04/24/2009
Yale University Press, 1934
This final chapter focuses mainly on the distinction that religions draw between two realms of living, the supernatural and the natural, or the sacred and the profane. The biggest current threat to religion, author claims, is the growing participation and involvement that humans have with those profane/natural realms of life: an involvement in science, technology, commerce, civics, etc. In the rise of these other engagements, the church-- or participation in a religion-- has become a special kind of institution within a secular community-- it has lost its supremacy over all realms of life (pg60-2). While science itself may have had little direct effect in this 'shift in the social center of gravity', author argues it has had a great indirect effect in changing many of the conditions that humans now live under (pg62-3). The problem for religions (but not a religious attitude) is this distinction between the supernatural and the natural, since now the natural has risen greatly in concern. However, a religious attitude, as previously defined as a life outlook motivated by ideals found in the imagination, needs to make no such distinction and is therefore free to permeate all realms of human social life. (pg66-68)
Author then discusses what he sees as the evolution of the supernatural that permeated human life (when it was invoked for explanations of natural events) to now its self-made relegation of a special mode of relating to the supernatural (pg69-70). Author also links this to the argument that humans need the supernatural for moral motivation and spiritual vitality and offers the alternative that our concrete relations provide us with the necessary motivations and experiences. (pg70-1)
Author takes some time to counter a possible objection from a religion: that those other realms of human social life are rife with corruption, cynicism, greed, sins, etc and therefore aren't worth investing in compared to religion and the church.(pg74) What this argument assumes, author argues, is that the current social institutions are the only ones possible for humans to have, or that the ones we have now are essentially this way, rather than accidentally this way. Once our social institutions are seen in a historical context, there is no reason to think they must continue in the way they operate now. (pg75-8) This kind of thinking makes the supernatural realm and the maintenance of the status quo 'twins'(pg78).
Thus the secular objection to religion is that it considers material conditions that are very changeable to be unchangeable or it has 'the tendency to dispose of social evils in terms of general moral causes' (pg77). (pg77-80) The argument is that the separated realm of religion often rails against the symptoms of social problems, rather than the causes (pg69), which are to be studied by social science, economics, politics, etc. Thus the churches find themselves in a difficult situation-- to the extent they wish to participate in working for social betterment they have to be involved in the natural world, yet in an awkward way must still hold their 'unique relation' to 'supreme values and motivating forces', making 'it impossible for the churches to participate in promotion of social ends on a natural and equal human basis'. (pg83) Author sees the salvation of the religious attitude to engage in the world through concerted effort that isn't diverted through a religion that claims a special realm of authority. Author draws a contrast between 'intelligence' and 'reason'; intelligence specifically can be infused with emotional support and passion, while reason is considered contrary to such an infusion. (pg79)
4/17/09
Dewey, John - A Common Faith Ch 2
04/17/2009
Yale University Press, 1934
This chapter 'Faith and Its Object' seeks to establish the problem with religion's claiming factual knowledge about the world based on supernatural truths or revelations. The early pages show the rift between scientific knowledge about the world and the tenets of theological belief (author wants to show a tension not between 'science' and 'religion' but between 'science' and 'theology' pg31). Author points out that each time science seems to provide an alternate, natural explanation for a particular article of theology, liberal theologians surrender that particular issue and simultaneously argue that it wasn't a crucial part of the theology (pg32). The problem is not this-or-that belief but the entire outlook of method and justification for non-scientific objective belief systems. (pg32-3)
One solution was to partition two realms: one of 'nature' and one of 'grace', or one for scientific experience and another for religious. (pg34) But remember that so-called mystical experience, according to author, is frequently interpreted through the lens of cultural practices and theology that one already has available (pg35-38). The distinction between two kinds of experience is just the old metaphysical distinction between two worlds, but remade into modern cultural sensibilities. (pg38) Author also defends science from those who misunderstand it, specifically that science is committed to a set of naturalistic doctrines. Instead, science is a method of acquiring knowledge about the world-- so far the best method (p38-9).
