Hacking, Ian - Why Race Still Matters

01/18/2008

Daedalus, Winter 2005

This article was written in Nov 2004 and looks at why racial categories persist from a variety of perspectives. Author examines the question from the 'natural kind' perspective, an historical 'genealogical' perspective, a cognitive science and social/political theory perspective.

First is the natural kind approach. This involves a discussion of JS Mill, who was one example of a 'sensible' naturalist. Mill discussed superficial kinds and real kinds of things. A superficial kind is something that shares few similarities and we group mostly by convention e.g. green things, things in my house. Natural kinds share innumerable similarities (and do so not by virtue of our prior sorting of them). Mill points out that it is surely possible-- and an empirical issue-- whether races correspond to a natural kind or are just superficial, sharing only pigmentation and a few other physical features. Though Mill is dubious, he leaves it as an open question. (pg 103-4) In general, science has found no deeper mechanism that could distinguish people enough to call 'race' a natural kind. However, this ignores a more prevalent aspect of science that is practiced these days-- rates of difference. Mill asked for a uniform difference in order to sort into true kinds. These days science instead looks for statistically significant differences. Author defines three types of possible positive outcomes when looking at statistics: (pg 105)

1) Significance: a statistic is significant if 'its distribution in one population is significantly different from that in a comparable population'.
2) Meaningful: a statistic is meaningful if we can explain the origin or cause that makes its occurrence. Note that what is determined to be meaningful is not technical.
3) Useful: a statistic is useful when it can be used in a practical application of some concern-- and the use of that statistic will do good (more than harm, and more than not using it). (pg 105)
Author claims that these three aspects of statistics make the analysis of race not just 'real kind'/'superficial kind' but more complex. Author compares Rushton, who has races as real kinds, to Hernstein & Murray (The Bell Curve), who argue instead that 'races are statistically significant classes' that are meaningful when it comes to IQ. (pg 106) Author discusses how statistically significant classes (that might roughly correspond to races) are useful in medical situations like Tay-Sachs, and 'race-targeted' heart medication. (pg 106-9)

Author next discusses the genealogy of racial classification, highlighting Cornell West's work as an example. Author recounts the story of the first recorded systematic approach to categorizing races, by Francois Bernier in 1684. (pg 110-111) The point is that 'classification and judgment are rarely separable'. (pg 109)

Author moves on to the cognitive science approach and claims it is largely inconclusive. Maybe we have innate categorizing modules, or maybe we learn very quickly from our surroundings that people are meant to be categorized. (pg 111-112)

Author then suggests one link that keeps racial categories active: the nature of having an empire. An empire is a governing or powerful body that ranges over a large swath of people/places/units. Empires conquer. Empires display their conquests in chunks (e.g. racial categories). Empires document what they have conquered in order to tax, properly govern, etc. 'Classification, as an imperial imperative, invites stereotyping.' (pg 113)

Author ties discussion of empire in with the self-other dichotomy and the presumably universal need to distinguish between groups. 'Groups need internal bonds to keep them together, as well as external boundaries for group identity.' (pg 114) One common way of doing this is to have 'pollution rules'. Meaning: this thing x that this out-group does will pollute you, your integrity, your identity. Author claims that every stable group has pollution rules (pg 114 top right). Author discusses how pollution rules have historically applied to race: e.g. one drop of negro blood makes you a negro, no matter how white you look.