12/18/2009
The New York Review of Books, Vol 44, No 5 March 27, 1997
This is a brief filed by 6 philosophers (Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, Thomson) with the US Supreme Court in support of assisted suicide, as there were two cases before the court relating to it. Dworkin wrote an introduction and in Slate Magazine there followed an exchange of letters between Michael McConnell and Dworkin, McConnell criticizing the brief's reliance on 'judicial rhetoric' and defending a reading of the due-process clause of the 14th amendment that rights are granted by the nation's 'tradition and experience' of granting them. Since the only one state has very recently allowed assisted suicide, there is no tradition and experience of granting this right therefore it is improper for the Court to grant it. Dworkin's reply is that this is a particular interpretation of the 14th amendment and isn't the only one used by the Court and certainly isn't the only defensible one.
The brief filed by the philosophers is introduced and summarized by author. Author takes the time to lay out the context of the debate: that there are two main 'slippery slopes' that the Court is worried about (or at least was worried about on oral argument): the theoretical and the practical.
The Theoretical slippery-slope says that there is no principled place to 'draw the line' about which assisted suicides are permissible and which are not. The Philosophers' response to this is to suggests a difference between firm, considered, deep convictions about life's value and impulsive decisions perhaps made out of emotional depression where the state has reason to believe that the person would be grateful later if they were prevented from dying.
The Practical slippery-slope says that if assisted-suicide were legal, states would no doubt try to regulate it; but there would be a mix of successes and failures, and the vulnerable patients, the poor or the less-cared-for, would die as an outcome of poor systematic protections. Author answers this first by suggesting that the wealthy already enjoy an informal version of this right. Author secondly suggests that this slippery-slope argument applies across the board, even with pain-management already. Building on this, if assisted suicide was legal, it would be likely legislated that all palliative measures would be legislated to be employed prior to the suicide, thereby possibly raising the level of care for the poor and needy.
Author proposes that there are three methods that the Court could use to rule against the lower courts (in favor of the right of assisted suicide) in this decision. The first would be to deny a liberty interest in assisted suicide. The second would be to grant a liberty interest in assisted suicide but claim that states can override this interest in toto. This seems to be 'a conundrum'. The final method would be postponement, which author favors as the least damaging way to reject lower courts' decisions.
The Philosophers' brief first claims that in a free society individuals have a right to determine, for themselves, their values about 'the most intimate and personal choices... central to a person's dignity and autonomy' (Casey). And offer deeply held beliefs about one's own death as falling under this category. Of particular interest is the discussion about the potential distinction between "letting die" and "killing", and a possible "common-sense" distinction between acts and omissions. The brief claims this is an error. Anything that causes death contrary to a patient's wishes, whether it is an act or an omission, is wrong for the same reason. The important interest here is the patient's wishes, and from a patient's perspective there is no difference what the doctor does if it is in line with her own wishes. From the doctor's perspective, there seems to be no difference either between less, more (or no) care if the death (or life) of the patient is what the doctor is aiming at. The final argument of the brief is that state interests are not high enough to categorically prohibit assisted suicide. The body of this argument involves responding to the Solicitor-General's arguments against assisted suicide.
12/11/09
Dworkin, Ronald - Sex, Death, and the Courts
12/11/2009
Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2000, Ch 14
This is a chapter reviewing two strands of judicial interpretation of the rights enumerated in the US Constitution (and its amendments). The two topics that are used to reveal the tension between these interpretations are homosexuality and the right-to-die. Author argues that the 14th amendment is the 'most abstract source of these rights' (pg454), that is, rights not enumerated in the other amendments. Author frames these two issues as members of a larger set, that of an individual's right against the judgment of the majority about what is, by and large, an individual decision.
The 14th amendment offers two abstract and broad principles: that the state may not deprive a citizen of liberty with "due process of law" and that the state may not deny anyone "equal protection of the laws". This abstract language has both too broad and too narrow interpretations, yet the ones favored by judges seem to be two: 'historical' and 'integral'. The 'historical' interpretation is that individuals are protected with due process and equal protection on a limited number of rights that the American people historically and overwhelming have considered to be their rights. Author identifies Justice Byron White in the Bowers v Hardwick decision as a principal proponent of this interpretation. (pg454) The other interpretation, which the author calls the interpretation of 'integrity', is that the principles behind the enumerated (and common law) rights may, in some cases, rationally and logically suggest other rights that have not necessarily been considered rights previously. (pg455) Author sites Justice John Harlan as such an interpreter in a 1961 dissent of Poe v Ullman.
With these two interpretations in mind, author goes through supreme court decisions first about homosexuality in Colorado. Colorado amended its constitution to restrict any favorable discriminatory treatment to homosexuals, overturning some statutes instituted by some of the state's cities. The case of Evans v Romer was a challenge of the constitutionality of that amendment.
Using the 14th amendment's 'due process' clause, the strategy would go as follows: 1) show the law compromises a 'liberty interest'-- a constitutionally protected right, and if so, 2) show the law does not have enough legitimate state interest to pass a balancing test. (pg457)
Using the 'equal protection' clause, the strategy would be: 1) show that the law requires more than 'relaxed scrutiny', (rational basis) but instead 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny because it reduces the ability of a certain group to participate in the political process-- it systematically disadvantages a class. (pg58-9) This is commonly used in the case of 'suspect' classes like blacks due to this country's history of discrimination. (459-60) The strategy would be to claim that simple 'the prejudice and contempt' of a majority is sufficient to warrant 'strict' scrutiny of legislation that will affect them. (pg460-1)
When the case got to the supreme court, a separate amici curiae (friends of the court) brief was written in opposition to the law, which neglected the previous judicial frameworks: it argued instead that the law stops a class from being a class, which is a violation of equal protection. The actual supreme court decision, 6-3, was 'surprisingly bold' (pg463) because it said that the law did not even pass 'relaxed scrutiny' because it was based on nothing more "except animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests" (pg464). Author considered this a victory for the 'integrity' interpretation.
The second topic considered is the right-to-die and assisted-suicide cases. Here, a supreme court decision of 9-0 against supporting such a right might seem like a resounding victory for the historicist approach, and the majority opinion of the court seemed like a straightforward historicisit reading-- inconsistent on principle, but in-line with history. What was interesting about the case was that the majority decision didn't represent 9 justices-- only 5. The others wrote their own opinions, and many of them revealed an 'integral' interpretation, but nevertheless held with the majority in this case. Author examines the different opinions and concludes that it isn't a knock-down victory for the historicist interpretation.
Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2000, Ch 14
This is a chapter reviewing two strands of judicial interpretation of the rights enumerated in the US Constitution (and its amendments). The two topics that are used to reveal the tension between these interpretations are homosexuality and the right-to-die. Author argues that the 14th amendment is the 'most abstract source of these rights' (pg454), that is, rights not enumerated in the other amendments. Author frames these two issues as members of a larger set, that of an individual's right against the judgment of the majority about what is, by and large, an individual decision.
The 14th amendment offers two abstract and broad principles: that the state may not deprive a citizen of liberty with "due process of law" and that the state may not deny anyone "equal protection of the laws". This abstract language has both too broad and too narrow interpretations, yet the ones favored by judges seem to be two: 'historical' and 'integral'. The 'historical' interpretation is that individuals are protected with due process and equal protection on a limited number of rights that the American people historically and overwhelming have considered to be their rights. Author identifies Justice Byron White in the Bowers v Hardwick decision as a principal proponent of this interpretation. (pg454) The other interpretation, which the author calls the interpretation of 'integrity', is that the principles behind the enumerated (and common law) rights may, in some cases, rationally and logically suggest other rights that have not necessarily been considered rights previously. (pg455) Author sites Justice John Harlan as such an interpreter in a 1961 dissent of Poe v Ullman.
With these two interpretations in mind, author goes through supreme court decisions first about homosexuality in Colorado. Colorado amended its constitution to restrict any favorable discriminatory treatment to homosexuals, overturning some statutes instituted by some of the state's cities. The case of Evans v Romer was a challenge of the constitutionality of that amendment.
Using the 14th amendment's 'due process' clause, the strategy would go as follows: 1) show the law compromises a 'liberty interest'-- a constitutionally protected right, and if so, 2) show the law does not have enough legitimate state interest to pass a balancing test. (pg457)
Using the 'equal protection' clause, the strategy would be: 1) show that the law requires more than 'relaxed scrutiny', (rational basis) but instead 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny because it reduces the ability of a certain group to participate in the political process-- it systematically disadvantages a class. (pg58-9) This is commonly used in the case of 'suspect' classes like blacks due to this country's history of discrimination. (459-60) The strategy would be to claim that simple 'the prejudice and contempt' of a majority is sufficient to warrant 'strict' scrutiny of legislation that will affect them. (pg460-1)
When the case got to the supreme court, a separate amici curiae (friends of the court) brief was written in opposition to the law, which neglected the previous judicial frameworks: it argued instead that the law stops a class from being a class, which is a violation of equal protection. The actual supreme court decision, 6-3, was 'surprisingly bold' (pg463) because it said that the law did not even pass 'relaxed scrutiny' because it was based on nothing more "except animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests" (pg464). Author considered this a victory for the 'integrity' interpretation.
The second topic considered is the right-to-die and assisted-suicide cases. Here, a supreme court decision of 9-0 against supporting such a right might seem like a resounding victory for the historicist approach, and the majority opinion of the court seemed like a straightforward historicisit reading-- inconsistent on principle, but in-line with history. What was interesting about the case was that the majority decision didn't represent 9 justices-- only 5. The others wrote their own opinions, and many of them revealed an 'integral' interpretation, but nevertheless held with the majority in this case. Author examines the different opinions and concludes that it isn't a knock-down victory for the historicist interpretation.
11/20/09
Sommers, Fred - Dissonant Beliefs
11/20/2009
Analysis, Vol 69 No 2 April 2009
This article attempts to change the conception of a belief as a propositional attitude. 'Propositionalists', as author calls them, believe that believing is primarily a relation between a believer and a proposition. Author also considers Fodor a propositionalist even though he gives a three-part relation, a believer, a sentential expression, and a proposition. Author's proposal is different: believing is a relation between a believer and the world. This view author dubs the 'mondialist' view, and believes it can account for so-called 'dissonant beliefs', which are beliefs where a person seems to believe a contradiction (or an inconsistency, since 'contradiction' may imply propositions)
Author lays out the standard two kinds of belief: de re and de dicto. He wants to add a third: de mundo, which takes the world to be 'xish'. Here is how the progression might work:
-Formation of a de re belief about the ringing of a smoke alarm
-Formation of a de mundo belief: the world is smoke-alarm-ish
-Possible, but not necessary or automatic: de dicto belief: 'There is a smoke alarm ringing'.
The separation between the first two and the third gives space for non-human animals to have beliefs, de re and de mundo, but not de dicto. (pg270)
In order to make this work, 'the world' needs a bit of a specialized understanding. Author gives it: 'the world is characterized by what is and is not in it.' (pg268-9) So, our world is 'elk-ish' and not 'elf-ish' since there are elks in the world but not elves. The second understanding is that there is a context that constrains mondial beliefs-- a 'Domain under Consideration' (DC). We use this when we say things like "it's raining". It isn't raining in the whole world-- just in our DC-- in our DC the world is rain-ish.
Author believes that mundial beliefs are more primitive than propositional belief-- he loosely translates mundial beliefs as 'being aware of something'. (pg270) The two advantages of having them is that they are good fits for non-human animal beliefs and also that they can account for 'dissonant beliefs'.
Author takes dissonant beliefs to be commonplace in our world. For the well-educated, dissonant beliefs come when we believe a proposition (de dicto) like E=mc2 but have no idea what the world is like because of it, or what it would be like if it weren't true. Author thinks it is rational to keep your mundial and your de dicto beliefs in line, but it may be very difficult given the amount of arcane scientific knowledge we are exposed to. (pg272) But a more mundane example is where someone who doesn't believe in the afterlife still feels as though her dead relative is checking in on her. Here a mundial belief of 'the world is father-ish' is inconsistent with the propositional belief 'my father is dead and gone'. (pg271)
Lastly, author advocates that treating beliefs as primarily non-propositional will allow for uncomplex analyses of difficult examples. The one he uses is of a man who sees a reflection through a window of a man with his pants on fire. He believes de dicto 'there is a man with his pants on fire', but does he believe this man is himself? Propositionalists, author claim, need to do cart in the concept of a 'presenting sentence' ('my pants' or 'somebody's pants'). Author simply says that the man can have two different mundial beliefs: 'the world is my-pants-on-fire-ish' or 'the world is somebody's-pants-on-fire-ish'.
Analysis, Vol 69 No 2 April 2009
This article attempts to change the conception of a belief as a propositional attitude. 'Propositionalists', as author calls them, believe that believing is primarily a relation between a believer and a proposition. Author also considers Fodor a propositionalist even though he gives a three-part relation, a believer, a sentential expression, and a proposition. Author's proposal is different: believing is a relation between a believer and the world. This view author dubs the 'mondialist' view, and believes it can account for so-called 'dissonant beliefs', which are beliefs where a person seems to believe a contradiction (or an inconsistency, since 'contradiction' may imply propositions)
Author lays out the standard two kinds of belief: de re and de dicto. He wants to add a third: de mundo, which takes the world to be 'xish'. Here is how the progression might work:
-Formation of a de re belief about the ringing of a smoke alarm
-Formation of a de mundo belief: the world is smoke-alarm-ish
-Possible, but not necessary or automatic: de dicto belief: 'There is a smoke alarm ringing'.
The separation between the first two and the third gives space for non-human animals to have beliefs, de re and de mundo, but not de dicto. (pg270)
In order to make this work, 'the world' needs a bit of a specialized understanding. Author gives it: 'the world is characterized by what is and is not in it.' (pg268-9) So, our world is 'elk-ish' and not 'elf-ish' since there are elks in the world but not elves. The second understanding is that there is a context that constrains mondial beliefs-- a 'Domain under Consideration' (DC). We use this when we say things like "it's raining". It isn't raining in the whole world-- just in our DC-- in our DC the world is rain-ish.
Author believes that mundial beliefs are more primitive than propositional belief-- he loosely translates mundial beliefs as 'being aware of something'. (pg270) The two advantages of having them is that they are good fits for non-human animal beliefs and also that they can account for 'dissonant beliefs'.
Author takes dissonant beliefs to be commonplace in our world. For the well-educated, dissonant beliefs come when we believe a proposition (de dicto) like E=mc2 but have no idea what the world is like because of it, or what it would be like if it weren't true. Author thinks it is rational to keep your mundial and your de dicto beliefs in line, but it may be very difficult given the amount of arcane scientific knowledge we are exposed to. (pg272) But a more mundane example is where someone who doesn't believe in the afterlife still feels as though her dead relative is checking in on her. Here a mundial belief of 'the world is father-ish' is inconsistent with the propositional belief 'my father is dead and gone'. (pg271)
Lastly, author advocates that treating beliefs as primarily non-propositional will allow for uncomplex analyses of difficult examples. The one he uses is of a man who sees a reflection through a window of a man with his pants on fire. He believes de dicto 'there is a man with his pants on fire', but does he believe this man is himself? Propositionalists, author claim, need to do cart in the concept of a 'presenting sentence' ('my pants' or 'somebody's pants'). Author simply says that the man can have two different mundial beliefs: 'the world is my-pants-on-fire-ish' or 'the world is somebody's-pants-on-fire-ish'.
11/13/09
Berlin, Isiah - The Pursuit of the Ideal
11/13/2009
Chapter from The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Henry Hardy ed., Alfred Knoph pub, 1991
This chapter gives an account of author's (autobiographical) progression from believing in one true ideal for the human condition to believing in a relativistic plurality of objective values. Author wants to avoid isolationist or absolute relativism, where the two parties can't come to understand each other. Author believes that with imagination and creativity we can understand the objective ends of other cultures, civilizations and people. (pg11) Author also understands 'objective values' to be things that humans pursue 'for their own sakes' (pg11).
The chapter is more story-oriented than full of argumentation: it starts with the reading of the great Russian writers, specifically Tolstoy, who were engaged in the struggle to find objective values and a way of living that supported them. This jibed well with the Greeks, at least Plato, and also with Hegel and Marx. The idea was that history was a set of progressive stages, some errors, but ultimately leading to a set of practices and principles that, if followed, would result in a utopian-type society. (II-IV, pg2-7)
Author began to change his mind about the unity of one ideal as the objective value for mankind when he started Machiavelli. It wasn't the political experience that started to crack this idealistic facade-- it was the observation that the Christian virtues were, inherently, at odds with the Roman ones. Further exploring the possibility of incompatible objective values, author took up Giambattista Vico's La Scienza Nuova, which discussed the various irreconcilable cultural ideals that have existed in the course of human history. (pg8-9) Author came to believe that there is no one ascendant objective value, but a pluralistic set of them, some mutually exclusive. And some are less acceptable than others-- e.g. ritualistic murder, slavery, torture for pleasure. (pg18)
The best (only?) way to get into an acceptable level of civilization is to pick a set of priorities that are mostly agreeable-- like reducing poverty, premature death, disease, suffering-- and use skill and wisdom to create a society that accomplishes them. But author also continually reminds that even these goals have unintended consequences, which will create additional problems that require further work-- utopia is unattainable. Author also states that the 'perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist... [is] conceptually incoherent' (pg13) This is because there is a multitude of valid objective values and they 'collide'.