The next part of the discussion has to do with symbols-- that religious matters involve beliefs that are symbolic. Author argues that symbols can be interpreted in two ways-- as symbolic of another objective item (that we can't attain for some reason or other) or as symbolic of a truly ideal item. If theological beliefs are symbolic in the first sense, then they are intellectually dubious and aren't truly 'ideal'. But if they are in the second sense, then there is no reason to suppose the objective aspect of the symbolized items/people/events. (pg40-2) The suggestion then becomes that 'God' be the 'unification of ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin'(pg43). Author further argues that trying to find the existence of the supernatural will distract humans and make them think that their betterment will come from an exterior source rather than from themselves (pg45-7).
The last part of the paper deals with arguing that ideals seated in the imagination are not 'imaginary stuff' but real and physical since they motivate us to act in particular ways in the world (pg49-51). The value of mystical experiences is to further one's commitment to the ideals they live by (pg52). Author discusses parallels that he sees between 'aggressive' atheism and traditional supernaturalism (e.g. Christianity) (pg52-3) in that they both view humans as separate from the natural world-- both are mistaken.
Yale University Press, 1934
This chapter 'Faith and Its Object' seeks to establish the problem with religion's claiming factual knowledge about the world based on supernatural truths or revelations. The early pages show the rift between scientific knowledge about the world and the tenets of theological belief (author wants to show a tension not between 'science' and 'religion' but between 'science' and 'theology' pg31). Author points out that each time science seems to provide an alternate, natural explanation for a particular article of theology, liberal theologians surrender that particular issue and simultaneously argue that it wasn't a crucial part of the theology (pg32). The problem is not this-or-that belief but the entire outlook of method and justification for non-scientific objective belief systems. (pg32-3)
One solution was to partition two realms: one of 'nature' and one of 'grace', or one for scientific experience and another for religious. (pg34) But remember that so-called mystical experience, according to author, is frequently interpreted through the lens of cultural practices and theology that one already has available (pg35-38). The distinction between two kinds of experience is just the old metaphysical distinction between two worlds, but remade into modern cultural sensibilities. (pg38) Author also defends science from those who misunderstand it, specifically that science is committed to a set of naturalistic doctrines. Instead, science is a method of acquiring knowledge about the world-- so far the best method (p38-9).
The next part of the discussion has to do with symbols-- that religious matters involve beliefs that are symbolic. Author argues that symbols can be interpreted in two ways-- as symbolic of another objective item (that we can't attain for some reason or other) or as symbolic of a truly ideal item. If theological beliefs are symbolic in the first sense, then they are intellectually dubious and aren't truly 'ideal'. But if they are in the second sense, then there is no reason to suppose the objective aspect of the symbolized items/people/events. (pg40-2) The suggestion then becomes that 'God' be the 'unification of ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin'(pg43). Author further argues that trying to find the existence of the supernatural will distract humans and make them think that their betterment will come from an exterior source rather than from themselves (pg45-7).
The last part of the paper deals with arguing that ideals seated in the imagination are not 'imaginary stuff' but real and physical since they motivate us to act in particular ways in the world (pg49-51). The value of mystical experiences is to further one's commitment to the ideals they live by (pg52). Author discusses parallels that he sees between 'aggressive' atheism and traditional supernaturalism (e.g. Christianity) (pg52-3) in that they both view humans as separate from the natural world-- both are mistaken.
