09/25/2009
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 9 No 1 Jan 1972
This paper attempts to show that one can make a moral judgment and yet not have a prescriptive attitude toward that judgment. It defines 'internalism' as the theory that acceptance of a moral judgment implies having a favorable/unfavorable attitude toward the content of the judgment. Author considers philosophers such as Stevenson and Hare to hold or imply such views. Internalism can be found in emotivism and prescriptivism and is contrasted with 'externalism', which is that one may accept a moral judgment while have no corresponding favorable or unfavorable attitude towards it.
Author takes an example a moral dispute about segregation, where someone believes it is morally permissible for the reasons that blacks are inferior and more prone to immorality. But, upon being informed that they are not so (perhaps by showing social science studies), he is convinced that 'segregation is morally wrong'. But, strangely, also says that 'I am completely indifferent as to whether the practice continues' (pg87) The internalist claims that this person fails to understand what it means to say 'segregation is morally wrong', therefore he must not understand the meaning of the sentence. Yet author points out this person had previously believed that segregation was morally permissible and was convinced through argumentation that it was not. It seems to be prima facia that he understood what the sentences meant. (pg88)
Author considers three replies from the internalist, who might then turn to a non-cognitive analysis of 'morally wrong':
1) Stevenson's account of meaning: that 'morally wrong' has emotive meaning that disposes people to have unfavorable attitudes. Author believes this doesn't do the work the internalist needs (pg88)
2) A 'meaning as use' theory might claim that you misuse the 'morally wrong' term when you lack the unfavorable attitude. Author: this just pushes the problem one step back, and the externalist will disagree it is a misuse.
3) The person who is indifferent does not understand the meaning of 'morally wrong'. Author: this is question-begging.
Author does review many plausible reasons to be drawn to the internalist picture: that we expect someone who sincerely believes that segregation is wrong to feel unfavorable about it; that we don't consider it a success if we convince someone that x is morally wrong and then he is indifferent towards it; that when someone assents that x is wrong but then is indifferent that we consider him insincere; and finally that moral disagreements will entail differing attitudes when the issue is supported or rejected by the public. Author claims that what these intuitions show is that moral judgments almost always come in the context of moral concern, where our interests are intermixed. But this does not establish internalism, since the two sides of the judgment can-- in principle-- be pulled apart. (pg89-90)
Author then tries to give an account of why internalism is intuitively plausible by making a distinction between two kinds of 'assent'-- one that is merely belief-oriented and another that includes evaluative attitudes. The example is 'Jones eats like a pig', which you might accept disapprovingly (it is gross), or approvingly (it is natural-good). "Believing is not the only way in which persons may accept what is expressed by utterances of certain sentences, nor is divergence in believe the only kind of disagreement" (pg91) With this distinction-- between belief and assent-- author claims we can understand the plausibility of our intuitions without being internalists.
The final section of the paper considers the problems with non-cognitive meta-ethical theories if internalism is false, or at least if it has no support for its truth. Author claims that internalism is used as a premise to show that concepts like 'morally good' and 'valuable' are different in kind from concepts like 'red' or 'rectangular'. Internalism is also used as a basis for the claim that moral judgments are not a species of factual judgments. If internalism isn't properly underwritten, it cannot support these further meta-ethical claims.
9/18/09
Stevenson, CL - Persuasive Definitions
09/18/2009
Facts & Values, Ch 3 Yale Press 1963
This paper explores the rhetorical device of 'persuasive definition', which is the act of giving a new conceptual meaning to a word without changing its 'emotive meaning'-- its connotative or affective meaning. Author contends that this is common in philosophy and that it is a misleading device. Author uses an example of "cultured", originally created from the predicates: 'well-read and familiar with the arts', but which eventually took on its own emotive meaning of esteem due to the way people often accompanied praise and good-will on those called "cultured". However, someone comes along and argues that what is truly valuable is having 'imaginative sensitivity' and argues that this should be the 'real meaning' of "cultured". Author doesn't consider this an 'analysis of a common concept' or a 'mere abbreviation'-- but instead an attempt to hijack the valued emotion of the concept for a new purpose- 'it changed interests by changing names'. (pg34) Author gives additional definitions and discusses that a persuasive definition is in the locus of changes of interest and changes of terminology. However, a persuasive definition in author's sense is one that doesn't just narrow interests with a definition of a term, but one where the speaker intends to alter our interests by employing an emotively laden word to a new conceptual definition. (pg38-9) The important point is that a persuasive definition involved the re-defining of a conceptual definition and keeping the same emotive support for the word.