Chapter from The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Henry Hardy ed., Alfred Knoph pub, 1991
This chapter gives an account of author's (autobiographical) progression from believing in one true ideal for the human condition to believing in a relativistic plurality of objective values. Author wants to avoid isolationist or absolute relativism, where the two parties can't come to understand each other. Author believes that with imagination and creativity we can understand the objective ends of other cultures, civilizations and people. (pg11) Author also understands 'objective values' to be things that humans pursue 'for their own sakes' (pg11).
The chapter is more story-oriented than full of argumentation: it starts with the reading of the great Russian writers, specifically Tolstoy, who were engaged in the struggle to find objective values and a way of living that supported them. This jibed well with the Greeks, at least Plato, and also with Hegel and Marx. The idea was that history was a set of progressive stages, some errors, but ultimately leading to a set of practices and principles that, if followed, would result in a utopian-type society. (II-IV, pg2-7)
Author began to change his mind about the unity of one ideal as the objective value for mankind when he started Machiavelli. It wasn't the political experience that started to crack this idealistic facade-- it was the observation that the Christian virtues were, inherently, at odds with the Roman ones. Further exploring the possibility of incompatible objective values, author took up Giambattista Vico's La Scienza Nuova, which discussed the various irreconcilable cultural ideals that have existed in the course of human history. (pg8-9) Author came to believe that there is no one ascendant objective value, but a pluralistic set of them, some mutually exclusive. And some are less acceptable than others-- e.g. ritualistic murder, slavery, torture for pleasure. (pg18)
The best (only?) way to get into an acceptable level of civilization is to pick a set of priorities that are mostly agreeable-- like reducing poverty, premature death, disease, suffering-- and use skill and wisdom to create a society that accomplishes them. But author also continually reminds that even these goals have unintended consequences, which will create additional problems that require further work-- utopia is unattainable. Author also states that the 'perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist... [is] conceptually incoherent' (pg13) This is because there is a multitude of valid objective values and they 'collide'.
11/6/09
Westphal, Jonathan - The Indicative Conditional: An Amendment to Stalnaker
11/06/2009
Unpublished
This paper explores the indicative conditional and the material conditional. Author starts with this 'old familiar question' and thinks that Stalnaker's answer is nearly correct: the conditional "if p then q" is true if 'the consequent is true, not necessarily in the world as it is, but in the world as it would be if the antecedent were true'.
Author gives the case of Seabiscuit, and the conditional: if Seabiscuit runs, he will win. "If r then w". First author distinguishes between regular cases where the race is fair, and the conditional is picking out the salient features of the situation. The trouble here is that the truth table could have a weird outcome in the case of the antecedent being false and the consequent being true. How could Seabiscuit win and not have run? So there is a kind-of dependence between the 'guide propositions'. Author concludes that for the truth tables to apply, there must be genuine independence between them.
Author then considers what happens when there is genuine independence but the antecedent is false. In these cases, it seems that the conditional is true when the consequent is true, but it isn't the 'if p then q' setup that 'force[s] it true'. When the consequent is true, this 'allow[s]' the conditional to be true-- but the distinction between 'forcing' and 'allowing' is lost in the analysis.
Author revisits the Seabiscuit conditional, "If Seabiscuit runs, he will win":
If R then W
If the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, then the conditional is false no matter what Seabiscuit does-- whether he does run or not. Even in the weird case where the antecedent is false and the consequent is true (he doesn't run, but wins), the conditional is... false! This is a 'line-dependent' outcome that the author points out. If both the antecedent and the consequent is true, then the conditional is true no matter what Seabiscuit does. So the final two lines of the truth table (where the antecedent is false) depend on the the first two lines, where the truth of the consequent varies.
Author considers finally 'silly conditionals', like: 'if the moon is cheese, then 17 is prime'. He concludes that the material conditional is the correct analysis here.
Author concludes that in cases of the indicative conditional, when the antecedent is false the conditional is undetermined-- or at least dependent on the outcome of the consequent when the antecedent is true. This makes it an open question whether the 'if... then...' rule is equivalent to 'not p, or q' (~p v q).
Unpublished
This paper explores the indicative conditional and the material conditional. Author starts with this 'old familiar question' and thinks that Stalnaker's answer is nearly correct: the conditional "if p then q" is true if 'the consequent is true, not necessarily in the world as it is, but in the world as it would be if the antecedent were true'.
Author gives the case of Seabiscuit, and the conditional: if Seabiscuit runs, he will win. "If r then w". First author distinguishes between regular cases where the race is fair, and the conditional is picking out the salient features of the situation. The trouble here is that the truth table could have a weird outcome in the case of the antecedent being false and the consequent being true. How could Seabiscuit win and not have run? So there is a kind-of dependence between the 'guide propositions'. Author concludes that for the truth tables to apply, there must be genuine independence between them.
Author then considers what happens when there is genuine independence but the antecedent is false. In these cases, it seems that the conditional is true when the consequent is true, but it isn't the 'if p then q' setup that 'force[s] it true'. When the consequent is true, this 'allow[s]' the conditional to be true-- but the distinction between 'forcing' and 'allowing' is lost in the analysis.
Author revisits the Seabiscuit conditional, "If Seabiscuit runs, he will win":
If R then W
If the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, then the conditional is false no matter what Seabiscuit does-- whether he does run or not. Even in the weird case where the antecedent is false and the consequent is true (he doesn't run, but wins), the conditional is... false! This is a 'line-dependent' outcome that the author points out. If both the antecedent and the consequent is true, then the conditional is true no matter what Seabiscuit does. So the final two lines of the truth table (where the antecedent is false) depend on the the first two lines, where the truth of the consequent varies.
Author considers finally 'silly conditionals', like: 'if the moon is cheese, then 17 is prime'. He concludes that the material conditional is the correct analysis here.
Author concludes that in cases of the indicative conditional, when the antecedent is false the conditional is undetermined-- or at least dependent on the outcome of the consequent when the antecedent is true. This makes it an open question whether the 'if... then...' rule is equivalent to 'not p, or q' (~p v q).
10/29/09
Raghuramaraju, A - Away From the Binary: Reading Rajas and Tamas in Mahatma Gandhi
10/30/2009
Unpublished book chapter
This is a chapter in a book about Gandhi-- this chapter seeks to locate Gandhi's policy of non-violence in a classical context of the three aspects of being: violence, non-violence, and non-action. Author argues that this is an important three-part substance that involves domination of one substance (non-violence) over the other two, rather than flat-out rejection of them. Furthermore, current writers simplify Gandhi into a two-part binary of violence and non-violence and suggest that one can be rejected and the other affirmed; both the factual claim and the meta-psychological conception is mistaken, according to author.
Author's first target is Richard Lannoy's binary relation, violence and non-violence. What is missing here is a third possibility: inaction. The three options correspond to three 'gunas': 'tamas' (inaction), 'rajas' (violent action) and 'sattva' (non-violent action). Author brings out through quotations that Gandhi preferred violent action to inaction, which upsets the notion that Gandhi rejected violence as an acceptable mode of action.
Author contends that Gandhi was rajastic (violent) in nature but constantly strove to overcome and dominate that tendency for the sake of sattva, non-violent action. Author locates the metapsychology here as coming from the Bhagavat Gita's discussion of the three gunas-- they are each constitutive elements of action, just one dominating the others during a particular action. Yet from this classical understanding did Gandhi stray, not accepting non-action (tamas) as a worthy possibility.
Unpublished book chapter
This is a chapter in a book about Gandhi-- this chapter seeks to locate Gandhi's policy of non-violence in a classical context of the three aspects of being: violence, non-violence, and non-action. Author argues that this is an important three-part substance that involves domination of one substance (non-violence) over the other two, rather than flat-out rejection of them. Furthermore, current writers simplify Gandhi into a two-part binary of violence and non-violence and suggest that one can be rejected and the other affirmed; both the factual claim and the meta-psychological conception is mistaken, according to author.
Author's first target is Richard Lannoy's binary relation, violence and non-violence. What is missing here is a third possibility: inaction. The three options correspond to three 'gunas': 'tamas' (inaction), 'rajas' (violent action) and 'sattva' (non-violent action). Author brings out through quotations that Gandhi preferred violent action to inaction, which upsets the notion that Gandhi rejected violence as an acceptable mode of action.
Author contends that Gandhi was rajastic (violent) in nature but constantly strove to overcome and dominate that tendency for the sake of sattva, non-violent action. Author locates the metapsychology here as coming from the Bhagavat Gita's discussion of the three gunas-- they are each constitutive elements of action, just one dominating the others during a particular action. Yet from this classical understanding did Gandhi stray, not accepting non-action (tamas) as a worthy possibility.
10/16/09
Waldron, Jeremy - Right and Wrong: Psychologists vs Philosophers
10/16/2009
New York Review of Books Vol 56 No 15 Oct 8, 2009
This is a review of Appiah's "Experiments in Ethics", which is cast as an attempt to take seriously the challenge to ethics coming from the psychologists. Author is critical of Appiah's seemingly facile attempt to grapple with the problems. He claims that Appiah alternates between taking the psychologists' "case against character" or the "psychologits' challenge" too seriously, or then not seriously enough.
Appiah seems to take the psychologists' challenge seriously at first, when he cites numerous studies that apparently show that the so-called virtues of charity or honesty aren't cross-situational, and are frequently influenced by small, seemingly insignificant changes in the situation. E.g. a person is more likely to be helpful to a stranger if he has previously found a spare dime in a telephone booth. The challenge to virtue ethics is that good character traits aren't as entrenched as we'd like to think, or that we frequently misidentify good characters. But author replies that another way to read much of this work is that it is irrelevant to virtue ethics-- many of the experiments are trivial. And in the more meaningful ones, people did show virtues like charity (e.g. the Milgram experiments). Author charges that Appiah doesn't mount a reply in this vein, instead moving to include additional virtues more suitable to being a full-fledged social human (humor, originality, love) or focusing on laws, institutions, and social construction of culture to give people the opportunity to do good in the most favorable circumstances.
The next move in the pschologists' challenge is the challenge to intuition, the 'spontaneous unreflected judgment'. Much work has been done in this field to show them to be flawed and unreliable. Author pushes Appiah: 'flawed' compared to what? Considered moral judgment? Where is that independent source of judgment? How do we talk about considered moral judgments without propping them up with intuitions and without adding some other psychological flaw or taint? This was the work that the reviewer wanted Appiah to do, and which he charges Appiah did not. One current and important challenge comes from a variety of 'trolley' problems that talks about having to sacrifice one person in order to save 5. People's intuitions are very messy when asked about what they would or should do in a multitude of situations. Yet author argues that we need to expand the studies and maybe take away another lesson: people can be prone to optical illusions; why can't they also be prone to moral illusions? We work through optical illusions by measuring, by using other standards, by changing our vantage-point. Why not do the same if we want to get the moral judgments right? Author argues that this reply assumes the same issue that author was asking for earlier-- an independent source of moral judgment.
Author reports that Appiah returns, at the end of the book, to a familiar argument that our considered moral judgments are perfectly safe, a let-down for the author who thought Appiah was taking the pscyhologists' challenge more seriously. Author praises the book for being exploratory, but criticizes it for not being serious enough.
New York Review of Books Vol 56 No 15 Oct 8, 2009
This is a review of Appiah's "Experiments in Ethics", which is cast as an attempt to take seriously the challenge to ethics coming from the psychologists. Author is critical of Appiah's seemingly facile attempt to grapple with the problems. He claims that Appiah alternates between taking the psychologists' "case against character" or the "psychologits' challenge" too seriously, or then not seriously enough.
Appiah seems to take the psychologists' challenge seriously at first, when he cites numerous studies that apparently show that the so-called virtues of charity or honesty aren't cross-situational, and are frequently influenced by small, seemingly insignificant changes in the situation. E.g. a person is more likely to be helpful to a stranger if he has previously found a spare dime in a telephone booth. The challenge to virtue ethics is that good character traits aren't as entrenched as we'd like to think, or that we frequently misidentify good characters. But author replies that another way to read much of this work is that it is irrelevant to virtue ethics-- many of the experiments are trivial. And in the more meaningful ones, people did show virtues like charity (e.g. the Milgram experiments). Author charges that Appiah doesn't mount a reply in this vein, instead moving to include additional virtues more suitable to being a full-fledged social human (humor, originality, love) or focusing on laws, institutions, and social construction of culture to give people the opportunity to do good in the most favorable circumstances.
The next move in the pschologists' challenge is the challenge to intuition, the 'spontaneous unreflected judgment'. Much work has been done in this field to show them to be flawed and unreliable. Author pushes Appiah: 'flawed' compared to what? Considered moral judgment? Where is that independent source of judgment? How do we talk about considered moral judgments without propping them up with intuitions and without adding some other psychological flaw or taint? This was the work that the reviewer wanted Appiah to do, and which he charges Appiah did not. One current and important challenge comes from a variety of 'trolley' problems that talks about having to sacrifice one person in order to save 5. People's intuitions are very messy when asked about what they would or should do in a multitude of situations. Yet author argues that we need to expand the studies and maybe take away another lesson: people can be prone to optical illusions; why can't they also be prone to moral illusions? We work through optical illusions by measuring, by using other standards, by changing our vantage-point. Why not do the same if we want to get the moral judgments right? Author argues that this reply assumes the same issue that author was asking for earlier-- an independent source of moral judgment.
Author reports that Appiah returns, at the end of the book, to a familiar argument that our considered moral judgments are perfectly safe, a let-down for the author who thought Appiah was taking the pscyhologists' challenge more seriously. Author praises the book for being exploratory, but criticizes it for not being serious enough.
10/9/09
Weinberg, Steven - The Missons of Astronomy
10/09/2009
The New York Review of Books Vol 56 No 16 10/22/2009
This is an article in the popular press about the history of astronomy, its importance in the ancient world, and the places it currently occupies in science. The thesis is that astronomy was developed as a science much earlier than other studies like physics or biology, probably because the movements of the stars and planets followed such regular patterns. The practical also contributed to the advancement of astronomy since it assisted with navigation, predicting the seasons and telling the time. As other mechanisms like GPS and atomic clocks have become widely used, the practicality of astronomy has become diminished. Yet astronomy has become much more important in figuring out our cosmology and sub-atomic laws of nature. For instance, it took observations of the deflection of light around a gravitational field to confirm the General Theory of Relativity.
The article ends with bemoaning the misplaced priorities of NASA and other government funding for manned spaceflight instead of unmanned, arguing that more, and more useful, scientific data could be collected by unmanned space missions.
The New York Review of Books Vol 56 No 16 10/22/2009
This is an article in the popular press about the history of astronomy, its importance in the ancient world, and the places it currently occupies in science. The thesis is that astronomy was developed as a science much earlier than other studies like physics or biology, probably because the movements of the stars and planets followed such regular patterns. The practical also contributed to the advancement of astronomy since it assisted with navigation, predicting the seasons and telling the time. As other mechanisms like GPS and atomic clocks have become widely used, the practicality of astronomy has become diminished. Yet astronomy has become much more important in figuring out our cosmology and sub-atomic laws of nature. For instance, it took observations of the deflection of light around a gravitational field to confirm the General Theory of Relativity.
The article ends with bemoaning the misplaced priorities of NASA and other government funding for manned spaceflight instead of unmanned, arguing that more, and more useful, scientific data could be collected by unmanned space missions.
10/2/09
Connolly, John - Augustine, the Will, and Original Sin
10/02/2009
DRAFT
This paper tries to sort out the complexities and possible contradictions that Augustine finds himself in when trying to combat both Manicheanism and also Pelagians. Author lays out the difficulty:
-The Manichees believed that good and evil were two forces in the universe, essentially that god had an evil equal. Augustine needed to establish there was only one god, a good one. But then the problem of the origins of evil arises. The solution was to claim that humans are stuck with Original Sin from the primal sin of Adam & Eve eating from the tree.
-The Pelagians believed that one could improve herself enough so that she could turn against sin on her own, thereby overcoming the weakened human condition brought on by primal sin. Augustine found this contrary to requiring Jesus for salvation and therefore had to argue that primal sin could not be overcome without god's grace.
Augustine's conception of primal sin was important to bolster his defense against both Manicheanism and the Peligians. However it has been argued previously that primal sin seems troubling: it must originate with the first humans, but not from any defect in their wills, or their characters, since that would mean that their maker (god) was partially at fault for their sin. But from whence does it come, if not from their ill will (pushing the problem one step back) or from a fault in their character? MacDonald has suggested that the answer lies in an act of negligence, of failing to attend to good reasons you have for doing something. This paper is largely a review of MacDonald's theory of Primal Sin; the conclusion is that this theory isn't enough to underwrite primal sin.
Author makes a comparison to MacDonald's theory of primal sin to the case of Aiden Quinn, the relatively upstanding individual who absent-mindedly text-messaged as he was driving a MBTA trolley, and ended up hitting another one. The intuition here at first bolsters MacDonald: this is a case of a careless act without ill-will, and yet we are very much inclined to blame Quinn for this negligence-- in short: it is sinful negligence without ill-will.
But author argues that we have a yet further analysis of this event if we are to consider it truly blameworthy-- that the actor failed to exercise the caution of the 'prudent man'. The standard we hold someone to prior to punishing her for gross (sinful) negligence is the standard of what a prudent person would take note of and account for in her decisions. The problem is that we do not believe that Adam & Eve could have failed that test, a hypothesis that MacDonald asks us to believe if his theory of primal sin is correct. It doesn't make sense that they would fail this test, thus making MacDonald's theory of primal sin implausible. This leaves the primal sin still in the difficult situation of being a sin ex nihilo, and remains a problem for Augustine.
