06/26/2009
The Case For Modern Man, Harper & Brothers 1956, Ch 6
This is a review of Niebuhr's main philosophies regarding the human condition. The discussion takes the form of a detailed exposition of Niebuhr's philosophy, and then a longer refutation of it. Niebuhr's main points are as follows:
-Humanity is trapped between ideal infinity and its finite nature, creating the defining emotion of anxiety.
-Anxiety in relation to unattainable perfection tends toward considering human finite nature to be the only worthy attainment, e.g. sin.
-The concept of original sin in the human condition plays a powerful explanatory role in human history. The concept works in this manner: because humanity does not recognize its finite nature it continually oversteps what it is capable of, ending in great disappointments (pg90).
-Liberalism attempts to deny that humanity has original sin and is therefore misguided and prone to failure.
-Original sin isn't a psychological phenomenon; it is somehow more: some sort of metaphysical condition on humanity that is insoluble (pg93-5). The insolubility comes from a fundamental 'paradox of human freedom', that humanity is free to choose yet bounded by causal necessity.
Author claims that this paradox is actually a logical mistake: there is no contradiction between being subject to the laws of nature and having freedom. Being predictable (subject to causal laws) doesn't entail lacking freedom (being able to choose based on your judgment). (pg96-98) Further, author claims that adding 'original sin' to human history does little to offer a better explanation, since sin is (1) ever present and (2) is a side-effect of the finite nature of humanity, though it has yet to be seen how finite humanity is. (pg100)
The next discussion relates to Niebuhr's indictment of liberalism's hope for man's progress. Yet Niebuhr makes a straw man out of liberalism; modern liberals were intimately familiar with humanity's self-interested motives and egoism. Author takes an extended look at the writings of Condorcet, whose writings, when translated into English, had the targeted term "the indefinite perfectibility of man'. (pg101-106) Condorcet was talking about how there are definite limits on how knowledge and social structures can improve mankind, but we aren't in a position to know what those limits are (until we reach them?). Really, it was a belief in the indefinite improvability of man'.
More importantly, author argues that the shift from 'man's sinfulness' to 'the goodness of man' wasn't a fundamental contradiction but instead a shift in focus. It wasn't an attempt to claim that the human condition was essentially good, but instead an attempt to redefine the focus of debate from soul/redemption-talk to social/societal-talk. (pg107-8) What the 'goodness of man' stance tries to get right is the primacy of social structures, government and knowledge in human flourishing, as opposed to the primacy of personal salvation in humanity's redemption.
The last discussion is an analysis of the context of Niebuhr's writings: they come at a time where 'everything seems to have contrived to make ... heightened moral impulses appear irrelevant' (pg112) and modern society experiences increasing alienation. Niebuhr's writings then make this experience a deep-seated, widespread metaphysical one, yet author argues that it explains little other than what we already know-- that humanity involves a struggle of ideals in a finite world. (pg113-5)
6/19/09
Neibuhr, Reinhold - The American Future
06/19/2009
The Irony of American History, Ch 7 University of Chicago Press, 2008
This chapter (written in 1951) discusses the prospects of the US in relation to itself and other nations. 1. Author first points out that the US was isolationist for a long time until WWII, where the US realized that technology had connected the world enough so that it couldn't 'be secure in an insecure world' (pg131). So in rising to the occasion and admitting to its abilities to lead and exercise its power, the US also employs its idealism, which author considers too 'oblivious' and needs to come 'to terms with the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historic configurations of power...' etc. (pg133)
2. The US's idealism is bolstered by what author sees as two factors, the first being that the US's power is very high on the world stage. While there are some advantages to concentrations of power in uniting states, the negative side is the resentment it can breed, as well as the temptation of the powerful side to abuse its power (pg135). Tempering power 'into the service of justice' has come in three ways: (a) redistribute power, (b) bring power 'under social and moral review', or (c) use religion to keep it in check. (pg135) Author argues that (a) is not relevant in the international community; it's just a fact of history. Option (b) is happening in the form of the United Nations, which author believes is salubrious, especially because 'it is impossible for any nation or individual fully to understand the peculiar circumstances and the unique history of any other nation or individual, which create their special view of reality.' (pg137) In this section author predicts that once the US realizes it must spend enormous efforts to upgrade its war preparedness with new technology, it may come to the UN more willing to work out a solution to the communist conflict. Strategy (c) involves humility and recognizing the 'other' is worthy of respect. (pg139)
3. The second factor that supposedly reinforces the US's idealism is that there seems to be no easy solution to the struggle against the communists. (pg140) This frustrates the US's liberal idealism that holds that a superior way of life should triumph without needing to compromise. What this misses is that 'human communities are never purely artifacts of the human mind and will' (pg142) and humans are creatures of history (pg141)-- meaning that it is sometimes difficult, sometimes impossible to wholly do away with undesirable powers and forces. (pg143) The argument seems to be that because of the US's idealism, it misinterprets this hard lesson as stubbornness or ignorance. (pg143)
