10/26/2007
Philosophical Psychology Vol 20 No 3 June 2007
This quick moving paper takes a combination of empirical, intuitive and reasoned approach to giving an epistemic model of concept possession. That is to say: it tries to lay out conditions where we can ascribe the possession of concepts in non-human animals. The first step is to lay out what it means to have a concept. Here, authors borrow from Peacocke in using a psychological-functional mental-capacities approach to concepts. (pg 284) Here also some preliminary ground work is done for what a concept is, how to individuate it, and so on.
The beginning attacks prior writers (Chater & Heyes) that argued that there are three theories of what a concept is: definitional, exemplar, and prototype. The problem is that only prototype concepts can be 'formulated' nonlinguistically, so thus nonlinguistic animals can only have this type of concept. But often it is impossible to tell the difference between conditioned stimulus-response (S-R) systems and prototype concept use. Using principles of parsimony, there is no reason to think animals have concepts. Authors take this to be a challenge of determining the differences between S-R and concept use. (pg 285-6)
Authors consider various approaches, e.g. Dretske, Allen & Hauser/Allen. Dretske gives the idea that you need a flexible response to the same stimuli at a minimum (to distinguish between S-R and concept use). Allen suggests that concepts require integration of more than one source of information in order to modify behavior-- stimulus independent, or as Pylyshyn suggests, 'transcendence of particular stimuli' (pg 287). Using this we arrive at the value of 'stable representations' that are independent of particular stimuli. This constraint is only necessary (not sufficient), since it could merely give us naming abilities for objects (see collie discussion pg 288).
Authors consider the Davidson argument about belief possession, and say flat out that it is wrong because it presupposes second-order belief usage in order to have first-order beliefs. That is, you need to have a concept of a concept before you can have a concept. Authors deny this could be realistic (pg 289), but agree with Davidson that there is a normative element to concept possession. Authors instead take this more modest metacognitive criterion from Allen:
ii. An Organism is capable of detecting some of its own discrimination errors between veridical applications of concept X and veridical applications of concept X (pg 289)
The next step is to have the ability to extract classes from perceptual data-- to separate properties from objects. Authors examine the case study for Alex the parrot, that was able to successfully 85% separate objects into piles according to the categories color, shape, material. Thus showing not just that Alex could learn red, blue, etc., but also higher-level categories. (pg 292-4) Authors distinguish between three different categories of cognitive capacities: nonconceptual representations (S-R), conceptual representations and propositional representations. Here is an interesting discussion about the 'cognitive' and what it means for something to be cognitive. [Clearly, 'cognition' isn't the same as 'thinking' anymore if an ant can do it to get home!] (pg 294) Here we are homing in on conceptual representations. In order to have a first-order perceptual concept (e.g. RED):
C1: The system has a stable representation of the property across a range of objects
C2: The system must be able to represent not only property X but also other properties of the same object
C3: The system has a distinguishing capacity that picks out particular properties of an object that is independent of the stimulus of the property itself (e.g. the system can, on its own, pick out the relevant property without its making itself salient somehow)
C4: The system has a minimal semantic net where the first-order concept fits into a proper dimension (e.g. RED fits into COLOR rather than STOPS or DANGER-WARNINGS).
There is extended discussion on these necessary conditions. (pg 296-7). Authors give their suggestions for what propositional representations are-- the combination of two concepts that are strongly stimulus-independent. Authors then look at the empirical evidence to see how non-human animals fit into the criteria. (pg 298-300) Authors reply to a few objections and summarize their claims. (pg 303-305)
10/26/07
10/18/07
Aizawa, Kenneth - Understanding the Embodiment of Perception
10/19/2007
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 1 January 2007
This is an essay regarding the different views of the embodiment of perception, which author beings by acknowledging is obviously embodied. There are two contending views, the COH and the CAH. The COH is opposed by author, which is the view that
COH: Perceptual experience is constituted in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills
This contrasts with
CAH: Perceptual experience is caused in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills
Author claims this is an important discussion because the COH gives grist for the extended mind hypothesis, while the CAH does not particularly do so. The main target in this paper is a book by Noe Action in Perception. Noe calls the COH the enactive approach. 'Perception is not a process in the brain but a kind of skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole' (pg 9). Author first makes some preliminary comments:
1) Perceptual experience is not the same as mere peripheral stimulation of sense organs-- something more than sensation. (pg 9-10)
2) This debate is an empirical one, or settled by interpretations of empirical evidence-- e.g. not a priori or analytic. Thus, we need a definition or analysis of perception that leaves it open whether COH or CAH is right.
