11/16/2012
Journal of Philosophy, June-July 2011
This final lecture gets to the epistemic warrant for self-understanding, for the privileged access to apperceptively rationally accessible points of view. An epistemic warrant is an objectively good route to truth, implying "veridicality in normal conditions" (pg339). More importantly, such a warrant must also show why such routes are prone to truth. Here a warrant is a reliable procedure to truth but can be subject to "brute error", which is an error due to accidental or non-normal conditions. However, with the warrants for self-understanding, author claims some cases are immune to brute error (pg340). The strategy is that some self-understanding is immune to brute error, but these psychological states are not essentially immune. There are some that are immune, however, and these are the ones that ground self-applicability of norms (pg341). "Immunity of the self-understanding to brute error is constitutive to having an apperceptive core self." (pg341) This is a key argument by the author: that self-understanding that is prone to error cannot give the "buck-stopping status" to the attitudes to which norms are applied (by the individual) (pg341-2). Author capitalizes "Self-Understanding" to signal when the discussion is about this kind of self-understanding that is immune to brute error for the constitutive self-application of moral and rational norms.
Section II serves to flesh out some of author's claims about immunity from brute error: it doesn't apply generally, it is not tied to any subject matter, there are other errors that could be involved, thoughts aren't self-intimating or infallibly known. Author even states that there is no necessary connection between having representational states (even propositional attitudes) and an individual knowing what those states or attitudes are (pg345). Section II also divides author's views from some notable rivals or other thinkers. Author also takes some time to argue against Peacock's view that "the subject matters of self-knowledge constitute reasons for the knowledge" (pg345-6). Another claim author disputes is that self-knowledge is structurally like being aware of one's own physical actions: like knowing that you're raising your arm (pg346-7). Author's response: while agents do act, there is a lot of self-knowledge that isn't related to actions.
Section III moves forward with author's argument, first distinguishing between warrants that are based on reasons (justifications) and those not so (entitlements): warrants for Self-Knowledge are based on the latter. The warrants about the attitudes that constitute Self-Understanding are, according to author, immune to brute error (Wibe). Author goes through three ways in which a token propositional attitude could be in error even if it is of the kind that is Wibe. (pg348)
1: the attitude is warranted in some other way (not Wibe)
2: the attitude was formed in a way where Wibe does not apply (through a different route)
3: some pathology might influence the attitude that is normally Wibe
Much of author's discussion then turns to three other kinds of entitled warrants that are psychological and de re about propositional attitudes and are immune to brute error, like deductive reasoning's logical "transitions" (pg349-352). Then in Section IV expounds on the 4 features that "ground immunity" for these cases:
1: the competencies rest on "propositional understanding" (understanding what a proposition is about)
2: having a point of view requires Wibe
3: it all ties together within itself [what?]
4: there is no other place from which veridical Self-Understanding might come from
Author ties this together with a principle on warrant (pg353) and goes on to discuss the three other kinds in light of these new features. Author then contrasts these warrants with those that are subject to brute error, namely perceptual beliefs (pg356-9).
Turning back to Self-Understanding, author wants to take much of the lessons learned about other Wibe cases and apply them. Author takes a basic meta-representational attitude like: "I believe that X" and investigates it's structure. It involves three different understandings: indication understanding, betokening understanding, and attribution understanding (pg360). Author narrows in on Self-Understanding about propositional states; author believes that the betokening understanding (which is self-predication of a particular propositional attitude, e.g. "believe"-pg360&364) is immune to brute error when it is warranted. (pg361)
Author believes that purely preservative memory is 'at the heart' of warranted Self-Understanding that is immune to brute error, thus takes some time discussing it (pg362-5). Purely preservative memory is given powers to preserve de re, and also to preserve the attitude mode (belief, disbelief, wonder if, etc.) under which the representation was acquired (pg362). Author discusses the form of the "cogito" cases ("I am currently thinking about X"), and compares them to "impure" cogito cases: "I believe that X is the case". (pg363) The individual may have a meta-representational belief that she is doing a psychological computation (believing), but she may be mistaken that she is actually doing that believing. These cases are both warranted and immune to brute error, though the second could still be in error due to a 'pathology'. Author concludes Section 5 by claiming that using preservative memory (and preservative memory being as it is) is constitutive to being a self (pg365).
