04/27/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011
First two paragraphs lay out the relation between reason-giving facts and beliefs, which offer apparent reasons. When beliefs are true, then B not only has apparent reason to act, but real reason. B acts rationally when acting on apparent reasons. This is different from causal dependence, on which beliefs desires depend. Author lays out the nexus of beliefs, desires, reasons and rationality on pg112-3. Author rejects the view that it is irrational to have a desire iff it is based on an irrational belief. Author argues that it is a belief's content (pg113) that makes it rational or irrational. In other words, if the content of the belief would support the desire rationally, then the desire is rational, regardless of whether the belief is true (pg119). In some ways, a desire is rational when it is properly supported by a belief (whether that belief is rational or irrational). In other ways, not. Author works on hammering this out (pg115-7). Author concludes that there is epistemic irrationality, but that does not get transmitted over into desires, which can only have practical irrationality. A key distinction for author is that practical reasoning results in voluntary acts, but we have non-voluntary responses to epistemic reasons (pg118).
With meta-beliefs about normativity, the same division might not work (pg119). Author considers the case of Scarlet, Crimson, and Pink (pg120). All three have "true believes about what it is like to be in agony and in slight pain, and about personal identity, time and all the other relevant non-normative facts." Scarlet prefers agony on any Tuesday vs pain on any other day of the week, Crimson prefers agony tomorrow vs any shorter pain today, and Pink prefers pain tomorrow over slightly smaller pain today. Author argues that Scarlet and Crimson are irrational, though practically rational by matching their preferences up to their beliefs (pg121). Pink is also irrational because his recognition of the irrelevance of time is correct, yet Pink still picks the pain tomorrow. However this is outweighed by having "rational beliefs about reasons" (pg122).
Next author considers the case of whether it makes any difference whether Scarlet or Crimson are subjectivists about reasons. For author, the answer is no: they are still irrational. However, it is not irrational to be a subjectivist (pg124). Author further claims that equating "rational" with "maximize expected utility" is a definitional claim, not a substantive one (pg125). Author considers other ways of using the term "rational". An interesting case is inconsistent desires. To author, they are not irrational, though acting on them both may be (pg127-8).
4/20/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 4 Further Arguments
04/20/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 4, Oxford University Press 2011
Subjectivists are committed, according to author, to claim that someone is rational in pursuing a future period of agony, if that is what their ideally informed desires are. This is Case Two (pg83) and is an argument against subjectivism due to the absurdity. A subjectivist cannot argue that this is inconceivable because "we can want what we know will be bad for us." (pg84). Refinement to this by the subjectivist could go as follows:
-There must be a reason people have to hold a desire. Like: B wants to avoid some future agony.
Author replies by framing an example that someone wouldn't want to avoid some agony for instrumental reasons (pg85). A subjectivist might further argue that it is possible to act in accordance with a desire by having a second-order desire to have a first order desire (which one does not currently have) (pg85). Author argues this will not always do for wanting to avoid future agony either, because it might be unavoidable and just thinking about it induces anxiety, which B wants to avoid (pg86).
Author then considers cases where B could avoid the future agony. This would mean that B could have a "desire-based reason" to have the desire to avoid some future agony. This leads to a "rationally self-justifying" fulfill-able desires, which author claims are clearly false (pg87). Author claims that without having reasons to backstop desires, there is "no reason" to desire to avoid agony, or have future periods of happiness (pg87). Author concludes that the notion of reasons underwriting desires ("desire-based reasons") is a contradiction (and infinite regress) to the subjectivist approach (pg88).
Author continues to argue against subjectivism using Case Two, that there is no reason to avoid a future agony, if B desires that future agony (pg89). Author rejects subjectivists who claim an asymmetry between desires to avoid agony and no desires to avoid agony (pg89). This is the All or None Argument: that the subjectivist doesn't get to pick or choose which desires are reason-giving: either they all are or none of them are.
Author claims the only times subjectivist theories seem ok is when they overlap with objective theories of value. Author compares epistemic cases to normative ones (pg92-3). Author rejects that subjectivists even want to know all the facts relevant to their situation, since they would be sneaking in reason-giving facts into deliberation about desires (pg93-4). Author proceeds to claim that wanting being fully informed about desires is incoherent to the subjectivist view (pg95). This is the Incoherence Argument. The idea is that more information would only shed light on the intrinsic features of what is desired, in other words, what facts are truly reason-giving. Since that is an objectivist claim and not a subjectivist one, the subjectivist cannot appeal to it. "Most of us want to have better informed desires or aims because we believe what objective theories claim" (pg96).
