02/22/2013
The Forum, Living Philosophies VII, March 1930
This article was written as a summary of Dewey's outlook and perspective, not necessarily the development of a particular argument. Author starts by discussing the change in connotation that the concept of "faith" has taken on, from an acceptance of a definite body of beliefs-- a creed-- to a "tendency toward action". This is reflective, author argues, of the change in the culture from the search for unchangeable, immutable substance to an acceptance of change and context-dependent values. This was started with the scientific method and was outwardly manifested with the industrial revolution. Author's pitch is to use the broad term "experience" as the basis for a new set of human values. Interesting: "Search for a single, inclusive good is doomed to failure. Such happiness as life is capable comes from the full participation of all our powers in the endeavor to wrest from each changing situation of experience its own full and unique meaning." (pg179).
Author does not believe that this change in perspective will be a death-knell for religion. Instead, religion will adapt and form onto this new way of approaching values and still be a source of meaning. The main problem, as author sees it, is that religion has become "so respectable", that is, largely ensconced in the social construction. Author takes some time to decry the current system of economic organization, from wage-slavery to the unhealthy distribution of wealth, and further talks about how cynicism or modernity has imperiled the possibility of a systematic philosophy.
2/8/13
Dewey, John - Philosophies of Freedom
02/08/2013
On Experience, Nature, and Freedom: Representative Selections, Richard Bernstein, ed. Bobbs-Merrill, 1960
This article was originally published in 1928 and uses as its starting point a "recent book on sovereignty" as a springboard for an investigation into the concept of freedom and choice. Author first makes the point from the book, that political ideas (like "freedom" or "sovereignty") are not necessarily "true" but expedient or serve a utility in a social context (pg262). From here author explores a rough, abstract recounting of the association between the concepts of choice and freedom, claiming that freedom is used to underwrite choice so that norms of behavior can be enforced using punishment and liability (pg262-3). To provide the link between punishment and choice, or more broadly just deserts and choice, author argues there was the development of freedom of the will, or the concept that humans had the power to make indifferent choice; the morally wrong one being blameworthy due to the right one being available to the will. Author finds these acrobatics still not up to the challenge of justifying liability, since the punishment is meted to the concrete individual, when it is the will that is supposed to be punished (pg264).
Author instead looks at responsibility as a forward-looking enforcement, meaning that the concept should be employed to influence future behavior, not to punish past. But then without the doctrine of free will, how is the concept of choice to be understood? Author takes that up next, first starting at a very basic level, discriminating between random and selective behavior. Selective behavior, even in inorganic matter, is "evidence of at least a rudimentary individuality or uniqueness in things" (pg265). The starting point is that selective behavior is an expression of the nature a thing. The next step involves the psychology of humans, and author claims that humans have a greater sensitivity to varied and opposing experiences; humans collect them into complexes of experience, which contributes to responses to situations by varying them and not making them deterministic or mechanical (pg266). The point here is that because humans witness and collect and experience varied responses to situations, there is no one determined behavior for any particular set of circumstances. With the variation of experience, author asserts that human choice is the individual's formation of a new preference from competing and varied ones (pg266-7).
Author takes a break from this discussion to go through the political concept of freedom as being free from external constraints (pg267-8) and ties it to the classic Lockean Liberal economic concept of property and freedom of constraint over types of industry. These economic notions invaded the psychological realm with the philosophy of "self-expression", author argues. Despite one's self-expression conceivably at odds with another's, author argues there is a pernicious link between human's instincts and impulses (self-expression) and naturalness or "native" originality (pg269). Author's conclusion here: classical Liberalism is flawed if it was to suppose that individuals simply needed to be set free from external constraints in order to solve political and economic problems (pg270), while it also simultaneously provided important emancipating work. The work of emancipation, however, was also flawed in that it freed up the economic interests of some emerging classes (merchants, industrialists) at the expense of failing to free individuals across classes (pg271). This failure is traceable to the idea that individuals have powers and rights that simply need to be "freed" in order to be exercised properly, without regard to prior economic conditions, education levels, or other forms of capital. The response, then, to a call for political freedom and for individual freedom of choice, is in "positive and constructive changes in social arrangements" (pg272).