DRAFT
This paper tries to sort out the complexities and possible contradictions that Augustine finds himself in when trying to combat both Manicheanism and also Pelagians. Author lays out the difficulty:
-The Manichees believed that good and evil were two forces in the universe, essentially that god had an evil equal. Augustine needed to establish there was only one god, a good one. But then the problem of the origins of evil arises. The solution was to claim that humans are stuck with Original Sin from the primal sin of Adam & Eve eating from the tree.
-The Pelagians believed that one could improve herself enough so that she could turn against sin on her own, thereby overcoming the weakened human condition brought on by primal sin. Augustine found this contrary to requiring Jesus for salvation and therefore had to argue that primal sin could not be overcome without god's grace.
Augustine's conception of primal sin was important to bolster his defense against both Manicheanism and the Peligians. However it has been argued previously that primal sin seems troubling: it must originate with the first humans, but not from any defect in their wills, or their characters, since that would mean that their maker (god) was partially at fault for their sin. But from whence does it come, if not from their ill will (pushing the problem one step back) or from a fault in their character? MacDonald has suggested that the answer lies in an act of negligence, of failing to attend to good reasons you have for doing something. This paper is largely a review of MacDonald's theory of Primal Sin; the conclusion is that this theory isn't enough to underwrite primal sin.
Author makes a comparison to MacDonald's theory of primal sin to the case of Aiden Quinn, the relatively upstanding individual who absent-mindedly text-messaged as he was driving a MBTA trolley, and ended up hitting another one. The intuition here at first bolsters MacDonald: this is a case of a careless act without ill-will, and yet we are very much inclined to blame Quinn for this negligence-- in short: it is sinful negligence without ill-will.
But author argues that we have a yet further analysis of this event if we are to consider it truly blameworthy-- that the actor failed to exercise the caution of the 'prudent man'. The standard we hold someone to prior to punishing her for gross (sinful) negligence is the standard of what a prudent person would take note of and account for in her decisions. The problem is that we do not believe that Adam & Eve could have failed that test, a hypothesis that MacDonald asks us to believe if his theory of primal sin is correct. It doesn't make sense that they would fail this test, thus making MacDonald's theory of primal sin implausible. This leaves the primal sin still in the difficult situation of being a sin ex nihilo, and remains a problem for Augustine.
9/24/09
Smith, Malcolm - Indifference and Moral Acceptance
09/25/2009
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 9 No 1 Jan 1972
This paper attempts to show that one can make a moral judgment and yet not have a prescriptive attitude toward that judgment. It defines 'internalism' as the theory that acceptance of a moral judgment implies having a favorable/unfavorable attitude toward the content of the judgment. Author considers philosophers such as Stevenson and Hare to hold or imply such views. Internalism can be found in emotivism and prescriptivism and is contrasted with 'externalism', which is that one may accept a moral judgment while have no corresponding favorable or unfavorable attitude towards it.
Author takes an example a moral dispute about segregation, where someone believes it is morally permissible for the reasons that blacks are inferior and more prone to immorality. But, upon being informed that they are not so (perhaps by showing social science studies), he is convinced that 'segregation is morally wrong'. But, strangely, also says that 'I am completely indifferent as to whether the practice continues' (pg87) The internalist claims that this person fails to understand what it means to say 'segregation is morally wrong', therefore he must not understand the meaning of the sentence. Yet author points out this person had previously believed that segregation was morally permissible and was convinced through argumentation that it was not. It seems to be prima facia that he understood what the sentences meant. (pg88)
Author considers three replies from the internalist, who might then turn to a non-cognitive analysis of 'morally wrong':
1) Stevenson's account of meaning: that 'morally wrong' has emotive meaning that disposes people to have unfavorable attitudes. Author believes this doesn't do the work the internalist needs (pg88)
2) A 'meaning as use' theory might claim that you misuse the 'morally wrong' term when you lack the unfavorable attitude. Author: this just pushes the problem one step back, and the externalist will disagree it is a misuse.
3) The person who is indifferent does not understand the meaning of 'morally wrong'. Author: this is question-begging.
Author does review many plausible reasons to be drawn to the internalist picture: that we expect someone who sincerely believes that segregation is wrong to feel unfavorable about it; that we don't consider it a success if we convince someone that x is morally wrong and then he is indifferent towards it; that when someone assents that x is wrong but then is indifferent that we consider him insincere; and finally that moral disagreements will entail differing attitudes when the issue is supported or rejected by the public. Author claims that what these intuitions show is that moral judgments almost always come in the context of moral concern, where our interests are intermixed. But this does not establish internalism, since the two sides of the judgment can-- in principle-- be pulled apart. (pg89-90)
Author then tries to give an account of why internalism is intuitively plausible by making a distinction between two kinds of 'assent'-- one that is merely belief-oriented and another that includes evaluative attitudes. The example is 'Jones eats like a pig', which you might accept disapprovingly (it is gross), or approvingly (it is natural-good). "Believing is not the only way in which persons may accept what is expressed by utterances of certain sentences, nor is divergence in believe the only kind of disagreement" (pg91) With this distinction-- between belief and assent-- author claims we can understand the plausibility of our intuitions without being internalists.
The final section of the paper considers the problems with non-cognitive meta-ethical theories if internalism is false, or at least if it has no support for its truth. Author claims that internalism is used as a premise to show that concepts like 'morally good' and 'valuable' are different in kind from concepts like 'red' or 'rectangular'. Internalism is also used as a basis for the claim that moral judgments are not a species of factual judgments. If internalism isn't properly underwritten, it cannot support these further meta-ethical claims.
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 9 No 1 Jan 1972
This paper attempts to show that one can make a moral judgment and yet not have a prescriptive attitude toward that judgment. It defines 'internalism' as the theory that acceptance of a moral judgment implies having a favorable/unfavorable attitude toward the content of the judgment. Author considers philosophers such as Stevenson and Hare to hold or imply such views. Internalism can be found in emotivism and prescriptivism and is contrasted with 'externalism', which is that one may accept a moral judgment while have no corresponding favorable or unfavorable attitude towards it.
Author takes an example a moral dispute about segregation, where someone believes it is morally permissible for the reasons that blacks are inferior and more prone to immorality. But, upon being informed that they are not so (perhaps by showing social science studies), he is convinced that 'segregation is morally wrong'. But, strangely, also says that 'I am completely indifferent as to whether the practice continues' (pg87) The internalist claims that this person fails to understand what it means to say 'segregation is morally wrong', therefore he must not understand the meaning of the sentence. Yet author points out this person had previously believed that segregation was morally permissible and was convinced through argumentation that it was not. It seems to be prima facia that he understood what the sentences meant. (pg88)
Author considers three replies from the internalist, who might then turn to a non-cognitive analysis of 'morally wrong':
1) Stevenson's account of meaning: that 'morally wrong' has emotive meaning that disposes people to have unfavorable attitudes. Author believes this doesn't do the work the internalist needs (pg88)
2) A 'meaning as use' theory might claim that you misuse the 'morally wrong' term when you lack the unfavorable attitude. Author: this just pushes the problem one step back, and the externalist will disagree it is a misuse.
3) The person who is indifferent does not understand the meaning of 'morally wrong'. Author: this is question-begging.
Author does review many plausible reasons to be drawn to the internalist picture: that we expect someone who sincerely believes that segregation is wrong to feel unfavorable about it; that we don't consider it a success if we convince someone that x is morally wrong and then he is indifferent towards it; that when someone assents that x is wrong but then is indifferent that we consider him insincere; and finally that moral disagreements will entail differing attitudes when the issue is supported or rejected by the public. Author claims that what these intuitions show is that moral judgments almost always come in the context of moral concern, where our interests are intermixed. But this does not establish internalism, since the two sides of the judgment can-- in principle-- be pulled apart. (pg89-90)
Author then tries to give an account of why internalism is intuitively plausible by making a distinction between two kinds of 'assent'-- one that is merely belief-oriented and another that includes evaluative attitudes. The example is 'Jones eats like a pig', which you might accept disapprovingly (it is gross), or approvingly (it is natural-good). "Believing is not the only way in which persons may accept what is expressed by utterances of certain sentences, nor is divergence in believe the only kind of disagreement" (pg91) With this distinction-- between belief and assent-- author claims we can understand the plausibility of our intuitions without being internalists.
The final section of the paper considers the problems with non-cognitive meta-ethical theories if internalism is false, or at least if it has no support for its truth. Author claims that internalism is used as a premise to show that concepts like 'morally good' and 'valuable' are different in kind from concepts like 'red' or 'rectangular'. Internalism is also used as a basis for the claim that moral judgments are not a species of factual judgments. If internalism isn't properly underwritten, it cannot support these further meta-ethical claims.
9/18/09
Stevenson, CL - Persuasive Definitions
09/18/2009
Facts & Values, Ch 3 Yale Press 1963
This paper explores the rhetorical device of 'persuasive definition', which is the act of giving a new conceptual meaning to a word without changing its 'emotive meaning'-- its connotative or affective meaning. Author contends that this is common in philosophy and that it is a misleading device. Author uses an example of "cultured", originally created from the predicates: 'well-read and familiar with the arts', but which eventually took on its own emotive meaning of esteem due to the way people often accompanied praise and good-will on those called "cultured". However, someone comes along and argues that what is truly valuable is having 'imaginative sensitivity' and argues that this should be the 'real meaning' of "cultured". Author doesn't consider this an 'analysis of a common concept' or a 'mere abbreviation'-- but instead an attempt to hijack the valued emotion of the concept for a new purpose- 'it changed interests by changing names'. (pg34) Author gives additional definitions and discusses that a persuasive definition is in the locus of changes of interest and changes of terminology. However, a persuasive definition in author's sense is one that doesn't just narrow interests with a definition of a term, but one where the speaker intends to alter our interests by employing an emotively laden word to a new conceptual definition. (pg38-9) The important point is that a persuasive definition involved the re-defining of a conceptual definition and keeping the same emotive support for the word.
Author argues that persuasive definitions have been used all over philosophy, for instance by Spinoza in re-writing "God" to mean "the one substance" but still keeping the emotively laden term "God" in place. Author suggests that Carnap utilized it when defining "meaning" narrowly and then assigning everything without meaning to be "nonsense", a strongly negative word. Author also thinks Plato used a persuasive definition in the Republic for the term "justice". (pg45)
The last part of the paper entails a description of four cases where it is important to take note of the differences between a disagreement in belief and a disagreement in interest. Author argues that once we understand that terms like "justice" carry strong emotive baggage, we may understand that not every disagreement is one about what predicates attach to a word, but instead how much value (interest) a word deserves. In cases of a disagreement about whether a particular law is "just", two men disagree in the following way:
1) Both agree that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, but one is unsure that the law leads to A & B.
2) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to B.
3) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to C.
Here, as in the others, the disagreement may be resolved empirically by showing whether the law does or does not lead to the consequences in question. But in the case of 3, the disputants are coming up against disagreements not just in concepts but in interests. (pg49-50) This leads to the next case:
4) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C, and it is well established that the law leads to A & B but not C. Here is a disagreement that cannot be resolved empirically since it is a disagreement 'in interest'. The author does offer one use for the empirical method: to show that C would lead to further consequences D, E, F that they agree are antithetical to justice.
Facts & Values, Ch 3 Yale Press 1963
This paper explores the rhetorical device of 'persuasive definition', which is the act of giving a new conceptual meaning to a word without changing its 'emotive meaning'-- its connotative or affective meaning. Author contends that this is common in philosophy and that it is a misleading device. Author uses an example of "cultured", originally created from the predicates: 'well-read and familiar with the arts', but which eventually took on its own emotive meaning of esteem due to the way people often accompanied praise and good-will on those called "cultured". However, someone comes along and argues that what is truly valuable is having 'imaginative sensitivity' and argues that this should be the 'real meaning' of "cultured". Author doesn't consider this an 'analysis of a common concept' or a 'mere abbreviation'-- but instead an attempt to hijack the valued emotion of the concept for a new purpose- 'it changed interests by changing names'. (pg34) Author gives additional definitions and discusses that a persuasive definition is in the locus of changes of interest and changes of terminology. However, a persuasive definition in author's sense is one that doesn't just narrow interests with a definition of a term, but one where the speaker intends to alter our interests by employing an emotively laden word to a new conceptual definition. (pg38-9) The important point is that a persuasive definition involved the re-defining of a conceptual definition and keeping the same emotive support for the word.
Author argues that persuasive definitions have been used all over philosophy, for instance by Spinoza in re-writing "God" to mean "the one substance" but still keeping the emotively laden term "God" in place. Author suggests that Carnap utilized it when defining "meaning" narrowly and then assigning everything without meaning to be "nonsense", a strongly negative word. Author also thinks Plato used a persuasive definition in the Republic for the term "justice". (pg45)
The last part of the paper entails a description of four cases where it is important to take note of the differences between a disagreement in belief and a disagreement in interest. Author argues that once we understand that terms like "justice" carry strong emotive baggage, we may understand that not every disagreement is one about what predicates attach to a word, but instead how much value (interest) a word deserves. In cases of a disagreement about whether a particular law is "just", two men disagree in the following way:
1) Both agree that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, but one is unsure that the law leads to A & B.
2) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to B.
3) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C. One is unsure the law leads to C.
Here, as in the others, the disagreement may be resolved empirically by showing whether the law does or does not lead to the consequences in question. But in the case of 3, the disputants are coming up against disagreements not just in concepts but in interests. (pg49-50) This leads to the next case:
4) One thinks that "justice" is whatever leads to A & B, the other B & C, and it is well established that the law leads to A & B but not C. Here is a disagreement that cannot be resolved empirically since it is a disagreement 'in interest'. The author does offer one use for the empirical method: to show that C would lead to further consequences D, E, F that they agree are antithetical to justice.
9/4/09
McTaggart, JME - The Unreality of Time
09/04/2009
The Philosophy of Time, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Poidevin & MacBeath, eds
This is a reprint of an old (1908) essay that seeks to show two things: first that time is essentially a matter of past, present and future, and second that these notions are contradictory. Since they contradict, time can't be real. Author starts by making a distinction between two positions of time, the, indicated by an A series and the B series. The A series involves the past, present and future, and things passing from the future to the present into the past. The B series involves things that are earlier, contemporaneous, and later, where events are related to each other along that scale. It may be tempting to believe that the B series is objective and the A series subjective, therefore time is essentially a B series matter. But author disagrees and set about claiming that the A series is the essential element to time, not the B series. (pg24-5)
Author submits that 'time involves change' and that 'there could be no time if nothing changed' (pg25). The next matter is to ask whether you can have change without the A series-- that is, if the A series is just accidental, subjective, or inessential to the nature of time. Author approaches the problem first by looking at whether you can have change using solely the B series. Here author claims that there is no change if there is solely the B series version of events. The argument goes as follows: (pg25-6)
1. For time to exist, events must change
2. Change is one event M ceasing and another N beginning
3. In the B series, event N follows event M
4. In the B series, event N always and forever follows event M
5. Therefore, the relations between N and M are permanent
6. Therefore, in the B series, N always exists after M (which also always exists)
7. If N always exists, it does not cease or begin (likewise for M)
8. Therefore there is no change in the B series
9. Therefore, there is no time in the B series
The solution, author suggests, is to make one of the relations between M and N change. That relation is the A series relation, of M being, at one point, in the present and N the future, and then eventually making M the past and N the present. This A series possibility changes the relations between the events, making change possible and thus being an essential element to time. (pg26-7)
Author then considers various objections to this view, starting with Bertrand Russell (pg27-8), who claims that the A series is merely a subjective aspect of time. The second objection is that time exists in fictitious works (like stories) but there is clearly no A series. (pg29) The upshot here is that author posits that 'time only belongs to the existent'. (pg29) The third objection is that it may be possible that time has several real and independent time-series. Meaning there could be more than one 'present', but just in different 'series'. This seems to be an objection to both the B and the A series, so author leaves it as showing that there wouldn't be 'the present', but 'the present of a certain aspect of the universe' (pg30).
The second part of the paper is devoted to showing that the A series involves a contradiction and therefore cannot exist. (pg31) The author starts by reminding us that the B series is insufficient to underwrite time, but that the A series needs to stand in relation to something outside the time series (pg31-2) 'If, then, anything is to be rightly called past, present, or future, it must be because it is in relation to something else.' Finding what that something else is 'would not be easy'. (pg32) But the real difficulty is that the terms 'past', 'present', and 'future' are incompatible predicates to apply to an event, yet each event has at least two. (pg32) Author argues that there is no way to dispel this inconsistency without an infinite regress into additional time predicates, which are all based around those initial three terms. (pg32-3)
Author ends by claiming that time is unreal and that our view of it is erroneous.