Author believes that facts only are reason-giving for value, not for informing us as to the efficacy of our aims or for playing a part in desire creation. Or, rather, author does not admit that there can be any facts that can play a part in desire creation that isn't part of an objectivist account. (pg96). Author discusses a supposed subjectivist (Harry Frankfurt) who he believes is either a covert objectivist or incoherent (pg97-100). Author argues Frankfurt is not a nihilist about objective ends, but a pluralist (pg100).
Author goes back to clarifying the terms used with "best possible" and "better" and "best-for-someone", and so on (pg101-2). According to author, subjectivists can't use "best-for-someone" in any reason-implying sense, since that implies an objective way someone's life will go. Accordingly, subjectivists have no "self-interested" or "moral" reasons (just desires that give reasons). Author considers other ways to use "best-for-someone", using Rawls' thin theory of the good as a lens (pg103). Author considers other ways of evaluating whether one's life will be "best-for-[someone]" (pg105). People can mean:
-greatest sum of happiness minus suffering
-the possible life where all desires are fulfilled (or most are)
Author believes these claims are either tautological (pg105) or does not really help out the subjectivist. The subjectivist is still pegged to the conclusion that B can rationally pursue a fully-informed desire for agony, even if it is not best for B. (pg106)
Author considers versions of the "ought implies can" defense of subjectivism, which says that you cannot be compelled to do something if you are not motivated to do it (pg107-8). In other words, the only way we do anything is through desires, not reason-giving facts. Author does not believe this because it confuses normative reasons with motivating ones.
Lastly, author mentions the Metaphysical Naturalists, who claim that reasons are irreducibly normative, not fact-based, because all facts are scientific. (pg109) Again author believes this conflates motivating reasons with normative ones. Author also claims that this kind of naturalism applies to epistemic reasoning too, thus naturalism's own claims are not "true" in an objective-descriptive manner (pg110).
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 4, Oxford University Press 2011
Subjectivists are committed, according to author, to claim that someone is rational in pursuing a future period of agony, if that is what their ideally informed desires are. This is Case Two (pg83) and is an argument against subjectivism due to the absurdity. A subjectivist cannot argue that this is inconceivable because "we can want what we know will be bad for us." (pg84). Refinement to this by the subjectivist could go as follows:
-There must be a reason people have to hold a desire. Like: B wants to avoid some future agony.
Author replies by framing an example that someone wouldn't want to avoid some agony for instrumental reasons (pg85). A subjectivist might further argue that it is possible to act in accordance with a desire by having a second-order desire to have a first order desire (which one does not currently have) (pg85). Author argues this will not always do for wanting to avoid future agony either, because it might be unavoidable and just thinking about it induces anxiety, which B wants to avoid (pg86).
Author then considers cases where B could avoid the future agony. This would mean that B could have a "desire-based reason" to have the desire to avoid some future agony. This leads to a "rationally self-justifying" fulfill-able desires, which author claims are clearly false (pg87). Author claims that without having reasons to backstop desires, there is "no reason" to desire to avoid agony, or have future periods of happiness (pg87). Author concludes that the notion of reasons underwriting desires ("desire-based reasons") is a contradiction (and infinite regress) to the subjectivist approach (pg88).
Author continues to argue against subjectivism using Case Two, that there is no reason to avoid a future agony, if B desires that future agony (pg89). Author rejects subjectivists who claim an asymmetry between desires to avoid agony and no desires to avoid agony (pg89). This is the All or None Argument: that the subjectivist doesn't get to pick or choose which desires are reason-giving: either they all are or none of them are.
Author claims the only times subjectivist theories seem ok is when they overlap with objective theories of value. Author compares epistemic cases to normative ones (pg92-3). Author rejects that subjectivists even want to know all the facts relevant to their situation, since they would be sneaking in reason-giving facts into deliberation about desires (pg93-4). Author proceeds to claim that wanting being fully informed about desires is incoherent to the subjectivist view (pg95). This is the Incoherence Argument. The idea is that more information would only shed light on the intrinsic features of what is desired, in other words, what facts are truly reason-giving. Since that is an objectivist claim and not a subjectivist one, the subjectivist cannot appeal to it. "Most of us want to have better informed desires or aims because we believe what objective theories claim" (pg96).
