05/03/2013
Mathematics, Matter and Method
This article tries to take apart the "received view" about the relationship between scientific theories and observations, and between theoretical terms and observational ones. For author, there are two two-part distinctions: observation/theoretical terms and then observational/theoretical statements. Author asserts that the supposed problems that these distinctions are meant to fix are not really problems: (1) how to understand theoretical terms? (2) how do you make sure theories aren't fulfilling the evidence, rather than how it's 'supposed' to go? (pg216). And finally, that the distinctions are "broken-backed", meaning that they fail to distinguish (pg216-7).
Author starts with Carnap in his Testability and Meaning. Carnap's idea is that there is an "observation language" or vocabulary, and that these correspond to observable qualities; author then pushes Carnap about whether the terms could also apply to unobservable qualities. The problem: if the observation terms can only refer to observable things, author argues that "there are no observable terms" (pg218); or if they can, then there isn't a problem with talking about unobservables that can be solved with vocabulary. What is really happening here, according to author, is that unobservables are being conflated with theoretical ones. This is a mistake (pg219) and misses what is important about theories.
Author then takes a small interlude to move to discuss the "notion of 'partial interpretation'", first giving Carnap's assertion about it and then discussing how it has been "applied indiscriminately" to terms, theories, and languages (pg220-1). Author discusses various ways a "partial interpretation" could be employed (pg221) and proceeds to dissect each possible understanding in the following pages (pg222-4). Author employs an extended discussion of a common understanding of "soluble". The discussion is meant to ridicule Carnap's understanding of a "partial interpretation": for Carnap, when sugar cubes dissolve in water, what we should do is respecify the meanings of theoretic terms based on observation.
Author returns to what he considers to be the ersatz problem: giving meanings for theoretic terms. Author asks: why assume they should get their meanings from only observation terms? The worry about circularity is a worry that occurs in any language. Perhaps the worry is about how theoretic terms become used in a language: author explores these worries as well (pg225). Interestingly, author claims that language can introduce more refined expressions using less refined ones: "we use less-refined tools to manufacture more-refined ones" (pg226). The argument here is that it is simply not possible to introduce a term into a language that neither relies on imprecise "primitives" or other terms whose precise definition at some point doesn't rest on primitives (pg226).
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