01/27/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1Ch 11, Oxford University Press 2011
In this chapter author goes about showing that Kant's conception of determinism is too strict to allow for free choice, or rather choices made based on reasons. For Kant, morality is possible only if free will is, and free will is not within the world of space-time, because that is the world where determinism reigns (pg258-9). The most valuable premise for Kant here is the 'ought implies can' premise, where a presupposition of what one ought to do is what one can do. If determinism makes it so one cannot do anything other than what she is, through causal forces, fated to do, then 'ought' is destroyed because 'can' is. (pg259-60) This is the incompatibilist view.
Author argues that there is a compatibilist way of understanding 'can', not in a 'categorical' sense (the actual world could have been different), but in a 'hypothetical' sense (this world could have been slightly different, thus a different outcome). (pg260) This compatibilist view gives space for agents to have acted differently, based on decision making and evaluating past actions (pg261). The reason Kant does not see this is because, according to author, he conflates fatalism with determinism. (pg261-2) Author claims that the compatibilist view of freedom is all that is necessary to underwrite morality (pg263).
The next discussion is an extension of the previous one, because Kant believes that part of morality is the desert of suffering because of to moral turpitude. Kant says that if all actions are 'merely events in space-time', then we could not deserve to suffer for wrongdoing. Author twists his premise to affirm the antecedent and also affirm the consequent. (pg264) Author wants to keep compatibilism about choice but reject compatibilism about desert. (pg265) Author interestingly talks about the search for reasons for action, eventually ending in an ultimate reason (pg266).
One of Kant's arguments for being an incompatibilist about desert is that how we are depends on our actions and decisions in prior versions of ourselves, which were determined by prior decisions, and so on, back to our very creation, for which we were not responsible. (pg267-8) Author affirms this, but denies Kant's later claim that since we do deserve to suffer for bad acts, that acts aren't solely space-time determined. Author argues against the graspable incomprehensibility of the noumenal world, arguing that determinism and choice from another realm is irreconcilable (pg269).
Author ties the whole thing together: (pg 270)
-We can have freedom of choice with actions that are solely space-time
-Thus we can reject Kant's conclusion that our actions cannot be within space-time
-Since Kant's argument is valid, we must reject a premise too
-Reject that we deserve to suffer from our poor choices
Author ends with talking about what we as agents do and don't deserve, and punishment (in the form of suffering) for wrongdoing is not one of them.
1/20/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 10 Respect and Value
1/20/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1Ch 10, Oxford University Press 2011
In this chapter author explores the concept that Kant has about respect for the dignity of rational beings. This is different from the concept that all rational beings are good-- some (most/many) aren't. But all rational beings deserve respect because they have dignity. Author's point is that respect for rational beings does not get us much foothold in assessing which acts are right and which are wrong.(pg235)
This analysis starts with claiming that Kant meant that all wrong acts treat people in ways that disrespect their dignity. Surely this is true of some wrong acts like humiliating punishment, defamation, ridicule, acts that display contempt. But it is a stronger claim that all wrong acts fail to respect dignity. Kant wishes to build in the claims that acts like lying, suicide, and masturbation are also against human dignity, but this is hard to swallow (pg234-5). Instead, it seems Kant's claim is better suited to be limited in scope.