Author believes that facts only are reason-giving for value, not for informing us as to the efficacy of our aims or for playing a part in desire creation. Or, rather, author does not admit that there can be any facts that can play a part in desire creation that isn't part of an objectivist account. (pg96). Author discusses a supposed subjectivist (Harry Frankfurt) who he believes is either a covert objectivist or incoherent (pg97-100). Author argues Frankfurt is not a nihilist about objective ends, but a pluralist (pg100).
Author goes back to clarifying the terms used with "best possible" and "better" and "best-for-someone", and so on (pg101-2). According to author, subjectivists can't use "best-for-someone" in any reason-implying sense, since that implies an objective way someone's life will go. Accordingly, subjectivists have no "self-interested" or "moral" reasons (just desires that give reasons). Author considers other ways to use "best-for-someone", using Rawls' thin theory of the good as a lens (pg103). Author considers other ways of evaluating whether one's life will be "best-for-[someone]" (pg105). People can mean:
-greatest sum of happiness minus suffering
-the possible life where all desires are fulfilled (or most are)
Author believes these claims are either tautological (pg105) or does not really help out the subjectivist. The subjectivist is still pegged to the conclusion that B can rationally pursue a fully-informed desire for agony, even if it is not best for B. (pg106)
Author considers versions of the "ought implies can" defense of subjectivism, which says that you cannot be compelled to do something if you are not motivated to do it (pg107-8). In other words, the only way we do anything is through desires, not reason-giving facts. Author does not believe this because it confuses normative reasons with motivating ones.
Lastly, author mentions the Metaphysical Naturalists, who claim that reasons are irreducibly normative, not fact-based, because all facts are scientific. (pg109) Again author believes this conflates motivating reasons with normative ones. Author also claims that this kind of naturalism applies to epistemic reasoning too, thus naturalism's own claims are not "true" in an objective-descriptive manner (pg110).
4/13/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 3 Subjective Theories
04/13/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011
Notes:
The simplest subjectivist about reasons might claim a simple desire-based theory: B has reason to act on whatever B's present desires are. The trouble is some desires should give reasons, e.g. when you have conflicting desires, or desires based on false beliefs, or faulty means-ends reasoning. (pg58-9) A small alteration to fit these cases is to claim that only telic (ends-desired-for-their-own-sakes) desires give us reasons to act.
Author brings up the case of when telic desires rest on false beliefs. Author asserts the subjectivist should deny these give reasons too (pg60). So present telic desires are reason giving only if error-free, as another amendment. Further refinement shows that telic desires from ignorance are not reason-giving; thus desires you would have with more knowledge (but don't have right now) are (might be) reason-giving. Discussion on informed desire theories (pg61).
Other subjective theories focus on choices made once someone is informed, not the desires they have. (pg61) This is distinct from an objectivist who might claim the same thing, but as a procedure to reach the right reason, not as a justification about what reason is right. (pg62-3)
Author thinks all versions of subjectivism should be rejected. Why is subjectivism so readily accepted by so many? Author offers reasons: (pg65-68) 1- we often desire what we have good reason to do. 2- we sometimes desire what would be good. 3- some people accept desire-based theories of well-being. 4- we often appeal to our desires when asked to explain our motivation, why we acted as we did (but not normative reason why). 5- derivative or instrumental reasons can be desire-based, thus people confuse them. 6- we value other people's desires, even if they have no reason to have them, for the sake of respecting autonomy. 7- we confuse rationally acting to fulfill a desire with having a reason for acting. 8- desire-based subjectivism gets assumed in hedonic reasons for acting, since it is assumed we desire what is pleasurable. Except when we desire something that we falsely believe is pleasurable. 9- we confuse the desire to avoid pain with the dislike of a painful sensation, and assume that "hedonic reasons are desire-based". No: hedonic reasons can create the desire to end/start x; it isn't the desire that gives the reason. 10- sometimes desires create reasons for acting since the reason is causally dependent on there being a desire. But a reason that is normatively dependent on a desire is different from one that is causally dependent on a desire.
In discussion that follows, author claims that other facts ("desire-dependent"), not the desire itself, is what gives the reasons for acting. (pg68-9)
Author claims another reason people think there are subjective reasons is that they are taken by analytic claims (tautologies) that are either open or closed, but both avoid substantive claims (pg70-72). The most serious is to use the term "reason" for action as a desire-fulfillment term. This creates a tautology that is not substantive.
