Strawson, Peter - The Mental and the Physical

12/03/2010

Skepticism and Naturalism Ch 3, Columbia University Press, 1985

This book chapter discusses the mind-body problem, specifically the 'Identity Thesis' that mental events are identical to physical ones. Author puts the discussion within the context of what author considers to be a dialogue between skeptics and naturalists. Author prefaces the discussion on the identity thesis with a recap of the comparison between the scientistisc approach to natural phenomena and the more phenomenal approach to the same events. For instance, there is a natural disposition to believe in the reality of colors, yet the scientistic approach dispenses with them in favor of some micro-properties, e.g., of surface spectral reflectance. Author contends that either standpoint can be occupied and that neither is superior to the other. (pg52)

The identity thesis is that events or states in a 'person's mental history... are, all of them, identical with events or states belonging to his physical history' (pg53)-- an anti-dualist approach. Author approaches the debate over the truth of the identity thesis by trying to establish some common elements of agreement, and, about the particular arguments supporting it, "tries to circumvent" them. Author gives a 'trivial' truth: that whatever is happening to a human subject at any given moment (in waking life), there are both physical and mental descriptions of it. Author calls them two 'stories'-- the physical and the personal. Perhaps an entirely physical story could be told, but it would leave out all that is "humanly interesting" (pg56). And no one supposes that the personal story isn't correlated with the physical one, at least somehow. (pg57) The discussion moves to what kind of connection could exist between the two kinds of description: is there 'causal linkage' or an identity, or some other model? Here author suggests that, instead of trying to decide what the connection between the two descriptions is, we should be 'noncommittal', preferring instead to be content with the two descriptions and understand there is a 'physical realization of the mental' (pg61).

Interestingly, author rejects as unsound the common objection to the causal claim-- that it makes the mental events into epiphenomena, not causally relevant, or "nomological danglers". It is unsound because the physical account would not yield an explanation for human action or agency. It would yield predictable physical events, but, author claims, the explanations for human behavior/actions lies in the personal descriptions, not the physical events. (pg62-3)

Overall, author believes there should be enthusiasm for uncovering the relationships between the physical operations of the brain and mental events, but remains agnostic about the identity theory. Finally, author wraps up the parallel author drew between the scientistic denial of phenomenal qualities and the physicalist denial of qualia (pg64-68).