02/28/2012
Author begins by considering the supposed distinction between Analytic and Continental philosophy, and points out that there is little of substance between them and that from the perspective from the philosophy of the East (Asia) it is just bickering within a family. Author admits that much of what follows is broad and misses details and distinctions, but assumes that the broad strokes author presents are true in some 'gross terms'.
Author believes the divide between Analytic and Continental in the 20th century had 3 phases: constructive, destructive, and fragmentation. The rebellion against German Idealism was led by Frege and Husserl, both concerned with representation in language and thought. Frege developed logic and semantic theories about sense, reference, objects, concepts. Husserl developed phenomenology and how consciousness 'presents itself'. The tools 'took on a life of their own' and the first half of the 20th century was filled with optimism about solving old problems with the new tools. Wittgenstein and Russell, then the logical positivists on the Analytic side, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the Continental. Then the destructive phase, Kuhn (Analytic) and Foucault (Continental) and the 'specter of relativism' from without, and the internal attacks from Quine, Derrida. Author states that the novel techniques that launched the constructive phase ended up 'collapsing under their own weight'. What followed was a variety of influential philosophers, each with separate goals and arguments: a fragmentation. The core of both traditions, states author, is a concern for representation and that in the fragmentation there are many more commonalities to be appreciated.
Author moves on to consider "Asian Philosophy" and discounts it as a coherent thing; there are at least two distinct traditions: from India and from China. This is different from Western Philosophy, which author states solely originates from ancient Greece. There are three barriers to westerners studying Eastern Philosophy: language, style, and culture. Author discusses first Indian, the Chinese philosophical history. Author focuses on Buddhism cross-pollinating with T(D)aoism to create Chan/Zen Buddhism, and briefly discusses the distinctions between Indian and Chinese Buddhism.
Author argues that from the Eastern perspective, the Analytic/Continental divide looks like an 'in-house debate', while the different origins, languages, and styles of Indian/Chinese philosophy are 'definitely very different'. Author concludes with a prediction that Asia will rise as the dominant political force of the world and that philosophy will migrate its center of gravity from the US to Asia, and perhaps create a global philosophical culture which will make the Analytic/Continental divide irrelevant.
9/28/12
9/21/12
Putnam, Hilary - A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy
09/21/2012
Renewing Philosophy, ch 9, Harvard University Press 1992
Author claims that Dewey's justification of democracy as a "form of social life" is epistemological, in contrast with Bernard Williams' discussion of ethical justifications as a "medical metaphor" and focused solely on the individual. For Williams, the justification for enforcing ethical rules, prototypically around flourishing, is that there is something objectively wrong with the individual who isn't flourishing: that individual is "ill" (pg180-2). Ethics would then be moved into some branch of human psychology, one that we have yet to fully flesh out (if at all). One chief problem author raises is that Williams' conception is 'radically individualistic' (pg182), and Dewey's is for a society in general. The problem is that the medical metaphor does not translate or anologize well into a societal picture.
Author goes on to talk about the problems in modern western society with critiquing other cultures. Besides the cultural relativism argument from anthropologists, there is a persistent idea of the "noble savage", which author tries to unpack as a belief that primitive cultures are superior to modern western ones (pg183-5). The other alternative is the "golden age" myth that points to a spot in history where society was rationally superior but that age is now gone (pg185). Both alternatives want to immunize that culture from suggestions of alternative ways of life, according to author.
The approach Dewey takes is that there are "better and worse resolutions to human predicaments" (pg186), and that this is discoverable through inquiry, hypothesis, experimentation and analysis: an epistemological approach. Author claims this is distinct from, say, Williams, who must have a prior "fact of the matter" established ontologically at which these better or worse resolutions aim. Without that, the resolutions are just "local" truths, not "absolute" ones. (pg187) Dewey believed that philosophy had no specific content for itself other than what was available to common sense and science, thus freedom and information were crucial for resolving problems (pg188). Furthermore, there is no one way to live, thus a democracy is needed to be responsive to further discussion and experimentation (pg189). This does not entail just relying on experts, as Durkheim concluded.