Author then examines the conception of freedom as it relates to power in action, and uses Spinoza as a lens. In Spinoza, author interprets a certain powerlessness in action, but a power to bend one's actions into conformity with the whole, which humans can understand through the intellect (pg273-4). This seed germinated in Hegel, whom author explores next (pg274-5). The point is to unpack a different notion of freedom: power in action, in accordance with law or "manifestation".
The resolution between the two conceptions, freedom from external constraint to make choices or freedom as having power behind one's actions, is what author gives next (pg275-6): an intelligent choice that manifests individuality enlarges the range of action from an individual, increasing her power. Even if a plan of action is thwarted by external events, author holds that the subject who performs the action gains power and freedom. If one does not believe this, author enlists the help of the "moralists" who claim that freedom and personal power can always be exercised in the realm of the moral, no matter what external circumstances do (pg278). Author uses an example of a child who could have her preferences all attended to, or inhibited. Neither is the way to develop personal freedom (pg278-80).
Author assesses this formula against Kant, who found a particular problem with freedom because his belief that all behavior is causally determined. Author finds this a misguided problem too focused on antecedents rather than consequences (pg281-2). In other words, if intelligent choice is the product of causal forces, who cares? Author also looks at what kind of information science gives about causation and claims it gives how things relate to each other, not how they are, intrinsically (pg283). The individuality of things in themselves is open to house choice (pg284), apart from "scientific law". Author ends with a thorough take-down of classical Liberalism.
On Experience, Nature, and Freedom: Representative Selections, Richard Bernstein, ed. Bobbs-Merrill, 1960
This article was originally published in 1928 and uses as its starting point a "recent book on sovereignty" as a springboard for an investigation into the concept of freedom and choice. Author first makes the point from the book, that political ideas (like "freedom" or "sovereignty") are not necessarily "true" but expedient or serve a utility in a social context (pg262). From here author explores a rough, abstract recounting of the association between the concepts of choice and freedom, claiming that freedom is used to underwrite choice so that norms of behavior can be enforced using punishment and liability (pg262-3). To provide the link between punishment and choice, or more broadly just deserts and choice, author argues there was the development of freedom of the will, or the concept that humans had the power to make indifferent choice; the morally wrong one being blameworthy due to the right one being available to the will. Author finds these acrobatics still not up to the challenge of justifying liability, since the punishment is meted to the concrete individual, when it is the will that is supposed to be punished (pg264).
Author instead looks at responsibility as a forward-looking enforcement, meaning that the concept should be employed to influence future behavior, not to punish past. But then without the doctrine of free will, how is the concept of choice to be understood? Author takes that up next, first starting at a very basic level, discriminating between random and selective behavior. Selective behavior, even in inorganic matter, is "evidence of at least a rudimentary individuality or uniqueness in things" (pg265). The starting point is that selective behavior is an expression of the nature a thing. The next step involves the psychology of humans, and author claims that humans have a greater sensitivity to varied and opposing experiences; humans collect them into complexes of experience, which contributes to responses to situations by varying them and not making them deterministic or mechanical (pg266). The point here is that because humans witness and collect and experience varied responses to situations, there is no one determined behavior for any particular set of circumstances. With the variation of experience, author asserts that human choice is the individual's formation of a new preference from competing and varied ones (pg266-7).