4.-5. Author compares individual heroism with national heroism, pointing out the most dramatic difference is that individual heroism can be willingly self-sacrificing and pursue an end without much probability of achieving it, while a nation cannot reasonably do so-- there must be some decent probability of success. Author also states that a democracy could never engage in an 'explicit preventive war' (pg146). In the following section author discusses the tensions in the US and rejects one of the solutions offered: Kennan argues that the US too eagerly extends its moralistic constitutional scheme to other nations, intending to remake them in its own image. This brings out another source of US idealism: that its 'technocratic' mastery of physical nature encourages the same approach toward human nature. (pg147-8) Author rejects Kennan's solution, namely that the US should become solely self-interested. What is needed is true humility regarding the US's abilities and charity regarding other nations.
The selected introduction to Neibuhr's "Moral Man and Immoral Society" involved a polemic against social scientists, modern educators and moralists who seek to better society by doing social science. Author's principal arguments are as follows:
-humans have parts that belong to the 'order of nature' (pgxii) that cannot ever be fully controlled by reason and conscience
-Social change, unlike changes in knowledge (science), involves conflict between the haves and have-nots; therefore the exercise of power is vitally important to changing social situations. This makes the retardation of social sciences compared to the advancement of the natural sciences not a product of 'ignorance' (pgxiv-xv) but of social-structure maintenance.
-Those educators (author uses Dewey as a target) seem to miss the class-struggle aspect of social change and are fraught with 'middle-class prejudices'(pgxiii-xiv)
The Irony of American History, Ch 7 University of Chicago Press, 2008
This chapter (written in 1951) discusses the prospects of the US in relation to itself and other nations. 1. Author first points out that the US was isolationist for a long time until WWII, where the US realized that technology had connected the world enough so that it couldn't 'be secure in an insecure world' (pg131). So in rising to the occasion and admitting to its abilities to lead and exercise its power, the US also employs its idealism, which author considers too 'oblivious' and needs to come 'to terms with the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historic configurations of power...' etc. (pg133)
2. The US's idealism is bolstered by what author sees as two factors, the first being that the US's power is very high on the world stage. While there are some advantages to concentrations of power in uniting states, the negative side is the resentment it can breed, as well as the temptation of the powerful side to abuse its power (pg135). Tempering power 'into the service of justice' has come in three ways: (a) redistribute power, (b) bring power 'under social and moral review', or (c) use religion to keep it in check. (pg135) Author argues that (a) is not relevant in the international community; it's just a fact of history. Option (b) is happening in the form of the United Nations, which author believes is salubrious, especially because 'it is impossible for any nation or individual fully to understand the peculiar circumstances and the unique history of any other nation or individual, which create their special view of reality.' (pg137) In this section author predicts that once the US realizes it must spend enormous efforts to upgrade its war preparedness with new technology, it may come to the UN more willing to work out a solution to the communist conflict. Strategy (c) involves humility and recognizing the 'other' is worthy of respect. (pg139)
3. The second factor that supposedly reinforces the US's idealism is that there seems to be no easy solution to the struggle against the communists. (pg140) This frustrates the US's liberal idealism that holds that a superior way of life should triumph without needing to compromise. What this misses is that 'human communities are never purely artifacts of the human mind and will' (pg142) and humans are creatures of history (pg141)-- meaning that it is sometimes difficult, sometimes impossible to wholly do away with undesirable powers and forces. (pg143) The argument seems to be that because of the US's idealism, it misinterprets this hard lesson as stubbornness or ignorance. (pg143)
4.-5. Author compares individual heroism with national heroism, pointing out the most dramatic difference is that individual heroism can be willingly self-sacrificing and pursue an end without much probability of achieving it, while a nation cannot reasonably do so-- there must be some decent probability of success. Author also states that a democracy could never engage in an 'explicit preventive war' (pg146). In the following section author discusses the tensions in the US and rejects one of the solutions offered: Kennan argues that the US too eagerly extends its moralistic constitutional scheme to other nations, intending to remake them in its own image. This brings out another source of US idealism: that its 'technocratic' mastery of physical nature encourages the same approach toward human nature. (pg147-8) Author rejects Kennan's solution, namely that the US should become solely self-interested. What is needed is true humility regarding the US's abilities and charity regarding other nations.
