Aune, Bruce - On An Argument by Castañeda

2014/06/19

Unpublished Paper

This is a short paper that argues that Hector-Neri Castañeda's discussion of the sentence:

(1) The Editor of Soul believes that he (himself) is a millionaire.

is not revealing groundbreaking philosophical territory. In particular, Castañeda argues that this "indirect reflexive pronoun" (the "he"), is special because it refers using the first-person. Author first argues that (1) is not a sentence where the speaker is the same person as the subject, since nobody uses "he" to refer to oneself when speaking in the first person.

But perhaps the import of the sentence can be salvaged by claiming, as Gary Matthews did, that it picks out a referent without using either a name or a definite description (using instead, perhaps, a 'first personal' indexical). Author argues that (1) does not give any information as to how the subject of the sentence is being picked out. While some might use the "I" to pick themselves out with an unerring first-personal reference, others might use a favorite definite description or proper name, author argues. It is a contingent matter, not a priori. Further, not every use of the "I" relies on this special first-personal "from my own point of view", author argues. Consider: "Tom said I look sad"; here the "I" is being attached to a predicate "looks sad" by Tom, not by the first person. So the "I" in this case, while it unerringly refers, it does not seem to have any special first-personal connection to the speaker.

Perhaps Castañeda was trying to use (1) to underwrite what makes a speaker a person, but author proposes other criteria: humans are language-using animals that
(a) perceive from a certain vantage point
(b) identify their own attitudes and those of others
(c) alter both their environs and themselves to suit (within limits) their "wants"
These features of language-using animals, not any special "I" usage, is sufficient for personhood.

Finally, author closes with a discussion of whether a so-called 'personal point of view' contrasts with a scientific one, offered by Nagle as impersonal and "from nowhere in particular". Author argues that general relativity specifically and most scientific language uses specific reference points when talking about the external world and its objects, and that "Properly understood, a scientific view of the world must, in fact, be regarded as thoroughly perspectival".