The Philosophy of Time, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Poidevin & MacBeath, eds
This is a reprint of an old (1908) essay that seeks to show two things: first that time is essentially a matter of past, present and future, and second that these notions are contradictory. Since they contradict, time can't be real. Author starts by making a distinction between two positions of time, the, indicated by an A series and the B series. The A series involves the past, present and future, and things passing from the future to the present into the past. The B series involves things that are earlier, contemporaneous, and later, where events are related to each other along that scale. It may be tempting to believe that the B series is objective and the A series subjective, therefore time is essentially a B series matter. But author disagrees and set about claiming that the A series is the essential element to time, not the B series. (pg24-5)
Author submits that 'time involves change' and that 'there could be no time if nothing changed' (pg25). The next matter is to ask whether you can have change without the A series-- that is, if the A series is just accidental, subjective, or inessential to the nature of time. Author approaches the problem first by looking at whether you can have change using solely the B series. Here author claims that there is no change if there is solely the B series version of events. The argument goes as follows: (pg25-6)
1. For time to exist, events must change
2. Change is one event M ceasing and another N beginning
3. In the B series, event N follows event M
4. In the B series, event N always and forever follows event M
5. Therefore, the relations between N and M are permanent
6. Therefore, in the B series, N always exists after M (which also always exists)
7. If N always exists, it does not cease or begin (likewise for M)
8. Therefore there is no change in the B series
9. Therefore, there is no time in the B series
The solution, author suggests, is to make one of the relations between M and N change. That relation is the A series relation, of M being, at one point, in the present and N the future, and then eventually making M the past and N the present. This A series possibility changes the relations between the events, making change possible and thus being an essential element to time. (pg26-7)
Author then considers various objections to this view, starting with Bertrand Russell (pg27-8), who claims that the A series is merely a subjective aspect of time. The second objection is that time exists in fictitious works (like stories) but there is clearly no A series. (pg29) The upshot here is that author posits that 'time only belongs to the existent'. (pg29) The third objection is that it may be possible that time has several real and independent time-series. Meaning there could be more than one 'present', but just in different 'series'. This seems to be an objection to both the B and the A series, so author leaves it as showing that there wouldn't be 'the present', but 'the present of a certain aspect of the universe' (pg30).
The second part of the paper is devoted to showing that the A series involves a contradiction and therefore cannot exist. (pg31) The author starts by reminding us that the B series is insufficient to underwrite time, but that the A series needs to stand in relation to something outside the time series (pg31-2) 'If, then, anything is to be rightly called past, present, or future, it must be because it is in relation to something else.' Finding what that something else is 'would not be easy'. (pg32) But the real difficulty is that the terms 'past', 'present', and 'future' are incompatible predicates to apply to an event, yet each event has at least two. (pg32) Author argues that there is no way to dispel this inconsistency without an infinite regress into additional time predicates, which are all based around those initial three terms. (pg32-3)
Author ends by claiming that time is unreal and that our view of it is erroneous.
8/28/09
Dummett, Michael - A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time
08/28/2009
Truth and Other Enigmas, Harvard University Press 1978
This article gives a lengthy explication of McTaggart's argument for there being a contradiction in time. Author reconstructs the argument:
a) an event M is past, present or future
b) an event M is before, at the same time as, or after another event N
Crucial here is that the facts of kind a) cannot be reducible to facts of kind b). Apparently McTaggart's reasoning for this is that change is essential to time, but there is no change in the truth function of the fact 'M comes after N', or 'M came before N'. Such facts, if true, are eternally true and therefore don't involve change. (pg351) Now the problem is that an event M can be described using three mutually incompatible predicates (past, present, future). This leads to a contradiction in describing the event, thus time is an unreality.
Author considers a possible response: the predicates applying to event M isn't just 'past', 'present', 'future', but 'will be past', 'is present', and 'was future'-- building tenses into the predicate. But adding tense verbs into the predicates only pushes the further back, since now there are 9 different predicate combinations: 'was past', 'is past', 'will be past' and so on for 'present' and 'future'. In any case the contradiction can be generated again. (pg351-2)
A more sophisticated response employs 'token-reflexive' expressions (e.g. 'I', 'here', 'now'), which are like indexicals that change a sentence's truth conditions according to context. We then specify that token-reflexive expressions are essential to time-facts and resolve the apparent incompatibility (pg353). This response, author points out, trivializes McTaggart's argument since it could also be made for space or personhood, just as it was for time. Yet McTaggart doesn't make analogous arguments about space or personhood, so author thinks there is more to his argument.
The difference, author claims, between the argument about time and an analogous one about space is that token-reflexivity is essential to time but it isn't to space. (pg354) Author discusses how it is possible to have a description of objects in space that doesn't include the describer-- that has no 'spatially token-reflexive expressions in giving a description of the physical uinverse' (pg354)-- but the same is not possible for time. Author argues that any account of a sequence of events without token-reflexive expressions will leave the question 'but what is happening right now' unanswered, therefore the account will be incomplete. Another possibility is to think of an external observer seeing time as a fourth dimension that is static, similar to how a full spatial description of the world would be a static image in 3 dimensions. In a weird turn, author argues that what would be observed would be a 'model' of events, not the events themselves. (pg355)
The possible response to this essential aspect of time is to jettison the notion that there is one complete description of reality (pg356), but author admits he is partial to this. Instead, it appears the unreality of time is self-defeating, since our apprehension of the world is certainly temporal.
Truth and Other Enigmas, Harvard University Press 1978
This article gives a lengthy explication of McTaggart's argument for there being a contradiction in time. Author reconstructs the argument:
a) an event M is past, present or future
b) an event M is before, at the same time as, or after another event N
Crucial here is that the facts of kind a) cannot be reducible to facts of kind b). Apparently McTaggart's reasoning for this is that change is essential to time, but there is no change in the truth function of the fact 'M comes after N', or 'M came before N'. Such facts, if true, are eternally true and therefore don't involve change. (pg351) Now the problem is that an event M can be described using three mutually incompatible predicates (past, present, future). This leads to a contradiction in describing the event, thus time is an unreality.
Author considers a possible response: the predicates applying to event M isn't just 'past', 'present', 'future', but 'will be past', 'is present', and 'was future'-- building tenses into the predicate. But adding tense verbs into the predicates only pushes the further back, since now there are 9 different predicate combinations: 'was past', 'is past', 'will be past' and so on for 'present' and 'future'. In any case the contradiction can be generated again. (pg351-2)
A more sophisticated response employs 'token-reflexive' expressions (e.g. 'I', 'here', 'now'), which are like indexicals that change a sentence's truth conditions according to context. We then specify that token-reflexive expressions are essential to time-facts and resolve the apparent incompatibility (pg353). This response, author points out, trivializes McTaggart's argument since it could also be made for space or personhood, just as it was for time. Yet McTaggart doesn't make analogous arguments about space or personhood, so author thinks there is more to his argument.
The difference, author claims, between the argument about time and an analogous one about space is that token-reflexivity is essential to time but it isn't to space. (pg354) Author discusses how it is possible to have a description of objects in space that doesn't include the describer-- that has no 'spatially token-reflexive expressions in giving a description of the physical uinverse' (pg354)-- but the same is not possible for time. Author argues that any account of a sequence of events without token-reflexive expressions will leave the question 'but what is happening right now' unanswered, therefore the account will be incomplete. Another possibility is to think of an external observer seeing time as a fourth dimension that is static, similar to how a full spatial description of the world would be a static image in 3 dimensions. In a weird turn, author argues that what would be observed would be a 'model' of events, not the events themselves. (pg355)
The possible response to this essential aspect of time is to jettison the notion that there is one complete description of reality (pg356), but author admits he is partial to this. Instead, it appears the unreality of time is self-defeating, since our apprehension of the world is certainly temporal.
8/14/09
Farley, John - The Scientific Case for Modern Anthropogenic Global Warming
08/14/2009
Monthly Review, July-August 2008
This article tries to give some general scientific background for understanding the human causes of global warming, and rebut a series of arguments made by Alexander Cockburn that anthropogenic global warming is a myth.
The evidence for human-made global warming presented by author is fairly straightforward: when the sun's rays hit the earth, some is radiated back into the atmosphere, mostly as infrared light. This light gets trapped in the atmosphere by greenhouse gases, which are opaque to this light. The three gasses are water vapor, CO2, and methane. This undisputed greenhouse effect is already responsible for heating the planet from a surface temperature of -1F to 60F. The experimental data collected by Keeling in Hawaii since 1959 shows a steady increase in CO2 into the atmosphere, which is also undisputed. Further, it is possible to examine air bubbles in arctic ice that shows a rise in CO2 around the industrial revolution, after holding relatively steady for the last 10,000 years. Author claims the reason for the recent rise is the anthropogenic burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.
Author admits that water vapor is the largest contributor to the greenhouse effect, but CO2 represents from 9-26% depending on how the counting is done. Another aspect to consider is that adding to infrared opacity in the atmosphere might have no effect if the opacity is already 100%. Instead, increasing CO2 will affect the 'wings', the areas where opacity is lower. Author likens increasing CO2 in those areas to closing the windows in a hot house.
According to author, the major debate among scientists isn't whether 'climate forcing' by humans is happening (increasing the atmospheric temperature by 2.2-2.3F), but what the 'climate response' will be-- the feedback from the earth that may increase or decrease our forcing. Author presents evidence for the possibility of negative feedback (e.g. decreasing the temperature) and positive feedback (e.g. increasing the temperature). Author reports the general consensus to be for positive feedback, somewhere from 2.7 to 8.1F. Two effects might indicate positive feedback:
(P1)- Ice-albedo effect-- as the temperature rises, ice near the poles melts and exposes more earth, decreasing the earth's reflectance of ultraviolet and visible light, heating it.
(P2)- Increased water vapor-- warmer air can hold more water vapor than cool air can, increasing the opacity for infrared light and causing an additional greenhouse effect.
Then there is some evidence for possible negative feedback:
(N1)- If warmer temperatures create more clouds and clouds have a net cooling effect, this could reduce the anthropogenic effects of increasing CO2.
(N2)- Richard Lindzen's "adaptive iris" effect, which suggests that greater temperatures in the tropics will create fewer cirrus clouds that increase the "leakage" of infrared radiation, resulting in cooling.
The state of science makes it difficult to predict a priori whether there will be net positive or negative feedback, but author argues that if we can take the long-term historical evidence as accurate, the warming temperatures were higher than one would predict without positive feedback. So positive feedback is consistent with previous periods of non-anthropogenic global warming. Author gives evidence from the earth's past ice ages, which are 'almost unanimously' agreed to be because of changes in the earth's axis tilt (Milankovich cycle). Yet simple changes in sunlight doesn't result in the amount of cooling (or, later, warming) that took place-- suggesting positive feedback played a part in those cases. Author also discusses the modes temperatures changes that took place from 1600-1800.
Author then directly addresses Cockburn's 6 main arguments:
1- During the economic depression of the 1930s, burning of fossil fuels decreased 30%, but there was no decrease of CO2 in the atmosphere, thus the two are unrelated.
Response: If CO2 entering the atmosphere decreases by 30%, that means the rate of CO2 'flux' decreases 30%, not the CO2 'reservoir' that is already in the atmosphere. Cutting CO2 flux to zero would mean there would be an eventual lowering of the CO2 reservoir, but that didn't happen so we should not have expected it.
2- Water vapor is the biggest greenhouse gas and the effects from CO2 are negligible.
Response: Yes it is true that water vapor is a larger effect than CO2. But the CO2 effect is appreciable.
3- Earth's last ice age ended when the the earth tilted slightly on its axis, temperatures rose and then CO2 in the atmosphere rose. CO2 rises as a result of global temperature, not as a cause of it.
Response: That is a true account of 10,000 years ago. But there are many ways to increase temperatures in the climate, and in the last 200 years, CO2 rises preceded temperature rises.
4- The increase of CO2 comes naturally from the oceans, not the man-made burning of fossil fuels.
Response: Yes the ocean has lots of CO2 in it. But there are two kinds of CO2 molecules, since there are two carbon isotopes (heavy ones have one extra neutron)-- the heavy ones are about 1% of the total carbon atoms. In turns out that plants prefer the regular 12-weight-carbons when adding to their biomass (growing). Thus you'd expect to find fewer 13-weight-carbons in plants and their derivatives, fossil fuels; and that is what experiments have found. The CO2 in the atmosphere contains a lower concentration of 13C than the norm, suggesting that the CO2 in the atmosphere comes from lower 13C sources (e.g. fossil fuels). On ocean surfaces there is a higher concentration of 13C, and in the deep oceans a depleted amount of 13C. Moreover, evidence from the Maua Loa observatory in Hawaii shows an increase of 12C in the atmosphere.
5- Any addition of CO2 to the atmosphere by humans will be dissolved into the ocean within a year or two, making anthropogenic effects short-lived if at all.
Response: This is an old, persistent belief that CO2 will easily and quickly dissolve into ocean waters since it does so in pure water. Author argues that it isn't an issue of whether all the CO2 in the atmosphere can get into the oceans, it's an issue of how long it will take-- a 'transient' problem rather than a 'equilibrium' problem. Estimates from ocean chemists suggest it will take from 60 to 360 years for the biggest percentage of CO2 to dissolve into the oceans-- and that is talking about the reservoir-- not the flux!
6- Global warming forecasts are largely dependent on computer models, which are easily manipulated to show whatever scary but unrealistic outcome you want to get.
Response: Yes, computer models are suspect, but much of our evidence doesn't come from models but instead from historical observations and old-fashioned theory. Moreover, much of the controversy is about what kind of feedback there will be-- the climate response-- not the climate forcing evidence (that doesn't rely on computer models). If the climate response is a positive feedback like there was during ice-age transitions, this is more evidence for the IPCC's estimates that don't rely on computer models.
Monthly Review, July-August 2008
This article tries to give some general scientific background for understanding the human causes of global warming, and rebut a series of arguments made by Alexander Cockburn that anthropogenic global warming is a myth.
The evidence for human-made global warming presented by author is fairly straightforward: when the sun's rays hit the earth, some is radiated back into the atmosphere, mostly as infrared light. This light gets trapped in the atmosphere by greenhouse gases, which are opaque to this light. The three gasses are water vapor, CO2, and methane. This undisputed greenhouse effect is already responsible for heating the planet from a surface temperature of -1F to 60F. The experimental data collected by Keeling in Hawaii since 1959 shows a steady increase in CO2 into the atmosphere, which is also undisputed. Further, it is possible to examine air bubbles in arctic ice that shows a rise in CO2 around the industrial revolution, after holding relatively steady for the last 10,000 years. Author claims the reason for the recent rise is the anthropogenic burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.
Author admits that water vapor is the largest contributor to the greenhouse effect, but CO2 represents from 9-26% depending on how the counting is done. Another aspect to consider is that adding to infrared opacity in the atmosphere might have no effect if the opacity is already 100%. Instead, increasing CO2 will affect the 'wings', the areas where opacity is lower. Author likens increasing CO2 in those areas to closing the windows in a hot house.
According to author, the major debate among scientists isn't whether 'climate forcing' by humans is happening (increasing the atmospheric temperature by 2.2-2.3F), but what the 'climate response' will be-- the feedback from the earth that may increase or decrease our forcing. Author presents evidence for the possibility of negative feedback (e.g. decreasing the temperature) and positive feedback (e.g. increasing the temperature). Author reports the general consensus to be for positive feedback, somewhere from 2.7 to 8.1F. Two effects might indicate positive feedback:
(P1)- Ice-albedo effect-- as the temperature rises, ice near the poles melts and exposes more earth, decreasing the earth's reflectance of ultraviolet and visible light, heating it.
(P2)- Increased water vapor-- warmer air can hold more water vapor than cool air can, increasing the opacity for infrared light and causing an additional greenhouse effect.
Then there is some evidence for possible negative feedback:
(N1)- If warmer temperatures create more clouds and clouds have a net cooling effect, this could reduce the anthropogenic effects of increasing CO2.
(N2)- Richard Lindzen's "adaptive iris" effect, which suggests that greater temperatures in the tropics will create fewer cirrus clouds that increase the "leakage" of infrared radiation, resulting in cooling.
The state of science makes it difficult to predict a priori whether there will be net positive or negative feedback, but author argues that if we can take the long-term historical evidence as accurate, the warming temperatures were higher than one would predict without positive feedback. So positive feedback is consistent with previous periods of non-anthropogenic global warming. Author gives evidence from the earth's past ice ages, which are 'almost unanimously' agreed to be because of changes in the earth's axis tilt (Milankovich cycle). Yet simple changes in sunlight doesn't result in the amount of cooling (or, later, warming) that took place-- suggesting positive feedback played a part in those cases. Author also discusses the modes temperatures changes that took place from 1600-1800.
Author then directly addresses Cockburn's 6 main arguments:
1- During the economic depression of the 1930s, burning of fossil fuels decreased 30%, but there was no decrease of CO2 in the atmosphere, thus the two are unrelated.
Response: If CO2 entering the atmosphere decreases by 30%, that means the rate of CO2 'flux' decreases 30%, not the CO2 'reservoir' that is already in the atmosphere. Cutting CO2 flux to zero would mean there would be an eventual lowering of the CO2 reservoir, but that didn't happen so we should not have expected it.
2- Water vapor is the biggest greenhouse gas and the effects from CO2 are negligible.
Response: Yes it is true that water vapor is a larger effect than CO2. But the CO2 effect is appreciable.
3- Earth's last ice age ended when the the earth tilted slightly on its axis, temperatures rose and then CO2 in the atmosphere rose. CO2 rises as a result of global temperature, not as a cause of it.
Response: That is a true account of 10,000 years ago. But there are many ways to increase temperatures in the climate, and in the last 200 years, CO2 rises preceded temperature rises.
4- The increase of CO2 comes naturally from the oceans, not the man-made burning of fossil fuels.
Response: Yes the ocean has lots of CO2 in it. But there are two kinds of CO2 molecules, since there are two carbon isotopes (heavy ones have one extra neutron)-- the heavy ones are about 1% of the total carbon atoms. In turns out that plants prefer the regular 12-weight-carbons when adding to their biomass (growing). Thus you'd expect to find fewer 13-weight-carbons in plants and their derivatives, fossil fuels; and that is what experiments have found. The CO2 in the atmosphere contains a lower concentration of 13C than the norm, suggesting that the CO2 in the atmosphere comes from lower 13C sources (e.g. fossil fuels). On ocean surfaces there is a higher concentration of 13C, and in the deep oceans a depleted amount of 13C. Moreover, evidence from the Maua Loa observatory in Hawaii shows an increase of 12C in the atmosphere.
