Fried, Barbara - Beyond Blame

08/16/2013

Boston Review & Forum, June 28, 2013

This article is a scholarly overview of the philosophical solutions (and challenges) to the problem of free will, with focus on the practical application of assigning blame. The article was then commented upon by other philosophers in the forum.

The article begins with the conundrum that moral philosophers pose to themselves as a hypothetical, in light of evidence about influencing factors in decision-making. The hypothetical is: if all choices are determined, can there be free will? Author looks at this specifically relating to blame and the cost of it: the prison system in the US, the perspective that people are at fault instead of being subjected to some sort of widespread social disorder, etc. Author reviews the state of debate: interest was reignited after Rawls' A Theory of Justice, followed by Nozick and Dworkin, shaking roughly into two camps:
-Capatibilism (free will and blame are compatible with determinism)
-Incompatibilism (free will and blame are incompatible with determinism)
Since Incompatibilism believes the two concepts cannot coexist, there are naturally proponents of either blameless determinism or free will. Author calls the first "Skeptical Incompatibilists" and the second "Libertarian Incompatibilists". Author first discusses the latter and concludes that Libertarian Incomaptibilists rest "profoundly consequential judgments on the insubstantial hook of abstract possibility" (pg4). Author moves then to Compatibilism, which continues to assign blame even after admitting (hypothetically) to determinism. This is an old problem, and author goes back to Jonathan Edwards to show the struggles with it. Author ultimately argues that Compatibilism does not give a normative basis for assigning blame, but first author gives an example of a bus driver that, even after exercising all proper care, is unfortunate enough to hit a child with his bus. Author believes we would blame this person, and this is unfair because "fate" intervened in the outcome of the situation (pg6). The "indigestible core" of Compatibilism is that it is all "fate" that determines every action. Author then acknowledges she is a Skeptical Incompatibilist.

The second part of the paper deals with the reasoning why most people are so intent to hold onto the concept of free will, and to "[make] the world safe for blame" (pg7). Here are the author's thoughts:
i. Humans naturally believe in their own agency, and that of others
ii. Blame is indispensable in controlling and normalizing human behavior (social benefits vs costs of a useful fiction)
iii. Belief in blame, ergo free will, treats each fairly, as you see yourself (a variation on i) (pg8-9) Author spends some time on this one, calling it "very Kantian" and troubling since it equates respect only with free will. Author channels Erin Kelly in outlining a different kind of respect: taking the perspective of the agent who committed the supposedly blameworthy action. Author also argues here that allowing for diminished responsibility due to diminished agency is "deeply problematic" for the Compatibilist since there is no logical stopping place until Incompatibilism. 
iv. Blame is just part of the world (variation on i)

Author concludes that there is some hope in some places on the more practical level, moving the US criminal incarceration system away from being entirely focused on blame, which author believes is very harmful.

A forum from a variety of philosophers follows, here:
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/barbara-fried-beyond-blame-moral-responsibility-philosophy-law

Here is a brief summary from each response:

Christine Korsgaard:
Action is judged by a success/failure rubric, blame is the collective agency of a society assigning "failure" to actions. This is only useful if there is a collective view of success, a goal or telos to the society or other communal unit (family). When there is a fractured view, blame comes unhinged.

Erin Kelly:
Blame isn't rampant because of a misunderstanding in the metaphysics of free will and determinism; it's a misunderstanding that criminal justice is where blame should be assigned. Also, even on a personal level, there are many responses to a wrongdoing: blame is only one and is not even necessary.

Adriaan Lanni:
If the harm is the mass incarceration, better to focus on that and moral arguments against it, rather than a debate about free will, though Lanni is sympathetic to Fried's views.

Mike Konczal:
Though the harms regarding blame are agreed upon, a different system that relies on statistical models and assumes determinism might be more authoritarian than we would want.

Paul Bloom:
The elementary argument against blame (determinism) has to remember that not only blame is jettisoned, but all choice, which is too much to lose. Choice doesn't have to be free to be chosen during deliberation, for which we can hold people accountable. Blame and guilt can motivate good behavior.

Gideon Rosen:
Re-frame "choice" as "control" and remember that there are forms of control (like a standard of competence) that are consistent with determinism, as the compatibilist would have. Fried's claims are actually quite radical, meaning that all crimes only have victims (there is no blameworthy perpetrator).

Brian Leiter:
Fried has just hit the tip of the ice berg: this "blame fest" has been happening since (at least) Jesus. Nietzsche has tried to re-word the discussion: "villain" becomes "enemy", "scoundrel" becomes "sick", and "sinner" becomes "fool". This understands that bad thoughts and bad character are worth remedying and sanctioning, but can do without compatibilism.

George Sher:
Fried is mistaken to believe that compatibilism is on a slippery slope when excusing agents with diminished control. Diminished agents do not have sufficient connection to reality to have control; hence some of their actions can be excused. Blame, at the very least, gives power to our moral values.

TM Scanlon:
Fried's efforts to banish all responsibility in banishing blame is an overreaction. Since blame requires seeing the actor's attitudes, by necessity the blamer needs to take the point-of-view of the perpetrator. The trouble with today's "blame fest" is that it confuses substantive responsibility with moral responsibility.

Reply by Fried:
Of course there still needs to be a code of conduct that is enforceable, but for the sake of harm reduction, not to mete out moral responsibility. Compatibilism, even with deliberation, control, etc. built in, still has an indigestible core, and "common sense" is no benefit.