4/19/13

Schaffner, Kenneth - Ernest Nagel and Reduction

04/18/2013

The Journal of Philosophy, Aug/Sept 2012

This is a long paper that explores Nagel's theory of reduction; how it has changed over time and how it relates to a current example. The author first gives Nagel's theory of reduction and its motivations. Nagel was following in the scientific tradition that was able to "absorb" other branches of science into mechanical models. Nagel's prototypical example is the reduction of "classical thermodynamics to statistical mechanics (SM)" (pg535). There were two types of reduction:
-homogeneous: no novel properties are introduced
-heterogeneous: properties are explained in terms of other ones: e.g. temperature to molecular energy
It was the heterogeneous reductions that were the more interesting, though they do not eliminate the earlier "folk" categories. (pg535-6)
Author recaps the various conditions that Nagel placed on theory reduction:
-That hypotheses and axioms take the form of explicit statements whose meanings are fixed by the discipline (pg536-7) (these were Nagel's first and second conditions; author calls them "0").
-Deriviability: the laws of the reduced science are the logical consequence of the reducing science's "theoretical assumptions" (pg537).
-Connectability: terms in the reduced science must be connected somehow to the reducing science using additional "assumptions" (pg537-8).

Author then discusses the extensions and revisions to Nagel's model, first from his own work in creating the "Generic Reduction Replacement" system, in which obsolete or discredited theories could also be reduced (pg540). Also discussed were alternatives like Wimsatt's claims that it isn't theories that should be reduced but "mechanisms" (pg541-2) or a kind of eliminatist-reconstruction "New Wave" advocated by the Churchlands (pg542). Finally, author talks about the functionalist approach to mind and the complications brought on by arguments about multiple realizability (pg543-4). The next section talks about the response to Nagel's model in the 21st century, starting with Hartmann's and (separately) Butterfield's defense of Nagel. The first part of this discussion is about derivability where the concern is over whether the reducing theory's connections can be stronger than a "strong analogy" to the reduced theory (pg545-6). The emerging defenses mainly argue that there is no need to have an overarching concept or definition of "analogy", and that reducing theories need only have an analogy to the reduced (pg545-8). Next is a discussion of connectability, specifically about the nature of the "bridge-laws" or "connectability assumptions". Here author defends his own view that these are synthetic, extensional connections against the two-part analysis of Dizadji-Bahmani that argues that identity statements are internal to a reducing theory, but bridge laws are external to that reducing theory (pg548).

Because "actual reduction is hard to do", there has been a rise in discussions about partial reduction (pg549). Author advocates that the more common types of reduction are 'patchy/local/creeping', at least in the e.g. biological or neurosciences (pg550). However, author gives a lengthy summary in the next section of a systematic reduction of optics undertaken by Sommerfeld (pg551-9). The extended example begins with stressing the importance of Nagel's first condition, that the formulations for both reduced and reducing theories be explicitly stated and connected. Another primary take-away is that the equations used for reduction are more simple than the more "complex and rigorous" (pg556) Maxwell ones, and that in some places, notably when experimenting with diffraction, the Maxwell equations do not provide a rigorous reduction (pg557-8). But author's reading of this, backed up by successive analyses from e.g. Boooker & Jackson, Saatsi & Vicker is that this is a good case of his GRR, where the reducing theory corrects the reduced but does not give a rigorous reduction because it relies on analogy (pg558). However, all-told, even in sciences where there can be significant reduction, there are failures "at the margins" (pg559).

In the penultimate section author talks about the conditions for partial reduction. Author gives a general suggestion: partial reductions should be treated as completed reductions but ones that have exceptions (pg562-3). Author also adds another condition to his GRR that is much like Nagel's original condition of explicit formulations, roughly, that there must be enough codification of hypotheses and theories that can allow for a judgment about whether reduction is successful (pg563).

4/12/13

Suppes, Patrick - Reflections on Ernest Nagel's 1977 Dewey Lectures Teleology Revisited

04/12/2013

The Journal of Philosophy, Aug/Sept 2012

This paper is a summary and examination of Nagel's 1961 chapters on biological teleology and Nagel's further arguments in the 1977 Dewey lectures. In the first section, author reviews Nagel's 1961 arguments against teleological explanation being "essential" to biology: (1) the teleological can be given analogues with the mechanical, (2) the teleological used to be the account for most physical processes, which have since been replaced by the mechanical (thus teleology in biology might be only provisional). Nagel's point is that a type of system theory will also do for biological explanation, that that biology doesn't require "a radically distinctive logic of inquiry". (pg506)

In the next section, author skips to Nagel's 1977 discussions of the various shortcomings of newer theories about explanation in biology. One analysis is of Mayr's "program" view, which separates some biological functions into the "teleomatic" and the "teleonomic" (pg507). The teleomatic is "automatic, as is the case for many human habits" and the teleonomic is more in line with the teleological. Author summarizes Nagel's main objections: That just because a process is controlled by a program does not mean it's teleological, and finding a good criterion to distinguish between the supposed two kinds of programs is not possible. The last part of this section includes Nagel's restatement of his theory which is now called the "system-property view", which includes a difficulty with variables that are not "determinantly connected by known laws of nature" (pg508).

