09/26/2008
Journal of Philosophy, March 2008
This is a paper that suggests that any way of reducing colors to physical or dispositional properties will give more modal properties to color than they should have. Author begins the paper with an analogy to Benacerraf's work on numbers, arguing they are primitive and not reducible to sets. The problem with reduction that Benacerraf reveals is that numbers are reducible to more than one system of sets. To pick between one seems ad hoc, but regardless of this, once picking one there are certain weird questions about numbers that have weird answers e.g.: 'does "3" contain "1" and "2"?' Yes? No? Either answer is weird because the question is 'ill-formed'. However, reducing numbers to sets 'forces' an answer to such a question, thereby giving numbers more properties than they should have. The solution is to make numbers primitive. Author takes this method of argument as an analogy to color.
Author wants color to be fully explained from within the domain of color. It is certainly possible that there will be physical-reductive facts (about surface reflectance, visual perception) that co-instantiate with color, but author argues this is like the set-theoretic account of numbers; they don't reduce to them. (pg130-1) Author takes the fact that there are disputes between color realists as analogous to the different methods of reducing numbers to sets. (pg132-3)
Author's positive account of color primitivism is that color terms do not rigidly designate any properties, nor do they non-rigidly designate any properties either. Instead, color rigidly designates colors. (pg136) If color terms designated anything other than that, then there would be ill-posed modal questions about colors that have truth values, which author argues needs to be avoided. An objection to this view is why you can't extend it by analogy to all property terms, like e.g. shape. Author replies that there are other observational/physical conditions for most other properties can that yield facts-of-the-matter in modal settings (pg139-140).
In the next section author takes Mark Johnston's discussion about 5 core beliefs about color. Johnston argues that these 5 core beliefs are inconsistent and therefore no solution to the reduction of color should have to account for all 5. Author's approach is to suggest a solution to what color is that can accommodate all 5 core beliefs (after he alters one of them). This is meant to recommend color primitivism. (pg 141) Author weakens and re-writes one of the beliefs:
Revelation: The intrinsic nature of Canary Yellow (CY) is fully revealed in an experience as of something CY
Re-written/Modest Revelation: A complete understanding of what CY is can be given by an experience as of something CY, in someone with normal human vision who has already acquired color concepts. (pg142)
Initially, Revelation conflicted with Explanation: Sometimes something's being CY explains why it looks CY. Author argues that with color primitivism, 'Modest Revelation' does not conflict with 'Explanation' (pg144-5) Author then walks through the other accounts of color: that it's a disjunctive primary quality/property of objects (pg145-6), that it's a disposition of a certain kind (pg147-8), that it's a secondary property of reflection (pg148-151). It is here where the reductionist is given a choice of saying that the properties that give rise to color are either nomologically or metaphysically connected to color. Author argues that either choice yields silly truth-values to ill-formed modal questions, and that the color primitivist does not have to pick between these two options. (pg149-150)
Lastly, author takes on the objection of spectrum inversion and considers Wittgenstein's private language argument as the reply to it (pg152-3). Author also discusses the possibility of animal color spectrum being larger than ours is.
9/18/08
Lopes, Dominic McIver - Nobody Needs A Theory of Art
09/19/2008
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 60 No 3 March 2008
This paper tries to dispose of the contentious drive for a theory of art and instead replace it with a Theory of the Arts, meaning a theory of painting, sculpture, theatre, and so on. Author offers his simple analysis:An item is a work of Art iff it is produced by a kind of activity that is an Art Form.
Author takes some time to give a history: by the 1700s various distinctions were being drawn between science and art and between aesthetic and moral goodness. (pg 110-2) The rise of 'the arts' was a new phenomenon in Western Culture. There could be 4 lessons from this: (pg112)
1) The concept of Art is historically conditioned
2) There was no art prior to the 1700s (dubious: it relies on there not being a concept of Art prior to there being a theory)
3) The concept of Art comes from a theory of Art
4) Better than 3: the concept of Art comes from a theory of the Arts Author argues that the early moderns were more concerned with a Theory of the Arts, not of Art. The avant-garde in the 1900s was taken as a challenge of Art, not of the Arts, thus an interest in a Theory of Art. (pg114)
Author discusses the two camps for Theory of Art: the functionalist and the proceduralist. The functionalist takes Art to perform a certain function (e.g. aesthetic, experiential). The proceduralist takes Art to be created a certain way (according to specific rules, recipes). (pg116) Functionalists tend to put avant-garde cases outside of Art, while proceduralists tend to include them. The fight is partially over what is included and what isn't: over intuitions, not just explanation. Author also discusses another possible theory criterion: that a Theory of Art should account for why it is so valuable, either culturally or economically. Beardsley (functionalist) does incorporate this desidriatum into his theory, while Dickie (proceduralist) does not; both claim this is a virtue.(pg118) Author claims that conflicting intuitions and conflicting theoretical criteria signal an impasse.