Author argues that Dewey's shortfall is when it comes to moral dilemmas, specifically ones where experimentation and optimizing policies will not work: author gives the example from Sartre's Pierre, who has to decide between joining the resistance (in WWII) or caring for his sick mother (pg190-1). Author talks about William James' Will To Believe essay and how this kind of existential decision can be made "in advance of the evidence". (pg191-2) This line of argumentation for James was criticized since he took belief in God to be an existential choice like Pierre's. Author argues that James falls in line with Wittgenstein that religious belief is a-rational, not irrational or rational. Author gives an extended discussion of the choice of belief in theories even in science (pg192-3), and distinguishes it from religion and other existential choices, whose "rightness" cannot be publicly confirmed (pg194-5). The idea here is that consequential 'estimated utilities' is no way to live a meaningful human life (pg194). Author speculates that Dewey's problem on the individual moral decision has to do with his dualistic conception of human life: the social and the aesthetic (pg196).
The final pages are a conclusion for the entire book, which argues that philosophy is the practice that 'unsettles' prejudices and 'pet convictions' but also changes both our lives and our self-perceptions (pg198-200).
Renewing Philosophy, ch 9, Harvard University Press 1992
Author claims that Dewey's justification of democracy as a "form of social life" is epistemological, in contrast with Bernard Williams' discussion of ethical justifications as a "medical metaphor" and focused solely on the individual. For Williams, the justification for enforcing ethical rules, prototypically around flourishing, is that there is something objectively wrong with the individual who isn't flourishing: that individual is "ill" (pg180-2). Ethics would then be moved into some branch of human psychology, one that we have yet to fully flesh out (if at all). One chief problem author raises is that Williams' conception is 'radically individualistic' (pg182), and Dewey's is for a society in general. The problem is that the medical metaphor does not translate or anologize well into a societal picture.
Author goes on to talk about the problems in modern western society with critiquing other cultures. Besides the cultural relativism argument from anthropologists, there is a persistent idea of the "noble savage", which author tries to unpack as a belief that primitive cultures are superior to modern western ones (pg183-5). The other alternative is the "golden age" myth that points to a spot in history where society was rationally superior but that age is now gone (pg185). Both alternatives want to immunize that culture from suggestions of alternative ways of life, according to author.
The approach Dewey takes is that there are "better and worse resolutions to human predicaments" (pg186), and that this is discoverable through inquiry, hypothesis, experimentation and analysis: an epistemological approach. Author claims this is distinct from, say, Williams, who must have a prior "fact of the matter" established ontologically at which these better or worse resolutions aim. Without that, the resolutions are just "local" truths, not "absolute" ones. (pg187) Dewey believed that philosophy had no specific content for itself other than what was available to common sense and science, thus freedom and information were crucial for resolving problems (pg188). Furthermore, there is no one way to live, thus a democracy is needed to be responsive to further discussion and experimentation (pg189). This does not entail just relying on experts, as Durkheim concluded.
Author argues that Dewey's shortfall is when it comes to moral dilemmas, specifically ones where experimentation and optimizing policies will not work: author gives the example from Sartre's Pierre, who has to decide between joining the resistance (in WWII) or caring for his sick mother (pg190-1). Author talks about William James' Will To Believe essay and how this kind of existential decision can be made "in advance of the evidence". (pg191-2) This line of argumentation for James was criticized since he took belief in God to be an existential choice like Pierre's. Author argues that James falls in line with Wittgenstein that religious belief is a-rational, not irrational or rational. Author gives an extended discussion of the choice of belief in theories even in science (pg192-3), and distinguishes it from religion and other existential choices, whose "rightness" cannot be publicly confirmed (pg194-5). The idea here is that consequential 'estimated utilities' is no way to live a meaningful human life (pg194). Author speculates that Dewey's problem on the individual moral decision has to do with his dualistic conception of human life: the social and the aesthetic (pg196).
The final pages are a conclusion for the entire book, which argues that philosophy is the practice that 'unsettles' prejudices and 'pet convictions' but also changes both our lives and our self-perceptions (pg198-200).
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