02/12/2010
This paper is mainly a statement that 'If there are any moral rights at all, the right of humans to be free is a natural right'. The freedom granted as a right means that others mustn't coerce or restrain s from acting so long as s's actions aren't coercing, restraining, or 'designed to injure' others. (pg77) Most of there rest of the paper is a clarification of what it is for there to be moral rights, natural rights, and other clarifications. Note that the argument is in the form of a conditional: 'If' there are any moral rights, then the right to be free is one. (Author mentions as an aside that there may be other moral systems that would include terms like right/wrong, good/bad that do not rely on rights.) (pg78)
A natural right is one that accrues to s by virtue of s's being a human chooser, e.g. someone capable of choice. It is not dependent on having taken a particular voluntary action. Rights have special characteristics, and author lays them out as he sees them as follows:
A) Moral rights are different, but related to legal ones; to secure a legal right there must be the allowance for coercion and restraint in case such a right is at risk of being violated. Yet the justification for s's restraining another isn't because of a moral right that s has vs others, it is due to the principle of legal rights distribution (pg80)
B) S's Having 'a right to x' means that s has no duty to restrain from doing x. However, there is competition for limited resources that provides an interesting contrast. All may have a right to acquire x, but no corresponding duty to let the other have it. (pg80-1)
C) Is there a corresponding right for every duty? No. Author argues we have a duty to not abuse animals, but they do not have a right against us in that regard. (pg81) Just because someone stands to gain from the performance of our duties, that someone does not have a right to that performance. Author uses as another example the contract n signs with s to provide care to s's aging mother. N's duty is to s, not the aging mother; yet the mother stands to benefit from the performance of the duty. (pg81-2)
Author takes care to distinguish between Special rights and General rights. Special rights arise out of transactions between individuals, special relationships, or special situations. These are such things as i) promises, ii) s conferring the prerogative to protect s's rights to another, iii) 'mutuality of restrictions' such as in a political process (pg85-6). (It is during this portion where author discusses the possibility of having a legal duty to refrain from doing the morally right thing, or vice versa.) iv) natural relationships like parent/child, v) s confers special liberties to another (e.g. to read s's diary).
General rights, on the other hand, accrue to s because of there being no special right inhibiting s's actions and because s has a right to be free. (pg87-88) The last section of the article involves author claiming that there is a right to interfere, restrain or coerce s when s is trying to do the same (or injure) another.
2/5/10
Smith, Malcom - Does Humanity Share a Common Moral Faculty?
02/05/2010
Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol 7 (2010)
This paper seeks to establish the plausibility of the view that humanity shares a deep common moral reasoning faculty. The first observation is that philosophers often utilize moral intuitions about hypothetical examples to come up with consensus around a moral precept. Author argues that claiming this is moral knowledge also presumes there is moral truth, and that most thinkers want these settled intuitions to be relevant in creating a normative theory. (pg38) The differences in what ability or attribute constitutes this faculty (Reason, or Sentiment) is irrelevant to the discussion here: what author is trying to argue for is its reasonableness. One stop along the way is an illustration of the differences of distribution that theorists have. Some, the 'Platonic elitists' might hold the faculty to be only well-developed in the philosopher class. But author instead seeks to establish the reasonableness of 'commonalism', (pg44) the idea that 'nonphilosophers' moral beliefs are no less authoritative than philosopers' (pg41).
Commonalism is taken to be the idea that we all share a largely similar (metaphorical) mentalistic "black box" where non-moral facts can be fed into it and through some causal-inferential process a similar 'converging' moral conclusion will be output about what is appropriate. This is the convergence hypothesis. (The moral conclusion supervenes on the factual one.) (pg41-2) The objection is that we experience moral disagreement. Author tries to distinguish between so-called 'surface' disagreement and 'deep' disagreement. Of surface moral belief, author ties to explain them away as differences in the non-moral beliefs that go into the moral judgment. E.g. a racist believes (falsely) that one race is inherently inferior. Another influence for disagreement is bias: personal interest, race, gender, etc. Of deep belief, author makes sure to point out indeterminacy due to competition between two valid moral standards, like e.g. failing to keep a promise but helping someone in need. (pg44-5) Competition indeterminacy does not necessarily go against commonalism, since it reveals no profound difference between those who choose to keep the promise, or those who help the victim, author claims.
