02/29/2008
New York Times Magazine, January 13, 2008
This is a popular press article, so much of it is a watering-down and more loosely-concluded than a more academic article. Author first discusses how we might have a 'moralization switch', which is different from other norms. There are a few 'hallmarks' for moralization: universal reasoning, and that transgressions deserve punishment. Author talks about how some things that used to be simple lifestyle choices (smoking, vegetarianism) became moralized, and previously moralized things (divorce, homosexuality) have lost much of their moral aspect.
Next the discussion turns to how, according to new psychological and neurological evidence, we make snap, intuitive judgments about a moral case and then rationalize it. We don't reason through it, we rational-ize it. The lesson form this is that there seems to be a universal moral code already established within us-- it just might not be one that follows rational rules of harm, justice, etc. It could be law-like, but still have conflicts with a more reasoned approach (e.g. trolley problems).
Author then discusses the work of Haidt and others that places more dimensions to moralizing than just harm/care and justice/fairness. (See previous article). Author tries to explain much of our cultural moralistic differences (among the purely cultural accidental aspects of what is sacred, what is profane) as placing more emphasis on one of the five different moralizing dimensions (e.g. Islam on profanity, Japanese on authority). The next discussion is about the possible genetic usefulness of these moral judgments. Altruism and fairness is explained by a summary of the work of Trivers, discussing recriprocal altruism and cheater detection. The best way to avoid being a cheater is to be a non-cheater, or a fair-player. (Or to believe you're a fair player...)
Author then responds to worries that unmasking our moral senses will somehow cheapen them. He counters that it will give us a greater understanding of our biases and take a more rational approach to building a better moral system. The next concern: what is the status of a 'moral truth'? Author discusses two supports for morality-- the external and one of the aspects of reasoning.
External: enlightened self-interest in the modern world (the 'prevalence of non-zero-sum games) is rational and also leads to cooperation
Internal: moral reasoning is not 1st personal but 3rd personal-- adopting a non-particular viewpoint-- this core, author claims, has bolstered some of history's best moral systems.
2/22/08
Haidt, Jonathan - Moral Psychology and the Misunderstanding of Religion
02/22/2008
The Edge 222, The Reality Club 09/12/2007 (Link)
Author writes a paper partially related to his book, the Happiness Hypothesis and also reflective of his work in social psychology and philosophy. Specifically, the issue is around morality, and its relation to religion. Author starts with a contrast of rational moral doctrines that are rule-following and law-like and emotional or 'disgust' reactions to morally salient situations that are then post-hoc reasoned to justify. Part of this is a change in the way we see moral development-- from the older, Kohlberg-style levels of conscious rational thought, to automatic, unconscious processes more tuned to emotions e.g. revulsion, disgust. Author puts forward what he considers the main tenets of the new psychological study of moral reasoning:
1) Intuitive primacy but not dictatorship- we make snap judgments but our reasoning can override them
2) Moral thinking is for social doing- when we mount moral arguments, they are mostly for pragmatic, political purposes
3) Morality binds and builds- shared moral decisions and public discussion on what ought to be done binds people together, serving as social cohesion. Author discusses the renewing possibility of group selection to encourage cohesion, cooperation.
4) Morality is about more than harm and fairness- the academic books, written by academics, mostly talk about harms or fairness. Gilligan convinced us that there was another dimension: 'care'. But still this falls short of capturing the moral reasoning. Through his research, author concludes there are at least three more dimensions:
1- justice/fairness
2- harm/care
+3- ingroup/loyalty
+4- authority/respect
+5- purity/sanctity
These can be considered 'learning modules' that we have evolved to pick up given our cultural surroundings. The last three serve to bind people to a group, while the first two are 'individualizing', meaning that they serve to protect individuals from each other. Author points out that he has found secular liberals give the first 2 to morality, while religious conservatives take all 5 as morality.