3) Sensorimotor skills are practical knowledge, not just (or maybe not at all) theoretical knowledge. This is complicated by Noe's apparent belief that sensorimotor skills also involve a level of theoretical knowledge.
Author reviews various empirical cases where COH (or CAH) is supposed to be supported: cases of removing congenital cataracts, cases of wearing distorting lenses, cases of images that fade from sight upon fixation. In each case, author gives alternatives to the COH analysis and supposes that COH fails to be established.
In the first case (of removing congenital cataracts), Noe claims that these are cases of 'experiential blindness', meaning that they cannot integrate sensations with patterns of movement and thought. Author claims 'it appears to be possible that some humans might perceive things, only without these perceptions being integrated into patterns of personal movement and thought.' (pg 15) Further, even if it were correct that these patients have 'experiential blindness', this would still fail to establish COH, since CAH can offer the alternative explanation that these patients' sensorimotor skills aren't yet connected (causally) to their sensory apparatus in the proper way. (pg 16)
The second example involves wearing distorting lenses and possible being 'experientially blind' in some manner or other. Author instead claims that since the subject is able to recognize these distorted objects, the subject really is perceiving. (pg 17) Further, all distorting lenses will really prove is a weaker version of COH, namely that the ability to exercises one kind of sensorimotor skill constitutes one kind of perception. Author claims this is weaker and doesn't establish COH. (pg 18)
Author also offers empirical evidence against COH, in the case of paralysis. Here is seems there is no exercise of sensorimotor skills, yet preception takes place. (pg 20-23)
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 1 January 2007
This is an essay regarding the different views of the embodiment of perception, which author beings by acknowledging is obviously embodied. There are two contending views, the COH and the CAH. The COH is opposed by author, which is the view that
COH: Perceptual experience is constituted in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills
This contrasts with
CAH: Perceptual experience is caused in part by the exercise of sensorimotor skills
Author claims this is an important discussion because the COH gives grist for the extended mind hypothesis, while the CAH does not particularly do so. The main target in this paper is a book by Noe Action in Perception. Noe calls the COH the enactive approach. 'Perception is not a process in the brain but a kind of skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole' (pg 9). Author first makes some preliminary comments:
1) Perceptual experience is not the same as mere peripheral stimulation of sense organs-- something more than sensation. (pg 9-10)
2) This debate is an empirical one, or settled by interpretations of empirical evidence-- e.g. not a priori or analytic. Thus, we need a definition or analysis of perception that leaves it open whether COH or CAH is right.
3) Sensorimotor skills are practical knowledge, not just (or maybe not at all) theoretical knowledge. This is complicated by Noe's apparent belief that sensorimotor skills also involve a level of theoretical knowledge.
Author reviews various empirical cases where COH (or CAH) is supposed to be supported: cases of removing congenital cataracts, cases of wearing distorting lenses, cases of images that fade from sight upon fixation. In each case, author gives alternatives to the COH analysis and supposes that COH fails to be established.
