10/26/2012
The Nation, 9/2012
This is a review of Thomas Nagel's newest book "Mind And Cosmos; Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False". According to authors, there are two major arguments that Nagel levels. The first is the false promise that philosophers have about theoretical reductionism, in that all material facts in the sciences can ultimately be reduced to physical facts about the fundamental elements of the universe. The second is that many scientific discoveries are contrary to "common sense" and our natural understandings about ourselves. The authors discuss the first briefly, the second more thoroughly.
To Nagel's first objection to naturalism the authors generally concede the point: no one is working very hard in the sciences to provide reduction; it is unclear if there is much practical benefit to providing such a thing; it is unclear it is fully even possible. Regarding the second of Nagel's 'broadsides', the authors push back: Nagel's understanding is limited; common sense often is in error, even about ourselves. Nagel uses the supposition that there is an objective moral, mathematical, and logical truths to drive a wedge between human mentality/behavior and the 'Neo-Darwinian' conception. Authors represent Nagel as having "simplistic evolutionary reasoning" and focus more on the logical and mathematical truths rather than the supposed moral ones.
Nagel's argument: how would we know it is valid if all our methods of knowing have nothing to do with validity and more to do with evolutionary history?
Authors: Because when we use math, things work validly.
Author's use the analogy of Neurath's Boat, that validity is built as it continues to sustain solutions that work.
The last argument from Nagel that authors consider is one where it seems (currently) impossible for science to explain how consciousness came to be from evolutionary processes. Authors claim that some explanation is possible but to ask for prediction to accompany explanation is asking too much. There need not be predictive capabilities on a one-to-one basis with explanations, authors retort.
10/12/12
Priest, Graham - What is Philosophy?
10/12/2012
The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2006
Author starts the paper by stating that this question is itself a philosophical question, so it is not surprising that there has been disagreement and contention since it was first asked. Author believes that there are two views about the nature of philosophy that have wide acceptance: Wittgenstein's and Derrida's. Author goes through them both en route to author's own view.
Wittgenstein's later view of philosophy is rooted in his view of language, so author takes some time summarizing Wittgenstein's approach to language found in the Philosophical Investigations. The first discussion talks about how Wittgenstein rejected his previous view of language put forth in the Tractatus, and instead offered a rules-based "language game" that is partially arbitrary and justified by use. (pg190-1) Philosophical problems are what happens when terms from the language game are removed from it and tried to be examined out of context: they are meaningless without it and so philosophical problems go from "difficult" to "meaningless". (pg191) One case author uses is the case of free will: in this case the concept of "freedom" is employed, but outside of the normal context that gives the words their accepted usage. Author concludes the summary of Wittgenstein's view that philosophy is best re-characterized as a practice to un-metaphysicalize words and concepts (pg192).
For author, Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is a "disappointing one" (pg193). Author argues that even if Wittgenstein's view of language as put forth in the Investigations is correct, it does not follow from that view that philosophy is best employed as Wittgenstein sketches. The fundamental premise that author takes to be false is that: philosophical problems only arise when a "notion is pulled out of its linguistic home-game" (pg193). Author gives examples like ethical dilemmas and discussions as to the nature of time. More fundamentally, author objects to equating the meaning of terms within a language game with their truth: the truth they are trying to get at is a further matter (pg194).
Author now discusses Derrida's view of philosophy: beginning with his view of language. For Derrida, there is no determinate meaning for language since all searches for meaning end up with more language (pg195-6). The problem: clearly language is meaningful somehow: how? For Derrida, words get their meaning from contrasts with other words ("red" contrasted with "green"), but also by using references to other words from other contexts, a kind of promissory note or deference that Derrida called "differance" (pg196). One upshot of this theory is that no text has a determinate meaning.
Since it is unknown how Derrida believed his theories of deconstruction applied to philosophy, author instead looks at Rorty, who claims that his understanding of philosophy is from Derrida (pg197). When philosophers try to "get it right" about a determinate truth of ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, they are conducting a fools errand since if language has no determinate meaning, then how does one find its determinate truth? With Rorty channeling Derrida, philosophy is just another kind of writing. Just as author did with Wittgenstein, author grants that Derrida's views on language are correct. The first point against Rorty/Derrida's view of philosophy starts as follows: this doesn't just apply to philosophy. All linguistic enterprise finds no determinate truth, including science and mathematics. And yet there are standards within each discipline that lead to better and worse outcomes ("disagree at the risk of life and limb." pg199). Once philosophy is put into this category, "things are not so bad" (pg199). The second point is that just because language has no determinate truth doesn't mean there isn't a determinate truth: some enterprises seek that truth (and fail) and others don't even try (e.g. fictive writing). Indeed if the very enterprises that Derrida and Rorty use are not supposed to be truth-seeking, they are just fictions to be ignored or they are self-refuting (pg199-200).