Section III examines the second half of chapter 12 in Nagel's The Structure of Science. In it, Nagel responds to the arguments offered by biologists resisting reduction of biology to physics. Nagel concludes that though this is not possible (yet), there must remain this possibility (pg509). The next section author shows Nagel's discussion of functional explanations and focuses on Nagel's criticisms of functional explanations that may smuggle in teleology, such as: "blood contains leucocytes for the sake of defending the body against invading bacteria." (pg510). Nagel deals with Hempel's analysis of the possibility of multiple causes (pg511) and also a view Nagel is sympathetic to in Michael Ruse's "welfare" view. Nagel's views are summarized on the bottom of pg512. The final section of the paper is author's comments on biological explanation with particular extended discussion on how solving the problem of consciousness will lead to ever more intermixing of physics, chemistry, and biology. 



4/5/13

Adams, Robert Merrihew - Involuntary Sins

04/05/2013

The Philosophical Review, Vol 44, No 1 (Jan 1985)

Author has a thesis that there can be moral wrongdoing that is non-voluntary. The paradigm example is of improper or disproportionate anger, that doesn't manifest itself in voluntary action. Just the mental state itself is morally culpable or wrong.
Author first addresses the alternatives to the theory that there are "involuntary sins". The first alternative is that involuntary acts like disproportionate anger is only wrong due to tending to be displayed in voluntary actions (pg 4-6). If this were possible then the counter-example of (involuntary) self-righteousness would not be morally offensive because the voluntary actions stemming from those motivations are all exemplary. It is instead the attitude or motivation that is offensive, and author argues that such an attitude for self-righteousness is non-voluntary (pg6).

The second alternative understands mental states to be blameworthy, but re-interprets all such states to be voluntary (pg6-11). For author, this argument may possibly work if one equates operations of the will to be the same as "voluntary", but really what author is getting at is activity under the subject's control-- a subset of the will but one author finds no "simple matter" to explain (pg6-7). Author undertakes this explanation (pg 8-9) and the analysis contains as its key a "trying" or meaning to do something; in other words: you can't try to do something you don't have any control over. Of course this analysis largely excludes desires and emotions since such are commonly understood as reactive and not apt to be tried to be had (pg9-10). After this understanding, author talks about the virtues of having a soul to be ordered like the American system of government: with checks, balances, and different parts working independently but all for the benefit of the same entity.

The third alternative is that we can be blameworthy for mental states only due to the indirect control we have over them: through "self-culture" (pg11-14). Author uses an example of unconscious ingratitude toward a benefactress as being blameworthy despite no indirect control or even consciousness over the attitude (pg12-13).

Author next tries to clarify the affirmative position: it does not preclude moral approbation for striving to have the right attitudes, but it does go further to find it morally wrong to have the wrong ones-- even when they are out of a subject's control (pg14-15). Interestingly, author talks about taking responsibility for having a bad attitude, as a kind of ownership-taking, not essentially tied to voluntary action (pg15-16). The next section explores the nature of "cognitive sins": it doesn't matter if you're conscious of having them, or that you may be ignorant of your propensity or having of them (pg17-18). Author takes some time to combat Donagan's claims about negligence around moral beliefs and attitudes (pg19-20).

Author tries to confront what seems like a reasonable account from Blum, which argues that while attitudes can be morally bad/good, involuntary ones aren't blameworthy but do underwrite being thought of "poorly". In other words, the ingrate isn't blameworthy but considered poorly. (pg21- ) Author believes that the theory can accommodate some of this intuition by varying the kinds of appropriate responses to involuntary sins: they aren't punishable as voluntary ones are (pg21), but instead subject to reproach, which is a form of blaming (pg22).

Another objection comes from a kind of slippery slope argument, that asserts that if humans can be blameworthy for non-voluntary factors, why can't we also be blameworthy for things that don't seem moral: like not being athletic or musical. Author suggests that a cognition of moral relevance will partly do the work, and also proposes some general guidelines: (1) these are states of mind (2) directed at intentional object(s) (3) that have their causes within a rich-enough psychology to appreciate moral relevance, (4) and have alternatives that can be grasped by the intellect. (pg25-7). What is also part of this theory is that it is not wrong to desire something that is not inherently bad-- in other words bad only if acted upon, or due to bad consequences (pg27-8). Next, author tries to clarify his theory with determinism; the theory would fit with both compatibilism or incompatibilism with some sort of agent or "substance" causation.