Parfit, Derek - Ch 15 Contractualism

02/24/2012

On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 15, Oxford University Press 2011

This chapter goes through three main formulations of non-utilitarian Contractualism, namely Rawls, Kant, and Scanlon. While it is mainly an introduction and exploration of the moral theory, author does make some arguments relating to the kind of moral philosophy Contractualism is, and its autonomy from utilitarianism.

Author first starts with a formulation of Contractualism: it is following universal principles to which everyone rationally agreed. The first element discussed is the rational agreement: one would not rationally agree to a principle that advantaged another group over yours, e.g. men over women. Author however also adds some description to the idealized process of universal rational agreement, and contrasts it with the possibility of finding no agreement. Author casts Contractualism as using a series of smaller votes on elements of the total principle, with adequate discussion, and then one final big vote on the whole contract, with the requirement of unanimity (pg344-5). If this big vote fails, people go on without a contract, which might actually favor some people, especially those who have more talent, wealth, or other forms of power. Given that these people know this, they may enter the debate with the threat of 'no-agreement', which could change the outcome of the final contract. Author considers this possibility Hobbesian, and rejects it as a 'minimal version' of morality (Gauthier is one of its defenders).

Author then moves to consider Rawls' formulation of Contractualism not for the just institutions of society but instead for morality. Rawls starts with individuals acting in their own rational interests, which many assume would be Rational Egoism, though Rawls leaves open the possibility that one's rational interests can easily include the interests of justice or of other people just as much (pg347). But author states that Rawls' theory contains a fundamental flaw: it is a subjective, desire-based theory (pg347-8) (pg354) where it is assumed everyone would promote their own interests. To weed out the Hobbesian problem, Rawls works in a "veil of ignorance", which does not offer an advantage in negotiations, and is supposed to make each person impartial (pg349). The next trouble for Rawls is distinguishing his Contractualism from Utilitarianism. According to author, it comes down to Rawls rejecting the "equal chance formula" in favor of a "no knowledge formula" about which positions within a society (or a circumstance) the actors will take. The contrast is as follows: (pg350)
-ECF: Equal Chance Formula: each actor has an equal chance of being in any position. Hence, choose the equivalent of the Utilitarian Average Principle.
-NKF: No Knowledge Formula: each actor has no knowledge of what probability there is she will be in any of the positions. [This seems more like a societal/institutional formulation rather than an individual one.] According to Rawls, this will allow for non-Utilitarian options.

Author argues that the NKF is not distinct enough from the ECF, and thus Rawls' theory is not distinct from Utilitarianism. (pg350-5) During the argument author discusses Rawls' interpretation of his own formula through Kantian language, which seems to add a 'thicker' veil of ignorance. Author responds that this makes informed choice difficult, if not impossible, which is contrary to the conditions needed for Contractualism to have a footing (pg351). Author portrays the Maximin Argument as the final attempt to justify the NKF, since one would try to minimize the poorest position in a situation because she would have no knowledge of the probabilities of being in that poorest position (supposedly an equal chance might be an acceptable risk). This argument fails to backstop NKF because it is a bad argument with wrong outcomes (pg353). The problem with Rawls' formula being Utilitarian is that it allows for great burdens to be placed onto a small number if it gives more goods to enough others (the old problem) (pg357).

Author's last objection to Rawls' theory is related to the first one: that it does not include any other interests beyond the self-interested ones: it leaves out an individual's beliefs about desert, responsibility, gratitude, etc. (pg354)

Author reprises Kant's Contractualism but claims that is has a structural advantage over other forms of Contractualism because it allows for an individual principles that can be rationally adopted, not the unanimous adoption of universal principles. (pg355-6) Author also believes this avoids the possibility of a veto queering the entire contract, which is a weaker version of the Hobbesian problem. (pg356-7). Furthermore, author argues Kant does not need the veil of ignorance, which is a 'crude' device. (pg357)

The argument for Kantian Contractualism comes to a rejection of Rational Egoism (pg358) because it is too narrow. According to author, a Rational Egoist would not accept this:
A- Everyone could rationally choose the principle that, in such cases, gives everyone equal shares. (pg359) This would be rejected because the Rational Egoist would want an unequal advantage.

The last Contractualist to consider is Scanlon: which author uses also as a foil for a potential problem for most Contractualis theories: they risk defining wrongness, instead of giving an account of one procedure for finding wrongness. But first author discusses Scanlon's formulation and defends it through generally defending Contractualism: when trying to determine whether an act is wrong, you use the system given, not intuitive moral beliefs that reject the Harmful Means Principle (using someone as a means for helping another, where the help outweighs the harm). (pg360-2)

Author states that Contractualism is a theory that many have sought because they wish to avoid the conclusions, most notably the Harmful Means conclusions, in Act Utilitarianism (AU). AU might justify your doctor taking your organs and giving them to 5 needy people (Harmful Means). A Contractualist might claim that if this was widespread practice it could not be beneficial to everyone because no one would trust her doctor. (pg363-4) The troubling part is that the Harmful Means principle seems intuitively wrong (but we cannot appeal to intuitions), but contractually it is indistinguishable from an "Emergency Principle"where you're allowed to flip a switch that would cause someone to fall in front of a train that would kill 5, stopping the train but killing the 1. The conceptual distinction is that the Harmful Means principle uses a person as a means, while the Emergency Principle tries to get at that, but can't. Author argues that Scanlon can't find this distinction in his Contractualism (pg364-6).

The last section talks about the problem of fitting "deontic" moral considerations into a Contractualist view. Rawls seems to countenance that his theory is not the sole determinant of wrongness. However Scanlon often falls into the difficulty of claiming that his Contractualism is giving the definition of wrongness. (pg367-9) For author, this is problematic because it makes Contractualist claims tautological.