01/25/2008
Unpublished manuscript
Mostly a summary and review of the two strands of thought in philosophy regarding race, this paper takes a reasonable and moderate view of treating race as both biologically based and also socially/culturally maintained or constructed.
Author notes that much of the discussion about race is tainted, or overshadowed, by the essentialist racism that was pervasive for much of our history. Such racism sought to distinguish races by traits that aren't just superficial but deeper and more uniform. The liberal reaction to such biological claims was to point out that there is more difference between intra-racial people than between races, making racial categories 'social constructs'. The prevalence of this argument, coupled with uncovering the genealogy of the use of the concept 'race', has led to the stance that the use of 'race' is not grounded in biology at all but entirely socially constructed.
Author points out that while differences between individuals might be no greater between races than within them, there are differences in occurrence of gene frequencies, much of which is explained by examining geographical (and in some cases, cultural) origin of a 'sub-species'. An example are cases of Sickle Cell Anemia, 97% of occur among African-Americans. The relative gene frequency within certain sub-populations is a biological fact that could serve as a basis for the introduction of the concept of 'race' in a biological context. It is important to remember that we are talking about origins and population patterns, not about essential characteristics due to physical features. Also important is that even those philosophers (Andreasen, Cavalli-Sforza) who talk about such an approach, disagree about whether the usage of 'race' is still valid, some saying there has been enough interbreeding of previously separated populations, others saying that there is still enough difference to sketch out origins.
The disagreement with these thinkers have come from a weird direction. Zack and Glasgow claim that this type of 'cladistic' historical-geographical analysis of human populations in terms of intra-breeding and using gene frequencies might yield genetically recognizable patterns, but those patterns don't correspond to what a 'race' is. The common man's definition is more simplistic, thus science misses at reduction. Author points out that this is equivalent to showing that salt isn't NaCl, since the common man thinks anything that tastes a certain way is 'salt'.
Author finishes by concluding that the new concept of race doesn't justify racism, and that perhaps now 'race' is maintained more so by culture and social practices (segregation, class divides, language barriers) than by geography. Nevertheless, it is important to keep this concept in use, not only for possibly medical expediencies but also for self-identity.
1/18/08
Hacking, Ian - Why Race Still Matters
01/18/2008
Daedalus, Winter 2005
This article was written in Nov 2004 and looks at why racial categories persist from a variety of perspectives. Author examines the question from the 'natural kind' perspective, an historical 'genealogical' perspective, a cognitive science and social/political theory perspective.
First is the natural kind approach. This involves a discussion of JS Mill, who was one example of a 'sensible' naturalist. Mill discussed superficial kinds and real kinds of things. A superficial kind is something that shares few similarities and we group mostly by convention e.g. green things, things in my house. Natural kinds share innumerable similarities (and do so not by virtue of our prior sorting of them). Mill points out that it is surely possible-- and an empirical issue-- whether races correspond to a natural kind or are just superficial, sharing only pigmentation and a few other physical features. Though Mill is dubious, he leaves it as an open question. (pg 103-4) In general, science has found no deeper mechanism that could distinguish people enough to call 'race' a natural kind. However, this ignores a more prevalent aspect of science that is practiced these days-- rates of difference. Mill asked for a uniform difference in order to sort into true kinds. These days science instead looks for statistically significant differences. Author defines three types of possible positive outcomes when looking at statistics: (pg 105)
1) Significance: a statistic is significant if 'its distribution in one population is significantly different from that in a comparable population'.
2) Meaningful: a statistic is meaningful if we can explain the origin or cause that makes its occurrence. Note that what is determined to be meaningful is not technical.
3) Useful: a statistic is useful when it can be used in a practical application of some concern-- and the use of that statistic will do good (more than harm, and more than not using it). (pg 105)
Author claims that these three aspects of statistics make the analysis of race not just 'real kind'/'superficial kind' but more complex. Author compares Rushton, who has races as real kinds, to Hernstein & Murray (The Bell Curve), who argue instead that 'races are statistically significant classes' that are meaningful when it comes to IQ. (pg 106) Author discusses how statistically significant classes (that might roughly correspond to races) are useful in medical situations like Tay-Sachs, and 'race-targeted' heart medication. (pg 106-9)
Author next discusses the genealogy of racial classification, highlighting Cornell West's work as an example. Author recounts the story of the first recorded systematic approach to categorizing races, by Francois Bernier in 1684. (pg 110-111) The point is that 'classification and judgment are rarely separable'. (pg 109)
Author moves on to the cognitive science approach and claims it is largely inconclusive. Maybe we have innate categorizing modules, or maybe we learn very quickly from our surroundings that people are meant to be categorized. (pg 111-112)
Author then suggests one link that keeps racial categories active: the nature of having an empire. An empire is a governing or powerful body that ranges over a large swath of people/places/units. Empires conquer. Empires display their conquests in chunks (e.g. racial categories). Empires document what they have conquered in order to tax, properly govern, etc. 'Classification, as an imperial imperative, invites stereotyping.' (pg 113)
Author ties discussion of empire in with the self-other dichotomy and the presumably universal need to distinguish between groups. 'Groups need internal bonds to keep them together, as well as external boundaries for group identity.' (pg 114) One common way of doing this is to have 'pollution rules'. Meaning: this thing x that this out-group does will pollute you, your integrity, your identity. Author claims that every stable group has pollution rules (pg 114 top right). Author discusses how pollution rules have historically applied to race: e.g. one drop of negro blood makes you a negro, no matter how white you look.