Author claims that subjectivism can lead to odd outcomes, like not having the desire to avoid future agony (pg73-4). Author claims attempts to fix this oddity strays from subjectivism. Using this case, author argues that the agony argument defeats subjectivism. Author then replies to possible objections (pg76-7). The most significant objection to the agony argument is that informed and rational deliberation would transmit future desire into the present. Author claims that subjectivists can only help themselves to procedural rationality (means-ends rationality?). But the problem for subjectivists is that they can't appeal to facts to make their case for rationality (like the fact that the future is the same as the present) (pg78-9). So author believes the agony argument stands and subjectivism falls. Argument goes as follows:
1. Subjectivists must accept the possibility that B can have no reason to avoid future agony because B has no fully informed desire to do so.
2. We all have reason to avoid future agony.
3. Thus, subjectivism is false.
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 3, Oxford University Press 2011
Notes:
The simplest subjectivist about reasons might claim a simple desire-based theory: B has reason to act on whatever B's present desires are. The trouble is some desires should give reasons, e.g. when you have conflicting desires, or desires based on false beliefs, or faulty means-ends reasoning. (pg58-9) A small alteration to fit these cases is to claim that only telic (ends-desired-for-their-own-sakes) desires give us reasons to act.
Author brings up the case of when telic desires rest on false beliefs. Author asserts the subjectivist should deny these give reasons too (pg60). So present telic desires are reason giving only if error-free, as another amendment. Further refinement shows that telic desires from ignorance are not reason-giving; thus desires you would have with more knowledge (but don't have right now) are (might be) reason-giving. Discussion on informed desire theories (pg61).
Other subjective theories focus on choices made once someone is informed, not the desires they have. (pg61) This is distinct from an objectivist who might claim the same thing, but as a procedure to reach the right reason, not as a justification about what reason is right. (pg62-3)
Author thinks all versions of subjectivism should be rejected. Why is subjectivism so readily accepted by so many? Author offers reasons: (pg65-68) 1- we often desire what we have good reason to do. 2- we sometimes desire what would be good. 3- some people accept desire-based theories of well-being. 4- we often appeal to our desires when asked to explain our motivation, why we acted as we did (but not normative reason why). 5- derivative or instrumental reasons can be desire-based, thus people confuse them. 6- we value other people's desires, even if they have no reason to have them, for the sake of respecting autonomy. 7- we confuse rationally acting to fulfill a desire with having a reason for acting. 8- desire-based subjectivism gets assumed in hedonic reasons for acting, since it is assumed we desire what is pleasurable. Except when we desire something that we falsely believe is pleasurable. 9- we confuse the desire to avoid pain with the dislike of a painful sensation, and assume that "hedonic reasons are desire-based". No: hedonic reasons can create the desire to end/start x; it isn't the desire that gives the reason. 10- sometimes desires create reasons for acting since the reason is causally dependent on there being a desire. But a reason that is normatively dependent on a desire is different from one that is causally dependent on a desire.
In discussion that follows, author claims that other facts ("desire-dependent"), not the desire itself, is what gives the reasons for acting. (pg68-9)
Author claims another reason people think there are subjective reasons is that they are taken by analytic claims (tautologies) that are either open or closed, but both avoid substantive claims (pg70-72). The most serious is to use the term "reason" for action as a desire-fulfillment term. This creates a tautology that is not substantive.
Author claims that subjectivism can lead to odd outcomes, like not having the desire to avoid future agony (pg73-4). Author claims attempts to fix this oddity strays from subjectivism. Using this case, author argues that the agony argument defeats subjectivism. Author then replies to possible objections (pg76-7). The most significant objection to the agony argument is that informed and rational deliberation would transmit future desire into the present. Author claims that subjectivists can only help themselves to procedural rationality (means-ends rationality?). But the problem for subjectivists is that they can't appeal to facts to make their case for rationality (like the fact that the future is the same as the present) (pg78-9). So author believes the agony argument stands and subjectivism falls. Argument goes as follows:
1. Subjectivists must accept the possibility that B can have no reason to avoid future agony because B has no fully informed desire to do so.
2. We all have reason to avoid future agony.
3. Thus, subjectivism is false.
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