5- Any addition of CO2 to the atmosphere by humans will be dissolved into the ocean within a year or two, making anthropogenic effects short-lived if at all.
Response: This is an old, persistent belief that CO2 will easily and quickly dissolve into ocean waters since it does so in pure water. Author argues that it isn't an issue of whether all the CO2 in the atmosphere can get into the oceans, it's an issue of how long it will take-- a 'transient' problem rather than a 'equilibrium' problem. Estimates from ocean chemists suggest it will take from 60 to 360 years for the biggest percentage of CO2 to dissolve into the oceans-- and that is talking about the reservoir-- not the flux!
6- Global warming forecasts are largely dependent on computer models, which are easily manipulated to show whatever scary but unrealistic outcome you want to get.
Response: Yes, computer models are suspect, but much of our evidence doesn't come from models but instead from historical observations and old-fashioned theory. Moreover, much of the controversy is about what kind of feedback there will be-- the climate response-- not the climate forcing evidence (that doesn't rely on computer models). If the climate response is a positive feedback like there was during ice-age transitions, this is more evidence for the IPCC's estimates that don't rely on computer models.
7/31/09
Westphal, Jonathan - An Aristotelian Solution to the Problem of the Measuring of Time
07/31/2009
Unpublished paper
This article starts with a particular problem found in Augustine's Confessions, regarding measurement of time. The idea goes as follows:
-What is past no longer exists, so it can't be measured, what is future has yet to exist, so it too can't be measured. And the present has no extension, so it also can't be measured.
Author points out this is a different problem from Aristotle's, who questions the very existence of time in the first place. Augustine's problem is about both measurement and ontological status. (pg1)
The solution given starts with a Wittgenstein-esque 'diagnosis' of the problem; the problem is that we think that the only kind of measurement is the kind that measures length along a 'traveling band' with a beginning point and and end point, yet all we can see is a small fraction of the middle (the present). The problem, then, is not with time but with our grammatical understanding of 'measurement', that the prototypical kind of measurement, that of length, becomes an essential aspect of measurement. Instead, we should get a 'reminder' of what we do when we do measure time, so that we can get a suitable analysis. (pg2-3)
Author first presents a clarification: we don't measure 'time' but 'a time', a piece of time. Next, we need to look for an event, a happening through time that we want to measure. There are some rules: There needs to be a measurement device that moves at a regular and unchanging rate over a fixed and equal set of units. Now we set the device to '0' and proceed with the measurement. The key here is that a time is used to measure a time, just as a length is used to measure a length. We measure 'over a series of present moments ... rather than at a present moment' (pg4) So there isn't a good answer to the question "how long (time) is it?", but there is a good answer to "how long (time) was it?". In the latter case the measurement is co-extensional with the event in that one dimension (time). (pg4) The temporal measuring device extends through time just as a length-wise measuring device extends through space.
Unpublished paper
This article starts with a particular problem found in Augustine's Confessions, regarding measurement of time. The idea goes as follows:
-What is past no longer exists, so it can't be measured, what is future has yet to exist, so it too can't be measured. And the present has no extension, so it also can't be measured.
Author points out this is a different problem from Aristotle's, who questions the very existence of time in the first place. Augustine's problem is about both measurement and ontological status. (pg1)
The solution given starts with a Wittgenstein-esque 'diagnosis' of the problem; the problem is that we think that the only kind of measurement is the kind that measures length along a 'traveling band' with a beginning point and and end point, yet all we can see is a small fraction of the middle (the present). The problem, then, is not with time but with our grammatical understanding of 'measurement', that the prototypical kind of measurement, that of length, becomes an essential aspect of measurement. Instead, we should get a 'reminder' of what we do when we do measure time, so that we can get a suitable analysis. (pg2-3)
Author first presents a clarification: we don't measure 'time' but 'a time', a piece of time. Next, we need to look for an event, a happening through time that we want to measure. There are some rules: There needs to be a measurement device that moves at a regular and unchanging rate over a fixed and equal set of units. Now we set the device to '0' and proceed with the measurement. The key here is that a time is used to measure a time, just as a length is used to measure a length. We measure 'over a series of present moments ... rather than at a present moment' (pg4) So there isn't a good answer to the question "how long (time) is it?", but there is a good answer to "how long (time) was it?". In the latter case the measurement is co-extensional with the event in that one dimension (time). (pg4) The temporal measuring device extends through time just as a length-wise measuring device extends through space.
7/24/09
Singer, Peter - Why We Must Ration Health Care
07/24/2009
New York Times, July 19 2009
This is a magazine article for the popular press dealing with the ways to assign value to public health. The article concludes that health care rationing already takes place and that instead we should enter into a conscious public conversation about how to find value with health-care dollars.
The article starts with an example of a drug that had been developed extend the life of terminal kidney cancer patients by maybe 6 months or so. The cost was $54,000. Would you pay for it? Would you want to be paying premiums for an insurance plan that pays for it? The article plays on the difference between the personal choice that you might make compared to the public-health choice that we collectively make. When using public funds to pay for treatments, author argues that it is 'crazy' not to ask for good value, which is equivalent to rationing.
The other argument here is that the US system also rations, but instead of doing so through a bureau, through one's ability to pay for treatment privately. This 'rationing' also leads to increased mortality and morbidity among the poor and uninsured.
The idea of weighing public policy against cost is not new. Author points out that the US does it in public safety frequently: where the costs to implement some new safety measure would be too expensive for the lives it would save. In order to extend the issue to public health, there needs to be a standard measurement that money buys: author talks about the QALY, or Quality Adjusted Life Year. To reflect the difference between treating a 20-yr old vs an 85-yr old, this measurement uses life expectancy to assign more value to the young. The QALY approach runs into prejudicial or adverse discriminatory issues when it tries to deal with more fine-grained issues, e.g. deafness, quadriplegia, etc. The issue here is that disabled people may not want to be treated as second-class compared to healthy ones. Healthy people might claim that they would rather live shorter lives than be quadriplegic, but this might just be an inherent healthy-person bias. Author points out the double-standard here-- if it is just fine to be disabled (according to the disabled group) then why bother curing it?
The remainder of the article discusses the options that the US has in making a public option and that it can take many forms than the supposedly-reviled Canadian and British system.
New York Times, July 19 2009
This is a magazine article for the popular press dealing with the ways to assign value to public health. The article concludes that health care rationing already takes place and that instead we should enter into a conscious public conversation about how to find value with health-care dollars.
The article starts with an example of a drug that had been developed extend the life of terminal kidney cancer patients by maybe 6 months or so. The cost was $54,000. Would you pay for it? Would you want to be paying premiums for an insurance plan that pays for it? The article plays on the difference between the personal choice that you might make compared to the public-health choice that we collectively make. When using public funds to pay for treatments, author argues that it is 'crazy' not to ask for good value, which is equivalent to rationing.
The other argument here is that the US system also rations, but instead of doing so through a bureau, through one's ability to pay for treatment privately. This 'rationing' also leads to increased mortality and morbidity among the poor and uninsured.
The idea of weighing public policy against cost is not new. Author points out that the US does it in public safety frequently: where the costs to implement some new safety measure would be too expensive for the lives it would save. In order to extend the issue to public health, there needs to be a standard measurement that money buys: author talks about the QALY, or Quality Adjusted Life Year. To reflect the difference between treating a 20-yr old vs an 85-yr old, this measurement uses life expectancy to assign more value to the young. The QALY approach runs into prejudicial or adverse discriminatory issues when it tries to deal with more fine-grained issues, e.g. deafness, quadriplegia, etc. The issue here is that disabled people may not want to be treated as second-class compared to healthy ones. Healthy people might claim that they would rather live shorter lives than be quadriplegic, but this might just be an inherent healthy-person bias. Author points out the double-standard here-- if it is just fine to be disabled (according to the disabled group) then why bother curing it?
The remainder of the article discusses the options that the US has in making a public option and that it can take many forms than the supposedly-reviled Canadian and British system.
7/17/09
MacDonald, Scott - Primal Sin
07/17/2009
The Augustinian Tradition, G Matthews ed. University of California Press, 1999 Ch 6
This paper tries to give a satisfactory account of St Augustine's concept of the primal sin of Adam & Eve and of the angels who turned against God. For Augustine, primal sin had to be voluntary, which meant it had to be a free act of will. The difficulty here is that a free act of will to sin suggests a bad will, or some bad efficient explanation. Augustine is constrained because of his debate with the Manichaeans, a sect that believed that there were two powers in the universe, one good and one evil. Augustine believes that there is only one power: God's, and it is supremely good. So Augustine does not want to admit that there is such a thing as a bad efficient cause to a free act of the will. Instead he claims that primal sin (turning away from the perfect goodness of God for an imperfect, lesser good) is a deficient act of the will-- a failing-- rather than one that was properly motivated. Yet this leaves Augustine in a difficult position: that of claiming that primal sin involved a free act of will that has no efficient origin. The unpleasant alternative is to admit that primal sin had origins in a bad will, but such an admission could implicate the creator (God) in the sin, since God created everything and God is only good (pg114-5). The author tries to resolve these problems. Note: this is not an attempt to deal with 'original sin', which is transmitted through the generations from the first sinful human beings. Instead it is an attempt to show how good creatures like angels and Adam & Eve can, through a deficiency, take a voluntary action of turning from God. (pg114)
Augustine's famous resolution of the problem of evil lies in its being a corruption from essence, having no actual essence of its own. Since God made everything good, evil must not be a thing but instead a 'privation' (pg114) or defection from good nature. In the same vein, for Augustine primal sin is corruption of 'rational nature' (pg115) that is done voluntarily and solely by the agent. The cause of primal sin must reside solely with the angels or humans; God must be totally blameless (e.g. God didn't make a faulty product) (pg115-6). Furthermore, primal sin must not be coerced or the result of some irresistible impulse-- the agents must have had the capacity to choose otherwise from what they did do. (pg117-8) Author couples this with Augustine's conception of sin here, which is a turning away from the ultimate, unchanging good (God's) to a lesser, temporal good-- this is a 'disordered' act of the will. (pg118) What explains this disorder, since it is irrational to turn away from God's goodness (and God didn't make humans to be irrational), and the angels and Adam & Eve weren't ignorant in any sense (if they were, they couldn't have full responsibility for their choices). (pg119-120)
Author argues that it must be a carelessness of practical reasoning that was the source of primal sin. (pg121) The carelessness consists in failing to attend to the goodness of God and attending instead to other good things. Primal sinners may still harbor the belief of God's ultimate goodness, but fail to attend to the fact when deciding to commit the primal sin. Author gives an example from modern life: about to go home from work, asks you to coffee; even though you had promised to take your children to the park, you fail to consider your other desires/beliefs and agree to go to coffee. Essentially, you fail to attend to all the reasons you have for going home instead of going for coffee. (pg123) If you managed to consider all your concurrently-held beliefs/desires, you would go home, but you have a failure in practical reasoning and you go to coffee instead. (pg124). Author considers this failure to be not an efficient reason but a deficient reason for willful action. This limitation isn't a defect, but a side-effect of the 'flow of conscious experience' that 'cannot help but make certain of [our] reasons more and others less immediate at any given moment.' (pg127) And the limitation is due to the fact that angels and Adam & Eve were created 'ex nihilo', from nothing (pg127).
There are two objections to this explanation that the author addresses:
1) This kind of failure might be possible, but it only represents momentary lapses or small errors and don't represent some sort of deep-seated corruption, the kind of corruption required for the gravity of primal sin. (pg128)
Reply: small lapses can build up into a pattern of the same behavior, small peccadilloes can create a pattern of thought that results in a characteristic lapse. (pg129-130)
2) This explanation still doesn't give the reasons for primal sin-- now you need to explain why the primal sinners had the motives and desires to fail in their practical reasoning.
Reply: while perhaps every willful action must be explained by appeal to reasons/beliefs/desires/motives, we don't insist on the same for every time we don't do something. And this explanation for primal sin entails a failure to act-- a not-doing of something-- not an action. (pg130-2)
Author ends the paper by broadening the account of primal sin into a genuine explanation of culpable irrationality that can be added to the cannon of moral decision-making.
The Augustinian Tradition, G Matthews ed. University of California Press, 1999 Ch 6
This paper tries to give a satisfactory account of St Augustine's concept of the primal sin of Adam & Eve and of the angels who turned against God. For Augustine, primal sin had to be voluntary, which meant it had to be a free act of will. The difficulty here is that a free act of will to sin suggests a bad will, or some bad efficient explanation. Augustine is constrained because of his debate with the Manichaeans, a sect that believed that there were two powers in the universe, one good and one evil. Augustine believes that there is only one power: God's, and it is supremely good. So Augustine does not want to admit that there is such a thing as a bad efficient cause to a free act of the will. Instead he claims that primal sin (turning away from the perfect goodness of God for an imperfect, lesser good) is a deficient act of the will-- a failing-- rather than one that was properly motivated. Yet this leaves Augustine in a difficult position: that of claiming that primal sin involved a free act of will that has no efficient origin. The unpleasant alternative is to admit that primal sin had origins in a bad will, but such an admission could implicate the creator (God) in the sin, since God created everything and God is only good (pg114-5). The author tries to resolve these problems. Note: this is not an attempt to deal with 'original sin', which is transmitted through the generations from the first sinful human beings. Instead it is an attempt to show how good creatures like angels and Adam & Eve can, through a deficiency, take a voluntary action of turning from God. (pg114)
Augustine's famous resolution of the problem of evil lies in its being a corruption from essence, having no actual essence of its own. Since God made everything good, evil must not be a thing but instead a 'privation' (pg114) or defection from good nature. In the same vein, for Augustine primal sin is corruption of 'rational nature' (pg115) that is done voluntarily and solely by the agent. The cause of primal sin must reside solely with the angels or humans; God must be totally blameless (e.g. God didn't make a faulty product) (pg115-6). Furthermore, primal sin must not be coerced or the result of some irresistible impulse-- the agents must have had the capacity to choose otherwise from what they did do. (pg117-8) Author couples this with Augustine's conception of sin here, which is a turning away from the ultimate, unchanging good (God's) to a lesser, temporal good-- this is a 'disordered' act of the will. (pg118) What explains this disorder, since it is irrational to turn away from God's goodness (and God didn't make humans to be irrational), and the angels and Adam & Eve weren't ignorant in any sense (if they were, they couldn't have full responsibility for their choices). (pg119-120)
Author argues that it must be a carelessness of practical reasoning that was the source of primal sin. (pg121) The carelessness consists in failing to attend to the goodness of God and attending instead to other good things. Primal sinners may still harbor the belief of God's ultimate goodness, but fail to attend to the fact when deciding to commit the primal sin. Author gives an example from modern life: about to go home from work, asks you to coffee; even though you had promised to take your children to the park, you fail to consider your other desires/beliefs and agree to go to coffee. Essentially, you fail to attend to all the reasons you have for going home instead of going for coffee. (pg123) If you managed to consider all your concurrently-held beliefs/desires, you would go home, but you have a failure in practical reasoning and you go to coffee instead. (pg124). Author considers this failure to be not an efficient reason but a deficient reason for willful action. This limitation isn't a defect, but a side-effect of the 'flow of conscious experience' that 'cannot help but make certain of [our] reasons more and others less immediate at any given moment.' (pg127) And the limitation is due to the fact that angels and Adam & Eve were created 'ex nihilo', from nothing (pg127).
There are two objections to this explanation that the author addresses:
1) This kind of failure might be possible, but it only represents momentary lapses or small errors and don't represent some sort of deep-seated corruption, the kind of corruption required for the gravity of primal sin. (pg128)
Reply: small lapses can build up into a pattern of the same behavior, small peccadilloes can create a pattern of thought that results in a characteristic lapse. (pg129-130)
2) This explanation still doesn't give the reasons for primal sin-- now you need to explain why the primal sinners had the motives and desires to fail in their practical reasoning.
Reply: while perhaps every willful action must be explained by appeal to reasons/beliefs/desires/motives, we don't insist on the same for every time we don't do something. And this explanation for primal sin entails a failure to act-- a not-doing of something-- not an action. (pg130-2)
Author ends the paper by broadening the account of primal sin into a genuine explanation of culpable irrationality that can be added to the cannon of moral decision-making.
7/10/09
Urquhart, Brian - What You Can Learn From Reinhold Niebuhr
07/10/2009
The New York Review of Books, March 26, 2009
This is a book review of three books, one reprint from Niebuhr 'The Irony of American History', and one from Andrew Bacevich 'The Limits of Power', and finally from James Traub 'The Freedom Agenda'. The reviews are fairly straightforward and largely summarize the main theses. Many of the points are put into the context of being vindicated by the post-Iraq GW Bush presidency.
1. Niebuhr 'The Irony of American History'
This review of a book written in 1952 talks about the US dream of 'managing history' and succumbing to the temptation of applying our socio-polictical concepts across the globe. Niebuhr also talked about the lack of stability of the US economic system and of the 'pretensions of virtue' that blind a nation like the US into seeing world affairs as black-and-white, good-vs-evil. An overarching theme here is the inscrutable nature of world political events and the pathos of such a powerful nation (the US) to attempt to control and mold such events.
2. Bacevich 'Limits of Power'
Bacevich's book carries much of Niebuhr's theme, talking specifically about the grand delusions that the Bush administration had about the military capabilities in Iraq. The review also contains a shortened version of Bacevich's analysis of the decline of US power since the 1950s. In the economic analysis, the US went into importing of much of its needed oil and going from being a creditor to being a debtor. Also since then the US has taken the position that it is in a permanent crisis-- or on the brink of it-- of national security. This has created the strong presidency to ascend over the congress and the permanent militarization of the US. The conclusion? The US doesn't need a bigger army, but a more modest foreign policy.