In the first case (of removing congenital cataracts), Noe claims that these are cases of 'experiential blindness', meaning that they cannot integrate sensations with patterns of movement and thought. Author claims 'it appears to be possible that some humans might perceive things, only without these perceptions being integrated into patterns of personal movement and thought.' (pg 15) Further, even if it were correct that these patients have 'experiential blindness', this would still fail to establish COH, since CAH can offer the alternative explanation that these patients' sensorimotor skills aren't yet connected (causally) to their sensory apparatus in the proper way. (pg 16)
The second example involves wearing distorting lenses and possible being 'experientially blind' in some manner or other. Author instead claims that since the subject is able to recognize these distorted objects, the subject really is perceiving. (pg 17) Further, all distorting lenses will really prove is a weaker version of COH, namely that the ability to exercises one kind of sensorimotor skill constitutes one kind of perception. Author claims this is weaker and doesn't establish COH. (pg 18)
Author also offers empirical evidence against COH, in the case of paralysis. Here is seems there is no exercise of sensorimotor skills, yet preception takes place. (pg 20-23)
10/12/07
Davidson, Donald - Problems in the Explanation of Action
10/12/2007
Metaphysics and Morality; Essays in honour of JJC Smart, Petit, Sylvan & Norman eds. Blackwell, 1987
Author starts with discussing his views on intentional actions and actions explained by reference to intentions. Specifically, author investigates the question posed by Wittgenstein: 'What must be added to my arm going up to make it my raising my arm?' Author claims that there is nothing that must be added; first is a discussion that if a raising of an arm is an effect of a previous act of the agent, it seems that previous act must also have a previous act, ad infinitum. The case is simple in the case of the arm raising the arm that is raised. However, what if a rope is tied to a pulley that raises a paralyzed arm (I pull the rope with the other arm)? It seems here there is the pulling of the lever and the raising of the arm-- 2 events. Author rejects this (pg 37), saying the 'two events' are identical. In a sense, the rising of my arm is not part of my raising my arm.
The next difficulty has to do with possible objections raised to this 'identity' thesis that show a disjunct between cause and effect, or at least a period of time and/or space that separates the two, thereby plausibly questioning the identity of the two 'actions'. (e.g. my sending a thank you message and the recipient not getting it until later) (pg 38). Author replies that often causal verbs actually have two (or more) parts where x causes y, then y causes z. This can fix certain space/time problems.
Author moves to a concern for giving explanations for actions. Often the explanation takes the form of describing the intention for the consequence. Author takes back a previous claim he had made in "Actions, Reasons and Causes" where he claimed that 'there were no such states as intending, there were just intentional actions.' Author claims that 'it is not enough to ensure that an action was performed with a certain intention that it was caused by that intention' (pg 39) and gives examples of deviant causal chains, which leads author to conclude that 'concepts of event, cause and intention are inadequate to account for intentional action'.
Forming an intention requires a belief and a 'pro-attitude' or desire. Desires aren't the same as intentions, since, according to the author, a desire is a conditional, dispositional state that can be countermanded, while an intention is 'sandwiched between cause and effect' (pg 41). The complaint now is that it seems that only an explanation of which desires and beliefs formed the intention that is a reason for the action (plays the part of a cause). The problem here is that it seems that the explanation for the cause is dependent on how the events are described and can be considered fragile in this way compared to the hard sciences. Perhaps what is desirable are psycho-laws that, once you specify the belief&desire, lawfully cause the action. Since these haven't been found, author claims this is not a reason to say reasons don't cause actions, rather that Author attempts to fix this problem by saying that causal powers may be mentioned in different explanatory contexts, but in principle instantiate laws (pg 42, bottom). This has come under criticism.
Author considers various attempts to specify reason-explanation laws, that are mostly inadequate (pg 43-4). His conclusion is that 'laws relating the mental and the physical are not like the laws of physics, therefore are not reducible to them' (pg 45) The big complaint (that is relevant to our recent previous readings) is that events causes each other by virtue of the lawlike behavior of properties, but the only real properties are physical. Thus there can't be mental-physical causation. Author then says that there are all sorts of kinds of laws, and with that different kinds of explanatory schemes that will apply according to our interests. This will make different properties causally efficacious. In the physical universe only (free of our interests), all properties cause the effect. (pg 45-6)
Author finishes by saying that there is a further distinction between physics, the special sciences (which may theoretically be ultimately reducible to physics) and reason-explanation in the explanation of action. The distinction between any scientific explanation and reason-explanations, is the normative. Here author identifies the semantic content as vital to explanation, and semantic content is subject to our interests in consistency, correctness, etc. Author ends by arguing against a behavioral system of 'black box' psychology.
