12/17/2010
The Philosophical Review, Vol 50, No 1 Jan 1991
This paper ties to defend the view that humans are rational ultimate ends-seekers against two objections from Elizabeth Anscombe. The view is Aristotle's but more refined by Aquinas, and it is, roughly, that all human activity aims at some (one) ultimate end. Anscombe's objections are given on the first page: first, human actions might have no particular end, and second, to believe that every human action aims at one ultimate end is probably an error in reasoning: a fallacious move from 'every action has some end' to 'some end is had for every action'. (pg31) Aside from the logical fallacy, the author's main task is to account for how the view that multiple intrinsic ends can be admitted to the Aristotelian conception of one ultimate end at which all human action aims. (pg32) Instead of using a reconstruction of Aristotle's argument, author prefers to use Aquinas' throughout the paper, since he believes is more expanded and explicit.
Author considers Aquinas' argument to have four main parts, each of which author goes about refining and defending. (pg34)
[A] Each human action is for the sake of some end
[B] Each human action is for the sake of some ultimate end
[C] There is some single ultimate end for the sake of which all the human actions of an individual human being are done
[D] There is some single ultimate end for the sake of which all human actions of all human beings are done
Over the course of the paper, author refines all the above claims into modified ones:
[A'] Each human action properly so-called, that is, each action resulting from deliberated willing, is for the sake of some end (pg37)
[B'] Each fully rational human action is for the sake of at least one weak ultimate end (pg45)
[C'] There is some single strong ultimate end for the sake of which all the human actions of a fully rational being are done (pg47)
[D'] All fully rational human beings share a purely formal strong ultimate end (pg61)
The paper takes each claim in order and converts it to it's altered state, and then discusses each one. First is to narrow the discussion of human action to human action that is done on a rational basis. Author utilizes a common distinction in Aquinas involving activities associated with humans (e.g. breathing) and actions done by a human qua human-- by virtue of a having reason. (pg35) Thus, Anscombe's first objection, that some human activity is just 'doing what we are doing, just because' is isolated into a different set of activities and author only wants to focus on those done for a reason. Author sketches what it means to perform a human action properly so-called: it is the intellect conceiving of a good, judging it as good, and presenting it to the will as worth doing: 'deliberated willing' (pg36). With this explication, author argues that A' is a conceptual truth talking about a subset of human activity, and author believes this subset is sufficiently large to be interesting (pg38-9). The key point here, which is used as a strategy throughout the paper, is to avoid taking A-D as being empirical generalizations about humans but instead criteria for what rational action consists in for humans (pg39-40). The second main strategy is to insist that Aquinas' arguments are laying out formal criteria, not contentful ones. Which particular ends Aquinas might believe are intrinsically the best are not implicit in A-D. (pg40-1)
In the next section author gives some terminology regarding ends and means: an end is subordinate if it is done for the sake of another end, and such a relation is transitive. (pg42) Author will later give further specifications: subordinate ends can be subordinate-as-constituent or subordinate-as-means (pg52), both of which, author claims, are distinct from the third subordination: instrumental subordination. More terminology: means-ends actions go into a 'tree'; every human action has an end'-tree, and it must contain one 'ultimate' end, meaning an end sought for itself. The argument for each tree having an ultimate end (pg43-4) is that without such an end, the will would not be moved to pursue the subordinate ends or other means. (This might also serve as a reason why an end tree cannot be infinite, without a terminus). An ultimate end (end desirable in itself) is named a 'weak ultimate end', to contrast it with a 'strong ultimate end', which is considered an end or set of ends that fully satisfy a particular human. [Of interest here is that author will talk about creating a strong ultimate end out of deliberation and conscious, rational, discarding of some weak ultimate ends (pg65)] With the argument for the need for at least one end-in-itself (weak ultimate end), author specifies B'.