The next discussion is about warrant to the betokening understanding. It seems author is intent on resting epistemic warrant that is Wibe on the reliability of purely preservative memory (PPM) (pg365-7). Author then elaborates the claim and defends it. Author claims first that purely preservative memory is "naturally reliable" (pg367) and is a condition of a "functioning representational psychology". Author claims that when PPM fails it is due to malfunctioning; thus maintains simultaneously that relying on its proper functioning creates a warrant that is immune to brute error. Author acknowledges some constructive features of memory (pg368) and seeks to separate episodic memory and PPM, but still wants to preserve immunity from brute error for even episodic memory (pg368-370).
Author talks further about PPM by clarifying that it does not represent either mode type (belief, thought, etc) or the representational content it preserves (pg370). Thus, it takes a betokening understanding to access this content and also to represent it. It is this representation that is immune to brute error (in some cases) (pg371). The key point author seeks to defend is that betokening understanding of a PPM will correctly pick up on the attitude mode (believe, think, wonder) that is supposedly stored there (pg372). Author introduces a norm of critical reason that involves preservation of reasonable beliefs: if an individual judges a psychological state as reasonable, the individual has reason to preserve that state. This norm, if it could not be applied reliably (that is, if it were subject to the proviso: 'though I may not reliably be able to do so') would undermine the "buck-stopping status" of lower-level psychological states and would undermine the critical reason of selves (pg372-3). Author takes stock of the state of the argument on page 375.
In Section 7, author tries to argue that reason-supporting claims can also be immune to brute error (e.g. X is reason for Y) (pg376-8). In Section 8, author discusses perceptions and sensations as they are betokened in the Self-Understanding. Finally, author summarizes author's claims and responds to some brief counter-examples.
11/9/12
Burge, Tyler - Self and Self-Understanding II: Self and Constitutive Norms
11/09/2012
The Journal of Philosophy, June-July 2011
In this paper author talks about norms, specifically norms of critical reason and those of morality or intentional action. The idea here, as with the previous lecture, is to show how capacities of an individual can be constitutive to creating a self and having self-understanding. For author, self-understanding is constitutive to having a self. In this paper, author focuses on the meta-psychological ability to evaluate psychological states and apply norms of critical reason and morality to them.
Author starts by defining a "norm", which is "teleological", a "standard that governs good or optimal ways of fulfilling some function" (pg316). Norms can be followed without consciousness, or even understanding, even some rational ones like inferences using propositions. Author goes further to define moral norms and norms of critical reason, and then argues that an understanding of 'having reasons' and 'moral wrongness' are constitutive to being a self (pg318). The argument is roughly:
-an individual must be able to instantiate in her psychology objects to which the norms of critical reason and morality apply
-for an individual to apply these norms, she must first (1) understand that she has relevant propositional attitudes in her psychology and (2) understand the norms themselves. (pg318-9)
-the individual must have a meta-psychological ability to apply norms to her own psychological states
-that ability requires self-understanding (pg320)
Author talks about what it means to understand a moral norm: it means the individual can evaluate "psychological motivations", since moral norms are essentially about those (pg319-320). For author, this involves an understanding of oneself "from the inside" (pg321), having proprietary "point of view" access to psychological attitudes that isn't inferential from action or behavior (pg325).
In section II author examines the application of moral norms and critical reason. Author looks into the psychological roots for understanding moral norms: motivation, intention, negligence, should-have-known-better, etc (pg321-323). Critical reason applications come next, and it is here where author divides the individual's psychology into rationally accessible and inaccessible: the areas of the unconscious, self-deception, beliefs hidden by emotion, etc. These are not subject to the application of critical reason in the individual with the same propriety; they "have a fundamentally different status" (pg323-325).