3. Traub 'The Freedom Agenda'
The review of this book casts it as a practical tome dedicated to posing and working on the tough questions of the US's foreign policy. Again Niebuhr is echoed in the discussion of the failure of Bush's 'Freedom Agenda' of bringing democratic regimes to other lands. The book is full of analysis and critiques of such attempts, e.g. Somalia and Bosnia, and unintended consequences like Hamas' election in the Gaza strip.
The New York Review of Books, March 26, 2009
This is a book review of three books, one reprint from Niebuhr 'The Irony of American History', and one from Andrew Bacevich 'The Limits of Power', and finally from James Traub 'The Freedom Agenda'. The reviews are fairly straightforward and largely summarize the main theses. Many of the points are put into the context of being vindicated by the post-Iraq GW Bush presidency.
1. Niebuhr 'The Irony of American History'
This review of a book written in 1952 talks about the US dream of 'managing history' and succumbing to the temptation of applying our socio-polictical concepts across the globe. Niebuhr also talked about the lack of stability of the US economic system and of the 'pretensions of virtue' that blind a nation like the US into seeing world affairs as black-and-white, good-vs-evil. An overarching theme here is the inscrutable nature of world political events and the pathos of such a powerful nation (the US) to attempt to control and mold such events.
2. Bacevich 'Limits of Power'
Bacevich's book carries much of Niebuhr's theme, talking specifically about the grand delusions that the Bush administration had about the military capabilities in Iraq. The review also contains a shortened version of Bacevich's analysis of the decline of US power since the 1950s. In the economic analysis, the US went into importing of much of its needed oil and going from being a creditor to being a debtor. Also since then the US has taken the position that it is in a permanent crisis-- or on the brink of it-- of national security. This has created the strong presidency to ascend over the congress and the permanent militarization of the US. The conclusion? The US doesn't need a bigger army, but a more modest foreign policy.
3. Traub 'The Freedom Agenda'
The review of this book casts it as a practical tome dedicated to posing and working on the tough questions of the US's foreign policy. Again Niebuhr is echoed in the discussion of the failure of Bush's 'Freedom Agenda' of bringing democratic regimes to other lands. The book is full of analysis and critiques of such attempts, e.g. Somalia and Bosnia, and unintended consequences like Hamas' election in the Gaza strip.
7/3/09
Mameli, Matteo - On Innateness: The Clutter Hypothesis and the Cluster Hypothesis
07/03/2009
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 Num 12 Dec 2008
This paper discusses the various problems with specifying what it is for something to be innate and a proposed meta-analysis (Clutter or Cluster) of the concept.
The analysis starts with the 'minimal condition' which is that something that is innate is not learned, and what is learned is not innate. (pg721). Examples of this are Plato's Meno and Chomsky's poverty of stimulus argument about the deep rules of grammar. Author argues that even the minimal condition is too strong since it calls the sex of a particular reptile non-learned (innate) when in actuality it was merely the result of the temperature while being incubated. (pg722) Perhaps, though, 'learning' can be reinterpreted to being a subset of larger 'MAPS', or 'Mechanisms for Adaptive Plasticity', which can be employed without using a psychological process. Under this fix, what is innate is what is not the result of the developmental outcome of a MAP. But author claims this goes awry too because of developmental maladies that aren't acquired through MAPS, but are nonetheless not innate. (pg723)
Author then considers multiple attempts at giving an analysis of innateness. The first is that what is genetically encoded is what is innate (pg724). The difficulty here is that genetic encoding creates things like proteins, not 'whole organism phenotypic traits' like sexual preference, ability to speak a language, obesity. There is a supposed consensus that such traits develop through causal processes that 'involve genetic and non-genetic factors' (pg725). In this way, whole-organism traits cannot be innate, if innate means 'genetically encoded'. The fix here might be to say that for innateness, genes must affect the developmental process relative to the emergence of an innate trait. But author invents a thought experiment that supposedly involves a learned trait that still satisfies this condition. The trait is the ability to understand the theory of Special Relativity-- author argues that this trait is learned but also could be the result of genes that affect the developmental process. (pg725-6) This thought experiment can combat simple genetic encoding analyses and also an account of innateness that specify a certain type of genetic encoding: evolutionary adaptation by natural selection. (pg726-7)
Another possible analysis of innateness is high degree of broad heritability. In this account, high heritability means that variation is mostly due to genetic factors. Author argues that this concept is ill-suited for innateness, since it doesn't have the tools to account for traits like 'having one head' (too universal to count), and it also misses universal traits that are altered by accident, like the trait 'having 10 fingers'. If most of the people without 10 fingers have lost them due to accidents, then the variation is due largely to non-genetic factors, putting the heritability of 'having 10 fingers' on the low end of the scale. (pg728)
The final analysis of innateness is that it involves invariance or canalization, that is, emergence of a trait given most environments-- or a certain degree of developmental 'buffering' against environmental variation. The problem here is that clearly learned traits like 'the belief that water is a liquid' are highly invariable and canalized. (pg729-730)
Author proposes two meta-analyses for the concept of innateness. The first is the Clutter hypothesis, the second is the Cluster hypothesis. The clutter hypothesis is that innateness is a mix of useful concepts that we have just started to pull apart with science, though previously we didn't have the capacity to do so. Therefore the concept is a clutter of different distinct ones and (probably) should be dissolved. (pg730-4) Ironically, author claims that some work has been done that shows that the concept of innatenes 'comes naturally' to humans (pg733). The Cluster hypothesis instead argues that the various aspects of innateness-- canalization, heritability, genetic encoding-- are properties that cluster around a deeper causal process of innateness. In some circumstances we should expect each property of innateness to emerge, but in others, only one property may be present. Those who advocate the cluster analysis will be required to tell the story about this deep causal process, but it is still open as a possibility. (pg735-6) Author claims that it is an empirical question which analysis is true.
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 Num 12 Dec 2008
This paper discusses the various problems with specifying what it is for something to be innate and a proposed meta-analysis (Clutter or Cluster) of the concept.
The analysis starts with the 'minimal condition' which is that something that is innate is not learned, and what is learned is not innate. (pg721). Examples of this are Plato's Meno and Chomsky's poverty of stimulus argument about the deep rules of grammar. Author argues that even the minimal condition is too strong since it calls the sex of a particular reptile non-learned (innate) when in actuality it was merely the result of the temperature while being incubated. (pg722) Perhaps, though, 'learning' can be reinterpreted to being a subset of larger 'MAPS', or 'Mechanisms for Adaptive Plasticity', which can be employed without using a psychological process. Under this fix, what is innate is what is not the result of the developmental outcome of a MAP. But author claims this goes awry too because of developmental maladies that aren't acquired through MAPS, but are nonetheless not innate. (pg723)
Author then considers multiple attempts at giving an analysis of innateness. The first is that what is genetically encoded is what is innate (pg724). The difficulty here is that genetic encoding creates things like proteins, not 'whole organism phenotypic traits' like sexual preference, ability to speak a language, obesity. There is a supposed consensus that such traits develop through causal processes that 'involve genetic and non-genetic factors' (pg725). In this way, whole-organism traits cannot be innate, if innate means 'genetically encoded'. The fix here might be to say that for innateness, genes must affect the developmental process relative to the emergence of an innate trait. But author invents a thought experiment that supposedly involves a learned trait that still satisfies this condition. The trait is the ability to understand the theory of Special Relativity-- author argues that this trait is learned but also could be the result of genes that affect the developmental process. (pg725-6) This thought experiment can combat simple genetic encoding analyses and also an account of innateness that specify a certain type of genetic encoding: evolutionary adaptation by natural selection. (pg726-7)
Another possible analysis of innateness is high degree of broad heritability. In this account, high heritability means that variation is mostly due to genetic factors. Author argues that this concept is ill-suited for innateness, since it doesn't have the tools to account for traits like 'having one head' (too universal to count), and it also misses universal traits that are altered by accident, like the trait 'having 10 fingers'. If most of the people without 10 fingers have lost them due to accidents, then the variation is due largely to non-genetic factors, putting the heritability of 'having 10 fingers' on the low end of the scale. (pg728)
The final analysis of innateness is that it involves invariance or canalization, that is, emergence of a trait given most environments-- or a certain degree of developmental 'buffering' against environmental variation. The problem here is that clearly learned traits like 'the belief that water is a liquid' are highly invariable and canalized. (pg729-730)
Author proposes two meta-analyses for the concept of innateness. The first is the Clutter hypothesis, the second is the Cluster hypothesis. The clutter hypothesis is that innateness is a mix of useful concepts that we have just started to pull apart with science, though previously we didn't have the capacity to do so. Therefore the concept is a clutter of different distinct ones and (probably) should be dissolved. (pg730-4) Ironically, author claims that some work has been done that shows that the concept of innatenes 'comes naturally' to humans (pg733). The Cluster hypothesis instead argues that the various aspects of innateness-- canalization, heritability, genetic encoding-- are properties that cluster around a deeper causal process of innateness. In some circumstances we should expect each property of innateness to emerge, but in others, only one property may be present. Those who advocate the cluster analysis will be required to tell the story about this deep causal process, but it is still open as a possibility. (pg735-6) Author claims that it is an empirical question which analysis is true.
6/26/09
Frankel, Charles - The Rediscovery Of Sin
06/26/2009
The Case For Modern Man, Harper & Brothers 1956, Ch 6
This is a review of Niebuhr's main philosophies regarding the human condition. The discussion takes the form of a detailed exposition of Niebuhr's philosophy, and then a longer refutation of it. Niebuhr's main points are as follows:
-Humanity is trapped between ideal infinity and its finite nature, creating the defining emotion of anxiety.
-Anxiety in relation to unattainable perfection tends toward considering human finite nature to be the only worthy attainment, e.g. sin.
-The concept of original sin in the human condition plays a powerful explanatory role in human history. The concept works in this manner: because humanity does not recognize its finite nature it continually oversteps what it is capable of, ending in great disappointments (pg90).
-Liberalism attempts to deny that humanity has original sin and is therefore misguided and prone to failure.
-Original sin isn't a psychological phenomenon; it is somehow more: some sort of metaphysical condition on humanity that is insoluble (pg93-5). The insolubility comes from a fundamental 'paradox of human freedom', that humanity is free to choose yet bounded by causal necessity.
Author claims that this paradox is actually a logical mistake: there is no contradiction between being subject to the laws of nature and having freedom. Being predictable (subject to causal laws) doesn't entail lacking freedom (being able to choose based on your judgment). (pg96-98) Further, author claims that adding 'original sin' to human history does little to offer a better explanation, since sin is (1) ever present and (2) is a side-effect of the finite nature of humanity, though it has yet to be seen how finite humanity is. (pg100)
The next discussion relates to Niebuhr's indictment of liberalism's hope for man's progress. Yet Niebuhr makes a straw man out of liberalism; modern liberals were intimately familiar with humanity's self-interested motives and egoism. Author takes an extended look at the writings of Condorcet, whose writings, when translated into English, had the targeted term "the indefinite perfectibility of man'. (pg101-106) Condorcet was talking about how there are definite limits on how knowledge and social structures can improve mankind, but we aren't in a position to know what those limits are (until we reach them?). Really, it was a belief in the indefinite improvability of man'.
More importantly, author argues that the shift from 'man's sinfulness' to 'the goodness of man' wasn't a fundamental contradiction but instead a shift in focus. It wasn't an attempt to claim that the human condition was essentially good, but instead an attempt to redefine the focus of debate from soul/redemption-talk to social/societal-talk. (pg107-8) What the 'goodness of man' stance tries to get right is the primacy of social structures, government and knowledge in human flourishing, as opposed to the primacy of personal salvation in humanity's redemption.
The last discussion is an analysis of the context of Niebuhr's writings: they come at a time where 'everything seems to have contrived to make ... heightened moral impulses appear irrelevant' (pg112) and modern society experiences increasing alienation. Niebuhr's writings then make this experience a deep-seated, widespread metaphysical one, yet author argues that it explains little other than what we already know-- that humanity involves a struggle of ideals in a finite world. (pg113-5)
The Case For Modern Man, Harper & Brothers 1956, Ch 6
This is a review of Niebuhr's main philosophies regarding the human condition. The discussion takes the form of a detailed exposition of Niebuhr's philosophy, and then a longer refutation of it. Niebuhr's main points are as follows:
-Humanity is trapped between ideal infinity and its finite nature, creating the defining emotion of anxiety.
-Anxiety in relation to unattainable perfection tends toward considering human finite nature to be the only worthy attainment, e.g. sin.
-The concept of original sin in the human condition plays a powerful explanatory role in human history. The concept works in this manner: because humanity does not recognize its finite nature it continually oversteps what it is capable of, ending in great disappointments (pg90).
-Liberalism attempts to deny that humanity has original sin and is therefore misguided and prone to failure.
-Original sin isn't a psychological phenomenon; it is somehow more: some sort of metaphysical condition on humanity that is insoluble (pg93-5). The insolubility comes from a fundamental 'paradox of human freedom', that humanity is free to choose yet bounded by causal necessity.
Author claims that this paradox is actually a logical mistake: there is no contradiction between being subject to the laws of nature and having freedom. Being predictable (subject to causal laws) doesn't entail lacking freedom (being able to choose based on your judgment). (pg96-98) Further, author claims that adding 'original sin' to human history does little to offer a better explanation, since sin is (1) ever present and (2) is a side-effect of the finite nature of humanity, though it has yet to be seen how finite humanity is. (pg100)
The next discussion relates to Niebuhr's indictment of liberalism's hope for man's progress. Yet Niebuhr makes a straw man out of liberalism; modern liberals were intimately familiar with humanity's self-interested motives and egoism. Author takes an extended look at the writings of Condorcet, whose writings, when translated into English, had the targeted term "the indefinite perfectibility of man'. (pg101-106) Condorcet was talking about how there are definite limits on how knowledge and social structures can improve mankind, but we aren't in a position to know what those limits are (until we reach them?). Really, it was a belief in the indefinite improvability of man'.
More importantly, author argues that the shift from 'man's sinfulness' to 'the goodness of man' wasn't a fundamental contradiction but instead a shift in focus. It wasn't an attempt to claim that the human condition was essentially good, but instead an attempt to redefine the focus of debate from soul/redemption-talk to social/societal-talk. (pg107-8) What the 'goodness of man' stance tries to get right is the primacy of social structures, government and knowledge in human flourishing, as opposed to the primacy of personal salvation in humanity's redemption.
The last discussion is an analysis of the context of Niebuhr's writings: they come at a time where 'everything seems to have contrived to make ... heightened moral impulses appear irrelevant' (pg112) and modern society experiences increasing alienation. Niebuhr's writings then make this experience a deep-seated, widespread metaphysical one, yet author argues that it explains little other than what we already know-- that humanity involves a struggle of ideals in a finite world. (pg113-5)
6/19/09
Neibuhr, Reinhold - The American Future
06/19/2009
The Irony of American History, Ch 7 University of Chicago Press, 2008
This chapter (written in 1951) discusses the prospects of the US in relation to itself and other nations. 1. Author first points out that the US was isolationist for a long time until WWII, where the US realized that technology had connected the world enough so that it couldn't 'be secure in an insecure world' (pg131). So in rising to the occasion and admitting to its abilities to lead and exercise its power, the US also employs its idealism, which author considers too 'oblivious' and needs to come 'to terms with the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historic configurations of power...' etc. (pg133)
2. The US's idealism is bolstered by what author sees as two factors, the first being that the US's power is very high on the world stage. While there are some advantages to concentrations of power in uniting states, the negative side is the resentment it can breed, as well as the temptation of the powerful side to abuse its power (pg135). Tempering power 'into the service of justice' has come in three ways: (a) redistribute power, (b) bring power 'under social and moral review', or (c) use religion to keep it in check. (pg135) Author argues that (a) is not relevant in the international community; it's just a fact of history. Option (b) is happening in the form of the United Nations, which author believes is salubrious, especially because 'it is impossible for any nation or individual fully to understand the peculiar circumstances and the unique history of any other nation or individual, which create their special view of reality.' (pg137) In this section author predicts that once the US realizes it must spend enormous efforts to upgrade its war preparedness with new technology, it may come to the UN more willing to work out a solution to the communist conflict. Strategy (c) involves humility and recognizing the 'other' is worthy of respect. (pg139)
3. The second factor that supposedly reinforces the US's idealism is that there seems to be no easy solution to the struggle against the communists. (pg140) This frustrates the US's liberal idealism that holds that a superior way of life should triumph without needing to compromise. What this misses is that 'human communities are never purely artifacts of the human mind and will' (pg142) and humans are creatures of history (pg141)-- meaning that it is sometimes difficult, sometimes impossible to wholly do away with undesirable powers and forces. (pg143) The argument seems to be that because of the US's idealism, it misinterprets this hard lesson as stubbornness or ignorance. (pg143)
4.-5. Author compares individual heroism with national heroism, pointing out the most dramatic difference is that individual heroism can be willingly self-sacrificing and pursue an end without much probability of achieving it, while a nation cannot reasonably do so-- there must be some decent probability of success. Author also states that a democracy could never engage in an 'explicit preventive war' (pg146). In the following section author discusses the tensions in the US and rejects one of the solutions offered: Kennan argues that the US too eagerly extends its moralistic constitutional scheme to other nations, intending to remake them in its own image. This brings out another source of US idealism: that its 'technocratic' mastery of physical nature encourages the same approach toward human nature. (pg147-8) Author rejects Kennan's solution, namely that the US should become solely self-interested. What is needed is true humility regarding the US's abilities and charity regarding other nations.