Metaphysics and Morality; Essays in honour of JJC Smart, Petit, Sylvan & Norman eds. Blackwell, 1987
Author starts with discussing his views on intentional actions and actions explained by reference to intentions. Specifically, author investigates the question posed by Wittgenstein: 'What must be added to my arm going up to make it my raising my arm?' Author claims that there is nothing that must be added; first is a discussion that if a raising of an arm is an effect of a previous act of the agent, it seems that previous act must also have a previous act, ad infinitum. The case is simple in the case of the arm raising the arm that is raised. However, what if a rope is tied to a pulley that raises a paralyzed arm (I pull the rope with the other arm)? It seems here there is the pulling of the lever and the raising of the arm-- 2 events. Author rejects this (pg 37), saying the 'two events' are identical. In a sense, the rising of my arm is not part of my raising my arm.
The next difficulty has to do with possible objections raised to this 'identity' thesis that show a disjunct between cause and effect, or at least a period of time and/or space that separates the two, thereby plausibly questioning the identity of the two 'actions'. (e.g. my sending a thank you message and the recipient not getting it until later) (pg 38). Author replies that often causal verbs actually have two (or more) parts where x causes y, then y causes z. This can fix certain space/time problems.
Author moves to a concern for giving explanations for actions. Often the explanation takes the form of describing the intention for the consequence. Author takes back a previous claim he had made in "Actions, Reasons and Causes" where he claimed that 'there were no such states as intending, there were just intentional actions.' Author claims that 'it is not enough to ensure that an action was performed with a certain intention that it was caused by that intention' (pg 39) and gives examples of deviant causal chains, which leads author to conclude that 'concepts of event, cause and intention are inadequate to account for intentional action'.
Forming an intention requires a belief and a 'pro-attitude' or desire. Desires aren't the same as intentions, since, according to the author, a desire is a conditional, dispositional state that can be countermanded, while an intention is 'sandwiched between cause and effect' (pg 41). The complaint now is that it seems that only an explanation of which desires and beliefs formed the intention that is a reason for the action (plays the part of a cause). The problem here is that it seems that the explanation for the cause is dependent on how the events are described and can be considered fragile in this way compared to the hard sciences. Perhaps what is desirable are psycho-laws that, once you specify the belief&desire, lawfully cause the action. Since these haven't been found, author claims this is not a reason to say reasons don't cause actions, rather that Author attempts to fix this problem by saying that causal powers may be mentioned in different explanatory contexts, but in principle instantiate laws (pg 42, bottom). This has come under criticism.
Author considers various attempts to specify reason-explanation laws, that are mostly inadequate (pg 43-4). His conclusion is that 'laws relating the mental and the physical are not like the laws of physics, therefore are not reducible to them' (pg 45) The big complaint (that is relevant to our recent previous readings) is that events causes each other by virtue of the lawlike behavior of properties, but the only real properties are physical. Thus there can't be mental-physical causation. Author then says that there are all sorts of kinds of laws, and with that different kinds of explanatory schemes that will apply according to our interests. This will make different properties causally efficacious. In the physical universe only (free of our interests), all properties cause the effect. (pg 45-6)
Author finishes by saying that there is a further distinction between physics, the special sciences (which may theoretically be ultimately reducible to physics) and reason-explanation in the explanation of action. The distinction between any scientific explanation and reason-explanations, is the normative. Here author identifies the semantic content as vital to explanation, and semantic content is subject to our interests in consistency, correctness, etc. Author ends by arguing against a behavioral system of 'black box' psychology.