Author discusses how many of us feel bafflement when confronted with an avant-garde work. But what kind of bafflement? Is it conceptual or theoretical? If it is conceptual bafflement, we wouldn't be able to say whether it was Art or not. If it is theoretical bafflement, we wouldn't be able to say why it's Art (or why it isn't).(pg119) Author argues that most of us, most of the time, can tell that an object is Art because of the context it is in. (pg120) The hard part is figuring out what Art Form avant-garde pieces fall into.(pg121-2) Next is theoretical bafflement, which is the standard problem: why is it Art? But if we can settle-- prior to this question-- what Art Form the work is in, this issue is irrelevant. The question is 'why is it sculpture?' not 'why is it Art?'. (pg122-3)
Under this model, author points to four possible outcomes when confronted with the avant-garde:
1) An Art Form admits this work as one of its kind: Art!
2) No Art Form admits this work: Not Art
3) No Art Form admits this work: Yet it is Art
4) No Art Form admits this work but it creates a new Art Form (e.g. conceptual art, film)
Author argues that only in the third case do we need a Theory of Art, and none of the famous examples fit into that third category. Most of the time it is usual and customary to create a new Art Form and thus cases of 3) become 4). (pg123) Author considers searching for a Theory of Art to be a category mistake (pg 123-4)
Lastly, author answers some small objections and shows some of the upshot to accepting his analysis.
9/12/08
Kawall, Jason - The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-being
09/12/2008
The Journal of Value Inquiry 33, 1999
This is a relatively short paper written to defend Mental State Welfare theories against the Experience Machine. The first part of the paper brings out the intuitions about what someones welfare is: it has to affect the individual for it to affect her well-being. (pg381-2) Author then quotes Nozick's Experience Machine argument, but claims that the EM does not hit only against MSW theories. What the EM argues for is our unwillingness to abandon our commitments, whether it be for other things in the real world or not. As an example, author asks us consider achieving perfect virtue, happiness and accomplishments but having to never see your friends and family again. Author says that few would take this, making the analogy between this choice and the EM choice.
Author claims that just because we have commitments we are unwilling to abandon doesn't make them necessary for our well-being. (pg384) Author argues that there is a separation between what we value and what is good for our well-being, possibly creating conflicts between rival values.
In the final part of the paper, author considers a soldier that jumps on a grenade in order to save his fellows. The analysis is that he had a commitment to their lives that conflicted with his own well-being. The possible objection is that there is no conflict; he has accomplished something he values, which is a noble thing, and thus that contributed to his well-being, but not his MSW, thus MSW is incorrect. Author replies, perhaps weakly, that it is possible his MSW would have been worse if he hadn't stifled the grenade: living with the guilt, etc. This reduces it to a matter of prudence or instrumental value.
The Journal of Value Inquiry 33, 1999
This is a relatively short paper written to defend Mental State Welfare theories against the Experience Machine. The first part of the paper brings out the intuitions about what someones welfare is: it has to affect the individual for it to affect her well-being. (pg381-2) Author then quotes Nozick's Experience Machine argument, but claims that the EM does not hit only against MSW theories. What the EM argues for is our unwillingness to abandon our commitments, whether it be for other things in the real world or not. As an example, author asks us consider achieving perfect virtue, happiness and accomplishments but having to never see your friends and family again. Author says that few would take this, making the analogy between this choice and the EM choice.
Author claims that just because we have commitments we are unwilling to abandon doesn't make them necessary for our well-being. (pg384) Author argues that there is a separation between what we value and what is good for our well-being, possibly creating conflicts between rival values.
In the final part of the paper, author considers a soldier that jumps on a grenade in order to save his fellows. The analysis is that he had a commitment to their lives that conflicted with his own well-being. The possible objection is that there is no conflict; he has accomplished something he values, which is a noble thing, and thus that contributed to his well-being, but not his MSW, thus MSW is incorrect. Author replies, perhaps weakly, that it is possible his MSW would have been worse if he hadn't stifled the grenade: living with the guilt, etc. This reduces it to a matter of prudence or instrumental value.
9/5/08
Rivera-Lopez, Eduardo - Are Mental State Welfarism and Our Concern for Non-Experiential Goals Incompatible?
09/05/2008
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly #88 (2007)
This paper tries to show that a version of Mental State Welfarism can account for the thesis that we have legitimate non-experiential goals. Author calls this Compatibility, and because a form of MSW (Mental State Welfarism) includes desires for objective accomplishments, it does not follow that if this form of MSW is true that we would plug into the experience machine. Thus the experience machine can be rejected even for a form of MSW.
Author begins discussion with a discussion of MSW: the subjective satisfaction of desires is the only intrinsically valuable thing. (pg74-5) Note that this is an agent-neutral definition: it doesn't say what is valuable from the agent's perspective, just what is valuable for the agent from an objective perspective (pg84).