Author argues that persuasive definitions have been used all over philosophy, for instance by Spinoza in re-writing "God" to mean "the one substance" but still keeping the emotively laden term "God" in place. Author suggests that Carnap utilized it when defining "meaning" narrowly and then assigning everything without meaning to be "nonsense", a strongly negative word. Author also thinks Plato used a persuasive definition in the Republic for the term "justice". (pg45)
The last part of the paper entails a description of four cases where it is important to take note of the differences between a disagreement in belief and a disagreement in interest. Author argues that once we understand that terms like "justice" carry strong emotive baggage, we may understand that not every disagreement is one about what predicates attach to a word, but instead how much value (interest) a word deserves. In cases of a disagreement about whether a particular law is "just", two men disagree in the following way:
1) Both agree that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, but one is unsure that the law leads to A & B.
2) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to B.
3) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to C.
Here, as in the others, the disagreement may be resolved empirically by showing whether the law does or does not lead to the consequences in question. But in the case of 3, the disputants are coming up against disagreements not just in concepts but in interests. (pg49-50) This leads to the next case:
4) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C, and it is well established that the law leads to A & B but not C. Here is a disagreement that cannot be resolved empirically since it is a disagreement 'in interest'. The author does offer one use for the empirical method: to show that C would lead to further consequences D, E, F that they agree are antithetical to justice.
Facts & Values, Ch 3 Yale Press 1963
This paper explores the rhetorical device of 'persuasive definition', which is the act of giving a new conceptual meaning to a word without changing its 'emotive meaning'-- its connotative or affective meaning. Author contends that this is common in philosophy and that it is a misleading device. Author uses an example of "cultured", originally created from the predicates: 'well-read and familiar with the arts', but which eventually took on its own emotive meaning of esteem due to the way people often accompanied praise and good-will on those called "cultured". However, someone comes along and argues that what is truly valuable is having 'imaginative sensitivity' and argues that this should be the 'real meaning' of "cultured". Author doesn't consider this an 'analysis of a common concept' or a 'mere abbreviation'-- but instead an attempt to hijack the valued emotion of the concept for a new purpose- 'it changed interests by changing names'. (pg34) Author gives additional definitions and discusses that a persuasive definition is in the locus of changes of interest and changes of terminology. However, a persuasive definition in author's sense is one that doesn't just narrow interests with a definition of a term, but one where the speaker intends to alter our interests by employing an emotively laden word to a new conceptual definition. (pg38-9) The important point is that a persuasive definition involved the re-defining of a conceptual definition and keeping the same emotive support for the word.
Author argues that persuasive definitions have been used all over philosophy, for instance by Spinoza in re-writing "God" to mean "the one substance" but still keeping the emotively laden term "God" in place. Author suggests that Carnap utilized it when defining "meaning" narrowly and then assigning everything without meaning to be "nonsense", a strongly negative word. Author also thinks Plato used a persuasive definition in the Republic for the term "justice". (pg45)
The last part of the paper entails a description of four cases where it is important to take note of the differences between a disagreement in belief and a disagreement in interest. Author argues that once we understand that terms like "justice" carry strong emotive baggage, we may understand that not every disagreement is one about what predicates attach to a word, but instead how much value (interest) a word deserves. In cases of a disagreement about whether a particular law is "just", two men disagree in the following way:
1) Both agree that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, but one is unsure that the law leads to A & B.
2) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to B.
3) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to C.
Here, as in the others, the disagreement may be resolved empirically by showing whether the law does or does not lead to the consequences in question. But in the case of 3, the disputants are coming up against disagreements not just in concepts but in interests. (pg49-50) This leads to the next case:
4) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C, and it is well established that the law leads to A & B but not C. Here is a disagreement that cannot be resolved empirically since it is a disagreement 'in interest'. The author does offer one use for the empirical method: to show that C would lead to further consequences D, E, F that they agree are antithetical to justice.
9/4/09
McTaggart, JME - The Unreality of Time
09/04/2009
The Philosophy of Time, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Poidevin & MacBeath, eds
This is a reprint of an old (1908) essay that seeks to show two things: first that time is essentially a matter of past, present and future, and second that these notions are contradictory. Since they contradict, time can't be real. Author starts by making a distinction between two positions of time, the, indicated by an A series and the B series. The A series involves the past, present and future, and things passing from the future to the present into the past. The B series involves things that are earlier, contemporaneous, and later, where events are related to each other along that scale. It may be tempting to believe that the B series is objective and the A series subjective, therefore time is essentially a B series matter. But author disagrees and set about claiming that the A series is the essential element to time, not the B series. (pg24-5)
Author submits that 'time involves change' and that 'there could be no time if nothing changed' (pg25). The next matter is to ask whether you can have change without the A series-- that is, if the A series is just accidental, subjective, or inessential to the nature of time. Author approaches the problem first by looking at whether you can have change using solely the B series. Here author claims that there is no change if there is solely the B series version of events. The argument goes as follows: (pg25-6)
1. For time to exist, events must change
2. Change is one event M ceasing and another N beginning
3. In the B series, event N follows event M
4. In the B series, event N always and forever follows event M
5. Therefore, the relations between N and M are permanent
6. Therefore, in the B series, N always exists after M (which also always exists)
7. If N always exists, it does not cease or begin (likewise for M)
8. Therefore there is no change in the B series
9. Therefore, there is no time in the B series
The solution, author suggests, is to make one of the relations between M and N change. That relation is the A series relation, of M being, at one point, in the present and N the future, and then eventually making M the past and N the present. This A series possibility changes the relations between the events, making change possible and thus being an essential element to time. (pg26-7)
Author then considers various objections to this view, starting with Bertrand Russell (pg27-8), who claims that the A series is merely a subjective aspect of time. The second objection is that time exists in fictitious works (like stories) but there is clearly no A series. (pg29) The upshot here is that author posits that 'time only belongs to the existent'. (pg29) The third objection is that it may be possible that time has several real and independent time-series. Meaning there could be more than one 'present', but just in different 'series'. This seems to be an objection to both the B and the A series, so author leaves it as showing that there wouldn't be 'the present', but 'the present of a certain aspect of the universe' (pg30).