The selected introduction to Neibuhr's "Moral Man and Immoral Society" involved a polemic against social scientists, modern educators and moralists who seek to better society by doing social science. Author's principal arguments are as follows:
-humans have parts that belong to the 'order of nature' (pgxii) that cannot ever be fully controlled by reason and conscience
-Social change, unlike changes in knowledge (science), involves conflict between the haves and have-nots; therefore the exercise of power is vitally important to changing social situations. This makes the retardation of social sciences compared to the advancement of the natural sciences not a product of 'ignorance' (pgxiv-xv) but of social-structure maintenance.
-Those educators (author uses Dewey as a target) seem to miss the class-struggle aspect of social change and are fraught with 'middle-class prejudices'(pgxiii-xiv)
The Irony of American History, Ch 7 University of Chicago Press, 2008
This chapter (written in 1951) discusses the prospects of the US in relation to itself and other nations. 1. Author first points out that the US was isolationist for a long time until WWII, where the US realized that technology had connected the world enough so that it couldn't 'be secure in an insecure world' (pg131). So in rising to the occasion and admitting to its abilities to lead and exercise its power, the US also employs its idealism, which author considers too 'oblivious' and needs to come 'to terms with the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historic configurations of power...' etc. (pg133)
2. The US's idealism is bolstered by what author sees as two factors, the first being that the US's power is very high on the world stage. While there are some advantages to concentrations of power in uniting states, the negative side is the resentment it can breed, as well as the temptation of the powerful side to abuse its power (pg135). Tempering power 'into the service of justice' has come in three ways: (a) redistribute power, (b) bring power 'under social and moral review', or (c) use religion to keep it in check. (pg135) Author argues that (a) is not relevant in the international community; it's just a fact of history. Option (b) is happening in the form of the United Nations, which author believes is salubrious, especially because 'it is impossible for any nation or individual fully to understand the peculiar circumstances and the unique history of any other nation or individual, which create their special view of reality.' (pg137) In this section author predicts that once the US realizes it must spend enormous efforts to upgrade its war preparedness with new technology, it may come to the UN more willing to work out a solution to the communist conflict. Strategy (c) involves humility and recognizing the 'other' is worthy of respect. (pg139)
3. The second factor that supposedly reinforces the US's idealism is that there seems to be no easy solution to the struggle against the communists. (pg140) This frustrates the US's liberal idealism that holds that a superior way of life should triumph without needing to compromise. What this misses is that 'human communities are never purely artifacts of the human mind and will' (pg142) and humans are creatures of history (pg141)-- meaning that it is sometimes difficult, sometimes impossible to wholly do away with undesirable powers and forces. (pg143) The argument seems to be that because of the US's idealism, it misinterprets this hard lesson as stubbornness or ignorance. (pg143)
4.-5. Author compares individual heroism with national heroism, pointing out the most dramatic difference is that individual heroism can be willingly self-sacrificing and pursue an end without much probability of achieving it, while a nation cannot reasonably do so-- there must be some decent probability of success. Author also states that a democracy could never engage in an 'explicit preventive war' (pg146). In the following section author discusses the tensions in the US and rejects one of the solutions offered: Kennan argues that the US too eagerly extends its moralistic constitutional scheme to other nations, intending to remake them in its own image. This brings out another source of US idealism: that its 'technocratic' mastery of physical nature encourages the same approach toward human nature. (pg147-8) Author rejects Kennan's solution, namely that the US should become solely self-interested. What is needed is true humility regarding the US's abilities and charity regarding other nations.
The selected introduction to Neibuhr's "Moral Man and Immoral Society" involved a polemic against social scientists, modern educators and moralists who seek to better society by doing social science. Author's principal arguments are as follows:
-humans have parts that belong to the 'order of nature' (pgxii) that cannot ever be fully controlled by reason and conscience
-Social change, unlike changes in knowledge (science), involves conflict between the haves and have-nots; therefore the exercise of power is vitally important to changing social situations. This makes the retardation of social sciences compared to the advancement of the natural sciences not a product of 'ignorance' (pgxiv-xv) but of social-structure maintenance.
-Those educators (author uses Dewey as a target) seem to miss the class-struggle aspect of social change and are fraught with 'middle-class prejudices'(pgxiii-xiv)
6/12/09
Rorty, Richard - Religious faith, intellectual responsibility, and romance
06/12/2009
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 5, RA Putnam ed, 1997
This article is an overview of James' commitments to utilitarianism and pragmatism and how it provided the basis for James' view of religion. Author also suggests an alternate strategy of argumentation that he believes might have been more effective, using the same basic commitments. According to author, there are two major aspects of James' philosophy that provides space for the Will to Believe: (1) is that Mill's version of utilitarianism features the Harm principle, which is the principle that if a subject s does action x and x is not hurting anybody else, only s is the judge on whether to do x; and (2) that scientific pragmatism holds that intellectual responsibility is primarily to other people in a joint project of creating a workable description of the world. If you sufficiently privatize religion to isolate it from such a joint project, there is some room for it regardless of the scientific justification or evidence. (pg85)
Author reviews Clifford's main claims about evidence and justification, suggesting that there are two minimal ways to take Clifford: (1) that the meaning of a belief is what inferences it creates to other beliefs-- a kind of holism-- making any one belief inseparable from the social project; (or even more generally) (2) that to be rational is to submit belief to scrutiny, to intersubjective confirmation-- a belief that is not open for testing is not really a belief. (pg87-8) Clifford argues that without evidence then it is one's responsibility not to hold a belief, yet James 'resists', and creates a kind of forced, momentous and live choice as a result. (pg88) Author finds this unsatisfying (pg90) and suggests that James take another approach: instead of agreeing on a firm distinction between (public) beliefs and (private) desires/hopes, to cash out cognitive states in terms of actional consequences, using utilitarianism to talk about intellectual obligations to others, and areas where there are no such obligations. (pg89) Thus if religion is private action, then it can be pursued without obligation to others. While privatizing religion might make accepting religion not, strictly speaking, a belief, author argues it should make little difference to James. (pg90-1)
Privatization of religion is unsatifying to many (e.g. MacIntyre), since it seems to remove most actional elements (ex hypothesis) and talks vaguely about "the eternal". Author tries to distinguish pragmatists from instrumentalists: pragmatists are realists about theoretic entities but also believe that justification for any entity takes place within a human-interest context. Such a position allows for the justification of macro-objects like tables, micro entities like atoms, and perhaps even social institutions. (pg92) Author tries to show that pure scientific realists and religious fundamentalists 'are products of the same urge.... private projects which have gotten out of hand.' (pg93)
James' focus of the religious hypothesis 'perfection is eternal' can be unsatisfying since it removes much of the specific actional elements of a creed. Author tries to compare the private religious pursuit to that of love of another human. (pg94) Loving another certainly has actional consequences, but not because you are trying to 'predict or control' them or their behavior. (pg94) (Further, we commonly do not ask for justification for such love.) This sort of life-area carve-out threatens the theory that we can reduce all intentional states into belief-desire pairs with definite inferences and actional consequences. Without this reduction, pragmatism might be unable to support its claim of the inextricable nature of desire and beliefs, making it difficult to substitute intersubjective justification for so-called objective verification. (pg95) Luckily there is an externalist interpretation of the behavior of someone in love (or religious) that imputes beliefs and desires onto them based on their actions, though the beliefs might be unjustifiable intellectually. Author states that even though such belief-desire imputations might not fit into a scheme of justification that other beliefs of the subject would, they are still explanatory.
Author lastly discusses what he believes should have been the religious focus for James-- not in something external to human life (eternal things), but in the 'future possibilities of mortal humans', a faith that looks a lot like hope, love, or Romantic commitments. (pg96-7) Author tells a story about how we used to look to external forces for something better but now we should be looking only to our own human future. (pg97)
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 5, RA Putnam ed, 1997
This article is an overview of James' commitments to utilitarianism and pragmatism and how it provided the basis for James' view of religion. Author also suggests an alternate strategy of argumentation that he believes might have been more effective, using the same basic commitments. According to author, there are two major aspects of James' philosophy that provides space for the Will to Believe: (1) is that Mill's version of utilitarianism features the Harm principle, which is the principle that if a subject s does action x and x is not hurting anybody else, only s is the judge on whether to do x; and (2) that scientific pragmatism holds that intellectual responsibility is primarily to other people in a joint project of creating a workable description of the world. If you sufficiently privatize religion to isolate it from such a joint project, there is some room for it regardless of the scientific justification or evidence. (pg85)
Author reviews Clifford's main claims about evidence and justification, suggesting that there are two minimal ways to take Clifford: (1) that the meaning of a belief is what inferences it creates to other beliefs-- a kind of holism-- making any one belief inseparable from the social project; (or even more generally) (2) that to be rational is to submit belief to scrutiny, to intersubjective confirmation-- a belief that is not open for testing is not really a belief. (pg87-8) Clifford argues that without evidence then it is one's responsibility not to hold a belief, yet James 'resists', and creates a kind of forced, momentous and live choice as a result. (pg88) Author finds this unsatisfying (pg90) and suggests that James take another approach: instead of agreeing on a firm distinction between (public) beliefs and (private) desires/hopes, to cash out cognitive states in terms of actional consequences, using utilitarianism to talk about intellectual obligations to others, and areas where there are no such obligations. (pg89) Thus if religion is private action, then it can be pursued without obligation to others. While privatizing religion might make accepting religion not, strictly speaking, a belief, author argues it should make little difference to James. (pg90-1)
Privatization of religion is unsatifying to many (e.g. MacIntyre), since it seems to remove most actional elements (ex hypothesis) and talks vaguely about "the eternal". Author tries to distinguish pragmatists from instrumentalists: pragmatists are realists about theoretic entities but also believe that justification for any entity takes place within a human-interest context. Such a position allows for the justification of macro-objects like tables, micro entities like atoms, and perhaps even social institutions. (pg92) Author tries to show that pure scientific realists and religious fundamentalists 'are products of the same urge.... private projects which have gotten out of hand.' (pg93)
James' focus of the religious hypothesis 'perfection is eternal' can be unsatisfying since it removes much of the specific actional elements of a creed. Author tries to compare the private religious pursuit to that of love of another human. (pg94) Loving another certainly has actional consequences, but not because you are trying to 'predict or control' them or their behavior. (pg94) (Further, we commonly do not ask for justification for such love.) This sort of life-area carve-out threatens the theory that we can reduce all intentional states into belief-desire pairs with definite inferences and actional consequences. Without this reduction, pragmatism might be unable to support its claim of the inextricable nature of desire and beliefs, making it difficult to substitute intersubjective justification for so-called objective verification. (pg95) Luckily there is an externalist interpretation of the behavior of someone in love (or religious) that imputes beliefs and desires onto them based on their actions, though the beliefs might be unjustifiable intellectually. Author states that even though such belief-desire imputations might not fit into a scheme of justification that other beliefs of the subject would, they are still explanatory.
Author lastly discusses what he believes should have been the religious focus for James-- not in something external to human life (eternal things), but in the 'future possibilities of mortal humans', a faith that looks a lot like hope, love, or Romantic commitments. (pg96-7) Author tells a story about how we used to look to external forces for something better but now we should be looking only to our own human future. (pg97)
6/5/09
Clifford, William - The Ethics of Belief
06/05/2009
Lectures and Essays, 2nd edition, Macmillan & Co 1886
This paper inveighs against belief with insufficient evidence, calling it wrong in the moral/ethical sense, not just the epistemological. Author starts with a lengthy example of a shipowner who has some reason to believe his ship isn't seaworthy but nevertheless convinces himself to let her sail; on the seas she does down and the passengers die. Author takes a deonotological view of the morals of belief, arguing that it is morally wrong to believe on insufficient evidence no matter what the consequences were (pg340). After presenting another example relating to public defamation, author also argues that it is morally wrong to believe even a true proposition on insufficient evidence. (pg341)
Author entertains an objection: that what is morally wrong is the action taken that was based on the (epistemically) wrong belief, not the wrong belief itself. While author agrees that there are additional obligations that extend to action, he also argues that 'it is not possible to sever the belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning the other'.(pg342) Here the argument is that if you already believe that p is true, you're not going to do a thorough investigation of whether you should act as though p is false. Furthermore, author claims that if p really is to count as a belief and not just some fantasy, it takes some role, somewhere or other, in action. (pg342) Finally, author argues that 'no one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone', arguing that our common culture on which we all depend (and have all inherited) is strengthened by the successes of our ancestors-- an 'heirloom' into which everything we've said and done will be woven and passed down to succeeding generations-- thus an obligation to pass on only evidentially supported beliefs. (pg342-3)
Author discusses how withholding belief in cases where there isn't enough evidence can be unsettling (pg344), but the alternative of giving belief without the evidence is far worse for your own moral character ('weaken our powers of self-control') and for the society at large. Society at large is threatened by a credulous character in the same way as it is by thievery. To steal is wrong enough, but the real problem is that society can become a 'den of thieves'; in the same way being credulous is bad enough, but if it is a permanent character trait among the people, society might 'sink back into savagery'. (pg345)
II. The next matter author takes up is how to go about believing something for which you have no personal experience-- how to rely on authority. (Author also mentions in passing that it is permissible to act upon probability if there is not enough evidence to fully justify belief and action must be taken. pg347) In the case of accepting the word of another, we must be concerned with her truthfulness and her knowledge. (pg348-350) Author seems to put forth some version of a verification principle; if the evidence for a belief isn't capable of being retrieved by humans, then you should not believe it. (pg353-4)
Author uses the case of Mohammed, who spoke honestly but author doubts his ability to know-- his divine knowledge. Even though his precepts are adopted by thousands and they live happily only shows, according to author, that the belief system is 'comfortable' and 'pleasant to the soul', not that it is true. What may be confirmed instead is that the prophet had 'knowledge of human nature', not that he had divine inspiration or celestial knowledge. (pg351) Author supposes that there is a 'celestial visitor' who makes prophesies, some of which are verified. This still would give no grounds for believing those prophesies yet untested (or currently untestable). (pg350) Author also attacks beliefs passed down through traditions, and takes as an example the modern liberal belief that it is good to give to beggars. Instead, it is good to give them work, not to encourage idleness. (pg356)
III.Further along the lines of what to believe and when, author discusses the limits of inference. Author first points out that whenever we direct our thinking toward the future (or toward actions), we go beyond our experience and infer the continuity and uniformity of nature-- that the past is similar to the future. (pg360) Author argues that in cases where we are required to infer things about, e.g. the sun, based on our observations on the earth, all we need to use is the assumption of the uniformity of nature. (pg361)
Lectures and Essays, 2nd edition, Macmillan & Co 1886
This paper inveighs against belief with insufficient evidence, calling it wrong in the moral/ethical sense, not just the epistemological. Author starts with a lengthy example of a shipowner who has some reason to believe his ship isn't seaworthy but nevertheless convinces himself to let her sail; on the seas she does down and the passengers die. Author takes a deonotological view of the morals of belief, arguing that it is morally wrong to believe on insufficient evidence no matter what the consequences were (pg340). After presenting another example relating to public defamation, author also argues that it is morally wrong to believe even a true proposition on insufficient evidence. (pg341)
Author entertains an objection: that what is morally wrong is the action taken that was based on the (epistemically) wrong belief, not the wrong belief itself. While author agrees that there are additional obligations that extend to action, he also argues that 'it is not possible to sever the belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning the other'.(pg342) Here the argument is that if you already believe that p is true, you're not going to do a thorough investigation of whether you should act as though p is false. Furthermore, author claims that if p really is to count as a belief and not just some fantasy, it takes some role, somewhere or other, in action. (pg342) Finally, author argues that 'no one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone', arguing that our common culture on which we all depend (and have all inherited) is strengthened by the successes of our ancestors-- an 'heirloom' into which everything we've said and done will be woven and passed down to succeeding generations-- thus an obligation to pass on only evidentially supported beliefs. (pg342-3)
Author discusses how withholding belief in cases where there isn't enough evidence can be unsettling (pg344), but the alternative of giving belief without the evidence is far worse for your own moral character ('weaken our powers of self-control') and for the society at large. Society at large is threatened by a credulous character in the same way as it is by thievery. To steal is wrong enough, but the real problem is that society can become a 'den of thieves'; in the same way being credulous is bad enough, but if it is a permanent character trait among the people, society might 'sink back into savagery'. (pg345)
II. The next matter author takes up is how to go about believing something for which you have no personal experience-- how to rely on authority. (Author also mentions in passing that it is permissible to act upon probability if there is not enough evidence to fully justify belief and action must be taken. pg347) In the case of accepting the word of another, we must be concerned with her truthfulness and her knowledge. (pg348-350) Author seems to put forth some version of a verification principle; if the evidence for a belief isn't capable of being retrieved by humans, then you should not believe it. (pg353-4)
Author uses the case of Mohammed, who spoke honestly but author doubts his ability to know-- his divine knowledge. Even though his precepts are adopted by thousands and they live happily only shows, according to author, that the belief system is 'comfortable' and 'pleasant to the soul', not that it is true. What may be confirmed instead is that the prophet had 'knowledge of human nature', not that he had divine inspiration or celestial knowledge. (pg351) Author supposes that there is a 'celestial visitor' who makes prophesies, some of which are verified. This still would give no grounds for believing those prophesies yet untested (or currently untestable). (pg350) Author also attacks beliefs passed down through traditions, and takes as an example the modern liberal belief that it is good to give to beggars. Instead, it is good to give them work, not to encourage idleness. (pg356)
III.Further along the lines of what to believe and when, author discusses the limits of inference. Author first points out that whenever we direct our thinking toward the future (or toward actions), we go beyond our experience and infer the continuity and uniformity of nature-- that the past is similar to the future. (pg360) Author argues that in cases where we are required to infer things about, e.g. the sun, based on our observations on the earth, all we need to use is the assumption of the uniformity of nature. (pg361)
5/29/09
Hollinger, David - James, Clifford, and the scientific conscience
05/29/2009
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 4, RA Putnam ed, 1997
Though mostly an overview, this paper argues that the WK Clifford quoted in James' Will to Believe was largely misrepresented by James, in particular regarding the willingness of someone who guides her beliefs only with sufficient evidence to act without enough of it. James seems to cast Clifford as staunchly opposed to it, when author claims instead that Clifford was more reasoned and sophisticated. Clifford wrote The Ethics of Belief, which (according to author) took as the root concern the 'structure of plausibility' (pg70)-- meaning what those with intellectual (scientific) mindsets would consider acceptable additions to their worldview prior to receiving the evidence.