The most common objection to MSW is the experience machine, which posits a device that would make you believe you had satisfied your desires: e.g. gave you the subjective satisfaction (that is the only intrinsically valuable thing). The lesson from the experience machine is that we have desires about what really (objectively) happens, not just what we experience: the non-experiential goals thesis. Author treats this thesis as legitimate for value ethics. (pg76) Author points out that a sophisticated hedonist (pg77) who argues that objective goals are just instrumental isn't an effective reply to the experience machine.
Author defends any version of MSW by appealing to the intuition that 'nothing can have intrinsic value if it does not affect someone' (pg78) and gives some examples (pg78-9). Then author launches into an Objector and Defender (of Compatibility) in the form of a dialogue. (pg79-84)
The argument goes as follows:
1) Desire-Satisfaction MSW is the only account of intrinsic value
2) D-S MSWelfarists still have reality-centered desires
3) Removing reality-centered desires from Desire-Satisfaction MSW will remove the 'Desire' part from the D-S MSW.
4) Giving up reality-centered desires will significantly alter the content of the agent's desires, probably impoverishing them and making entrance to the experience machine conditional on significant personal-identity alteration. Furthermore, the life within the experience machine would be unappealing, since the agent would believe she is doing all the things she no longer desires to do. The D-S MSWelfarist would reject the experience machine.
Author compares Non-Experiential Goals to D-S MSW. D-S MSW is an agent-neutral, external value theory. N-E Goals is an agent-perspective value proposition. Author compares these differences to the theories of 'indirect' consequentialism, which says that agent-perspective rules like 'don't kill' must be absolute, but from the external perspective they are just instrumental ways of usually promoting valuable consequences. Yet the agent must believe these are unbreakable rules for the whole system to work! Author calls this moral schizophrenia (pg85) and argues that it seems analogous to the situation in value theory, only much less conflicted and more plausible. In moral theory, there could be two competing norms for the same action. In value theory, two norms (experience-centered desire or reality-centered desire) don't compete because we naturally have reality-centered desires. (pg86) [important]
Lastly, author rejects that this Compatible D-S MSW theory entails plugging into the experience machine. It might give a prima facie reason for plugging other people into the experience machine without their knowledge (but not plugging those people in that you have a desire to see do a particular thing in the world). (pg87-88)
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly #88 (2007)
This paper tries to show that a version of Mental State Welfarism can account for the thesis that we have legitimate non-experiential goals. Author calls this Compatibility, and because a form of MSW (Mental State Welfarism) includes desires for objective accomplishments, it does not follow that if this form of MSW is true that we would plug into the experience machine. Thus the experience machine can be rejected even for a form of MSW.
Author begins discussion with a discussion of MSW: the subjective satisfaction of desires is the only intrinsically valuable thing. (pg74-5) Note that this is an agent-neutral definition: it doesn't say what is valuable from the agent's perspective, just what is valuable for the agent from an objective perspective (pg84).
The most common objection to MSW is the experience machine, which posits a device that would make you believe you had satisfied your desires: e.g. gave you the subjective satisfaction (that is the only intrinsically valuable thing). The lesson from the experience machine is that we have desires about what really (objectively) happens, not just what we experience: the non-experiential goals thesis. Author treats this thesis as legitimate for value ethics. (pg76) Author points out that a sophisticated hedonist (pg77) who argues that objective goals are just instrumental isn't an effective reply to the experience machine.
Author defends any version of MSW by appealing to the intuition that 'nothing can have intrinsic value if it does not affect someone' (pg78) and gives some examples (pg78-9). Then author launches into an Objector and Defender (of Compatibility) in the form of a dialogue. (pg79-84)
The argument goes as follows:
1) Desire-Satisfaction MSW is the only account of intrinsic value
2) D-S MSWelfarists still have reality-centered desires
3) Removing reality-centered desires from Desire-Satisfaction MSW will remove the 'Desire' part from the D-S MSW.
4) Giving up reality-centered desires will significantly alter the content of the agent's desires, probably impoverishing them and making entrance to the experience machine conditional on significant personal-identity alteration. Furthermore, the life within the experience machine would be unappealing, since the agent would believe she is doing all the things she no longer desires to do. The D-S MSWelfarist would reject the experience machine.
Author compares Non-Experiential Goals to D-S MSW. D-S MSW is an agent-neutral, external value theory. N-E Goals is an agent-perspective value proposition. Author compares these differences to the theories of 'indirect' consequentialism, which says that agent-perspective rules like 'don't kill' must be absolute, but from the external perspective they are just instrumental ways of usually promoting valuable consequences. Yet the agent must believe these are unbreakable rules for the whole system to work! Author calls this moral schizophrenia (pg85) and argues that it seems analogous to the situation in value theory, only much less conflicted and more plausible. In moral theory, there could be two competing norms for the same action. In value theory, two norms (experience-centered desire or reality-centered desire) don't compete because we naturally have reality-centered desires. (pg86) [important]
Lastly, author rejects that this Compatible D-S MSW theory entails plugging into the experience machine. It might give a prima facie reason for plugging other people into the experience machine without their knowledge (but not plugging those people in that you have a desire to see do a particular thing in the world). (pg87-88)
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