Section III discusses a baseline concept of the "rationally accessible point of view", and adds "apperceptive" to the front of it to indicate that this is first-personal access to psychological states of an individual. The "rationally accessible" excludes the Freudian unconscious, self-deception, and other states that need "extensive priming" to be recognized; in general it is all memory, representational states, psychological events, and conscious sensations, feelings, and beliefs (pg326). The contents of this point of view have a "privileged status" when it comes to applying moral and rational norms: it is here where the individual does so (pg327). This status is the "buck-stopping status" that author uses as a term: it is the end of where an individual applies norms of moral responsibility and rationality (pg327). [This is not to say that once an individual abides by all norms in this point of view that she is perfectly rational or good, but just that's where her evaluations end.] From this privileged point of view is where inferences begin, since the apperceptive rationally accessible point of view is an "immediate, non-inductively accessible" baseline (pg327).
The place where you apply norms is to the psychological antecedents of action, and author argues that accountability to norms depends on having a self-understanding of one's own psychology in a "from the inside" way (pg328-9).
Section IV is a discussion of how self-understanding in the ability to apply norms is constitutive of selves, and in particular relating (again) to memory. This time author turns to diachronic understanding of motivations and the individual's own psychology: a meta-psychological influence. The argument runs roughly as follows:
-selves must be able to make inferences about the contents of propositions (pg330-1)
-selves must be able to apply rational standards (minimally) to the contents of propositions. In effect, this means having privileged access to the contents of their psychology so that beliefs or attitudes can be evaluated and shed (pg331)
-making inferences means an individual must have the capacity to remember (autobiographically, not just storing propositions) (pg332-4)
Section V is a very useful summary of author's position thus far.
The Journal of Philosophy, June-July 2011
In this paper author talks about norms, specifically norms of critical reason and those of morality or intentional action. The idea here, as with the previous lecture, is to show how capacities of an individual can be constitutive to creating a self and having self-understanding. For author, self-understanding is constitutive to having a self. In this paper, author focuses on the meta-psychological ability to evaluate psychological states and apply norms of critical reason and morality to them.
Author starts by defining a "norm", which is "teleological", a "standard that governs good or optimal ways of fulfilling some function" (pg316). Norms can be followed without consciousness, or even understanding, even some rational ones like inferences using propositions. Author goes further to define moral norms and norms of critical reason, and then argues that an understanding of 'having reasons' and 'moral wrongness' are constitutive to being a self (pg318). The argument is roughly:
-an individual must be able to instantiate in her psychology objects to which the norms of critical reason and morality apply
-for an individual to apply these norms, she must first (1) understand that she has relevant propositional attitudes in her psychology and (2) understand the norms themselves. (pg318-9)
-the individual must have a meta-psychological ability to apply norms to her own psychological states
-that ability requires self-understanding (pg320)
Author talks about what it means to understand a moral norm: it means the individual can evaluate "psychological motivations", since moral norms are essentially about those (pg319-320). For author, this involves an understanding of oneself "from the inside" (pg321), having proprietary "point of view" access to psychological attitudes that isn't inferential from action or behavior (pg325).
In section II author examines the application of moral norms and critical reason. Author looks into the psychological roots for understanding moral norms: motivation, intention, negligence, should-have-known-better, etc (pg321-323). Critical reason applications come next, and it is here where author divides the individual's psychology into rationally accessible and inaccessible: the areas of the unconscious, self-deception, beliefs hidden by emotion, etc. These are not subject to the application of critical reason in the individual with the same propriety; they "have a fundamentally different status" (pg323-325).