The next part of the paper, author takes the work of the 'new atheists' to be not scientific thinking but the kind of 'moral' thinking he discussed above. He holds these 'scientific' thinkers to the standard of science and not of the 'moral thinking' he just developed. He uses examples from the books of Dawkins, Harris, Dennett. Harris gives a 'standard liberal definition of morality': morality is about happiness and suffering. Author proposes his alternative:
"Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible."
Author claims the 'standard liberal' definition is a 'contractual approach', while his is a 'beehive approach'. The beehive approach takes religion as a key component in the development of morality, and acknowledges that it has its discontents, but also points out that religious conservatives are more likely to give to charity, time, money, and blood. They also report being happier, healthier, and they live longer. This evidence author claims Dennett denies-- again being unfair to the proper place of religious commitments. Author concludes by saying that "every longstanding ideology and way of life contains some wisdom, some insights into ways of suppressing selfishness, enhancing cooperation, and ultimately enhancing human flourishing."
Replies
David Sloan Wilson:
These four questions need to be answered by the new atheists:
1) Is there any empirical evidence for the existence of supernatural agents?
2) If not, how can we explain the universal aspect of religion in naturalistic terms?
3) What are the effects of religion, good and bad, on human welfare?
4) How can we use these understandings to advance our society?
Wilson claims that e.g. Dawkins, only focuses on the first question, which leaves a lot out.
Michael Shermer
Religion is a force for both good and bad. It kills, maims, suppresses difference. Yet it also makes people happier, healthier, and promotes a more social cohesion. The difficulty is that when we get into complex societies of large sizes, we needed to make institutions that encouraged social cohesion and also human flourishing-- the two main ones were organized religion and centralized government. We now need to try to convince the world to make new institutions in the place of the old ones.
Sam Harris
Where is the 'wisdom' in the many, many religions that, e.g., conducted human sacrifice? Haidt might want to gloss over the actual beliefs and look at what purposes they serve, but the actual beliefs do matter-- they're bogus. Harris interprets the 3 'other' dimensions of morality as just subsets of the care/harm dimension. For example-- being worried about taking the lord's name in vain (respect/authority) is just being worried you'll go to hell (harm/care). Science shouldn't care whether false religious beliefs lead to better lives-- science is about getting the empirical work right, and religions generally fail.
PZ Myers
Myers likes in general the discussion of the expansion of morality. He heavily criticizes Haidt's likening of the new atheists to religious thinkers. Meyers says that Haidt equates the new dimensions of morality with religious practice. Must (necessarily) we have religion to have this full-fledged morality? Certainly not. Myers spins the discussion of welfare and charity, saying that most charities secular liberals do not trust, and that they are also dissatisfied moreso than conservatives with the direction of the country, world, etc. Myers also says that if believing in a false thing gives me extra life, extra happiness, he doesn't want it.
Marc Hauser
Hauser talks about the possibility of group selection for religious modules. Hauser concludes it has not yet been shown and that individual or gene-centric selection has been far more explanatory. Hauser also tries to distinguish two different issues:
- the evolution of morality as a biological faculty that guides our intuitive judgments
- the ways in which cultural factors, including religion, can alter our explicit moral judgments
The target here is the evidence that religious people give more. The problem is that in some moral judgments, both religious and non-religious decide equally. Do the religious give more because they are religious, or because they are more beehive oriented and are more likely to take on religion?
Hadit has a final entry, where he discusses three main points:
1) the possibility of group selection
2) religious people really are happier and more charitable
3) binding/beehive moralities can be good for us (emphasis on 'can')
The Edge 222, The Reality Club 09/12/2007 (Link)
Author writes a paper partially related to his book, the Happiness Hypothesis and also reflective of his work in social psychology and philosophy. Specifically, the issue is around morality, and its relation to religion. Author starts with a contrast of rational moral doctrines that are rule-following and law-like and emotional or 'disgust' reactions to morally salient situations that are then post-hoc reasoned to justify. Part of this is a change in the way we see moral development-- from the older, Kohlberg-style levels of conscious rational thought, to automatic, unconscious processes more tuned to emotions e.g. revulsion, disgust. Author puts forward what he considers the main tenets of the new psychological study of moral reasoning:
1) Intuitive primacy but not dictatorship- we make snap judgments but our reasoning can override them
2) Moral thinking is for social doing- when we mount moral arguments, they are mostly for pragmatic, political purposes
3) Morality binds and builds- shared moral decisions and public discussion on what ought to be done binds people together, serving as social cohesion. Author discusses the renewing possibility of group selection to encourage cohesion, cooperation.
