02/25/2011
This paper advances the thesis that Aristotle considered eudaimonia to be an inclusive concept of a mixture between the political virtues and the activity of contemplation. Further, the practical/political virtues and contemplation are goods-in-themselves and take part in eudaimonia because they are constitutive of it, not because they are instrumental for eudaimonia.
Author begins by reviewing the main question around Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: what is the best life for a man to lead? The answer seems to first be the political/practical virtues (henceforth: the political virtues), and yet in book 10 of NE, Aristotle seems to claim that it is instead engaging in contemplation.
Author reviews prominent efforts to explain this discrepancy on a higher level-- explaining possible incoherence in Aristotle's thinking.
The first is Gauthier & Jolif, who contend that Aristotle believed that the political virtues create a characteristic state that favors the exercise of contemplation. But this would mean they were instrumental, so they aren't good-in-themselves, which is inconsistent with Aristotle's view on virtues. They try to explain the inconsistency by saying Aristotle confused the value of 'productive activity' with the value of actions themselves.
The second is Hintikka, who argues that Aristotle is locked into a teleological way of thinking, so he must relegate actions he found inherently valuable as means to an even further end, in this case a kind-of place holder: eudaimonia.
The third is Hardie, who argues that Aristotle has a standard view that eudaimonia has one "dominant" activity as the good in human life. (And that is contemplation). Instead of allowing eudaimonia to be inclusive of multiple activities (he has "flashes" where he allows that), Aristotle is committed to one end providing for eudaimonia, for humans: contemplation.
Author believes that Aristotle has an inclusive concept of eudaimonia and that there is no reason to believe he was confused on the matter. (pg59)
Author first takes time to lay out what is meant by an 'inclusive' concept of eudaimonia. (III) The idea is that there is a plurality of ends that make up eudaimonia, as opposed to a single 'dominant' or 'monolithic' end. Author also argues that eudaimonia as a concept does not entail dominance of one end. Author then delves into the text and focuses especially on a sequence in book 1 where Aristotle talks about subordinate activities and outcomes. The idea is that activities valued only instrumentally can be nested in a hierarchy of subordination (buy food-to cook food-to eat food) but that so too can activities valued in themselves also be nested in a hierarchy. Author believes this is the concept of good-as-constitutive, rather than just the standard good-as-means evaluation. (IV) What this allows is that goods-in-themselves can also be goods-for-the-sake-of eudaimonia (pg61-2).
Author then examines book 7 where eudaimonia is considered to be 'self-sufficient', meaning that it isn't aimed at for the sake of anything else, and that it is the final end of human pursuits. (V) (pg63-4) This is a logical point in the concept of eudaimonia. However, eudaimonia itself can be composed of numerous ends-in-themselves. "...There are several final ends. When Aristotle says that if so we are seeking the most final he is surely not laying down that only one of them (theoria) is really a final end." (pg65) Instead, he is saying that once we assess that there are many final ends, we must give the most final, which is eudaimonia. [This seems to turn eudaimonia into a kind-of placeholder.] Author swipes at Kenny, who tries to translate eudaimonia into happiness-- author denies this is possible since happiness can be forsaken for other pursuits, while eudaimonia as a concept cannot. (pg66-7)
Author then tries to debunk the reading that eudaimonia involves a 'dominant' activity or single object of desire. In book 1 chapter 2, Aristotle apparently commits the fallacy of concluding that since everything is done for a reason, a single reason is responsible for why everything is done. While Hardie (proponent of the 'dominant' end) acquits Aristotle (pg68), author holds Aristotle on the hook, but re-reads the passage to include the conceptual argument about eudaimonia previously given. So of course everything is done for the sake of eudaimonia-- that is a conceptual truth. The conclusion is only easy to disprove because there are multiple ends-in-themselves. But if eudaimonia is inclusive of those ends, then the conceptual nature of eudaimonia as including all ends-in-themselves is preserved.
Author then moves to discuss the famous ergon argument from Aristotle in book 1: that the specific function of a being will determine its eudaimonia. For humans, it is the rational element-- that intellect and reason can dictate to the emotions. Author argues this does not readily favor contemplation over practical reason (and the political virtues). (pg70) He even argues against such favoritism since contemplation is distinctive to the gods, not to humans. For author here as well as in other places, 'most final' means, for Aristotle, 'final without qualification'-- a comprehensive end that could easily include many constitutive ends-in-themselves. It doesn't mean one exclusive end-in-itself. (pg71)
The problem for this interpretation of Aristotle is that he should surely have realized that if there are more than a single end-in-itself to pursue, what is the combination-- what's the recipe-- for which ones to pursue, and when? Author complains that this is a difficult answer to work out, especially with Plato's Protagoras looking over Aristotle's shoulder. (VIII) (pg72)
Author goes on to examine the interplay of practical reason and contemplation after book 10-- does practical reason try to maximize contemplation? Do you perform the political virtues for the sake of contemplation? (Author: no. pg 73-4)
2/11/11
Bush, Stephen - Divine and Human Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics
02/11/2011
Philosophical Review, Vol 117 No 1, 2008
This paper discusses the ostensibly contradictory position by Aristotle that in the Nichomachean Ethics happiness consists in contemplation (the exercise of theoretic reason) and, also, that happiness consists in the exercise of the political virtues. Author's position is that Aristotle takes a dualistic approach to happiness, one activity of a human is divine happiness, another activity of a human being human happiness. This is contrary to two other interpretations, one he considers "monistic" and another is 'inclusive', or aggregate. The monistic version tries to have the contemplative activity as the good and argues that the civic virtues are somehow related, approximating, or subservient to theoretical reason. The inclusive or aggregate view author believes is an unnatural reading of the text, so it is largely ignored (pg50).