10/5/07
Polger, Thomas - Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind
10/05/2007
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 85 No 2 June 2007
Author's main target is Gillett's account of Realization and Reduction. Author has numerous objections to the family of realization accounts (Kim, Shoemaker, Gillett), as well as Gillett's specifically, which is called the 'dimensional' view. Author claims that these accounts of realization will destroy the distinction between Realization Physicalism (RP) and the original account (the account that RP was supposed to be an alternative to), identity theories. Author does not want to defend RP, but instead make sense of Realization so that RP can be properly evaluated.
Realization is not the same as 'instantiation'. Author gives multiple examples of use of the term 'realization' (pg 235), and suggests that the paradigm 'textbook' case is something like:
My computer currently realizes Microsoft Word; or
Memory fixation is realized in humans by long term potentiation of neurons.
"Certain electrical states of the device realize computational states such as, say, storing the contents of the last copy operation. The electrical activity of the device is not identical to any program state of Microsoft Word, but it implements or realizes such program states" (pg 236)
Author takes the view of Gillett et al to be that causal powers of properties of objects individuate the realization of the function in question. Author considers this the 'causal view' of Realization. Gillett's view differs from Kim & Shoemaker's in that their view is of a 'flat' causal theory where realizer and realized properties are in the same object, at the same level, in virtue simply of causal powers. Gillett's view is that the realizer properties can take place at a lower level, or a horizontal one, or as part of the structure of the object (or at the object level). This is considered the 'dimensional' causal view. (pg 238)
Author's major reply to the entire causal view is that it fails to capture objects that realize abstract processes, like machines that realize 'addition' or 'Microsoft Word'(pg 240). The claim is that an abstract function like addition is a formal and not a causal relation, and so you can't use causal powers to individuate them. Thus the causal approach fails to capture textbook cases of abstract, formal, or algorithm realization, since these things get realized but the objects/properties that realize them are not doing so causally but in form instead. Author extends this to intentional and etiological (historical) realized properties too (e.g. A US dollar is whatever the US Gov't says is a dollar). Author predicts there will be numerous objections to his attack, which he considers: (pg 243-6)
1) The computational/functional model of cognition (RP) is over
Author: so? We should still try to get the Realization relation right
2) The project of abstract realization in general is defunct
Author: wrong! 'We cannot dismiss abstract realization out of hand' (pg 245) [important!]
3) Ok, maybe a machine can't cause 'addition', but it can cause 'adding things', and that's all you need for Realization. Thus the causal view is saved.
Author: A) there are other realization relations that I hope that doesn't work for B) We can still say that an 'adder' that 'adds things' stands in a particular relation to addition, and thus name that Realization. (pg 246) [this makes no sense]
4) Realization of abstract functions is not Realization proper.
Author: But then we have no room for the special sciences, or for functionalism.
Author turns to the specific criticism of Gillett's dimensional causal view. Author claims (pg 248-50) it essentially destroys Realization and makes it into an identity theory. Author then proposes his own theory of Realization:
'to realize a property or state is to have a function'. (e.g. 'something realizes the property of being a heart iff it has the function of pumping blood') (pg 251)
Author leaves open what kinds of functions will be realized.
Author then considers a final attack on Gillett. This is a discussion about Multiple Realization (MR). Gillett thinks that before we have an idea of MR we need an account of R. But author denies this. Author says that MR is an argument for R, so we can't have R figuring in the explanation of MR-- that would beg the question. Author claims that MR is a theory about explanation and explanatory kinds, whereas R is a metaphysical theory about properties. (pg 255) This leads to a 'paradox' where something might be MR across species/objects/etc. but not actually realized (R) in the special, irreducible sense, since the multiple species/objects' properties are the same across those species/objects/items. Author puts forth that we must first use MR for kinds as an explanation, then investigate the relation between the properties realized (e.g. an eye) and the physical objects doing the explaining (e.g. retina, cornea). If the relation isn't one of identity across the MRs, then maybe we have the Realization relation instead.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 85 No 2 June 2007
Author's main target is Gillett's account of Realization and Reduction. Author has numerous objections to the family of realization accounts (Kim, Shoemaker, Gillett), as well as Gillett's specifically, which is called the 'dimensional' view. Author claims that these accounts of realization will destroy the distinction between Realization Physicalism (RP) and the original account (the account that RP was supposed to be an alternative to), identity theories. Author does not want to defend RP, but instead make sense of Realization so that RP can be properly evaluated.