The selected introduction to Neibuhr's "Moral Man and Immoral Society" involved a polemic against social scientists, modern educators and moralists who seek to better society by doing social science. Author's principal arguments are as follows:
-humans have parts that belong to the 'order of nature' (pgxii) that cannot ever be fully controlled by reason and conscience
-Social change, unlike changes in knowledge (science), involves conflict between the haves and have-nots; therefore the exercise of power is vitally important to changing social situations. This makes the retardation of social sciences compared to the advancement of the natural sciences not a product of 'ignorance' (pgxiv-xv) but of social-structure maintenance.
-Those educators (author uses Dewey as a target) seem to miss the class-struggle aspect of social change and are fraught with 'middle-class prejudices'(pgxiii-xiv)
6/12/09
Rorty, Richard - Religious faith, intellectual responsibility, and romance
06/12/2009
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 5, RA Putnam ed, 1997
This article is an overview of James' commitments to utilitarianism and pragmatism and how it provided the basis for James' view of religion. Author also suggests an alternate strategy of argumentation that he believes might have been more effective, using the same basic commitments. According to author, there are two major aspects of James' philosophy that provides space for the Will to Believe: (1) is that Mill's version of utilitarianism features the Harm principle, which is the principle that if a subject s does action x and x is not hurting anybody else, only s is the judge on whether to do x; and (2) that scientific pragmatism holds that intellectual responsibility is primarily to other people in a joint project of creating a workable description of the world. If you sufficiently privatize religion to isolate it from such a joint project, there is some room for it regardless of the scientific justification or evidence. (pg85)
Author reviews Clifford's main claims about evidence and justification, suggesting that there are two minimal ways to take Clifford: (1) that the meaning of a belief is what inferences it creates to other beliefs-- a kind of holism-- making any one belief inseparable from the social project; (or even more generally) (2) that to be rational is to submit belief to scrutiny, to intersubjective confirmation-- a belief that is not open for testing is not really a belief. (pg87-8) Clifford argues that without evidence then it is one's responsibility not to hold a belief, yet James 'resists', and creates a kind of forced, momentous and live choice as a result. (pg88) Author finds this unsatisfying (pg90) and suggests that James take another approach: instead of agreeing on a firm distinction between (public) beliefs and (private) desires/hopes, to cash out cognitive states in terms of actional consequences, using utilitarianism to talk about intellectual obligations to others, and areas where there are no such obligations. (pg89) Thus if religion is private action, then it can be pursued without obligation to others. While privatizing religion might make accepting religion not, strictly speaking, a belief, author argues it should make little difference to James. (pg90-1)
Privatization of religion is unsatifying to many (e.g. MacIntyre), since it seems to remove most actional elements (ex hypothesis) and talks vaguely about "the eternal". Author tries to distinguish pragmatists from instrumentalists: pragmatists are realists about theoretic entities but also believe that justification for any entity takes place within a human-interest context. Such a position allows for the justification of macro-objects like tables, micro entities like atoms, and perhaps even social institutions. (pg92) Author tries to show that pure scientific realists and religious fundamentalists 'are products of the same urge.... private projects which have gotten out of hand.' (pg93)
James' focus of the religious hypothesis 'perfection is eternal' can be unsatisfying since it removes much of the specific actional elements of a creed. Author tries to compare the private religious pursuit to that of love of another human. (pg94) Loving another certainly has actional consequences, but not because you are trying to 'predict or control' them or their behavior. (pg94) (Further, we commonly do not ask for justification for such love.) This sort of life-area carve-out threatens the theory that we can reduce all intentional states into belief-desire pairs with definite inferences and actional consequences. Without this reduction, pragmatism might be unable to support its claim of the inextricable nature of desire and beliefs, making it difficult to substitute intersubjective justification for so-called objective verification. (pg95) Luckily there is an externalist interpretation of the behavior of someone in love (or religious) that imputes beliefs and desires onto them based on their actions, though the beliefs might be unjustifiable intellectually. Author states that even though such belief-desire imputations might not fit into a scheme of justification that other beliefs of the subject would, they are still explanatory.