Daedalus, Winter 2005
This article was written in Nov 2004 and looks at why racial categories persist from a variety of perspectives. Author examines the question from the 'natural kind' perspective, an historical 'genealogical' perspective, a cognitive science and social/political theory perspective.
First is the natural kind approach. This involves a discussion of JS Mill, who was one example of a 'sensible' naturalist. Mill discussed superficial kinds and real kinds of things. A superficial kind is something that shares few similarities and we group mostly by convention e.g. green things, things in my house. Natural kinds share innumerable similarities (and do so not by virtue of our prior sorting of them). Mill points out that it is surely possible-- and an empirical issue-- whether races correspond to a natural kind or are just superficial, sharing only pigmentation and a few other physical features. Though Mill is dubious, he leaves it as an open question. (pg 103-4) In general, science has found no deeper mechanism that could distinguish people enough to call 'race' a natural kind. However, this ignores a more prevalent aspect of science that is practiced these days-- rates of difference. Mill asked for a uniform difference in order to sort into true kinds. These days science instead looks for statistically significant differences. Author defines three types of possible positive outcomes when looking at statistics: (pg 105)
1) Significance: a statistic is significant if 'its distribution in one population is significantly different from that in a comparable population'.
2) Meaningful: a statistic is meaningful if we can explain the origin or cause that makes its occurrence. Note that what is determined to be meaningful is not technical.
3) Useful: a statistic is useful when it can be used in a practical application of some concern-- and the use of that statistic will do good (more than harm, and more than not using it). (pg 105)
Author claims that these three aspects of statistics make the analysis of race not just 'real kind'/'superficial kind' but more complex. Author compares Rushton, who has races as real kinds, to Hernstein & Murray (The Bell Curve), who argue instead that 'races are statistically significant classes' that are meaningful when it comes to IQ. (pg 106) Author discusses how statistically significant classes (that might roughly correspond to races) are useful in medical situations like Tay-Sachs, and 'race-targeted' heart medication. (pg 106-9)
Author next discusses the genealogy of racial classification, highlighting Cornell West's work as an example. Author recounts the story of the first recorded systematic approach to categorizing races, by Francois Bernier in 1684. (pg 110-111) The point is that 'classification and judgment are rarely separable'. (pg 109)
Author moves on to the cognitive science approach and claims it is largely inconclusive. Maybe we have innate categorizing modules, or maybe we learn very quickly from our surroundings that people are meant to be categorized. (pg 111-112)
Author then suggests one link that keeps racial categories active: the nature of having an empire. An empire is a governing or powerful body that ranges over a large swath of people/places/units. Empires conquer. Empires display their conquests in chunks (e.g. racial categories). Empires document what they have conquered in order to tax, properly govern, etc. 'Classification, as an imperial imperative, invites stereotyping.' (pg 113)
Author ties discussion of empire in with the self-other dichotomy and the presumably universal need to distinguish between groups. 'Groups need internal bonds to keep them together, as well as external boundaries for group identity.' (pg 114) One common way of doing this is to have 'pollution rules'. Meaning: this thing x that this out-group does will pollute you, your integrity, your identity. Author claims that every stable group has pollution rules (pg 114 top right). Author discusses how pollution rules have historically applied to race: e.g. one drop of negro blood makes you a negro, no matter how white you look.
1/11/08
Kitcher, Philip - Does 'Race' Have A Future?
01/11/2008
Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol 35 No 4
This paper fits into a group that deals with the issue of race as possibly a legitimate classification, but denies the standard essentialist support for 'race' and also the accompanying stereotyping. Author takes us through a walk that starts with rejecting an essentialist view of race, instead using a modified 'realist' conception of natural kinds to redefine racial categories, and then ultimately to a pragmatist account of natural kinds, which specifies that inquiries into racial conceptions should have a reasonable motivation.