4) Morality is about more than harm and fairness- the academic books, written by academics, mostly talk about harms or fairness. Gilligan convinced us that there was another dimension: 'care'. But still this falls short of capturing the moral reasoning. Through his research, author concludes there are at least three more dimensions:
1- justice/fairness
2- harm/care
+3- ingroup/loyalty
+4- authority/respect
+5- purity/sanctity
These can be considered 'learning modules' that we have evolved to pick up given our cultural surroundings. The last three serve to bind people to a group, while the first two are 'individualizing', meaning that they serve to protect individuals from each other. Author points out that he has found secular liberals give the first 2 to morality, while religious conservatives take all 5 as morality.
The next part of the paper, author takes the work of the 'new atheists' to be not scientific thinking but the kind of 'moral' thinking he discussed above. He holds these 'scientific' thinkers to the standard of science and not of the 'moral thinking' he just developed. He uses examples from the books of Dawkins, Harris, Dennett. Harris gives a 'standard liberal definition of morality': morality is about happiness and suffering. Author proposes his alternative:
"Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible."
Author claims the 'standard liberal' definition is a 'contractual approach', while his is a 'beehive approach'. The beehive approach takes religion as a key component in the development of morality, and acknowledges that it has its discontents, but also points out that religious conservatives are more likely to give to charity, time, money, and blood. They also report being happier, healthier, and they live longer. This evidence author claims Dennett denies-- again being unfair to the proper place of religious commitments. Author concludes by saying that "every longstanding ideology and way of life contains some wisdom, some insights into ways of suppressing selfishness, enhancing cooperation, and ultimately enhancing human flourishing."
Replies
David Sloan Wilson:
These four questions need to be answered by the new atheists:
1) Is there any empirical evidence for the existence of supernatural agents?
2) If not, how can we explain the universal aspect of religion in naturalistic terms?
3) What are the effects of religion, good and bad, on human welfare?
4) How can we use these understandings to advance our society?
Wilson claims that e.g. Dawkins, only focuses on the first question, which leaves a lot out.
Michael Shermer
Religion is a force for both good and bad. It kills, maims, suppresses difference. Yet it also makes people happier, healthier, and promotes a more social cohesion. The difficulty is that when we get into complex societies of large sizes, we needed to make institutions that encouraged social cohesion and also human flourishing-- the two main ones were organized religion and centralized government. We now need to try to convince the world to make new institutions in the place of the old ones.
Sam Harris
Where is the 'wisdom' in the many, many religions that, e.g., conducted human sacrifice? Haidt might want to gloss over the actual beliefs and look at what purposes they serve, but the actual beliefs do matter-- they're bogus. Harris interprets the 3 'other' dimensions of morality as just subsets of the care/harm dimension. For example-- being worried about taking the lord's name in vain (respect/authority) is just being worried you'll go to hell (harm/care). Science shouldn't care whether false religious beliefs lead to better lives-- science is about getting the empirical work right, and religions generally fail.
PZ Myers
Myers likes in general the discussion of the expansion of morality. He heavily criticizes Haidt's likening of the new atheists to religious thinkers. Meyers says that Haidt equates the new dimensions of morality with religious practice. Must (necessarily) we have religion to have this full-fledged morality? Certainly not. Myers spins the discussion of welfare and charity, saying that most charities secular liberals do not trust, and that they are also dissatisfied moreso than conservatives with the direction of the country, world, etc. Myers also says that if believing in a false thing gives me extra life, extra happiness, he doesn't want it.