Author lastly discusses what he believes should have been the religious focus for James-- not in something external to human life (eternal things), but in the 'future possibilities of mortal humans', a faith that looks a lot like hope, love, or Romantic commitments. (pg96-7) Author tells a story about how we used to look to external forces for something better but now we should be looking only to our own human future. (pg97)
The Cambridge Companion to William James, Ch 5, RA Putnam ed, 1997
This article is an overview of James' commitments to utilitarianism and pragmatism and how it provided the basis for James' view of religion. Author also suggests an alternate strategy of argumentation that he believes might have been more effective, using the same basic commitments. According to author, there are two major aspects of James' philosophy that provides space for the Will to Believe: (1) is that Mill's version of utilitarianism features the Harm principle, which is the principle that if a subject s does action x and x is not hurting anybody else, only s is the judge on whether to do x; and (2) that scientific pragmatism holds that intellectual responsibility is primarily to other people in a joint project of creating a workable description of the world. If you sufficiently privatize religion to isolate it from such a joint project, there is some room for it regardless of the scientific justification or evidence. (pg85)
Author reviews Clifford's main claims about evidence and justification, suggesting that there are two minimal ways to take Clifford: (1) that the meaning of a belief is what inferences it creates to other beliefs-- a kind of holism-- making any one belief inseparable from the social project; (or even more generally) (2) that to be rational is to submit belief to scrutiny, to intersubjective confirmation-- a belief that is not open for testing is not really a belief. (pg87-8) Clifford argues that without evidence then it is one's responsibility not to hold a belief, yet James 'resists', and creates a kind of forced, momentous and live choice as a result. (pg88) Author finds this unsatisfying (pg90) and suggests that James take another approach: instead of agreeing on a firm distinction between (public) beliefs and (private) desires/hopes, to cash out cognitive states in terms of actional consequences, using utilitarianism to talk about intellectual obligations to others, and areas where there are no such obligations. (pg89) Thus if religion is private action, then it can be pursued without obligation to others. While privatizing religion might make accepting religion not, strictly speaking, a belief, author argues it should make little difference to James. (pg90-1)
Privatization of religion is unsatifying to many (e.g. MacIntyre), since it seems to remove most actional elements (ex hypothesis) and talks vaguely about "the eternal". Author tries to distinguish pragmatists from instrumentalists: pragmatists are realists about theoretic entities but also believe that justification for any entity takes place within a human-interest context. Such a position allows for the justification of macro-objects like tables, micro entities like atoms, and perhaps even social institutions. (pg92) Author tries to show that pure scientific realists and religious fundamentalists 'are products of the same urge.... private projects which have gotten out of hand.' (pg93)
James' focus of the religious hypothesis 'perfection is eternal' can be unsatisfying since it removes much of the specific actional elements of a creed. Author tries to compare the private religious pursuit to that of love of another human. (pg94) Loving another certainly has actional consequences, but not because you are trying to 'predict or control' them or their behavior. (pg94) (Further, we commonly do not ask for justification for such love.) This sort of life-area carve-out threatens the theory that we can reduce all intentional states into belief-desire pairs with definite inferences and actional consequences. Without this reduction, pragmatism might be unable to support its claim of the inextricable nature of desire and beliefs, making it difficult to substitute intersubjective justification for so-called objective verification. (pg95) Luckily there is an externalist interpretation of the behavior of someone in love (or religious) that imputes beliefs and desires onto them based on their actions, though the beliefs might be unjustifiable intellectually. Author states that even though such belief-desire imputations might not fit into a scheme of justification that other beliefs of the subject would, they are still explanatory.