Author discusses the taxonomy of Kant's moral system, one that assigns value and a separate system that assigns moral worth, or the rightness or wrongness of actions. Author first starts with laying out a basic distinction between valuable things that can be promoted, and valuable things that aren't promoted in the same way-- they are respected instead. Author uses the term 'good events', but I believe the proper terminology is that there are valued events. Some events (states of affairs, outcomes, acts) are valued instrumentally, some are valued intrinsically. The most inclusive account of valued events is "Actualism": possible acts are valued as ends when they have intrinsic properties that "give us reason to want them to be actual", and means are valued when their ends are valued. (pg236) This account takes both intrinsically valued events and also events that are valued as means. Interestingly, author denies that Acualism applies to things other than events (taken broadly), for instance: it doesn't apply to persisting things like people or artworks. (pg237)
Actualism is not the only account of value: there are other things like objects, people, and concepts that are valuable but aren't teleological. These can't be 'promoted' but are instead 'respected'. Because these things are to be respected, author argues it is good to treat them with the respect they deserve (pg238). Author takes a weird direction though, appearing to argue that acts that respect the value of such things are good as ends (intrinsically valuable?) because they are acts that accord with Actualism.(pg238)
Kant's kinds of ends: ends-to-be-promoted, existent ends, and then ends-in-themselves. Ends-in-themselves are things Kant says have dignity and considers its value incomparable.(pg 239) Kant puts in the ends-to-be-promoted category the value of a good will, which is the will to do one's duty because it is one's duty. Author also claims Kant wants a possible world to be promoted where everyone has a good will. (However we shall see later that this end-to-be-promoted does not place any additional obligation on anyone other than having a good will.) Finally, the ultimate end-to-be-promoted (for Kant) is a world everyone receives happiness in proportion to the goodness of their will. So the steps of the ends-to-be-promoted are: (pg240)
1. Have a good will
2. Live in a world where everybody has a good will
3. Live in a world where we're all appropriately compensated for our good wills
Author goes on to claim that for Kant rationality is an an end-to-be-promoted rather than an end-in-itself. Things that have value as ends-in-themselves have 'dignity', which are of a value incomparable to those that have 'price'. But if rationality had dignity its price would be infinitely higher than other ends-to-be-promoted, like the avoidance of pain. Author claims this view is crazy, so Kant must not hold it. (pg241-2) Instead, author makes a distinction between rationality and humanity. Humanity is the capacity for morality, while rationality is "our other rational capacities and abilities" (pg242) Rationality is an end-to-be-promoted, e.g. worked on, while humanity i.e. the capacity for morality is the end-in-itself and has dignity.
Because we're talking about value and not goodness, every rational being, despite their goodness (or badness) has the value of rationality and therefore deserves respect. (pg240-1) Author suggests that Kant did not hold some common views about the relation between goodness and value (pg243), but that Kant does believe that a good will, the world where all have good will, and where all get their just desserts-- is both valuable and good. (pg244) Author describes Kant's views on the greatest goodness (to-be-promoted) in the "Formula of the Greatest Good" (pg245). Author reads Kant as giving a values-based end-to-be-promoted, similar to a consequentialist.
Author moves next into discussing consequentialism, which is a value-based theory of good action, but the terms to change to "the good" and "ought". (pg246) Most consequentialism uses the good to define the ought. This is distinct from Kant because Kant takes the good and ought to be distinct and one concept not more fundamental than the other (pg247-8). Author contrasts between Moore's tautological formulation of the good and the ought with Kant's (pg248-9). Author then explores how Kant's Formula of the Greatest Good (the world of good will and just dessert) relates to his other formulas (pg250), with the conclusion that if everyone did their duty, this is the best way to promote Kant's Greatest Good. (pg251)
The next line of discussion is about the possibility of connecting act-consequentialism with rule-consequentialism. In this pursuit, author claims we must appeal "to some view about how we ought to assess the effects of our acts." (pg252). Author considers three:
-Marginalist View
-Share of the Total View
-Whole Scheme View
These views are tested against a thought experiment "Rescue", in which four people are needed to save the lives of miners, but five people are unnecessary. (pg253) The Marginalist view suggests that the fifth person joining the mission makes all the actors inconsequential, which is absurd unless you add to it the Share of the Total View. Author casts both Hume and Kant as committed to the Whole Scheme View, since for Kant the achievement of the Greatest Good is by each person doing their duty. In this sense, Kant is a rule-consequentialist (pg255-6). However, author rejects the Whole Scheme View of both Hume and Kant-- the strict rule-following-- in favor of the Martinalist/Total View (pg256). This view, however, implies that Rule- and Act-consequentialism cannot be reconciled.