Author starts by dismissing the standard 'essentialist' notion of distinctive genes or biological markers that distinguish races in Homo Sapiens. Author points out that while this is true, it isn't on point as a retort to using the 'biological species concept', which tries to identify species as populations that would freely interbreed in the wild but for reproductive isolation. (pg 295) Developing this biological concept further, if there is a degree of infra-species inbreeding, due to subtle differences, cultural factors, geography or whatever, this is a biological basis for defining a 'cluster' or race. (pg 296-7) Author points out this could be for pernicious social factors, at least in the case of humans (pg 297). If so, then race could be 'both biologically real and socially constructed'. (pg 298)
Author then takes back some of this discussion's grounding, since it relies on a 'realist' view of natural kinds. He thinks instead that there is no 'natural' way to cut up the world, even though there is just one world to describe. Instead, different categories will emerge given our different interests, a 'pragmatist' approach (pg 299-301) Once one takes the pragmatist approach, it becomes important to indicate the practical importance of using infraspecies breeding patters to define a cluster of inbred populations. Author points out this is useful for such purposes as determining migration patters in human history. But the point here is that the purposes of such an analysis needs to be defended. (pg 301-2) Author points out some other reasons why it might be important as well-- e.g. modern medicine (pg 302-3).
Author discusses statistical genomic analysis that 'clusters' the species by degrees of genetic similarity, but also cautions against using this as a way to revive essential difference talk (pg 306). Author points out that with a pragmatist perspective, it is a legitimate question of whether such research should be done, given that we know there will be some misunderstanding of it and possibly a revival of old 'ogre naturalist' categories. He also points out that much of this analysis will run into the cultural and prejudicial errors of the past, which will seriously muddy such an analysis.
Author finishes piece by pointing out that while not distinctive traits pick out races, trait frequency is different in different inbred clusters. As such, for e.g. bone marrow transplant donors the usage of racial preference seems justifiable but only as an expedient to get a favored group of donors. (pg 312-4)
Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol 35 No 4
This paper fits into a group that deals with the issue of race as possibly a legitimate classification, but denies the standard essentialist support for 'race' and also the accompanying stereotyping. Author takes us through a walk that starts with rejecting an essentialist view of race, instead using a modified 'realist' conception of natural kinds to redefine racial categories, and then ultimately to a pragmatist account of natural kinds, which specifies that inquiries into racial conceptions should have a reasonable motivation.
Author starts by dismissing the standard 'essentialist' notion of distinctive genes or biological markers that distinguish races in Homo Sapiens. Author points out that while this is true, it isn't on point as a retort to using the 'biological species concept', which tries to identify species as populations that would freely interbreed in the wild but for reproductive isolation. (pg 295) Developing this biological concept further, if there is a degree of infra-species inbreeding, due to subtle differences, cultural factors, geography or whatever, this is a biological basis for defining a 'cluster' or race. (pg 296-7) Author points out this could be for pernicious social factors, at least in the case of humans (pg 297). If so, then race could be 'both biologically real and socially constructed'. (pg 298)
Author then takes back some of this discussion's grounding, since it relies on a 'realist' view of natural kinds. He thinks instead that there is no 'natural' way to cut up the world, even though there is just one world to describe. Instead, different categories will emerge given our different interests, a 'pragmatist' approach (pg 299-301) Once one takes the pragmatist approach, it becomes important to indicate the practical importance of using infraspecies breeding patters to define a cluster of inbred populations. Author points out this is useful for such purposes as determining migration patters in human history. But the point here is that the purposes of such an analysis needs to be defended. (pg 301-2) Author points out some other reasons why it might be important as well-- e.g. modern medicine (pg 302-3).
Author discusses statistical genomic analysis that 'clusters' the species by degrees of genetic similarity, but also cautions against using this as a way to revive essential difference talk (pg 306). Author points out that with a pragmatist perspective, it is a legitimate question of whether such research should be done, given that we know there will be some misunderstanding of it and possibly a revival of old 'ogre naturalist' categories. He also points out that much of this analysis will run into the cultural and prejudicial errors of the past, which will seriously muddy such an analysis.
Author finishes piece by pointing out that while not distinctive traits pick out races, trait frequency is different in different inbred clusters. As such, for e.g. bone marrow transplant donors the usage of racial preference seems justifiable but only as an expedient to get a favored group of donors. (pg 312-4)
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