Author lastly discusses what he believes should have been the religious focus for James-- not in something external to human life (eternal things), but in the 'future possibilities of mortal humans', a faith that looks a lot like hope, love, or Romantic commitments. (pg96-7) Author tells a story about how we used to look to external forces for something better but now we should be looking only to our own human future. (pg97)
6/5/09
Clifford, William - The Ethics of Belief
06/05/2009
Lectures and Essays, 2nd edition, Macmillan & Co 1886
This paper inveighs against belief with insufficient evidence, calling it wrong in the moral/ethical sense, not just the epistemological. Author starts with a lengthy example of a shipowner who has some reason to believe his ship isn't seaworthy but nevertheless convinces himself to let her sail; on the seas she does down and the passengers die. Author takes a deonotological view of the morals of belief, arguing that it is morally wrong to believe on insufficient evidence no matter what the consequences were (pg340). After presenting another example relating to public defamation, author also argues that it is morally wrong to believe even a true proposition on insufficient evidence. (pg341)
Author entertains an objection: that what is morally wrong is the action taken that was based on the (epistemically) wrong belief, not the wrong belief itself. While author agrees that there are additional obligations that extend to action, he also argues that 'it is not possible to sever the belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning the other'.(pg342) Here the argument is that if you already believe that p is true, you're not going to do a thorough investigation of whether you should act as though p is false. Furthermore, author claims that if p really is to count as a belief and not just some fantasy, it takes some role, somewhere or other, in action. (pg342) Finally, author argues that 'no one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone', arguing that our common culture on which we all depend (and have all inherited) is strengthened by the successes of our ancestors-- an 'heirloom' into which everything we've said and done will be woven and passed down to succeeding generations-- thus an obligation to pass on only evidentially supported beliefs. (pg342-3)
Author discusses how withholding belief in cases where there isn't enough evidence can be unsettling (pg344), but the alternative of giving belief without the evidence is far worse for your own moral character ('weaken our powers of self-control') and for the society at large. Society at large is threatened by a credulous character in the same way as it is by thievery. To steal is wrong enough, but the real problem is that society can become a 'den of thieves'; in the same way being credulous is bad enough, but if it is a permanent character trait among the people, society might 'sink back into savagery'. (pg345)
II. The next matter author takes up is how to go about believing something for which you have no personal experience-- how to rely on authority. (Author also mentions in passing that it is permissible to act upon probability if there is not enough evidence to fully justify belief and action must be taken. pg347) In the case of accepting the word of another, we must be concerned with her truthfulness and her knowledge. (pg348-350) Author seems to put forth some version of a verification principle; if the evidence for a belief isn't capable of being retrieved by humans, then you should not believe it. (pg353-4)
Author uses the case of Mohammed, who spoke honestly but author doubts his ability to know-- his divine knowledge. Even though his precepts are adopted by thousands and they live happily only shows, according to author, that the belief system is 'comfortable' and 'pleasant to the soul', not that it is true. What may be confirmed instead is that the prophet had 'knowledge of human nature', not that he had divine inspiration or celestial knowledge. (pg351) Author supposes that there is a 'celestial visitor' who makes prophesies, some of which are verified. This still would give no grounds for believing those prophesies yet untested (or currently untestable). (pg350) Author also attacks beliefs passed down through traditions, and takes as an example the modern liberal belief that it is good to give to beggars. Instead, it is good to give them work, not to encourage idleness. (pg356)
III.Further along the lines of what to believe and when, author discusses the limits of inference. Author first points out that whenever we direct our thinking toward the future (or toward actions), we go beyond our experience and infer the continuity and uniformity of nature-- that the past is similar to the future. (pg360) Author argues that in cases where we are required to infer things about, e.g. the sun, based on our observations on the earth, all we need to use is the assumption of the uniformity of nature. (pg361)