The monist interpretation, after reading book 10 of NE, becomes an intellectualist interpretation since contemplation, or exercise of theoretic reason, is the highest good. The trouble is what the status of the civic virtues like generosity, courage, justice are if they are not human goods in themselves. Author reviews the recent attempts by three authors to show how the civic virtues are related to the intellecualist position. The authors are Gabriel Richardson Lear, John Cooper, and Richard Kraut.
Richardson Lear argues that there are mid-level ends that are both goods-in-themselves but also for some other good. The way that the civic virtues are goods for the sake of happiness is a good-by-approximation. "If a middle-level end approximates the final end in some significant manner, that relation of approximation endows the middle-level end with intrinsic value that is derived from the value of the final end." (pg52) Another author, Cooper, argues differently. For Cooper, contemplation is an activity that is kind-of the progenitor of the exercise of civic virtues, since they are properly executed using practical reason. Since practical reason resembles theoretic reason and practical reason is the executive for the civic virtues, the intrinsic value of theoretic reason is conferred to practical reason and the exercise of the civic virtues. The final author considered here, Kraut, gives a kind-of first-choice, second-choice answer: the highest happiness is contemplation, but failing that, the second-best is civic virtue. (pg54-5) Author gives the problem for each of the intellectual monists: civic virtue and contemplation are two distinct activities; if both constitute happiness, then the view can't be monistic. "While Richardson Lear and Cooper spend proportionately a great deal of time demonstrating that the morally virtuous life is choiceworthy and valuable, neither gives much attention to how we can properly call that life happy." (pg53) Author presents his inconsistent tetrad: (pg54)
a) happiness is monistic
b) contemplative activity is exclusively happiness
c) contemplative activity and morally virtuous activity are distinct from each other
d) morally virtuous activity is happiness
What Cooper and Richardson Lear seem to advocate is that one can have a happy life without practicing theoretic reason since civic virtue approximates (Richardson Leer) or is related to (Cooper) theoretic reason. But this means a life of civic virtue can be a happy one but it lacks the activity of happiness, that is, contemplation. So author takes an interlude through the text of NE to discover whether Aristotle believed that one could be happy without the activity of happiness (pg56-8), or whether Aristotle believed that there was a robust condition of happiness that was separate from the good activity. (Author concludes: no)
Author believes Aristotle is clear that practicing the civic virtues is happiness, and that practicing contemplation is happiness. While this indicts monism, it does not lead him to an aggregate or inclusivist theory; rather, author advances a dualist theory of happiness. Other dualist theories have come from writers like Dominic Scott, whose work author reviews (pg60-1). Scott believes that Aristotle has primary happiness, in the strict sense, as contemplation, but derivative, secondary, happiness in the civic virtues. This is because humans have a bifocal nature-- one of contemplation but also one of practical reason and emotion. Author finds this particular take unconvincing because of the paradigmatic/secondary aspect of happiness.
Instead, author proposes a distinction between the 'characteristic human good' and 'the highest good that humans can obtain'. (pg61-2) The concept is that humans can reach human happiness based on their characteristic human good (practical reason), but that humans also possess theoretic reason, which will allow them to engage in an activity of divine happiness (contemplation). The characteristic human activity is to have its emotions conform to reason (the compound of reason and emotion)-- in the civic virtues. Yet, "The characteristic or peculiar good of a species is not necessarily the highest good that a species can obtain." (pg62) Author takes this thesis through the text of the NE (pg62-68). Along the way author pulls the strands of characteristic human-goods and human-happiness and of divine-goods and divine-happiness (pg64). So, on this reading, the highest human good is civic virtue, but humans can still access even a higher good-- though not a human one (a divine one)-- in contemplation. (pg67)
The interpretive difficulty in author's dualistic theory is a question about whether Aristotle implies that humans are 'mostly theoretic', and so the highest human good should be identified by the practice of their characteristic activity-- their theoretic capacities, contemplation. This would throw the divine element back into the human compound, destroying the dualistic distinction. (pg69-70) This is a question of how Aristotle sees the identity of the human-- what is the distinctive quality for humans? Author favors a reading of 'mostly' (malista) not as 'strictly' but 'especially'. (pg71) Author supposes Aristotle favors a distinction between what is 'merely human' and what is human and also divine. (pg72)
Philosophical Review, Vol 117 No 1, 2008
This paper discusses the ostensibly contradictory position by Aristotle that in the Nichomachean Ethics happiness consists in contemplation (the exercise of theoretic reason) and, also, that happiness consists in the exercise of the political virtues. Author's position is that Aristotle takes a dualistic approach to happiness, one activity of a human is divine happiness, another activity of a human being human happiness. This is contrary to two other interpretations, one he considers "monistic" and another is 'inclusive', or aggregate. The monistic version tries to have the contemplative activity as the good and argues that the civic virtues are somehow related, approximating, or subservient to theoretical reason. The inclusive or aggregate view author believes is an unnatural reading of the text, so it is largely ignored (pg50).
