Author introduces the Convergence Claim, which is that agreement in moral belief if everyone had the non-moral facts, used similar normative concepts, and were not affected by distorting influences. This is contrary to the Argument from Disagreement, which must involve denying moral principles due to fundamental normative disagreement. Author sees Nietzsche as a thinker who presents fundamental disagreement.
The first apparent disagreement is about suffering, and how it may be intrinsically good. Author argues that Nietzsche seems to suggest that suffering is good because of his principle that everything is good. (pg571) This could be about accepting the whole of the universe, or fate, and finding some kind of solace in it. (pg572) Author suggests this may have been a view held by Nietzsche for biographical reasons.
Further disagreement may be found in Nietzsche's view of the suffering of others, or in the value of compassion. Here author helps himself again to Nietzsche's biography, pointing out that he was deeply compassionate (pg574). Instead, author argues Nietzsche thinks rather that compassion has bad effects, specifically in weakening the healthy (pg573). This leads to a deeper discussion about the virtues Nietzsche found valuable in life, especially 'warlike virtues' which author interprets more to be about being bold, taking risks, and struggling to create great works. (pg574-6) More trouble arises when Nietzsche discusses the 'healthy aristocracy', which will be both great and also subject 'untold' humans to degradation and suffering. (pg577)
Author turns to exploring why Nietzsche had these beliefs to find their (partial) justification (pg578-9), calling attention to Nietzsche's insanity near the end of his life as partial evidence for the views he held. Author comes to claim (pg581) that often Nietzsche is not aiming at moral truth, but instead at other goals for humanity. Thus the disagreement isn't comparable. But what is happening is that Nietzsche is appealing to reasons beyond the moral; for author reason is more fundamental anyway, so the discussion moves to Nietzsche's proposed reason-giving alternatives to morality.
Author moves to discuss Nietzsche's view of moral truth, and the concepts of moral goodness and evil in general (pg582). Author first examines Nietzsche's view about moral responsibility, which he says we cannot have because we don't have the type of freedom necessary for guilt. Second, there is the Nietzschean view that morality involves a false psychology of acting from obligation or altruism, which does not exist as an intention or motivation. Author claims morality does not rest on this psychology. (pg583) Author takes a brief apparent detour into the Kantian double meaning of "sollen", a German word that can be both "shall" and "ought", one of which can be true/false, the former other cannot. (pg584-5) Schopenhauer argued against the 'shall' version of 'sollen' after it first gets admittance by reason with the sense of 'ought'. (pg585) The detour through 'sollen' and Schopenhauer comes back to Neitzsche because both believed that the concept of God underpinned morality in the 'shall' sense, and since God did not exist, morality fell too. (pg586-7) Author reasserts that there are reasons for morality even without God, and that commands should not be equated with 'oughts' (pg588). Thus author concludes that Nietzsche takes the fundamental moral relationship to be one of 'shalls' rather than 'oughts'. Thus the disagreement is not comparable to author's sequence of reason-based oughts.
The next biggest challenge involves the Nietzschean view that equal rights for all is misguided, or false-- since the creative geniuses deserve much greater consideration and can trample others. But author takes the statements that the whole of society would benefit from the works of great people to mean that Nietzsche also gave consideration to the 'mediocre'. (pg590-1) Author interprets Nietzsche to agree about the badness of suffering (pg591-2), and also to back into a kind of utilitarianism that justifies the suffering of many for the great works of the few for which such suffering may exist. (pg592-3) Author moves to the discussion of morality and happiness, or virtue and flourishing, and the strained relationship between them (pg594-5) in Nietzsche. However, author claims contradictory comments are inconclusive.
The discussion is really on the "meaning of life", or for Nietzsche whether there is such a goal or destiny. Since God is out of the picture, another possibility is that nature, or life itself, has one for humanity. But in this case, consciousness, especially of agreeable or disagreeable conditions (e.g. suffering, pleasure) are means for achieving some end (since life gave us consciousness along with all our other tools for achieving whatever end it has for us). (pg596-7) Thus suffering isn't bad in itself. Author denies that nature's goal for humans should be our goal, or that nature might even have a goal for us. Nietzsche however goes further in that life or nature may not provide the goals, instead that values are our own-- and he seeks a new value system once morality has been felled (pg599-600). Author summarizes the various claims on pg 602-3. Author chalks much of the perceived disagreement to either Nietzsche's mistaking commands for oughts, or insanity.