Lectures and Essays, 2nd edition, Macmillan & Co 1886
This paper inveighs against belief with insufficient evidence, calling it wrong in the moral/ethical sense, not just the epistemological. Author starts with a lengthy example of a shipowner who has some reason to believe his ship isn't seaworthy but nevertheless convinces himself to let her sail; on the seas she does down and the passengers die. Author takes a deonotological view of the morals of belief, arguing that it is morally wrong to believe on insufficient evidence no matter what the consequences were (pg340). After presenting another example relating to public defamation, author also argues that it is morally wrong to believe even a true proposition on insufficient evidence. (pg341)
Author entertains an objection: that what is morally wrong is the action taken that was based on the (epistemically) wrong belief, not the wrong belief itself. While author agrees that there are additional obligations that extend to action, he also argues that 'it is not possible to sever the belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning the other'.(pg342) Here the argument is that if you already believe that p is true, you're not going to do a thorough investigation of whether you should act as though p is false. Furthermore, author claims that if p really is to count as a belief and not just some fantasy, it takes some role, somewhere or other, in action. (pg342) Finally, author argues that 'no one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone', arguing that our common culture on which we all depend (and have all inherited) is strengthened by the successes of our ancestors-- an 'heirloom' into which everything we've said and done will be woven and passed down to succeeding generations-- thus an obligation to pass on only evidentially supported beliefs. (pg342-3)
Author discusses how withholding belief in cases where there isn't enough evidence can be unsettling (pg344), but the alternative of giving belief without the evidence is far worse for your own moral character ('weaken our powers of self-control') and for the society at large. Society at large is threatened by a credulous character in the same way as it is by thievery. To steal is wrong enough, but the real problem is that society can become a 'den of thieves'; in the same way being credulous is bad enough, but if it is a permanent character trait among the people, society might 'sink back into savagery'. (pg345)
II. The next matter author takes up is how to go about believing something for which you have no personal experience-- how to rely on authority. (Author also mentions in passing that it is permissible to act upon probability if there is not enough evidence to fully justify belief and action must be taken. pg347) In the case of accepting the word of another, we must be concerned with her truthfulness and her knowledge. (pg348-350) Author seems to put forth some version of a verification principle; if the evidence for a belief isn't capable of being retrieved by humans, then you should not believe it. (pg353-4)
Author uses the case of Mohammed, who spoke honestly but author doubts his ability to know-- his divine knowledge. Even though his precepts are adopted by thousands and they live happily only shows, according to author, that the belief system is 'comfortable' and 'pleasant to the soul', not that it is true. What may be confirmed instead is that the prophet had 'knowledge of human nature', not that he had divine inspiration or celestial knowledge. (pg351) Author supposes that there is a 'celestial visitor' who makes prophesies, some of which are verified. This still would give no grounds for believing those prophesies yet untested (or currently untestable). (pg350) Author also attacks beliefs passed down through traditions, and takes as an example the modern liberal belief that it is good to give to beggars. Instead, it is good to give them work, not to encourage idleness. (pg356)
III.Further along the lines of what to believe and when, author discusses the limits of inference. Author first points out that whenever we direct our thinking toward the future (or toward actions), we go beyond our experience and infer the continuity and uniformity of nature-- that the past is similar to the future. (pg360) Author argues that in cases where we are required to infer things about, e.g. the sun, based on our observations on the earth, all we need to use is the assumption of the uniformity of nature. (pg361)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