Author claims that both Wittgenstein's and Derrida/Rorty's approaches are both self-refuting (giving a philosophical account of philosophy that denies that philosophy can give accounts) and are also dependent on a substantive theory of meaning. Instead, author puts forth the theory that philosophy is: critical, assumption-challenging, where "anything" can be scrutinized, subversive, unsettling, and universally applicable (pg201-3). On the positive side, philosophy is also constructive and creative with new theories and conceptions, author spends time arguing this is a corollary of the critical nature of philosophy (pg204-6).
The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2006
Author starts the paper by stating that this question is itself a philosophical question, so it is not surprising that there has been disagreement and contention since it was first asked. Author believes that there are two views about the nature of philosophy that have wide acceptance: Wittgenstein's and Derrida's. Author goes through them both en route to author's own view.
Wittgenstein's later view of philosophy is rooted in his view of language, so author takes some time summarizing Wittgenstein's approach to language found in the Philosophical Investigations. The first discussion talks about how Wittgenstein rejected his previous view of language put forth in the Tractatus, and instead offered a rules-based "language game" that is partially arbitrary and justified by use. (pg190-1) Philosophical problems are what happens when terms from the language game are removed from it and tried to be examined out of context: they are meaningless without it and so philosophical problems go from "difficult" to "meaningless". (pg191) One case author uses is the case of free will: in this case the concept of "freedom" is employed, but outside of the normal context that gives the words their accepted usage. Author concludes the summary of Wittgenstein's view that philosophy is best re-characterized as a practice to un-metaphysicalize words and concepts (pg192).
For author, Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is a "disappointing one" (pg193). Author argues that even if Wittgenstein's view of language as put forth in the Investigations is correct, it does not follow from that view that philosophy is best employed as Wittgenstein sketches. The fundamental premise that author takes to be false is that: philosophical problems only arise when a "notion is pulled out of its linguistic home-game" (pg193). Author gives examples like ethical dilemmas and discussions as to the nature of time. More fundamentally, author objects to equating the meaning of terms within a language game with their truth: the truth they are trying to get at is a further matter (pg194).
Author now discusses Derrida's view of philosophy: beginning with his view of language. For Derrida, there is no determinate meaning for language since all searches for meaning end up with more language (pg195-6). The problem: clearly language is meaningful somehow: how? For Derrida, words get their meaning from contrasts with other words ("red" contrasted with "green"), but also by using references to other words from other contexts, a kind of promissory note or deference that Derrida called "differance" (pg196). One upshot of this theory is that no text has a determinate meaning.
Since it is unknown how Derrida believed his theories of deconstruction applied to philosophy, author instead looks at Rorty, who claims that his understanding of philosophy is from Derrida (pg197). When philosophers try to "get it right" about a determinate truth of ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, they are conducting a fools errand since if language has no determinate meaning, then how does one find its determinate truth? With Rorty channeling Derrida, philosophy is just another kind of writing. Just as author did with Wittgenstein, author grants that Derrida's views on language are correct. The first point against Rorty/Derrida's view of philosophy starts as follows: this doesn't just apply to philosophy. All linguistic enterprise finds no determinate truth, including science and mathematics. And yet there are standards within each discipline that lead to better and worse outcomes ("disagree at the risk of life and limb." pg199). Once philosophy is put into this category, "things are not so bad" (pg199). The second point is that just because language has no determinate truth doesn't mean there isn't a determinate truth: some enterprises seek that truth (and fail) and others don't even try (e.g. fictive writing). Indeed if the very enterprises that Derrida and Rorty use are not supposed to be truth-seeking, they are just fictions to be ignored or they are self-refuting (pg199-200).
Author claims that both Wittgenstein's and Derrida/Rorty's approaches are both self-refuting (giving a philosophical account of philosophy that denies that philosophy can give accounts) and are also dependent on a substantive theory of meaning. Instead, author puts forth the theory that philosophy is: critical, assumption-challenging, where "anything" can be scrutinized, subversive, unsettling, and universally applicable (pg201-3). On the positive side, philosophy is also constructive and creative with new theories and conceptions, author spends time arguing this is a corollary of the critical nature of philosophy (pg204-6).
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