On What Matters, Vol 1Ch 10, Oxford University Press 2011
In this chapter author explores the concept that Kant has about respect for the dignity of rational beings. This is different from the concept that all rational beings are good-- some (most/many) aren't. But all rational beings deserve respect because they have dignity. Author's point is that respect for rational beings does not get us much foothold in assessing which acts are right and which are wrong.(pg235)
This analysis starts with claiming that Kant meant that all wrong acts treat people in ways that disrespect their dignity. Surely this is true of some wrong acts like humiliating punishment, defamation, ridicule, acts that display contempt. But it is a stronger claim that all wrong acts fail to respect dignity. Kant wishes to build in the claims that acts like lying, suicide, and masturbation are also against human dignity, but this is hard to swallow (pg234-5). Instead, it seems Kant's claim is better suited to be limited in scope.
Author discusses the taxonomy of Kant's moral system, one that assigns value and a separate system that assigns moral worth, or the rightness or wrongness of actions. Author first starts with laying out a basic distinction between valuable things that can be promoted, and valuable things that aren't promoted in the same way-- they are respected instead. Author uses the term 'good events', but I believe the proper terminology is that there are valued events. Some events (states of affairs, outcomes, acts) are valued instrumentally, some are valued intrinsically. The most inclusive account of valued events is "Actualism": possible acts are valued as ends when they have intrinsic properties that "give us reason to want them to be actual", and means are valued when their ends are valued. (pg236) This account takes both intrinsically valued events and also events that are valued as means. Interestingly, author denies that Acualism applies to things other than events (taken broadly), for instance: it doesn't apply to persisting things like people or artworks. (pg237)
Actualism is not the only account of value: there are other things like objects, people, and concepts that are valuable but aren't teleological. These can't be 'promoted' but are instead 'respected'. Because these things are to be respected, author argues it is good to treat them with the respect they deserve (pg238). Author takes a weird direction though, appearing to argue that acts that respect the value of such things are good as ends (intrinsically valuable?) because they are acts that accord with Actualism.(pg238)
Kant's kinds of ends: ends-to-be-promoted, existent ends, and then ends-in-themselves. Ends-in-themselves are things Kant says have dignity and considers its value incomparable.(pg 239) Kant puts in the ends-to-be-promoted category the value of a good will, which is the will to do one's duty because it is one's duty. Author also claims Kant wants a possible world to be promoted where everyone has a good will. (However we shall see later that this end-to-be-promoted does not place any additional obligation on anyone other than having a good will.) Finally, the ultimate end-to-be-promoted (for Kant) is a world everyone receives happiness in proportion to the goodness of their will. So the steps of the ends-to-be-promoted are: (pg240)
1. Have a good will
2. Live in a world where everybody has a good will
3. Live in a world where we're all appropriately compensated for our good wills
Author goes on to claim that for Kant rationality is an an end-to-be-promoted rather than an end-in-itself. Things that have value as ends-in-themselves have 'dignity', which are of a value incomparable to those that have 'price'. But if rationality had dignity its price would be infinitely higher than other ends-to-be-promoted, like the avoidance of pain. Author claims this view is crazy, so Kant must not hold it. (pg241-2) Instead, author makes a distinction between rationality and humanity. Humanity is the capacity for morality, while rationality is "our other rational capacities and abilities" (pg242) Rationality is an end-to-be-promoted, e.g. worked on, while humanity i.e. the capacity for morality is the end-in-itself and has dignity.
Because we're talking about value and not goodness, every rational being, despite their goodness (or badness) has the value of rationality and therefore deserves respect. (pg240-1) Author suggests that Kant did not hold some common views about the relation between goodness and value (pg243), but that Kant does believe that a good will, the world where all have good will, and where all get their just desserts-- is both valuable and good. (pg244) Author describes Kant's views on the greatest goodness (to-be-promoted) in the "Formula of the Greatest Good" (pg245). Author reads Kant as giving a values-based end-to-be-promoted, similar to a consequentialist.