The second part of the paper is devoted to showing that the A series involves a contradiction and therefore cannot exist. (pg31) The author starts by reminding us that the B series is insufficient to underwrite time, but that the A series needs to stand in relation to something outside the time series (pg31-2) 'If, then, anything is to be rightly called past, present, or future, it must be because it is in relation to something else.' Finding what that something else is 'would not be easy'. (pg32) But the real difficulty is that the terms 'past', 'present', and 'future' are incompatible predicates to apply to an event, yet each event has at least two. (pg32) Author argues that there is no way to dispel this inconsistency without an infinite regress into additional time predicates, which are all based around those initial three terms. (pg32-3)
Author ends by claiming that time is unreal and that our view of it is erroneous.
The Philosophy of Time, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Poidevin & MacBeath, eds
This is a reprint of an old (1908) essay that seeks to show two things: first that time is essentially a matter of past, present and future, and second that these notions are contradictory. Since they contradict, time can't be real. Author starts by making a distinction between two positions of time, the, indicated by an A series and the B series. The A series involves the past, present and future, and things passing from the future to the present into the past. The B series involves things that are earlier, contemporaneous, and later, where events are related to each other along that scale. It may be tempting to believe that the B series is objective and the A series subjective, therefore time is essentially a B series matter. But author disagrees and set about claiming that the A series is the essential element to time, not the B series. (pg24-5)
Author submits that 'time involves change' and that 'there could be no time if nothing changed' (pg25). The next matter is to ask whether you can have change without the A series-- that is, if the A series is just accidental, subjective, or inessential to the nature of time. Author approaches the problem first by looking at whether you can have change using solely the B series. Here author claims that there is no change if there is solely the B series version of events. The argument goes as follows: (pg25-6)
1. For time to exist, events must change
2. Change is one event M ceasing and another N beginning
3. In the B series, event N follows event M
4. In the B series, event N always and forever follows event M
5. Therefore, the relations between N and M are permanent
6. Therefore, in the B series, N always exists after M (which also always exists)
7. If N always exists, it does not cease or begin (likewise for M)
8. Therefore there is no change in the B series
9. Therefore, there is no time in the B series
The solution, author suggests, is to make one of the relations between M and N change. That relation is the A series relation, of M being, at one point, in the present and N the future, and then eventually making M the past and N the present. This A series possibility changes the relations between the events, making change possible and thus being an essential element to time. (pg26-7)
Author then considers various objections to this view, starting with Bertrand Russell (pg27-8), who claims that the A series is merely a subjective aspect of time. The second objection is that time exists in fictitious works (like stories) but there is clearly no A series. (pg29) The upshot here is that author posits that 'time only belongs to the existent'. (pg29) The third objection is that it may be possible that time has several real and independent time-series. Meaning there could be more than one 'present', but just in different 'series'. This seems to be an objection to both the B and the A series, so author leaves it as showing that there wouldn't be 'the present', but 'the present of a certain aspect of the universe' (pg30).
The second part of the paper is devoted to showing that the A series involves a contradiction and therefore cannot exist. (pg31) The author starts by reminding us that the B series is insufficient to underwrite time, but that the A series needs to stand in relation to something outside the time series (pg31-2) 'If, then, anything is to be rightly called past, present, or future, it must be because it is in relation to something else.' Finding what that something else is 'would not be easy'. (pg32) But the real difficulty is that the terms 'past', 'present', and 'future' are incompatible predicates to apply to an event, yet each event has at least two. (pg32) Author argues that there is no way to dispel this inconsistency without an infinite regress into additional time predicates, which are all based around those initial three terms. (pg32-3)
Author ends by claiming that time is unreal and that our view of it is erroneous.
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