Marc Hauser
Hauser talks about the possibility of group selection for religious modules. Hauser concludes it has not yet been shown and that individual or gene-centric selection has been far more explanatory. Hauser also tries to distinguish two different issues:
- the evolution of morality as a biological faculty that guides our intuitive judgments
- the ways in which cultural factors, including religion, can alter our explicit moral judgments
The target here is the evidence that religious people give more. The problem is that in some moral judgments, both religious and non-religious decide equally. Do the religious give more because they are religious, or because they are more beehive oriented and are more likely to take on religion?
Hadit has a final entry, where he discusses three main points:
1) the possibility of group selection
2) religious people really are happier and more charitable
3) binding/beehive moralities can be good for us (emphasis on 'can')
2/15/08
Atran, Scott - The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism
02/15/2008
The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006
Author is both outlining his theory on the growth and motivation of suicide attacks and also responding to the work of Robert Pape in Dying to Win, 2005. Pape claims that foreign occupation is the 'root cause' of suicide attacks (SA). He compiles data from 1980-2003 and concludes that it is specific political objectives rather than religious/ideological/social reasons that indicate SA. For example, Al Qaeda was designed to get America out of the heartland of the Arab world. Under this analysis, SA come from agents of secular, educated middle-class places whose efforts to succeed are stymied by corrupt systems or are propped up by US or other foreign interests. (pg129-130)
Author criticizes Pape's approach as relying too heavily on statistical work that shows correlations, not causation. Author instead uses in-depth interviews and systematic observations (of groups that often have SA agents come from their ranks) to point to some causal factors of SA. (pg130) Author criticizes the sampling of Pape, claiming that there have been so many new SAs in 2005 that much of Pape's previous work would be statistically overwhelmed by the new SAs. Author claims Pape's conclusions are too narrow: it misses times when withdrawls are because of convential resistance and not due to SAs, or when SAs actually create larger occupations. Author claims Pape is also too broad: summing up SAs as related to one set of concerns misses an emerging aspect of the more recent SAs. Author claims Pape also misses at least one reason for SAs-- increasing a sponsoring organization's 'market share' among the possible other recruiting organizations. (pg132) Author also contests Pape's claim that SAs are only marginally related to Salafi ideology.
Author discusses a 'changing landscape' of SAs. Instead of joining a centralized organization, small-group cells form around shared interests, usually religious or ideological in nature. They receive guidance from internet sites and then undertake jihad. This is a decentralized model that relies on small-group dynamics and also usually requires a deeply-held commitment to something greater expelling foreign forces. Jihadists come from 'diaspora communities' (pg135) who are disconnected from a sense of community and deeper meanings. Forming these small-groups nurtures their desire to commit to their religious or moral principles. Jihadists are not 'nihilistic' or 'hating freedom', like our political figures paint them. (pg136) Instead, many undertake jihad more because of perceived humiliation rather than straightforward military occupation or because they hate values. Many cells no longer feel connected to the populations they are imbedded in. (pg137) Individuals swarm into small-groups to reinforce their beliefs, carry out SAs, then disperse, sometimes then joining other groups elsewhere. The efficacy of such a network is improved by seeing the fight as global, and the values supporting it more broad-based and deeper than fighting occupation (obligations to God, rather than family or country). (pg138) Not taking this kind of deeply held moral commitment seriously is folly.