Author takes a break from this discussion to go through the political concept of freedom as being free from external constraints (pg267-8) and ties it to the classic Lockean Liberal economic concept of property and freedom of constraint over types of industry. These economic notions invaded the psychological realm with the philosophy of "self-expression", author argues. Despite one's self-expression conceivably at odds with another's, author argues there is a pernicious link between human's instincts and impulses (self-expression) and naturalness or "native" originality (pg269). Author's conclusion here: classical Liberalism is flawed if it was to suppose that individuals simply needed to be set free from external constraints in order to solve political and economic problems (pg270), while it also simultaneously provided important emancipating work. The work of emancipation, however, was also flawed in that it freed up the economic interests of some emerging classes (merchants, industrialists) at the expense of failing to free individuals across classes (pg271). This failure is traceable to the idea that individuals have powers and rights that simply need to be "freed" in order to be exercised properly, without regard to prior economic conditions, education levels, or other forms of capital. The response, then, to a call for political freedom and for individual freedom of choice, is in "positive and constructive changes in social arrangements" (pg272).
Author then examines the conception of freedom as it relates to power in action, and uses Spinoza as a lens. In Spinoza, author interprets a certain powerlessness in action, but a power to bend one's actions into conformity with the whole, which humans can understand through the intellect (pg273-4). This seed germinated in Hegel, whom author explores next (pg274-5). The point is to unpack a different notion of freedom: power in action, in accordance with law or "manifestation".
The resolution between the two conceptions, freedom from external constraint to make choices or freedom as having power behind one's actions, is what author gives next (pg275-6): an intelligent choice that manifests individuality enlarges the range of action from an individual, increasing her power. Even if a plan of action is thwarted by external events, author holds that the subject who performs the action gains power and freedom. If one does not believe this, author enlists the help of the "moralists" who claim that freedom and personal power can always be exercised in the realm of the moral, no matter what external circumstances do (pg278). Author uses an example of a child who could have her preferences all attended to, or inhibited. Neither is the way to develop personal freedom (pg278-80).
Author assesses this formula against Kant, who found a particular problem with freedom because his belief that all behavior is causally determined. Author finds this a misguided problem too focused on antecedents rather than consequences (pg281-2). In other words, if intelligent choice is the product of causal forces, who cares? Author also looks at what kind of information science gives about causation and claims it gives how things relate to each other, not how they are, intrinsically (pg283). The individuality of things in themselves is open to house choice (pg284), apart from "scientific law". Author ends with a thorough take-down of classical Liberalism.
2/1/13
Smith, John - The Reconception of Experience in Peirce, James and Dewey
02/01/2013
America's Philosophical Vision, Ch 1, University of Chicago, 1992
This is a paper given as an address at a conference and is basically a summary of the three conceptions of the concept of experience given by Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The goal is to show their reactions to and departures from the British Empiricist tradition and Kant. Author first gives a summary (or caricature) of traditional empiricism (pg18-19) and then a congealed response from the Pragmatists (pg19-20).
Author reviews and condenses the views on "experience" starting with Peirce (pg20-25), then James (pg25-29), and then Dewey (pg29-34). Generally, the main contentions against British Empiricists are as follows: "experience" isn't a passive exercise but an active process between the self and the world, perhaps even eliminating the subject/object distinction, and: "experience" is best conceptualized not as atomistic bits to be used as a foundation for knowledge but instead as a rich mix of the sensory and the rational.
America's Philosophical Vision, Ch 1, University of Chicago, 1992
This is a paper given as an address at a conference and is basically a summary of the three conceptions of the concept of experience given by Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The goal is to show their reactions to and departures from the British Empiricist tradition and Kant. Author first gives a summary (or caricature) of traditional empiricism (pg18-19) and then a congealed response from the Pragmatists (pg19-20).
Author reviews and condenses the views on "experience" starting with Peirce (pg20-25), then James (pg25-29), and then Dewey (pg29-34). Generally, the main contentions against British Empiricists are as follows: "experience" isn't a passive exercise but an active process between the self and the world, perhaps even eliminating the subject/object distinction, and: "experience" is best conceptualized not as atomistic bits to be used as a foundation for knowledge but instead as a rich mix of the sensory and the rational.
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