5/11/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 7 Moral Concepts
05/11/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 7, Oxford University Press 2011
This is author's first main chapter on morality, and it starts by enumerating the various senses of "wrong"-- first the the ordinary sense, where someone has all the morally-relevant facts. The successive senses involve cases of partial ignorance:
Fact-relative: x is wrong if B had all the relevant facts
Belief-relative: x is wrong if B had true beliefs about the relevant facts
Evidence-relative: x is wrong if B had enough evidence to believe relevant facts
The reason for drawing these distinctions is to account for moral luck, where the consequences turn out right despite one's beliefs, or one's available evidence, or one's intentions. Author goes through a variety of cases. Cases one and two show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than belief-relative cases. (pg151-2) Cases three and four show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than evidence-relevant senses. (pg152-3) Cases five and six try to show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than fact-relevant senses. (pg153) Interestingly, author places epistemic incompetence, or failing to believe x when presented with relevant evidence, as not morally culpable, even if such incompetence fails to correct an unjustified belief that plays a part in deliberation in a moral situation. (pg153) Author's first reason for using all three senses is that other people use all three senses, so it is wise to keep the usage but guide the terminology (pg153-4).
The next discussion is about what the different senses of "wrong" pick out, and the importance of what is picked out. With the belief-relevant senses, if B was right about the facts, B's acts would be ordinarily wrong (trying to kill someone). So for blameworthiness, belief-relevance is crucial. Fact-relevance is less so, or at least that is an intuition shared especially by kantians. However, author discusses and rejects semi-kantians (pg156-7) who believe that fact-relevance in blameworthiness is sometimes partially a factor. Author introduces another sense of "wrong": the moral-belief-relative sense: when B believes x is wrong in the ordinary sense. This is meant to accommodate the Thomistic view, which is that: if you think you're doing something wrong, you're doing something wrong. Author agrees this might be blameworthy in the moral-belief-relative sense, even if it is not wrong in the evidence- or fact-relevant sense.
Another important question aside from blameworthiness is deliberation about what to do (pg159-. Here author hews toward evidence-relative factors and "expectablism", especially when looking for outcomes (pg160-1).
What relevance does the fact-relevant sense of "wrong" or "ought" have then? Author answers by claiming that discovering true moral principles is one reason to use the fact-relevant sense. Fact-relevant senses of ought are the most fundamental, leading most straight-forwardly to the ordinary sense of wrong and ought. (pg162) Then there are senses of what B ought-practically to do, where evidence-relevant senses come into play, as do belief-relative and "moral/normative-belief-relative" senses.
Author then moves from the ordinary sense of wrong (which took the various different senses, above) to other possible senses of the concept (pg164-5). The first major point author makes is that there is a basic sense of wrong that is indefinable. There are other senses like "blameworthiness" and "unjustifiable" that are definable (pg165-6). Next author discusses the language of morality at the nexus of reason-implying senses of the words. (pg166-8) Most interestingly, author considers Rational Egoism an "external rival" to morality. But similarly, Act Consequentialism, the most fundamental form of Utilitarianism, is also considered an external rival (pg168-9).
Author circles back to the multiple senses of "wrong" and why author holds there are many (pg169-170). One reason writers think there is only one sense is that we believe we are in legitimate disagreement when we argue over moral cases. Author considers these weak and not plausible enough to underwrite one sense of "wrong" (pg170-1). Lastly, author discusses the reason-implying senses of "ought" and "wrong" (pg172-4).
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 7, Oxford University Press 2011
This is author's first main chapter on morality, and it starts by enumerating the various senses of "wrong"-- first the the ordinary sense, where someone has all the morally-relevant facts. The successive senses involve cases of partial ignorance:
Fact-relative: x is wrong if B had all the relevant facts
Belief-relative: x is wrong if B had true beliefs about the relevant facts
Evidence-relative: x is wrong if B had enough evidence to believe relevant facts
The reason for drawing these distinctions is to account for moral luck, where the consequences turn out right despite one's beliefs, or one's available evidence, or one's intentions. Author goes through a variety of cases. Cases one and two show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than belief-relative cases. (pg151-2) Cases three and four show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than evidence-relevant senses. (pg152-3) Cases five and six try to show there is a moral sense of "wrong" that is greater than fact-relevant senses. (pg153) Interestingly, author places epistemic incompetence, or failing to believe x when presented with relevant evidence, as not morally culpable, even if such incompetence fails to correct an unjustified belief that plays a part in deliberation in a moral situation. (pg153) Author's first reason for using all three senses is that other people use all three senses, so it is wise to keep the usage but guide the terminology (pg153-4).