The monist interpretation, after reading book 10 of NE, becomes an intellectualist interpretation since contemplation, or exercise of theoretic reason, is the highest good. The trouble is what the status of the civic virtues like generosity, courage, justice are if they are not human goods in themselves. Author reviews the recent attempts by three authors to show how the civic virtues are related to the intellecualist position. The authors are Gabriel Richardson Lear, John Cooper, and Richard Kraut.
Richardson Lear argues that there are mid-level ends that are both goods-in-themselves but also for some other good. The way that the civic virtues are goods for the sake of happiness is a good-by-approximation. "If a middle-level end approximates the final end in some significant manner, that relation of approximation endows the middle-level end with intrinsic value that is derived from the value of the final end." (pg52) Another author, Cooper, argues differently. For Cooper, contemplation is an activity that is kind-of the progenitor of the exercise of civic virtues, since they are properly executed using practical reason. Since practical reason resembles theoretic reason and practical reason is the executive for the civic virtues, the intrinsic value of theoretic reason is conferred to practical reason and the exercise of the civic virtues. The final author considered here, Kraut, gives a kind-of first-choice, second-choice answer: the highest happiness is contemplation, but failing that, the second-best is civic virtue. (pg54-5) Author gives the problem for each of the intellectual monists: civic virtue and contemplation are two distinct activities; if both constitute happiness, then the view can't be monistic. "While Richardson Lear and Cooper spend proportionately a great deal of time demonstrating that the morally virtuous life is choiceworthy and valuable, neither gives much attention to how we can properly call that life happy." (pg53) Author presents his inconsistent tetrad: (pg54)
a) happiness is monistic
b) contemplative activity is exclusively happiness
c) contemplative activity and morally virtuous activity are distinct from each other
d) morally virtuous activity is happiness
What Cooper and Richardson Lear seem to advocate is that one can have a happy life without practicing theoretic reason since civic virtue approximates (Richardson Leer) or is related to (Cooper) theoretic reason. But this means a life of civic virtue can be a happy one but it lacks the activity of happiness, that is, contemplation. So author takes an interlude through the text of NE to discover whether Aristotle believed that one could be happy without the activity of happiness (pg56-8), or whether Aristotle believed that there was a robust condition of happiness that was separate from the good activity. (Author concludes: no)
Author believes Aristotle is clear that practicing the civic virtues is happiness, and that practicing contemplation is happiness. While this indicts monism, it does not lead him to an aggregate or inclusivist theory; rather, author advances a dualist theory of happiness. Other dualist theories have come from writers like Dominic Scott, whose work author reviews (pg60-1). Scott believes that Aristotle has primary happiness, in the strict sense, as contemplation, but derivative, secondary, happiness in the civic virtues. This is because humans have a bifocal nature-- one of contemplation but also one of practical reason and emotion. Author finds this particular take unconvincing because of the paradigmatic/secondary aspect of happiness.
Instead, author proposes a distinction between the 'characteristic human good' and 'the highest good that humans can obtain'. (pg61-2) The concept is that humans can reach human happiness based on their characteristic human good (practical reason), but that humans also possess theoretic reason, which will allow them to engage in an activity of divine happiness (contemplation). The characteristic human activity is to have its emotions conform to reason (the compound of reason and emotion)-- in the civic virtues. Yet, "The characteristic or peculiar good of a species is not necessarily the highest good that a species can obtain." (pg62) Author takes this thesis through the text of the NE (pg62-68). Along the way author pulls the strands of characteristic human-goods and human-happiness and of divine-goods and divine-happiness (pg64). So, on this reading, the highest human good is civic virtue, but humans can still access even a higher good-- though not a human one (a divine one)-- in contemplation. (pg67)
The interpretive difficulty in author's dualistic theory is a question about whether Aristotle implies that humans are 'mostly theoretic', and so the highest human good should be identified by the practice of their characteristic activity-- their theoretic capacities, contemplation. This would throw the divine element back into the human compound, destroying the dualistic distinction. (pg69-70) This is a question of how Aristotle sees the identity of the human-- what is the distinctive quality for humans? Author favors a reading of 'mostly' (malista) not as 'strictly' but 'especially'. (pg71) Author supposes Aristotle favors a distinction between what is 'merely human' and what is human and also divine. (pg72)
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