Author moves next into discussing consequentialism, which is a value-based theory of good action, but the terms to change to "the good" and "ought". (pg246) Most consequentialism uses the good to define the ought. This is distinct from Kant because Kant takes the good and ought to be distinct and one concept not more fundamental than the other (pg247-8). Author contrasts between Moore's tautological formulation of the good and the ought with Kant's (pg248-9). Author then explores how Kant's Formula of the Greatest Good (the world of good will and just dessert) relates to his other formulas (pg250), with the conclusion that if everyone did their duty, this is the best way to promote Kant's Greatest Good. (pg251)
The next line of discussion is about the possibility of connecting act-consequentialism with rule-consequentialism. In this pursuit, author claims we must appeal "to some view about how we ought to assess the effects of our acts." (pg252). Author considers three:
-Marginalist View
-Share of the Total View
-Whole Scheme View
These views are tested against a thought experiment "Rescue", in which four people are needed to save the lives of miners, but five people are unnecessary. (pg253) The Marginalist view suggests that the fifth person joining the mission makes all the actors inconsequential, which is absurd unless you add to it the Share of the Total View. Author casts both Hume and Kant as committed to the Whole Scheme View, since for Kant the achievement of the Greatest Good is by each person doing their duty. In this sense, Kant is a rule-consequentialist (pg255-6). However, author rejects the Whole Scheme View of both Hume and Kant-- the strict rule-following-- in favor of the Martinalist/Total View (pg256). This view, however, implies that Rule- and Act-consequentialism cannot be reconciled.
1/6/12
Parfit, Derek - Ch 9 Merely as a Means
1/6/2012
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 9, Oxford University Press 2011
This chapter is an examination of Kant's contention, under the Humanity Principle, that it is wrong to treat persons "merely as a means". On the face of it, it is ok to treat someone 'as a means', but perhaps not 'merely' as such. Author suggests as well that there is a distinction between 'doing something to someone to achieve some aim' and 'treating a person as a means'. (pg213) [This distinction is baffling to me.]
The problem with the prohibition against acting in a way that treats someone 'merely as a means' is that it is either too weak or too strong. Author first talks about how it can be too weak: a slave-owner might let his slaves rest during the hottest part of the day, thereby attending to some degree to their well-being or acting according to some weak (but present) moral principle. Thus, his slaves are not treated 'merely' as a means. (pg213) This is not strong enough, so author suggests it is a matter of degree: you can "come close" to treating some 'merely as a means' (MAAM). (pg214)
Author then introduces two new exceptions to the (treating someone) MAAM prohibition: (pg214)
1) treatment of another is guided by a relevant moral standard in a 'sufficiently important' way
2) you would bear a great burden for this other person
Author is not clear what these conditions amount to, and moves on from them to discuss the differences between acting toward someone MAAM, and regarding someone MAAM. (pg215-6) The trouble with a prohibition against acting toward someone MAAM, is that you can keep your promise by saving a child's life, for the sake of keeping the promise. Thus, you act toward the child MAAM of keeping your promise. If acting MAAM was impermissible, you could not save the child's life. Thus it might be necessary to add:
3) you do not act MAAM if your acts will not harm the other person
Author argues that this will not stop some acts MAAM because of the use of expedient solutions. Perhaps Green would want to act toward Gold in a harmful way, but decides the most expedient is to be kind. This act might still be wrong because Green treats Gold MAAM, but it abides by 3). (pg217) [This may mean that 3) should be thrown away.]