The next part of the paper seeks to install plausibility for C', and author relies heavily on the formal, criterial aspects of the discussion and also some additional distinctions. For author, a strong ultimate end is considered simple to be an end which fully satisfies the rational human to every extent possible: "it completely fulfills all a human being's rational desires". (pg46-7) However, it does not have to be one thing. It can be an aggregate of many weak ultimate ends, combined together into one (disjunctive?) end. To believe that a strong ultimate end must be one thing is a 'monolithic' conception of the ultimate end, of which, author conjectures, hedonistic utilitarianism is an example. (pg48) However, there can be an aggregate case, which is a collection of weak ultimate ends into some sort of formula. (pg49-50) It is here that author introduces ends that can be ends-in-themselves but also subordinate-as-constituents of a further-- aggregated-- ultimate end. (pg51) "The possibility of an aggregate view of ultimate ends, then, requires us to distinguish three different relations of subordination among ends: instrumental subordination, subordinatino-as-a-constituent-part, and subordination-as-a-means." (pg53)
The worrisome part of Aquinas' argument for the rationality of an ultimate end is the teleological element-- that each being desires its own 'perfection'. But author believes that the case can be made that it is rational to have a strong ultimate end without such teleology. (pg54) The way author goes about this is to try to establish that the human intellect can consider 'the good' in the abstract, or the universal concept of 'the good'. Thus humans can not only consider a particular aim or goal as good-in-itself, but also form a conception of various goods as comprising the (abstract) good. (pg55) We can see how some goods conflict, how some might need weighing, or perhaps even rejecting. Thus a human can conceive of how her collection of good-in-themselves might conflict or might fit together into a coherent and structured ultimate good (using practical reason), the best life (pg56). What is also revealed here is that such an effort will uncover one single strong ultimate end (possibly aggregated), since more than one will mean incoherence or conflict-- a sort of schizophrenia (pg58). Author uses an example of Albert Schweitzer, who may have both wanted to pursue science and also music. Though he chose to pursue science, he could still recognize the pursuit of music as an end-in-itself, but he could not be said to desire it any longer. (pg57-8) Author places the use of practical reason in crafting an aggregate strong ultimate end from multiple ends-in-themselves.
Author introduces one more type of subordinate end, the subordinate-as-specification. (pg59) This subordinate is a determinate specification for a more abstract, indeterminate-ending ultimate end. Author uses 'attain political power' as the ultimate end, and 'win the mayoral race' as a subordinate-as-specification. Author then reviews the three types of ends (strong ultimate, weak ultimate, and instrumental-to-weak-ultimate) and the four subordinate relations (instrumental, -as-means, -as-constituents, -as-specifications) in a prolonged example of a triathelete. (pg60, also see appendix) The upshot of these introductions is that it gives best-life theorists much better tools in talking about the motivations and desires of their human subjects. For instance, it is acceptable to say both that one loves her children for its own sake, but also because it is a constituent of living well (pg63-4).
Author spcifies that rational human agents should all share a formal strong ultimate end-- which would be ether a monolithic or aggregate concept of the individual's most-satisfying good. (pg61-2) The trouble is in figuring out the content. Author believes that practical reasoning isn't just means-ends reasoning, but also reasoning about which ends go into the ultimate one (pg63-4). This is in contrast to philosophers who might argue that there is no rational way to decide between strong ultimate ends. (Frankfurt or Williams?)
12/17/10
12/10/10
Strawson, Peter - Morality and Perception
12/10/2010
Skepticism and Naturalism Ch 2, Columbia University Press, 1985
Author starts this chapter by talking about two dimensions of analysis of human behavior, the first being humans' natural inclination to talk about moral attitudes, free will, judgments, actions, and beliefs, and the other being the purely objective, morally 'skeptical', approach to the world which takes physical causes and physical behavior to the the only constituent elements. Author points our that a reasoned reply to this skepticism isn't efficacious since one can't be 'reasoned' out of either position. (pg32-3) Instead, it should be noted and agreed that it is a 'condition of our humanity' to see people as moral agents bearing freedom of choice and responsibility, and that occupancy of the other, purely physical, position, can be short-lived at best. (pg33-4) Here there is a contrast between what is natural for humans to assume about each other, and the 'naturalistic' position that can also be occupied, about the same subject matter. Hence two 'radically different' standpoints.