The next discussion is about what the different senses of "wrong" pick out, and the importance of what is picked out. With the belief-relevant senses, if B was right about the facts, B's acts would be ordinarily wrong (trying to kill someone). So for blameworthiness, belief-relevance is crucial. Fact-relevance is less so, or at least that is an intuition shared especially by kantians. However, author discusses and rejects semi-kantians (pg156-7) who believe that fact-relevance in blameworthiness is sometimes partially a factor. Author introduces another sense of "wrong": the moral-belief-relative sense: when B believes x is wrong in the ordinary sense. This is meant to accommodate the Thomistic view, which is that: if you think you're doing something wrong, you're doing something wrong. Author agrees this might be blameworthy in the moral-belief-relative sense, even if it is not wrong in the evidence- or fact-relevant sense.
Another important question aside from blameworthiness is deliberation about what to do (pg159-. Here author hews toward evidence-relative factors and "expectablism", especially when looking for outcomes (pg160-1).
What relevance does the fact-relevant sense of "wrong" or "ought" have then? Author answers by claiming that discovering true moral principles is one reason to use the fact-relevant sense. Fact-relevant senses of ought are the most fundamental, leading most straight-forwardly to the ordinary sense of wrong and ought. (pg162) Then there are senses of what B ought-practically to do, where evidence-relevant senses come into play, as do belief-relative and "moral/normative-belief-relative" senses.
Author then moves from the ordinary sense of wrong (which took the various different senses, above) to other possible senses of the concept (pg164-5). The first major point author makes is that there is a basic sense of wrong that is indefinable. There are other senses like "blameworthiness" and "unjustifiable" that are definable (pg165-6). Next author discusses the language of morality at the nexus of reason-implying senses of the words. (pg166-8) Most interestingly, author considers Rational Egoism an "external rival" to morality. But similarly, Act Consequentialism, the most fundamental form of Utilitarianism, is also considered an external rival (pg168-9).
Author circles back to the multiple senses of "wrong" and why author holds there are many (pg169-170). One reason writers think there is only one sense is that we believe we are in legitimate disagreement when we argue over moral cases. Author considers these weak and not plausible enough to underwrite one sense of "wrong" (pg170-1). Lastly, author discusses the reason-implying senses of "ought" and "wrong" (pg172-4).
5/4/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 6 Morality
05/04/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 6, Oxford University Press 2011
Author is firmly in the objective reasons theory now, comparing different kinds. Author starts with a discussion of Rational Egoism and Rational Impartialism being combined into Sidgwick's dualism, which states that it is rational to be either impartial or egoistic in any circumstance (pg131). Author believes that for Sidgwick it is the incomparability of egoistic and impartial reasons that means either are rational. This is rooted (for Sidgwick) in the separateness of persons and the duality of standpoints (pg133). Author believes that some reasons, even across kinds, are comparable (pg132) and uses an example of trying to build a building and account for both aesthetics and economics. Author then takes on Sidgwick's reasoning by enumerating it (pg134) and then rejecting portions of it.
Sidgwick:
(A) There are two standpoints which both give reasons for act, personal and impartial.
(B-C) From both perspectives, different reasons are supreme
(D) Comparison between kinds of reasons requires a third point-of-view
(E) There is no such point of view
Conclusion: Both personal and impartial views are rational
Author first rejects (A), then (D), then (B) by giving the example of saving yourself the pain of the prick of a pin versus the death of 1M people (pg135). Next author attacks the solely first-personal basis for personal action, by using the claim that the close ties we have with others give us personal reasons to care about the well-being of others. This is underwritten not by our personal identity, but by our "various psychological relations between ourselves as we are now and our future selves [and psychological relations with others]" (pg136). Author also argues we have impartial reasons to care about everyone's well-being.
Author partially agrees with Sidgwick in that different kinds of reasons are not fully comparable, though they are imprecisely so. Author unveils the Wide Value-Based Objective View here (pg137). Author argues we all have an impartial reason to alleviate suffering, wherever we can, though our relationship to our pain is different from our relationship to a stranger's pain (pg138-9).