Section III discusses a baseline concept of the "rationally accessible point of view", and adds "apperceptive" to the front of it to indicate that this is first-personal access to psychological states of an individual. The "rationally accessible" excludes the Freudian unconscious, self-deception, and other states that need "extensive priming" to be recognized; in general it is all memory, representational states, psychological events, and conscious sensations, feelings, and beliefs (pg326). The contents of this point of view have a "privileged status" when it comes to applying moral and rational norms: it is here where the individual does so (pg327). This status is the "buck-stopping status" that author uses as a term: it is the end of where an individual applies norms of moral responsibility and rationality (pg327). [This is not to say that once an individual abides by all norms in this point of view that she is perfectly rational or good, but just that's where her evaluations end.] From this privileged point of view is where inferences begin, since the apperceptive rationally accessible point of view is an "immediate, non-inductively accessible" baseline (pg327).
The place where you apply norms is to the psychological antecedents of action, and author argues that accountability to norms depends on having a self-understanding of one's own psychology in a "from the inside" way (pg328-9).
Section IV is a discussion of how self-understanding in the ability to apply norms is constitutive of selves, and in particular relating (again) to memory. This time author turns to diachronic understanding of motivations and the individual's own psychology: a meta-psychological influence. The argument runs roughly as follows:
-selves must be able to make inferences about the contents of propositions (pg330-1)
-selves must be able to apply rational standards (minimally) to the contents of propositions. In effect, this means having privileged access to the contents of their psychology so that beliefs or attitudes can be evaluated and shed (pg331)
-making inferences means an individual must have the capacity to remember (autobiographically, not just storing propositions) (pg332-4)
Section V is a very useful summary of author's position thus far.
11/2/12
Burge, Tyler - Self & Understanding Lecture I: Some Origins of Self
11/02/2012
The Journal of Philosophy, June/July 2011
This lecture is devoted to understanding the self and its psychological functions. Author begins with some clarifying remarks: the discussion is about the psychology of the self, not its ontology (Strawson is brought up as someone who provides a useful concept but does not manage to prove that the concept "person" can only be physical). Also, author takes care to distinguish between concepts of person-hood, and self-hood, which is more about critical self-reflection. (pg290) Interestingly, author claims that a person has a self if it has it while in its mature state, even before it realizes that state. (pg290) Further, author claims that unconscious elements of psychology only are "constitutively relevant to selves" when they are conscious. (pg291-2) This comes when introducing a technical term: a "point of view": representational states and occurrences that are imputable to the individual (pg292). A self/individual realizes a multi-tiered structure of itself (self-reference) by taking objects within it's point of view as further objects to be represented. (pg292)
In section II author discusses the difference between perception and sensory systems: not all sensory systems are perceptual. Perception involves representation of objects in the world, while other sensory systems might be more or less successful at getting what the living thing needs/wants, but there is no test of veridicality. (pg292-3) For author, the "mark" of the perceptual is "perceptual constancy": that objects perceived retain their features even through shifting contexts. (pg293) Prior to self-representation is another, more primitive form of representation outlined by the term "egocentric index": a spatio-temporal representation that 'indexes' an origin as an individual's point of view; it is "immune to failure" (pg294). There are two functions (constitutive) of an egocentric index: (1) an origin/index for representations and (2) a provider of ego-relevance when it comes to the individuals own goals, needs, and perspective. (pg294-5)
Author moves into talking about developmental ontogeny for self-representation, specifically four capacities:
1. Coupling of visual representations of a body and kinesthetic movements (the mirror test), and attribution of the body as one's own. (pg296-300) Author does not believe this is self-consciousness or self-awareness since no psychological states are involved in the proprioception. Author instead states this is a version of 'double indexing', where the object seen in the mirror is indexed again as the individual's own body (pg298).