The answer for the author, for dealing with these two disparate positions, is not to choose between them, or even suggest that a choice must be made. In order to have the criteria to make such a choice, author suggests there must be a third, independent metaphysical place to occupy, and author believes there is no such place. Instead, admit both are accurate and habitable, though the naturalistic position less so than the 'naturalist' position of believing humans have moral attributes. While there are parallels between this move and answers to skepticism about the natural world, author argues there is a breakdown in the analogy since it is sometimes salubrious to occupy the naturalistic position, where it is not ever useful to be a physical world skeptic. (pg39-40)
Author argues better analogy is found in the debate over the reality of sensible properties like color, texture, smells. These sensibles can be reduced to surface reflectivity, chemicals in the air, and so on: purely physical properties expressed using micro-structures and causal forces. (pg42) The debate here is between the 'commonsense realist' and the 'scientific realist'. This debate does not need to have one victor; instead, we should recognize 'a certain ultimate relativity in our conception of the real' (pg44).
The trouble with this relativizing move is that it fails to appease the 'hard-line' physicalist, who feels the reductive position is compromised. (pg45) Author then takes an interlude into a discussion about the various internal relative conceptions of what is morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy. This mild moral relativism perhaps gives the naturalistic reductionist even more grist for the mill, now claiming that the reason we lack agreement is that the entire structure is based either on illusion or on some other mutable human function. Author's answer is just to assert that the naturalist and the naturalistic views aren't incompatible, one we are simply naturally committed to, and the other is intellectually habitable though not for very long (pg49-50).
Skepticism and Naturalism Ch 2, Columbia University Press, 1985
Author starts this chapter by talking about two dimensions of analysis of human behavior, the first being humans' natural inclination to talk about moral attitudes, free will, judgments, actions, and beliefs, and the other being the purely objective, morally 'skeptical', approach to the world which takes physical causes and physical behavior to the the only constituent elements. Author points our that a reasoned reply to this skepticism isn't efficacious since one can't be 'reasoned' out of either position. (pg32-3) Instead, it should be noted and agreed that it is a 'condition of our humanity' to see people as moral agents bearing freedom of choice and responsibility, and that occupancy of the other, purely physical, position, can be short-lived at best. (pg33-4) Here there is a contrast between what is natural for humans to assume about each other, and the 'naturalistic' position that can also be occupied, about the same subject matter. Hence two 'radically different' standpoints.
The answer for the author, for dealing with these two disparate positions, is not to choose between them, or even suggest that a choice must be made. In order to have the criteria to make such a choice, author suggests there must be a third, independent metaphysical place to occupy, and author believes there is no such place. Instead, admit both are accurate and habitable, though the naturalistic position less so than the 'naturalist' position of believing humans have moral attributes. While there are parallels between this move and answers to skepticism about the natural world, author argues there is a breakdown in the analogy since it is sometimes salubrious to occupy the naturalistic position, where it is not ever useful to be a physical world skeptic. (pg39-40)
Author argues better analogy is found in the debate over the reality of sensible properties like color, texture, smells. These sensibles can be reduced to surface reflectivity, chemicals in the air, and so on: purely physical properties expressed using micro-structures and causal forces. (pg42) The debate here is between the 'commonsense realist' and the 'scientific realist'. This debate does not need to have one victor; instead, we should recognize 'a certain ultimate relativity in our conception of the real' (pg44).
The trouble with this relativizing move is that it fails to appease the 'hard-line' physicalist, who feels the reductive position is compromised. (pg45) Author then takes an interlude into a discussion about the various internal relative conceptions of what is morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy. This mild moral relativism perhaps gives the naturalistic reductionist even more grist for the mill, now claiming that the reason we lack agreement is that the entire structure is based either on illusion or on some other mutable human function. Author's answer is just to assert that the naturalist and the naturalistic views aren't incompatible, one we are simply naturally committed to, and the other is intellectually habitable though not for very long (pg49-50).