One problem is the imprecise comparability of person-neutral and person-relative reasons. Can person-neutral reasons override person-relative ones only when hugely magnified? Author is inclined to disagree, saying that even a one-to-one swap of life (First Shipwreck) would be rational. The result is Wide Dualism, where we can be permitted to act in accord with our own well-being, or be permitted to be impartial; either reasoning is rational. (pg140)
Author next considers "the profoundest problem", where self-interested reasons and impartial reasons (the obligation to do one's duty) conflict. In short, a conflict between Moral Rationalism and Rational Egoism. Sidgwick tried to encompass the dualism by claiming that in cases of conflict, reason gives no guidance (pg142-3). This is really two problems (at least), according to author. First is the moralist's problem: in cases of conflict, people have good reason to act wrongly (in self-interest rather than morally). The other is the rationalist's problem: reason should give us guidance in these cases, or else reason is not our only (or ultimate) guide. (pg143-4)
Author discusses norms and different kinds of rules, lumping morality in with other kinds of norms. The problem is when multiple rules give conflicting guides. The solution is to find an impartial criterion for judgment, which author takes to be reason (pg146). Reason, according to author, "is wider, and more fundamental" (pg147). However, it isn't the case simply that reason is more important in the reason-implying sense (that would be circular). Instead, reason is the end of justification. (pg148)
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 6, Oxford University Press 2011
Author is firmly in the objective reasons theory now, comparing different kinds. Author starts with a discussion of Rational Egoism and Rational Impartialism being combined into Sidgwick's dualism, which states that it is rational to be either impartial or egoistic in any circumstance (pg131). Author believes that for Sidgwick it is the incomparability of egoistic and impartial reasons that means either are rational. This is rooted (for Sidgwick) in the separateness of persons and the duality of standpoints (pg133). Author believes that some reasons, even across kinds, are comparable (pg132) and uses an example of trying to build a building and account for both aesthetics and economics. Author then takes on Sidgwick's reasoning by enumerating it (pg134) and then rejecting portions of it.
Sidgwick:
(A) There are two standpoints which both give reasons for act, personal and impartial.
(B-C) From both perspectives, different reasons are supreme
(D) Comparison between kinds of reasons requires a third point-of-view
(E) There is no such point of view
Conclusion: Both personal and impartial views are rational
Author first rejects (A), then (D), then (B) by giving the example of saving yourself the pain of the prick of a pin versus the death of 1M people (pg135). Next author attacks the solely first-personal basis for personal action, by using the claim that the close ties we have with others give us personal reasons to care about the well-being of others. This is underwritten not by our personal identity, but by our "various psychological relations between ourselves as we are now and our future selves [and psychological relations with others]" (pg136). Author also argues we have impartial reasons to care about everyone's well-being.
Author partially agrees with Sidgwick in that different kinds of reasons are not fully comparable, though they are imprecisely so. Author unveils the Wide Value-Based Objective View here (pg137). Author argues we all have an impartial reason to alleviate suffering, wherever we can, though our relationship to our pain is different from our relationship to a stranger's pain (pg138-9).
One problem is the imprecise comparability of person-neutral and person-relative reasons. Can person-neutral reasons override person-relative ones only when hugely magnified? Author is inclined to disagree, saying that even a one-to-one swap of life (First Shipwreck) would be rational. The result is Wide Dualism, where we can be permitted to act in accord with our own well-being, or be permitted to be impartial; either reasoning is rational. (pg140)
Author next considers "the profoundest problem", where self-interested reasons and impartial reasons (the obligation to do one's duty) conflict. In short, a conflict between Moral Rationalism and Rational Egoism. Sidgwick tried to encompass the dualism by claiming that in cases of conflict, reason gives no guidance (pg142-3). This is really two problems (at least), according to author. First is the moralist's problem: in cases of conflict, people have good reason to act wrongly (in self-interest rather than morally). The other is the rationalist's problem: reason should give us guidance in these cases, or else reason is not our only (or ultimate) guide. (pg143-4)
Author discusses norms and different kinds of rules, lumping morality in with other kinds of norms. The problem is when multiple rules give conflicting guides. The solution is to find an impartial criterion for judgment, which author takes to be reason (pg146). Reason, according to author, "is wider, and more fundamental" (pg147). However, it isn't the case simply that reason is more important in the reason-implying sense (that would be circular). Instead, reason is the end of justification. (pg148)
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