Realization is not the same as 'instantiation'. Author gives multiple examples of use of the term 'realization' (pg 235), and suggests that the paradigm 'textbook' case is something like:
My computer currently realizes Microsoft Word; or
Memory fixation is realized in humans by long term potentiation of neurons.
"Certain electrical states of the device realize computational states such as, say, storing the contents of the last copy operation. The electrical activity of the device is not identical to any program state of Microsoft Word, but it implements or realizes such program states" (pg 236)
Author takes the view of Gillett et al to be that causal powers of properties of objects individuate the realization of the function in question. Author considers this the 'causal view' of Realization. Gillett's view differs from Kim & Shoemaker's in that their view is of a 'flat' causal theory where realizer and realized properties are in the same object, at the same level, in virtue simply of causal powers. Gillett's view is that the realizer properties can take place at a lower level, or a horizontal one, or as part of the structure of the object (or at the object level). This is considered the 'dimensional' causal view. (pg 238)
Author's major reply to the entire causal view is that it fails to capture objects that realize abstract processes, like machines that realize 'addition' or 'Microsoft Word'(pg 240). The claim is that an abstract function like addition is a formal and not a causal relation, and so you can't use causal powers to individuate them. Thus the causal approach fails to capture textbook cases of abstract, formal, or algorithm realization, since these things get realized but the objects/properties that realize them are not doing so causally but in form instead. Author extends this to intentional and etiological (historical) realized properties too (e.g. A US dollar is whatever the US Gov't says is a dollar). Author predicts there will be numerous objections to his attack, which he considers: (pg 243-6)
1) The computational/functional model of cognition (RP) is over
Author: so? We should still try to get the Realization relation right
2) The project of abstract realization in general is defunct
Author: wrong! 'We cannot dismiss abstract realization out of hand' (pg 245) [important!]
3) Ok, maybe a machine can't cause 'addition', but it can cause 'adding things', and that's all you need for Realization. Thus the causal view is saved.
Author: A) there are other realization relations that I hope that doesn't work for B) We can still say that an 'adder' that 'adds things' stands in a particular relation to addition, and thus name that Realization. (pg 246) [this makes no sense]
4) Realization of abstract functions is not Realization proper.
Author: But then we have no room for the special sciences, or for functionalism.
Author turns to the specific criticism of Gillett's dimensional causal view. Author claims (pg 248-50) it essentially destroys Realization and makes it into an identity theory. Author then proposes his own theory of Realization:
'to realize a property or state is to have a function'. (e.g. 'something realizes the property of being a heart iff it has the function of pumping blood') (pg 251)
Author leaves open what kinds of functions will be realized.
Author then considers a final attack on Gillett. This is a discussion about Multiple Realization (MR). Gillett thinks that before we have an idea of MR we need an account of R. But author denies this. Author says that MR is an argument for R, so we can't have R figuring in the explanation of MR-- that would beg the question. Author claims that MR is a theory about explanation and explanatory kinds, whereas R is a metaphysical theory about properties. (pg 255) This leads to a 'paradox' where something might be MR across species/objects/etc. but not actually realized (R) in the special, irreducible sense, since the multiple species/objects' properties are the same across those species/objects/items. Author puts forth that we must first use MR for kinds as an explanation, then investigate the relation between the properties realized (e.g. an eye) and the physical objects doing the explaining (e.g. retina, cornea). If the relation isn't one of identity across the MRs, then maybe we have the Realization relation instead.
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