Author discusses the possible ways to disrupt the rise SAs and jihad. First, don't think that a response from foreign nations is the best model. Control might have to be given to 'regional powers' (pg140). It is likely that a multi-national, or even a transnational response is required. First off, focus not on statistics but instead on the cells, which become pseudo-families.(pg141) These cells aren't formed strictly on the basis of commiting SAs, but instead on preserving deeply held moral or religious values. Refocus those values into something more constructive. Secondly, traditional methods of spying and surveillance that are centralized and heirarchical is ineffective in catching a decentralized network of possible SAs. Third, use 'soft power' rather than 'hard power' to turn the tide of public opinion in support of SAs to instead support the foreign occupier. An example is the rebuilding efforts after the tsunami in Asia-- America is seen much more favorably after it helped. (pg143)
The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006
Author is both outlining his theory on the growth and motivation of suicide attacks and also responding to the work of Robert Pape in Dying to Win, 2005. Pape claims that foreign occupation is the 'root cause' of suicide attacks (SA). He compiles data from 1980-2003 and concludes that it is specific political objectives rather than religious/ideological/social reasons that indicate SA. For example, Al Qaeda was designed to get America out of the heartland of the Arab world. Under this analysis, SA come from agents of secular, educated middle-class places whose efforts to succeed are stymied by corrupt systems or are propped up by US or other foreign interests. (pg129-130)
Author criticizes Pape's approach as relying too heavily on statistical work that shows correlations, not causation. Author instead uses in-depth interviews and systematic observations (of groups that often have SA agents come from their ranks) to point to some causal factors of SA. (pg130) Author criticizes the sampling of Pape, claiming that there have been so many new SAs in 2005 that much of Pape's previous work would be statistically overwhelmed by the new SAs. Author claims Pape's conclusions are too narrow: it misses times when withdrawls are because of convential resistance and not due to SAs, or when SAs actually create larger occupations. Author claims Pape is also too broad: summing up SAs as related to one set of concerns misses an emerging aspect of the more recent SAs. Author claims Pape also misses at least one reason for SAs-- increasing a sponsoring organization's 'market share' among the possible other recruiting organizations. (pg132) Author also contests Pape's claim that SAs are only marginally related to Salafi ideology.
Author discusses a 'changing landscape' of SAs. Instead of joining a centralized organization, small-group cells form around shared interests, usually religious or ideological in nature. They receive guidance from internet sites and then undertake jihad. This is a decentralized model that relies on small-group dynamics and also usually requires a deeply-held commitment to something greater expelling foreign forces. Jihadists come from 'diaspora communities' (pg135) who are disconnected from a sense of community and deeper meanings. Forming these small-groups nurtures their desire to commit to their religious or moral principles. Jihadists are not 'nihilistic' or 'hating freedom', like our political figures paint them. (pg136) Instead, many undertake jihad more because of perceived humiliation rather than straightforward military occupation or because they hate values. Many cells no longer feel connected to the populations they are imbedded in. (pg137) Individuals swarm into small-groups to reinforce their beliefs, carry out SAs, then disperse, sometimes then joining other groups elsewhere. The efficacy of such a network is improved by seeing the fight as global, and the values supporting it more broad-based and deeper than fighting occupation (obligations to God, rather than family or country). (pg138) Not taking this kind of deeply held moral commitment seriously is folly.
Author discusses the possible ways to disrupt the rise SAs and jihad. First, don't think that a response from foreign nations is the best model. Control might have to be given to 'regional powers' (pg140). It is likely that a multi-national, or even a transnational response is required. First off, focus not on statistics but instead on the cells, which become pseudo-families.(pg141) These cells aren't formed strictly on the basis of commiting SAs, but instead on preserving deeply held moral or religious values. Refocus those values into something more constructive. Secondly, traditional methods of spying and surveillance that are centralized and heirarchical is ineffective in catching a decentralized network of possible SAs. Third, use 'soft power' rather than 'hard power' to turn the tide of public opinion in support of SAs to instead support the foreign occupier. An example is the rebuilding efforts after the tsunami in Asia-- America is seen much more favorably after it helped. (pg143)
2/8/08
Spelman, Elizabeth - Managing Ignorance
02/08/2008
Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, Sullivan & Tuana, eds. State University of NY, 2007
This chapter in a book has two main sections. The first section talks about the doxastic attitude that Baldwin claims whites have about the condition of blacks, or 'the grievances of blacks'. It isn't that whites believe such grievances are false, nor do they believe they are true. Instead, whites manage to be ignorant of the grievances of blacks, effectively maintaining the status quo. It is because whites want to believe the grievances are false, but are too afraid to actually investigave whether they are, in fact, false, because then they might discover (to their horror) that the grievances are true. Unwilling to take the risk that they are true, whites instead ignore the truth-value of the grievances of blacks, and manage to be ignorant.