Author's major argument in favor of commonalism and the convergence hypothesis is that we fruitfully engage in moral discourse, and that we understand and engage with people across particular societies and cultures. (pg45-6) Probably the biggest possible blow to commonalism is the abortion debate, which author admits may be intractable at the deep level. However author argues that much of this may be competition indeterminacy, bias, and non-moral differences in belief. (pg47) He then defends the charge that he has an a priori answer for every objection (pg47-8). (However, there is a 'deep difficulty' with criticizing commonalism in favor of some sort of elitist model: how do you find moral judgments that are convergent yet simultaneously deny that the common-man has access to them? (pg50-1))
Author then considers the upshot of adopting commonalism: it will do away with moral nihilism and reduce the strength of moral relativism, since relativism is partially motivated by nihilism. (pg49) It also can be a backbone for natural rights theories, which many societies' laws reference. (pg52) It could also further moral understanding, since it may council patient attitudes toward moral disagreement. (pg53)
Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol 7 (2010)
This paper seeks to establish the plausibility of the view that humanity shares a deep common moral reasoning faculty. The first observation is that philosophers often utilize moral intuitions about hypothetical examples to come up with consensus around a moral precept. Author argues that claiming this is moral knowledge also presumes there is moral truth, and that most thinkers want these settled intuitions to be relevant in creating a normative theory. (pg38) The differences in what ability or attribute constitutes this faculty (Reason, or Sentiment) is irrelevant to the discussion here: what author is trying to argue for is its reasonableness. One stop along the way is an illustration of the differences of distribution that theorists have. Some, the 'Platonic elitists' might hold the faculty to be only well-developed in the philosopher class. But author instead seeks to establish the reasonableness of 'commonalism', (pg44) the idea that 'nonphilosophers' moral beliefs are no less authoritative than philosopers' (pg41).
Commonalism is taken to be the idea that we all share a largely similar (metaphorical) mentalistic "black box" where non-moral facts can be fed into it and through some causal-inferential process a similar 'converging' moral conclusion will be output about what is appropriate. This is the convergence hypothesis. (The moral conclusion supervenes on the factual one.) (pg41-2) The objection is that we experience moral disagreement. Author tries to distinguish between so-called 'surface' disagreement and 'deep' disagreement. Of surface moral belief, author ties to explain them away as differences in the non-moral beliefs that go into the moral judgment. E.g. a racist believes (falsely) that one race is inherently inferior. Another influence for disagreement is bias: personal interest, race, gender, etc. Of deep belief, author makes sure to point out indeterminacy due to competition between two valid moral standards, like e.g. failing to keep a promise but helping someone in need. (pg44-5) Competition indeterminacy does not necessarily go against commonalism, since it reveals no profound difference between those who choose to keep the promise, or those who help the victim, author claims.
Author's major argument in favor of commonalism and the convergence hypothesis is that we fruitfully engage in moral discourse, and that we understand and engage with people across particular societies and cultures. (pg45-6) Probably the biggest possible blow to commonalism is the abortion debate, which author admits may be intractable at the deep level. However author argues that much of this may be competition indeterminacy, bias, and non-moral differences in belief. (pg47) He then defends the charge that he has an a priori answer for every objection (pg47-8). (However, there is a 'deep difficulty' with criticizing commonalism in favor of some sort of elitist model: how do you find moral judgments that are convergent yet simultaneously deny that the common-man has access to them? (pg50-1))
Author then considers the upshot of adopting commonalism: it will do away with moral nihilism and reduce the strength of moral relativism, since relativism is partially motivated by nihilism. (pg49) It also can be a backbone for natural rights theories, which many societies' laws reference. (pg52) It could also further moral understanding, since it may council patient attitudes toward moral disagreement. (pg53)
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