Most of the paper explores the arguments given by Clifford and James and gives their context. James suggests in Will to Believe that in the two scientific passions-- the desire to find truth and avoid error-- the desire to avoid error will paralyze you in times where action is required (forced choice) but there isn't sufficient evidence to fix a belief. James quotes Clifford as an example of the passion to avoid error: a reasonable conclusion is that Clifford would advocate withholding action. But Clifford understood this problem well and suggested instead that we act on probabilities in such cases. (pg71) Other misrepresentations occurred with James' discussion of the uniformity of nature. (pg72-3) Author grants that in some respects the impression James left was fair: Clifford was more hostile to religion and more positive about the previous advancements of scientific knowledge than James was (pg73, 75).
The Jamesian program was to give an essentially personal defense of a theistic religious commitment, though particular pillars of such a belief were largely unexplored (pg74-5). The break with Clifford was that Clifford put religious belief in the same sphere as all other beliefs-- there wasn't a special realm for religious ones. One of Clifford's main tenets was that beliefs had actional and therefore (probably) social consequences, making it a general moral concern that you avoid errors in your beliefs. Clifford used an example of a ship-owner who uncritically believed (falsely) that his ship was sea-worthy, sent it out and it sunk, killing the passengers. (pg76) While James did also emphasize the behavioristic consequences of belief, he leaves religious belief personal and isolated, and does not discuss what actional results it would take; author calls this 'obscurantist'. (pg77) James made a distinction between questions that could be settled 'on intellectual grounds' and those that 'by nature' could not; this was a distinction that allowed for the freedom of belief, and one Clifford did not abide. (pg79) Author takes this divide to be at odds with Peirce, and eventually the later James in his work Pragmatism.
This paper also gives attention to the context and concerns of the writers. Clifford wrote in England and perceived a milieu of wary skepticism about the abilities and worth of science, while James wrote in America and echoed a concern that science was intimidating the laymen.(pg78, 80-1)
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 4, RA Putnam ed, 1997
Though mostly an overview, this paper argues that the WK Clifford quoted in James' Will to Believe was largely misrepresented by James, in particular regarding the willingness of someone who guides her beliefs only with sufficient evidence to act without enough of it. James seems to cast Clifford as staunchly opposed to it, when author claims instead that Clifford was more reasoned and sophisticated. Clifford wrote The Ethics of Belief, which (according to author) took as the root concern the 'structure of plausibility' (pg70)-- meaning what those with intellectual (scientific) mindsets would consider acceptable additions to their worldview prior to receiving the evidence.
Most of the paper explores the arguments given by Clifford and James and gives their context. James suggests in Will to Believe that in the two scientific passions-- the desire to find truth and avoid error-- the desire to avoid error will paralyze you in times where action is required (forced choice) but there isn't sufficient evidence to fix a belief. James quotes Clifford as an example of the passion to avoid error: a reasonable conclusion is that Clifford would advocate withholding action. But Clifford understood this problem well and suggested instead that we act on probabilities in such cases. (pg71) Other misrepresentations occurred with James' discussion of the uniformity of nature. (pg72-3) Author grants that in some respects the impression James left was fair: Clifford was more hostile to religion and more positive about the previous advancements of scientific knowledge than James was (pg73, 75).
The Jamesian program was to give an essentially personal defense of a theistic religious commitment, though particular pillars of such a belief were largely unexplored (pg74-5). The break with Clifford was that Clifford put religious belief in the same sphere as all other beliefs-- there wasn't a special realm for religious ones. One of Clifford's main tenets was that beliefs had actional and therefore (probably) social consequences, making it a general moral concern that you avoid errors in your beliefs. Clifford used an example of a ship-owner who uncritically believed (falsely) that his ship was sea-worthy, sent it out and it sunk, killing the passengers. (pg76) While James did also emphasize the behavioristic consequences of belief, he leaves religious belief personal and isolated, and does not discuss what actional results it would take; author calls this 'obscurantist'. (pg77) James made a distinction between questions that could be settled 'on intellectual grounds' and those that 'by nature' could not; this was a distinction that allowed for the freedom of belief, and one Clifford did not abide. (pg79) Author takes this divide to be at odds with Peirce, and eventually the later James in his work Pragmatism.
This paper also gives attention to the context and concerns of the writers. Clifford wrote in England and perceived a milieu of wary skepticism about the abilities and worth of science, while James wrote in America and echoed a concern that science was intimidating the laymen.(pg78, 80-1)
5/22/09
James, William - The Will To Believe
05/22/2009
Essays In Popular Philosophy, Ch 1 Longmans Green & Co 1911
This well-known paper is about the permissibility of belief in religion, probably considered now to be a stand-in for belief in the divine. The main argument is that when you are forced to make a momentous choice where there is some credibility for either option, making either choice is beyond rebuke. Author first spends time investigating kinds of hypotheses and the nature of science and scientific investigation.
The first move is to discuss different kinds of hypotheses-- live or dead, forced or unforced, momentous or trivial. The most interesting is the live or dead hypothesis: a live hypothesis is subjective and relative-- if the hypothesis proposed 'appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed' (I) then it is live. A dead hypothesis isn't considered a possibility related to action-- something that individual would take up as true. (A momentous hypothesis is also subjective and relative). Author readily concedes that as a matter of psychology choosing to believe A over B simply for expediency or for the benefits (e.g. Pascal's wager) isn't possible. (II) However, author interprets this as largely applicable for dead hypotheses, not necessarily live ones. Instead, he believes that our passions do influence what beliefs we readily keep. He points out that many of our beliefs we accept on 'authority' or because they carry 'prestige' (e.g. that democracy or progress is worthwhile); such beliefs would not hold up to serious skeptical challenge. (III)
The next distinction to draw is between an 'empiricist' and an 'absolutist' approach to truth. Roughly, the absolutist contends that once we've made a hypothesis T covering cases A, and experiment E confirms T, we will also be able to tell whether T is the final and true characterization for A. In other words, we can know that we know T. The empiricist-- once E confirms T-- says that T is the current knowledge on A but we do not know for sure that it is the final and irrevocable characterization. (V) According to author, most of science has adopted the empiricist bent, while most of philosophy is absolutist. Moreover, being absolutist is mostly our tendency-- we are only empiricists (if we ever are) 'on reflection'. Author endorses empiricism, even though 'objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals', we have no good procedure to determine what underwrites an absolutist's claim. (VI) More importantly the the purpose of this argument, the empiricist acknowledges that what may be true will not necessarily announce itself to us as true-- we may believe it for whatever reason (or for good reasons) but we understand that we are not waiting for some additional level of certitude to appear.
The last bit of preliminaries author discusses (VII) are the ideals (passions) that abide in scientific life: those of finding truth or avoiding error. While the two sound similar, author argues that they are 'two materially different laws', one of which must be given priority in belief-fixing pursuits. For James, he prefers the seeking of truth as primary. More importantly, for live momentous forced choices, the ideal/passion of avoiding falsehood will lead to withholding a decision, which in forced choices is equivalent to making one. (VIII) An example of such choices are questions of the truth of morals-- that is whether arguments to be moral are 'true' or binding. A skeptical approach or withholding judgment 'until all facts are in' will result in opting out of morality. Author uses the example of building friendship. (IX) In the case of becoming a friend to someone, I must first act as though I like her, and/or act as though she likes me. I can't 'stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence' that the other wants to befriend me-- this will probably lead to failure. This is considered a matter of faith helping to create the fact it is looking to find. (IX)
In the case of religious belief, we see also that it is a momentous forced choice. For those for whom it is live, and who take the pursuit of truth to be a higher value than avoidance of error, believing in religion is justified. Since the hypothesis is momentous (very important to the individual making the decision), author argues that whatever choice we make we are entitled to make. Author argues that taking avoidance of error as a higher ideal in this case will also lead to the same conclusion-- since it is a forced choice-- as disbelieving. Moreover, author argues that the absolute approach to truth may easily result in withholding judgment (=disbelieving) since in such matters there is no scientific resolution available and therefore no certitude given from that quarter. (X) The abstract conclusion is that 'we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will'. While this may sound silly, it is because we forget that a live hypothesis is something that is legitimately tempting to believe (and is therefore not ruled out by the whole of science and rational argument). If a particular hypothesis isn't legitimately possible (living), then this whole endeavor will appear to be Pascal's wager. Yet if it is alive for an individual, and since it is a momentous forced choice, the individual is given the freedom to believe.
Essays In Popular Philosophy, Ch 1 Longmans Green & Co 1911
This well-known paper is about the permissibility of belief in religion, probably considered now to be a stand-in for belief in the divine. The main argument is that when you are forced to make a momentous choice where there is some credibility for either option, making either choice is beyond rebuke. Author first spends time investigating kinds of hypotheses and the nature of science and scientific investigation.
The first move is to discuss different kinds of hypotheses-- live or dead, forced or unforced, momentous or trivial. The most interesting is the live or dead hypothesis: a live hypothesis is subjective and relative-- if the hypothesis proposed 'appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed' (I) then it is live. A dead hypothesis isn't considered a possibility related to action-- something that individual would take up as true. (A momentous hypothesis is also subjective and relative). Author readily concedes that as a matter of psychology choosing to believe A over B simply for expediency or for the benefits (e.g. Pascal's wager) isn't possible. (II) However, author interprets this as largely applicable for dead hypotheses, not necessarily live ones. Instead, he believes that our passions do influence what beliefs we readily keep. He points out that many of our beliefs we accept on 'authority' or because they carry 'prestige' (e.g. that democracy or progress is worthwhile); such beliefs would not hold up to serious skeptical challenge. (III)
The next distinction to draw is between an 'empiricist' and an 'absolutist' approach to truth. Roughly, the absolutist contends that once we've made a hypothesis T covering cases A, and experiment E confirms T, we will also be able to tell whether T is the final and true characterization for A. In other words, we can know that we know T. The empiricist-- once E confirms T-- says that T is the current knowledge on A but we do not know for sure that it is the final and irrevocable characterization. (V) According to author, most of science has adopted the empiricist bent, while most of philosophy is absolutist. Moreover, being absolutist is mostly our tendency-- we are only empiricists (if we ever are) 'on reflection'. Author endorses empiricism, even though 'objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals', we have no good procedure to determine what underwrites an absolutist's claim. (VI) More importantly the the purpose of this argument, the empiricist acknowledges that what may be true will not necessarily announce itself to us as true-- we may believe it for whatever reason (or for good reasons) but we understand that we are not waiting for some additional level of certitude to appear.
The last bit of preliminaries author discusses (VII) are the ideals (passions) that abide in scientific life: those of finding truth or avoiding error. While the two sound similar, author argues that they are 'two materially different laws', one of which must be given priority in belief-fixing pursuits. For James, he prefers the seeking of truth as primary. More importantly, for live momentous forced choices, the ideal/passion of avoiding falsehood will lead to withholding a decision, which in forced choices is equivalent to making one. (VIII) An example of such choices are questions of the truth of morals-- that is whether arguments to be moral are 'true' or binding. A skeptical approach or withholding judgment 'until all facts are in' will result in opting out of morality. Author uses the example of building friendship. (IX) In the case of becoming a friend to someone, I must first act as though I like her, and/or act as though she likes me. I can't 'stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence' that the other wants to befriend me-- this will probably lead to failure. This is considered a matter of faith helping to create the fact it is looking to find. (IX)
In the case of religious belief, we see also that it is a momentous forced choice. For those for whom it is live, and who take the pursuit of truth to be a higher value than avoidance of error, believing in religion is justified. Since the hypothesis is momentous (very important to the individual making the decision), author argues that whatever choice we make we are entitled to make. Author argues that taking avoidance of error as a higher ideal in this case will also lead to the same conclusion-- since it is a forced choice-- as disbelieving. Moreover, author argues that the absolute approach to truth may easily result in withholding judgment (=disbelieving) since in such matters there is no scientific resolution available and therefore no certitude given from that quarter. (X) The abstract conclusion is that 'we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will'. While this may sound silly, it is because we forget that a live hypothesis is something that is legitimately tempting to believe (and is therefore not ruled out by the whole of science and rational argument). If a particular hypothesis isn't legitimately possible (living), then this whole endeavor will appear to be Pascal's wager. Yet if it is alive for an individual, and since it is a momentous forced choice, the individual is given the freedom to believe.
5/15/09
Putnam, Hilary - A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy
05/15/2009
Renewing Philosophy, Harvard Press 1992 Ch 9
This chapter tries to establish Dewey's defense of democracy as an argument for social morality. Author beings by quoting Bernard Williams when it comes to giving a justification of moral claims-- forget trying to convince someone to be moral and instead try to justify the concepts and particulars to someone already committed to being moral. Williams' shortfall however was in giving an objective justification for ethics as an individual case of having a personally deleterious moral character-- a justification coming from psychology. This is considered a personal, ontological justification, which is orthogonal to Dewey's social, epistemological one (pg182). It is social because it addresses society and societal problems. It is epistemological in that it posits that intelligent empirical investigation is the best chance at finding effectual strategies for fixing social problems.(pg186) Author considers this anti-metaphysical because it doesn't presuppose that there is one 'absolute' answer outside of whatever we can find in scientific investigation. (pg187) So the grounds of moral activity comes from the shortcomings of the current social situation and the likelihood that science will find a solution. This jointly justifies 'democratic institutions as freedom of thought and speech' (pg188). One important factor in this argument is that Dewey doesn't leave it to the 'experts' (pg189) to show us progress, since privilege can easily create privileged interests and 'cognitive distortion' about the good. Instead, social progress must be done in the same way (by analogy) that scientific progress is done: with open, informed, free democratic investigation and thus justification.
The worth of democracy is occasionally objected two by two different sources, according to author. They include extreme relativists who object to interventions into any other culture's traditions, even the most undemocratic (pg183-5). They also include the reactionaries who believe that society begins to regress once democracy is established-- author considers Alasdair MacIntyre as an example (pg185-6).
One criticism author levels at Dewey's approach is that it lacks the content required to settle personal ontic anxiety-- existential moral questions-- such as the one posed by Sartre about staying at home to help your elderly mother or going off to join the anti-fascist revolution. (pg190-2) More importantly, James extends this criticism (in The Will To Believe) to be against scientific inquiry when it comes to many deep personal decisions-- you can't try both and see which suit you better. (pg192-6)
The chapter (and book?) ends with a conclusion and discusses how important true equality is in a liberal democracy-- so that everyone can partake in the free play of their natural endowments. (pg198-199)
Renewing Philosophy, Harvard Press 1992 Ch 9
This chapter tries to establish Dewey's defense of democracy as an argument for social morality. Author beings by quoting Bernard Williams when it comes to giving a justification of moral claims-- forget trying to convince someone to be moral and instead try to justify the concepts and particulars to someone already committed to being moral. Williams' shortfall however was in giving an objective justification for ethics as an individual case of having a personally deleterious moral character-- a justification coming from psychology. This is considered a personal, ontological justification, which is orthogonal to Dewey's social, epistemological one (pg182). It is social because it addresses society and societal problems. It is epistemological in that it posits that intelligent empirical investigation is the best chance at finding effectual strategies for fixing social problems.(pg186) Author considers this anti-metaphysical because it doesn't presuppose that there is one 'absolute' answer outside of whatever we can find in scientific investigation. (pg187) So the grounds of moral activity comes from the shortcomings of the current social situation and the likelihood that science will find a solution. This jointly justifies 'democratic institutions as freedom of thought and speech' (pg188). One important factor in this argument is that Dewey doesn't leave it to the 'experts' (pg189) to show us progress, since privilege can easily create privileged interests and 'cognitive distortion' about the good. Instead, social progress must be done in the same way (by analogy) that scientific progress is done: with open, informed, free democratic investigation and thus justification.
The worth of democracy is occasionally objected two by two different sources, according to author. They include extreme relativists who object to interventions into any other culture's traditions, even the most undemocratic (pg183-5). They also include the reactionaries who believe that society begins to regress once democracy is established-- author considers Alasdair MacIntyre as an example (pg185-6).
One criticism author levels at Dewey's approach is that it lacks the content required to settle personal ontic anxiety-- existential moral questions-- such as the one posed by Sartre about staying at home to help your elderly mother or going off to join the anti-fascist revolution. (pg190-2) More importantly, James extends this criticism (in The Will To Believe) to be against scientific inquiry when it comes to many deep personal decisions-- you can't try both and see which suit you better. (pg192-6)
The chapter (and book?) ends with a conclusion and discusses how important true equality is in a liberal democracy-- so that everyone can partake in the free play of their natural endowments. (pg198-199)
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