Such management is dificult, and Baldwin considers that it is rooted in a deep fear that has crippled whites so that they cannot climb out of this willful ignorance without the help of blacks. (pg 122). Author then points out that this is not necessarily a claim of racism by Baldwin, but instead a claim of ignorance. Yet it is a kind of passive or 'cowardly' racism, set somewhere between white supremecists (who wilfully believe that black grievances are false) and those who believe the grievances are true. Thus it is injustice by 'spinelessness' (pg 124). This is an effective way to indict whites who don't consider themselves blatant racists or white supremecists.
The second section of the chapter talks about what kinds of efforts whites took to create the doxastic attitude they now enjoy. Author looks at the history of the reconstruction, both immediately following the Civil War and also as many as 5 centuries later, with a speech by Woodrow Wilson. In the cases author examines, all discussion of the moral aspects of the war, that it was over the treatment of blacks/slaves, are censored from explicit reference. Instead, reconcilliation is achieved among the whites by talking about how both sides fought bravely, and suffered, and so on. In order to mend the republic of whites, the reasons the war was fought are covered over. But this also covered over the grievances of blacks, effectively creating a screen for whites to enjoy. (pg 126-130)
Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, Sullivan & Tuana, eds. State University of NY, 2007
This chapter in a book has two main sections. The first section talks about the doxastic attitude that Baldwin claims whites have about the condition of blacks, or 'the grievances of blacks'. It isn't that whites believe such grievances are false, nor do they believe they are true. Instead, whites manage to be ignorant of the grievances of blacks, effectively maintaining the status quo. It is because whites want to believe the grievances are false, but are too afraid to actually investigave whether they are, in fact, false, because then they might discover (to their horror) that the grievances are true. Unwilling to take the risk that they are true, whites instead ignore the truth-value of the grievances of blacks, and manage to be ignorant.
Such management is dificult, and Baldwin considers that it is rooted in a deep fear that has crippled whites so that they cannot climb out of this willful ignorance without the help of blacks. (pg 122). Author then points out that this is not necessarily a claim of racism by Baldwin, but instead a claim of ignorance. Yet it is a kind of passive or 'cowardly' racism, set somewhere between white supremecists (who wilfully believe that black grievances are false) and those who believe the grievances are true. Thus it is injustice by 'spinelessness' (pg 124). This is an effective way to indict whites who don't consider themselves blatant racists or white supremecists.
The second section of the chapter talks about what kinds of efforts whites took to create the doxastic attitude they now enjoy. Author looks at the history of the reconstruction, both immediately following the Civil War and also as many as 5 centuries later, with a speech by Woodrow Wilson. In the cases author examines, all discussion of the moral aspects of the war, that it was over the treatment of blacks/slaves, are censored from explicit reference. Instead, reconcilliation is achieved among the whites by talking about how both sides fought bravely, and suffered, and so on. In order to mend the republic of whites, the reasons the war was fought are covered over. But this also covered over the grievances of blacks, effectively creating a screen for whites to enjoy. (pg 126-130)
2/1/08
Mosley, Albert - Modern Racism: A Defense
02/01/2008
Unpublished Paper
This is a paper that attempts to unmask a more 'scientific' form of racism. Instead of arguing for essentialism of the races, the new terminology is the 'relative frequency of traits'. One such writer is Michael Levin, who considers the genetic differences between the races to be ones not of essential difference but of relative occurence. However, he also takes on some form of genetic determinism, strongly downplaying environmental or social factors, or arguing more that it was a matter of choice, or stupidity, that maintains the environmental disparities that could be used as alternate explanations to genetic differences. Author picks apart these arguments and shows how they are a dressed up form of old-fashioned racism.
Author argues that the claim that different races have different distribution of intellectual ability dovetails with Stephen Kershnar's conclusion that races with lower intelligence have lower moral agency, and are less capable of self-rule, or obeying laws, leading to a higher level of criminality.
Author discusses the problems with retaining any talk of races, since it can be used by more modern racists to veil their racism in biologically sanctioned categories.
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