2. Copying and imitation capacities.(pg301-30) This is considered more advanced than the mirror test since it requires adjustment to activity the individual cannot control. (pg303) Further, author argues that imitation and joint attention are not psychological understandings of others but instead teleological understandings of them. This is still not yet self-representation or even theory of mind (pg304),
3. Joint Attention (pg303)
4. Memory. Author takes a long tour through a taxonomy of memory. Author is interested first in Long-Term Experiential Episodic memory, a subspecies of Long-Term Experiential memory. Episodic memory must be conscious, and is time-specific to picking out objects as they were at the time (pg306), and revisiting them is like re-living them (pg307). This is different from non-episodic experiential memory, where one has access to the content of a belief based on the past but does not have access to how the particulars were experienced. These kinds of memories locate the remember in the situation (pg308). Episodic and generic long-term memory is considered 'de re' by author (pg305-6), because it must be conscious and noninferential (pg213). Author develops Autobiographical Experiential Memory as a kind of memory "from the inside", which preserves the perspective of the individual within the memory (pg309). The importance of this kind of memory is that it is extended over time in ways that imitation, joint attention, and the mirror test have do not. (pg310)
Author ends this discussion with looking at the Kantian and Lockean conception of selfhood through the lenses of memory author just sketched.
The Journal of Philosophy, June/July 2011
This lecture is devoted to understanding the self and its psychological functions. Author begins with some clarifying remarks: the discussion is about the psychology of the self, not its ontology (Strawson is brought up as someone who provides a useful concept but does not manage to prove that the concept "person" can only be physical). Also, author takes care to distinguish between concepts of person-hood, and self-hood, which is more about critical self-reflection. (pg290) Interestingly, author claims that a person has a self if it has it while in its mature state, even before it realizes that state. (pg290) Further, author claims that unconscious elements of psychology only are "constitutively relevant to selves" when they are conscious. (pg291-2) This comes when introducing a technical term: a "point of view": representational states and occurrences that are imputable to the individual (pg292). A self/individual realizes a multi-tiered structure of itself (self-reference) by taking objects within it's point of view as further objects to be represented. (pg292)
In section II author discusses the difference between perception and sensory systems: not all sensory systems are perceptual. Perception involves representation of objects in the world, while other sensory systems might be more or less successful at getting what the living thing needs/wants, but there is no test of veridicality. (pg292-3) For author, the "mark" of the perceptual is "perceptual constancy": that objects perceived retain their features even through shifting contexts. (pg293) Prior to self-representation is another, more primitive form of representation outlined by the term "egocentric index": a spatio-temporal representation that 'indexes' an origin as an individual's point of view; it is "immune to failure" (pg294). There are two functions (constitutive) of an egocentric index: (1) an origin/index for representations and (2) a provider of ego-relevance when it comes to the individuals own goals, needs, and perspective. (pg294-5)
Author moves into talking about developmental ontogeny for self-representation, specifically four capacities:
1. Coupling of visual representations of a body and kinesthetic movements (the mirror test), and attribution of the body as one's own. (pg296-300) Author does not believe this is self-consciousness or self-awareness since no psychological states are involved in the proprioception. Author instead states this is a version of 'double indexing', where the object seen in the mirror is indexed again as the individual's own body (pg298).
2. Copying and imitation capacities.(pg301-30) This is considered more advanced than the mirror test since it requires adjustment to activity the individual cannot control. (pg303) Further, author argues that imitation and joint attention are not psychological understandings of others but instead teleological understandings of them. This is still not yet self-representation or even theory of mind (pg304),
3. Joint Attention (pg303)
4. Memory. Author takes a long tour through a taxonomy of memory. Author is interested first in Long-Term Experiential Episodic memory, a subspecies of Long-Term Experiential memory. Episodic memory must be conscious, and is time-specific to picking out objects as they were at the time (pg306), and revisiting them is like re-living them (pg307). This is different from non-episodic experiential memory, where one has access to the content of a belief based on the past but does not have access to how the particulars were experienced. These kinds of memories locate the remember in the situation (pg308). Episodic and generic long-term memory is considered 'de re' by author (pg305-6), because it must be conscious and noninferential (pg213). Author develops Autobiographical Experiential Memory as a kind of memory "from the inside", which preserves the perspective of the individual within the memory (pg309). The importance of this kind of memory is that it is extended over time in ways that imitation, joint attention, and the mirror test have do not. (pg310)
Author ends this discussion with looking at the Kantian and Lockean conception of selfhood through the lenses of memory author just sketched.
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