could be considered "nothing". Author points out the problem that this misses the point: the quantum fields are the elementary physical stuffs, true "nothing" would be the absence of those fields.
Finally, there is the Krauss' objection that this is changing the game or "moving the goal posts" because "nothing" as it has been traditionally understood meant "no particles", and he has explained how particles can arise from a no-particle state (of quantum fields). Author just replies that this just goes to show that we now know better that the fundamental make-up of the universe are not particles but fields. It isn't the endgame Krauss is assuming he has, and furthermore, author chides Krauss for thinking of the dialectic in cosmology as some sort of game.
7/13/12
Putnam, Hilary - Capabilities and Two Ethical Theories
07/13/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author begins the paper by distinguishing between "Expressivist" and "Kantian" modes of thinking about ethical and normative questions. Expressivism is meant to capture the concept that ethical sentences are expressions of attitudes, not beliefs or facts. Author intends to take Simon Blackburn's theories as a reasonable expression. Kantian approach is less the actual ideas of Kant but more that ethics have a basis in reason and rational action. Blackburn claims that expressivism can fit in well with the demise of positivism and the rise of pluralistic accounts of the good, and (especially for this paper) the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen.
Author outlines Blackburn's main approach, which is to disentangle ethical terms into a descriptive notion and an attitude (pg301). The difficulty Blackburn points out now is that attitudes may be completely free of rational evaluation, which is a result of their being noncognitive. So Blackburn tries to show that indeed ethical discussion is important (pg302) and also show that discussions can be classified in terms of how they are conducted; evasion, concealment, ad hominem, etc are examples of bad argumentation, thus are not rational ways of conducting ethical discussion. Author points out these criteria are fraught with the same normative judgments Blackburn is supposed to be explaining, and that worse is that there is no independent evaluation of rational argumentation if the end-results of good process are not considered any more true than the end-results of bad process (because there is no truth of the matter). (pg303) Author claims Blackburn suffers from a "severe impoverishment of categories". (pg303) Blackburn is using a "procrustean" bed of world representation/attitude expression (pg304) that is descended from Hume.
Author contrasts Blackburn with Scanlon's view of ethics as contractual, in that an action should be avoided if it is one that others might reasonably reject. (pg303-5) Author claims that Scanlon's procedural ethics misses some of humanity's "basic interests", though we should resist the temptation to build a foundation for ethics on any one of them (pg305-6) because the bundle that holds together those interests is too thin. Author next considers 2 objections to Scanlon's view, that he perceives as age-old:
1) equality is fine within classes, or castes (the slave-holding class)
2) equality is fine for people with certain characteristics (the warriors of the society)
In the case of the second, author argues we have come to hold different interests. Those interests are "justified" from within morality, not from without it or below it. Author claims we no longer see the warrior lifestyle as the pinnacle of human excellence, and that we no longer see caste systems as a correct representation of superiority, and that we "appreciate the superiority of the ... 'democratic way of life'" (pg308).
Author talks about Habermas' conception of universal agreement and how the major objection, that it never happens in real life (when the norm is suitably broadly extending) is serious (pg309). This is not an objection to Scanlon, however, who offers a lower bar that no one can "reasonably" reject such norms. So author poses the question: when there is disagreement, how are we to decide? Author's answer is: Democracy and Fallibilism (pg310-11) In other words, bring all the stakeholders together to decide on the best course of action, and be ready to revise it, even revise the fundamental rights or approaches, as time goes on.
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author begins the paper by distinguishing between "Expressivist" and "Kantian" modes of thinking about ethical and normative questions. Expressivism is meant to capture the concept that ethical sentences are expressions of attitudes, not beliefs or facts. Author intends to take Simon Blackburn's theories as a reasonable expression. Kantian approach is less the actual ideas of Kant but more that ethics have a basis in reason and rational action. Blackburn claims that expressivism can fit in well with the demise of positivism and the rise of pluralistic accounts of the good, and (especially for this paper) the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen.
Author outlines Blackburn's main approach, which is to disentangle ethical terms into a descriptive notion and an attitude (pg301). The difficulty Blackburn points out now is that attitudes may be completely free of rational evaluation, which is a result of their being noncognitive. So Blackburn tries to show that indeed ethical discussion is important (pg302) and also show that discussions can be classified in terms of how they are conducted; evasion, concealment, ad hominem, etc are examples of bad argumentation, thus are not rational ways of conducting ethical discussion. Author points out these criteria are fraught with the same normative judgments Blackburn is supposed to be explaining, and that worse is that there is no independent evaluation of rational argumentation if the end-results of good process are not considered any more true than the end-results of bad process (because there is no truth of the matter). (pg303) Author claims Blackburn suffers from a "severe impoverishment of categories". (pg303) Blackburn is using a "procrustean" bed of world representation/attitude expression (pg304) that is descended from Hume.
Author contrasts Blackburn with Scanlon's view of ethics as contractual, in that an action should be avoided if it is one that others might reasonably reject. (pg303-5) Author claims that Scanlon's procedural ethics misses some of humanity's "basic interests", though we should resist the temptation to build a foundation for ethics on any one of them (pg305-6) because the bundle that holds together those interests is too thin. Author next considers 2 objections to Scanlon's view, that he perceives as age-old:
1) equality is fine within classes, or castes (the slave-holding class)
2) equality is fine for people with certain characteristics (the warriors of the society)
In the case of the second, author argues we have come to hold different interests. Those interests are "justified" from within morality, not from without it or below it. Author claims we no longer see the warrior lifestyle as the pinnacle of human excellence, and that we no longer see caste systems as a correct representation of superiority, and that we "appreciate the superiority of the ... 'democratic way of life'" (pg308).