Author tries to revise the principle again, suggesting the provision about avoiding harm is built into the MAAM prohibition: It is wrong to treat someone MAAM (or do so by degree) if the act harms that person. (pg217) Author then considers the usual kill-one-to-save-five trolley problems: (pg218)
Lifeboat (one lifeboat, save either 5 people or 1)
Tunnel (divert a train from hitting 5 and instead it hits 1)
Bridge (operate a trap door to let 1 person fall in front of the train, saving 5)
In all of these cases, someone is harmed in the process of saving 5. However, only in Bridge could the case really be made that one acted MAAM. (pg219) Author tries to figure out whether the prohibition against MAAM would/should stop the operation of the trap door in Bridge. Author argues that because in all cases it is rational for the 1 to consent to saving the 5, including giving up his own life, then the MAAM prohibition is superseded by the Consent Principle, thus making all cases morally permissible. (pg220) Curiously, author argues that the Consent Principle overrides the MAAM prohibition, if someone gives consent. (pg220-1)
The above outcome seems to make the MAAM prohibition very weak. Author considers the "Standard View" of the MAAM prohibition: (pg221)
Harm a person, without her consent, as a means of achieving some aim: this is prohibited as treating someone MAAM.
Author argues that this is wrong in three ways:
a: you may not be treating a person MAAM (instead treating their bodies?)
b: you may be treating them as a means, but not merely
c: even if so, this act might not be impermissible
Author explores the case of injuring someone in self-defense, making it thereby impossible for her to continue to pursue you (breaking Brown's leg when she is running after you intending to kill you). This is an illustration of (a). (pg222)
Author then discusses a complex example where you could save your child's life (from an earthquake) by crushing Black's toe. Crush another of Black's toes and you can save your own life too. However, you believe it is wrong to save your own life this way. Thus, you act according to some moral principle (1), and you endure great harm for Black's sake (2) (see above for these provisos) Thus you treat Black as a means, but not MAAM. This is an illustration of (b). Author considers further refinement to the MAAM prohibition but argues it will not do the trick to bolster the "Standard View" or make Bridge wrong. (pg223-4)
Author considers the case that deception is wrong because it violates the MAAM prohibition, but offers a counter-example to it (pg225)-- deception is wrong for other reasons, not for the MAAM prohibition. Author then discusses whether Kant uses the MAAM language in some special way, so that we are using lay terms for philosophically technical terms-- author finds this unconvincing. (pg226-7)
Though it may be wrong to regard someone MAAM, it is not wrong to act in a way that treats someone MAAM. This was shown in the egoist/promise-keeper-saves-a-child case. The Standard View needs revision that stipulates that it is ok to harm someone as a means for achieving some end, as long as that harm is not too great, and there is no other way to do it (pg229) (Because without this revision, you can't crush Black's toe to save your child).
When considering this harm, author argues that the factors for the decision might include whether someone is treated as a means. But adding 'merely' does not factor into the decision about making the act wrong. (pg230) And furthermore, author cannot find good enough reason to consider an act wrong when adding that someone is being used as a means. We know it is wrong to regard someone as a means, and wrong to regard someone as a mere thing (not a person) (pg226), but that does not prohibit acts that treat people as means, and adding 'merely' does not change the situation.
On What Matters, Vol 1 Ch 9, Oxford University Press 2011
This chapter is an examination of Kant's contention, under the Humanity Principle, that it is wrong to treat persons "merely as a means". On the face of it, it is ok to treat someone 'as a means', but perhaps not 'merely' as such. Author suggests as well that there is a distinction between 'doing something to someone to achieve some aim' and 'treating a person as a means'. (pg213) [This distinction is baffling to me.]
The problem with the prohibition against acting in a way that treats someone 'merely as a means' is that it is either too weak or too strong. Author first talks about how it can be too weak: a slave-owner might let his slaves rest during the hottest part of the day, thereby attending to some degree to their well-being or acting according to some weak (but present) moral principle. Thus, his slaves are not treated 'merely' as a means. (pg213) This is not strong enough, so author suggests it is a matter of degree: you can "come close" to treating some 'merely as a means' (MAAM). (pg214)
Author then introduces two new exceptions to the (treating someone) MAAM prohibition: (pg214)
1) treatment of another is guided by a relevant moral standard in a 'sufficiently important' way
2) you would bear a great burden for this other person
Author is not clear what these conditions amount to, and moves on from them to discuss the differences between acting toward someone MAAM, and regarding someone MAAM. (pg215-6) The trouble with a prohibition against acting toward someone MAAM, is that you can keep your promise by saving a child's life, for the sake of keeping the promise. Thus, you act toward the child MAAM of keeping your promise. If acting MAAM was impermissible, you could not save the child's life. Thus it might be necessary to add:
3) you do not act MAAM if your acts will not harm the other person
Author argues that this will not stop some acts MAAM because of the use of expedient solutions. Perhaps Green would want to act toward Gold in a harmful way, but decides the most expedient is to be kind. This act might still be wrong because Green treats Gold MAAM, but it abides by 3). (pg217) [This may mean that 3) should be thrown away.]
