08/24/2012
From: Wittgenstein: Toward a Re-Evaluation; Fourteenth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Haller & Brandl, eds 1990
A Fideism is defined by author as someone who believes that faith overrides reason. Author does not believe Wittgenstein is a fideist but instead someone who tries to apply ordinary language to inner processes. Author first gives some examples of Wittgenstein's method and statements about the non-sense found in philosophy. But in the next section (3), author gives some examples, including "God's Eye sees everything", which author abbreviates "E". This E is taken not simply as a given but as being embedded in a system of other beliefs, attitudes and expectations, "some of which are rationally examinable".
Author discusses Wittgenstein's conception of a 'Framework Belief', or a belief that is part of the riverbed of one's belief system, like: "I have forebears". Only the insane could doubt such a belief, and such doubt is taken to be hollow. Someone who doubts that 'motorcars grow from the earth' doesn't even accept our system of verification. This is more evidence author uses to claim that Wittgenstein is looking for criteria for belief; not faith. Further than that, there is the problem that expressions of religious faith do not have obvious FBs to 'secure' them.
Another facet of Wittgenstein's work author brings to bear is his adaptation of Moore's Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). Moore's PCA claims that religious beliefs can be reasoned about, and are either true or false. A Fideist might claim that religious beliefs are not intended to be T/F, but this is exactly what PCA scrutinizes. Author conducts an extended analysis of religious belief statements under the supposition that they "fit into a scheme of value statements". In a conservative but charitable understanding of value statements, they are not T/F but reasoned and open to evaluation once given criteria. But furthermore there is the problem that if religious belief is not T/F then the practices that are based on their truth are similarly undermined. (pg342)
8/24/12
8/10/12
Putnam, Hilary - Wittgenstein and Realism
08/10/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Ch 22 Harvard University Press, 2012
Author starts with Wittgenstein's line from the Tractatus proposing an equivalence between solipsism and "pure realism". In figuring out what notion of solipsism Wittgenstein had in mind, author turns to an interpretation offered by Brian McGuinness, whereby Wittgenstein was trying to both contradict and reconcile Schopenhauer's 'famous dictum' that the world is "my idea". (pg340) The idea here is that language is used to express propositions about the world and how the world could be configured, and solipsistic (or realist) propositions are not changing or adding anything intelligible to the language (pg341-2).
The next discussion adds Carnap to the mix, as a representative of the Vienna Circle, which had thoroughly discussed Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Carnap considered the Tractatus to be not entirely free of metaphysics, specifically about the logical structure of propositions/the world. Author investigates what Carnap meant with the term "metaphysics", which firstly was seen as nonsense because it was opposed to verifiability, but later became nonsense because it was the pursuit of external-sentences using language-terms from an internal-language. (pg344-5) Here author claims that Quine's indictment of Carnap's position would be similar to Wittgenstein's. Later, Carnap points out a problem for Wittgenstein: if the solipsist propositions are equivalent to the realist ones, then mustn't their logical form be also equivalent? But even if the propositions can be made into having the same outcomes, their logical form can't be equivalent (author and Carnap argues), thus a tenet of the Tractatus falls (pg346-7).
Author then moves to Reichenbach and his analysis of the "choice" of either the realist language or an "egocentric language". Reichenbach justifies our use of the realist language because it helps justify a great many human actions, like buying life insurance (pg347-8). Author believes this "egocentric language" is a stand-in for Carnap's solipsistic one. Author also argues that it is unlikely this "egocentric language" is even intelligible. (pg349) This leads to an interesting approach to the private language argument in the later Wittgenstein; though author first talks about Wittgenstein's notion how a logic and grammar may be "rotated" around the real need to understand, e.g. intention (pg350-1).
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Ch 22 Harvard University Press, 2012
Author starts with Wittgenstein's line from the Tractatus proposing an equivalence between solipsism and "pure realism". In figuring out what notion of solipsism Wittgenstein had in mind, author turns to an interpretation offered by Brian McGuinness, whereby Wittgenstein was trying to both contradict and reconcile Schopenhauer's 'famous dictum' that the world is "my idea". (pg340) The idea here is that language is used to express propositions about the world and how the world could be configured, and solipsistic (or realist) propositions are not changing or adding anything intelligible to the language (pg341-2).