Author talks about Habermas' conception of universal agreement and how the major objection, that it never happens in real life (when the norm is suitably broadly extending) is serious (pg309). This is not an objection to Scanlon, however, who offers a lower bar that no one can "reasonably" reject such norms. So author poses the question: when there is disagreement, how are we to decide? Author's answer is: Democracy and Fallibilism (pg310-11) In other words, bring all the stakeholders together to decide on the best course of action, and be ready to revise it, even revise the fundamental rights or approaches, as time goes on.
7/6/12
Putnam. Hilary - The Fact/Value Dichotomy and Its Critics
07/06/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author begins this paper by revisiting an earlier book he wrote on the "fact/value distinction", where a notable economist (during the great depression) argued forcefully for reason to be relegated to means, and ends to be values that were in some sense subjective (pg283-5) This had similarities with the logical positivists, who claimed that value assertions lacked cognitive meaning.
Author introduces Charles Stevenson's Ethics and Language and Stanley Cavell's The Claim of Reason to show the emotivist and rationalist arguments about ethics. (pg285-88) Stevenson remarks about how all disagreement is either about beliefs or attitudes, but beliefs (as in science) can be revealed and tested, while attitudes cannot in anything like the same manner. Cavell points out that disagreement may still be rational even if there is no alignment of belief or attitude. (pg287) Cavell goes on to give 4 main disagreements with Stevenson (pg287).
Author asserts that Quine's demolition of the theory/description distinction also destroyed the fact/value dichotomy (pg288), though author starts with recounting the positivists account of the analytic/synthetic distinction for the sciences, and Quine's assault on it (pg289-90). Author points out that whatever failures the positivists had, it was at least after years of hard work. While Stevenson's belief/attitude distinction rested on no such hard work and is therefore even more questionable.
Author moves on to the "entanglement" of facts and values, in the two senses: (pg291)
1. factual judgments depend on epistemic values (like coherence, simplicity, elegance), and even possibly what predicates to use for induction is an epistemic value (see Goodman, new riddle)
2. Values tap into an "evaluative point of view" (pg292)
The idea here may be that there must be something that we're trying to get "right" when we discuss the difference between bravery and foolhardiness. McDowell affirms this by claiming that there is a current move by emotivists that there can be a "disentanglement" between the feature of the world that we're picking up on, and the 'special perspective' of evaluative judgment. The objection (pg 292-3) is that if this feature could be picked out, its application could be mastered independently of knowing what the evaluative judgment might mean. Author points out that for McDowell, all human life is conceptualized, since McDowell has Kantian roots. Author moves instead to Cavell and one of his quotes about morality, as being a kind-of reconciliation process that comes with disagreement (pg295).
Author ends with a conclusion about how the fact/value dichotomy is the top of a three-legged stool:
1) "the postulation of theory-free 'facts'" (fact/theory distinction)
2) the denial that evaluation is entangled in 'facts'/science
3) the claim that science proceeds roughly by a combination of induction and deduction
Each leg breaks for different reasons, from different areas of philosophy.
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author begins this paper by revisiting an earlier book he wrote on the "fact/value distinction", where a notable economist (during the great depression) argued forcefully for reason to be relegated to means, and ends to be values that were in some sense subjective (pg283-5) This had similarities with the logical positivists, who claimed that value assertions lacked cognitive meaning.
Author introduces Charles Stevenson's Ethics and Language and Stanley Cavell's The Claim of Reason to show the emotivist and rationalist arguments about ethics. (pg285-88) Stevenson remarks about how all disagreement is either about beliefs or attitudes, but beliefs (as in science) can be revealed and tested, while attitudes cannot in anything like the same manner. Cavell points out that disagreement may still be rational even if there is no alignment of belief or attitude. (pg287) Cavell goes on to give 4 main disagreements with Stevenson (pg287).
Author asserts that Quine's demolition of the theory/description distinction also destroyed the fact/value dichotomy (pg288), though author starts with recounting the positivists account of the analytic/synthetic distinction for the sciences, and Quine's assault on it (pg289-90). Author points out that whatever failures the positivists had, it was at least after years of hard work. While Stevenson's belief/attitude distinction rested on no such hard work and is therefore even more questionable.
Author moves on to the "entanglement" of facts and values, in the two senses: (pg291)
1. factual judgments depend on epistemic values (like coherence, simplicity, elegance), and even possibly what predicates to use for induction is an epistemic value (see Goodman, new riddle)
2. Values tap into an "evaluative point of view" (pg292)
The idea here may be that there must be something that we're trying to get "right" when we discuss the difference between bravery and foolhardiness. McDowell affirms this by claiming that there is a current move by emotivists that there can be a "disentanglement" between the feature of the world that we're picking up on, and the 'special perspective' of evaluative judgment. The objection (pg 292-3) is that if this feature could be picked out, its application could be mastered independently of knowing what the evaluative judgment might mean. Author points out that for McDowell, all human life is conceptualized, since McDowell has Kantian roots. Author moves instead to Cavell and one of his quotes about morality, as being a kind-of reconciliation process that comes with disagreement (pg295).
Author ends with a conclusion about how the fact/value dichotomy is the top of a three-legged stool:
1) "the postulation of theory-free 'facts'" (fact/theory distinction)
2) the denial that evaluation is entangled in 'facts'/science
3) the claim that science proceeds roughly by a combination of induction and deduction
Each leg breaks for different reasons, from different areas of philosophy.
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