Author tries to revise the principle again, suggesting the provision about avoiding harm is built into the MAAM prohibition: It is wrong to treat someone MAAM (or do so by degree) if the act harms that person. (pg217) Author then considers the usual kill-one-to-save-five trolley problems: (pg218)
Lifeboat (one lifeboat, save either 5 people or 1)
Tunnel (divert a train from hitting 5 and instead it hits 1)
Bridge (operate a trap door to let 1 person fall in front of the train, saving 5)
In all of these cases, someone is harmed in the process of saving 5. However, only in Bridge could the case really be made that one acted MAAM. (pg219) Author tries to figure out whether the prohibition against MAAM would/should stop the operation of the trap door in Bridge. Author argues that because in all cases it is rational for the 1 to consent to saving the 5, including giving up his own life, then the MAAM prohibition is superseded by the Consent Principle, thus making all cases morally permissible. (pg220) Curiously, author argues that the Consent Principle overrides the MAAM prohibition, if someone gives consent. (pg220-1)
The above outcome seems to make the MAAM prohibition very weak. Author considers the "Standard View" of the MAAM prohibition: (pg221)
Harm a person, without her consent, as a means of achieving some aim: this is prohibited as treating someone MAAM.
Author argues that this is wrong in three ways:
a: you may not be treating a person MAAM (instead treating their bodies?)
b: you may be treating them as a means, but not merely
c: even if so, this act might not be impermissible
Author explores the case of injuring someone in self-defense, making it thereby impossible for her to continue to pursue you (breaking Brown's leg when she is running after you intending to kill you). This is an illustration of (a). (pg222)
Author then discusses a complex example where you could save your child's life (from an earthquake) by crushing Black's toe. Crush another of Black's toes and you can save your own life too. However, you believe it is wrong to save your own life this way. Thus, you act according to some moral principle (1), and you endure great harm for Black's sake (2) (see above for these provisos) Thus you treat Black as a means, but not MAAM. This is an illustration of (b). Author considers further refinement to the MAAM prohibition but argues it will not do the trick to bolster the "Standard View" or make Bridge wrong. (pg223-4)
Author considers the case that deception is wrong because it violates the MAAM prohibition, but offers a counter-example to it (pg225)-- deception is wrong for other reasons, not for the MAAM prohibition. Author then discusses whether Kant uses the MAAM language in some special way, so that we are using lay terms for philosophically technical terms-- author finds this unconvincing. (pg226-7)
Though it may be wrong to regard someone MAAM, it is not wrong to act in a way that treats someone MAAM. This was shown in the egoist/promise-keeper-saves-a-child case. The Standard View needs revision that stipulates that it is ok to harm someone as a means for achieving some end, as long as that harm is not too great, and there is no other way to do it (pg229) (Because without this revision, you can't crush Black's toe to save your child).
When considering this harm, author argues that the factors for the decision might include whether someone is treated as a means. But adding 'merely' does not factor into the decision about making the act wrong. (pg230) And furthermore, author cannot find good enough reason to consider an act wrong when adding that someone is being used as a means. We know it is wrong to regard someone as a means, and wrong to regard someone as a mere thing (not a person) (pg226), but that does not prohibit acts that treat people as means, and adding 'merely' does not change the situation.
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