The next discussion adds Carnap to the mix, as a representative of the Vienna Circle, which had thoroughly discussed Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Carnap considered the Tractatus to be not entirely free of metaphysics, specifically about the logical structure of propositions/the world. Author investigates what Carnap meant with the term "metaphysics", which firstly was seen as nonsense because it was opposed to verifiability, but later became nonsense because it was the pursuit of external-sentences using language-terms from an internal-language. (pg344-5) Here author claims that Quine's indictment of Carnap's position would be similar to Wittgenstein's. Later, Carnap points out a problem for Wittgenstein: if the solipsist propositions are equivalent to the realist ones, then mustn't their logical form be also equivalent? But even if the propositions can be made into having the same outcomes, their logical form can't be equivalent (author and Carnap argues), thus a tenet of the Tractatus falls (pg346-7).
Author then moves to Reichenbach and his analysis of the "choice" of either the realist language or an "egocentric language". Reichenbach justifies our use of the realist language because it helps justify a great many human actions, like buying life insurance (pg347-8). Author believes this "egocentric language" is a stand-in for Carnap's solipsistic one. Author also argues that it is unlikely this "egocentric language" is even intelligible. (pg349) This leads to an interesting approach to the private language argument in the later Wittgenstein; though author first talks about Wittgenstein's notion how a logic and grammar may be "rotated" around the real need to understand, e.g. intention (pg350-1).
8/3/12
Putnam, Hilary - Wittgenstein: A Reappraisal
08/03/2012
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author beings the chapter by mentioning some of the lessons author inherited from Wittgenstein that he believes are right; but the one that author takes as "quite wrong" is the notion that metaphysics is value-less, and should be cured by a type of therapy (pg483). Author first introduces the idea of what it is for things to not "make sense". For something to not make sense, author argues that it must be from the perspective of a philosophical argument or theory, not from an understanding of language or grammar (pg484). The idea here is to repudiate that the moniker "nonsense" can come about without using another (different) philosophical theory to justify its usage.
Author introduces two different interpretations of Wittgenstein, The New one embodied by Conant & Diamond, and the Orthodox, enumerated by Baker & Hacker. Both have different accounts of what a philosopher is doing when speaking nonsense, but both agree that philosophers speak nonsense most of the time, and both agree that this is a linguistic error. Author disagrees: these philosophers are making sense, though their metaphysics might lack "full intelligibility" since it may fail to show how something may be true (pg486).
There is a brief interlude about another way to answer skepticism, without claiming that skepticism is "nonsense" because it gets the grammar of the words "to know" or "to prove" wrong. Author believes that the skeptic can be answered by constructing an argument from premises that he must accept. That the skeptic does not accept them is not a concern; the premises are reasonable and therefore a suitable answer to the skeptic (pg488-9).
Author argues that Wittgenstein himself established the sort-of middle ground of "lacking full intelligibility" when it came to religious language; author suggests that had Wittgenstein taken an equally charitable approach toward philosophy he would allow metaphysics to be sensical though not fully intelligible (pg490). Author closes by giving a case of so-called scientists labeling a certain native tribe to be "soulless", though clearly there is no evidence for this. The question: are they making sense? Yes. But do they have a worldview that is alien (not fully intelligible) to us.
Philosophy in an Age of Science, Harvard University Press, 2012
Author beings the chapter by mentioning some of the lessons author inherited from Wittgenstein that he believes are right; but the one that author takes as "quite wrong" is the notion that metaphysics is value-less, and should be cured by a type of therapy (pg483). Author first introduces the idea of what it is for things to not "make sense". For something to not make sense, author argues that it must be from the perspective of a philosophical argument or theory, not from an understanding of language or grammar (pg484). The idea here is to repudiate that the moniker "nonsense" can come about without using another (different) philosophical theory to justify its usage.
Author introduces two different interpretations of Wittgenstein, The New one embodied by Conant & Diamond, and the Orthodox, enumerated by Baker & Hacker. Both have different accounts of what a philosopher is doing when speaking nonsense, but both agree that philosophers speak nonsense most of the time, and both agree that this is a linguistic error. Author disagrees: these philosophers are making sense, though their metaphysics might lack "full intelligibility" since it may fail to show how something may be true (pg486).
There is a brief interlude about another way to answer skepticism, without claiming that skepticism is "nonsense" because it gets the grammar of the words "to know" or "to prove" wrong. Author believes that the skeptic can be answered by constructing an argument from premises that he must accept. That the skeptic does not accept them is not a concern; the premises are reasonable and therefore a suitable answer to the skeptic (pg488-9).
Author argues that Wittgenstein himself established the sort-of middle ground of "lacking full intelligibility" when it came to religious language; author suggests that had Wittgenstein taken an equally charitable approach toward philosophy he would allow metaphysics to be sensical though not fully intelligible (pg490). Author closes by giving a case of so-called scientists labeling a certain native tribe to be "soulless", though clearly there is no evidence for this. The question: are they making sense? Yes. But do they have a worldview that is alien (not fully intelligible) to us.
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