12/3/10
Strawson, Peter - The Mental and the Physical
12/03/2010
Skepticism and Naturalism Ch 3, Columbia University Press, 1985
This book chapter discusses the mind-body problem, specifically the 'Identity Thesis' that mental events are identical to physical ones. Author puts the discussion within the context of what author considers to be a dialogue between skeptics and naturalists. Author prefaces the discussion on the identity thesis with a recap of the comparison between the scientistisc approach to natural phenomena and the more phenomenal approach to the same events. For instance, there is a natural disposition to believe in the reality of colors, yet the scientistic approach dispenses with them in favor of some micro-properties, e.g., of surface spectral reflectance. Author contends that either standpoint can be occupied and that neither is superior to the other. (pg52)
The identity thesis is that events or states in a 'person's mental history... are, all of them, identical with events or states belonging to his physical history' (pg53)-- an anti-dualist approach. Author approaches the debate over the truth of the identity thesis by trying to establish some common elements of agreement, and, about the particular arguments supporting it, "tries to circumvent" them. Author gives a 'trivial' truth: that whatever is happening to a human subject at any given moment (in waking life), there are both physical and mental descriptions of it. Author calls them two 'stories'-- the physical and the personal. Perhaps an entirely physical story could be told, but it would leave out all that is "humanly interesting" (pg56). And no one supposes that the personal story isn't correlated with the physical one, at least somehow. (pg57) The discussion moves to what kind of connection could exist between the two kinds of description: is there 'causal linkage' or an identity, or some other model? Here author suggests that, instead of trying to decide what the connection between the two descriptions is, we should be 'noncommittal', preferring instead to be content with the two descriptions and understand there is a 'physical realization of the mental' (pg61).
Interestingly, author rejects as unsound the common objection to the causal claim-- that it makes the mental events into epiphenomena, not causally relevant, or "nomological danglers". It is unsound because the physical account would not yield an explanation for human action or agency. It would yield predictable physical events, but, author claims, the explanations for human behavior/actions lies in the personal descriptions, not the physical events. (pg62-3)
Overall, author believes there should be enthusiasm for uncovering the relationships between the physical operations of the brain and mental events, but remains agnostic about the identity theory. Finally, author wraps up the parallel author drew between the scientistic denial of phenomenal qualities and the physicalist denial of qualia (pg64-68).
Skepticism and Naturalism Ch 3, Columbia University Press, 1985
This book chapter discusses the mind-body problem, specifically the 'Identity Thesis' that mental events are identical to physical ones. Author puts the discussion within the context of what author considers to be a dialogue between skeptics and naturalists. Author prefaces the discussion on the identity thesis with a recap of the comparison between the scientistisc approach to natural phenomena and the more phenomenal approach to the same events. For instance, there is a natural disposition to believe in the reality of colors, yet the scientistic approach dispenses with them in favor of some micro-properties, e.g., of surface spectral reflectance. Author contends that either standpoint can be occupied and that neither is superior to the other. (pg52)
The identity thesis is that events or states in a 'person's mental history... are, all of them, identical with events or states belonging to his physical history' (pg53)-- an anti-dualist approach. Author approaches the debate over the truth of the identity thesis by trying to establish some common elements of agreement, and, about the particular arguments supporting it, "tries to circumvent" them. Author gives a 'trivial' truth: that whatever is happening to a human subject at any given moment (in waking life), there are both physical and mental descriptions of it. Author calls them two 'stories'-- the physical and the personal. Perhaps an entirely physical story could be told, but it would leave out all that is "humanly interesting" (pg56). And no one supposes that the personal story isn't correlated with the physical one, at least somehow. (pg57) The discussion moves to what kind of connection could exist between the two kinds of description: is there 'causal linkage' or an identity, or some other model? Here author suggests that, instead of trying to decide what the connection between the two descriptions is, we should be 'noncommittal', preferring instead to be content with the two descriptions and understand there is a 'physical realization of the mental' (pg61).
Interestingly, author rejects as unsound the common objection to the causal claim-- that it makes the mental events into epiphenomena, not causally relevant, or "nomological danglers". It is unsound because the physical account would not yield an explanation for human action or agency. It would yield predictable physical events, but, author claims, the explanations for human behavior/actions lies in the personal descriptions, not the physical events. (pg62-3)
Overall, author believes there should be enthusiasm for uncovering the relationships between the physical operations of the brain and mental events, but remains agnostic about the identity theory. Finally, author wraps up the parallel author drew between the scientistic denial of phenomenal qualities and the physicalist denial of qualia (pg64-68).
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