4/10/09
Dewey, John - A Common Faith Ch 1
04/10/2009
Yale University Press, 1934
This chapter tries to create an adjective 'religious' that is distinct from 'religion'. The first discussion is about how diverse and varied the practice of religion is (pg4-6) and how, once placed in the cultural and historical context, it isn't obvious that the current cultural context is the correct one. Yet to try to give a theory of religion so that it covers all of the practices around the world and throughout history will make it so abstract and disjointed to be unrecognizable. Author concludes that there are instead 'a multitude of religions'. (pg7-8)
The next move is to distinguish between 'religion' and 'religious', which does not have the institutional history or theology that a religion is committed to. A religious attitude is different from a 'religious experience' however. A religious experience as a kind separate from aesthetic or political experiences is not what author has in mind. (pg10-11) This kind of experience is characterized by its outcome but labeled according to whatever culturally/institutionally relevant categories the individual may have handy. (pg11-13) But what is important about the experience is the 'adjustment' made within a person's self; different religions will call it different things. The important experience that can underwrite a religious attitude is one whose effects are an enduring deep-seated adjustment or orientation. (pg16-17)
Author takes pains to articulate the meta-psychological underpinning of a religious attitude: the imagination has an ideal for the self to strive for as it strives for integration, since integration takes place with something external to the self-- an ideal. (pg19) The non-objective nature of an ideal-- the non-factual aspect of it-- is contrasted by author to 'faith', which has become an evidential claim, a part of metaphysics instead of human imagination. (pg20) Author suggests that once the moral (imaginative) ideal of the religious attitude was converted into a claim of objective metaphysics by religion, it actually diminished moral faith, since it was not discovered to be present objectively (pg20-22).
Going to the positive account of the religious attitude, it should not just be an intense emotional feeling but also a broadly inclusive self-unifying end-ideal.(pg22-23) In this way the religious attitude involves a willful submission. Further discussion about the history of religions to assist (or inhibit) with the religious attitude follows (pg24-25). Lastly, author gives a discussion the human condition and asserts that the religious attitude includes cooperation and seeing one's place in a larger whole (pg25).
Yale University Press, 1934
This chapter tries to create an adjective 'religious' that is distinct from 'religion'. The first discussion is about how diverse and varied the practice of religion is (pg4-6) and how, once placed in the cultural and historical context, it isn't obvious that the current cultural context is the correct one. Yet to try to give a theory of religion so that it covers all of the practices around the world and throughout history will make it so abstract and disjointed to be unrecognizable. Author concludes that there are instead 'a multitude of religions'. (pg7-8)
The next move is to distinguish between 'religion' and 'religious', which does not have the institutional history or theology that a religion is committed to. A religious attitude is different from a 'religious experience' however. A religious experience as a kind separate from aesthetic or political experiences is not what author has in mind. (pg10-11) This kind of experience is characterized by its outcome but labeled according to whatever culturally/institutionally relevant categories the individual may have handy. (pg11-13) But what is important about the experience is the 'adjustment' made within a person's self; different religions will call it different things. The important experience that can underwrite a religious attitude is one whose effects are an enduring deep-seated adjustment or orientation. (pg16-17)
Author takes pains to articulate the meta-psychological underpinning of a religious attitude: the imagination has an ideal for the self to strive for as it strives for integration, since integration takes place with something external to the self-- an ideal. (pg19) The non-objective nature of an ideal-- the non-factual aspect of it-- is contrasted by author to 'faith', which has become an evidential claim, a part of metaphysics instead of human imagination. (pg20) Author suggests that once the moral (imaginative) ideal of the religious attitude was converted into a claim of objective metaphysics by religion, it actually diminished moral faith, since it was not discovered to be present objectively (pg20-22).
Going to the positive account of the religious attitude, it should not just be an intense emotional feeling but also a broadly inclusive self-unifying end-ideal.(pg22-23) In this way the religious attitude involves a willful submission. Further discussion about the history of religions to assist (or inhibit) with the religious attitude follows (pg24-25). Lastly, author gives a discussion the human condition and asserts that the religious attitude includes cooperation and seeing one's place in a larger whole (pg25).
4/3/09
Kennett, Jeanette & Smith, Michael - Synchronic self-control is always non-actional
04/03/2009
Analysis Vol 57 No 2 April 1997
This is a reply to Mele's previous article 'Underestimating self-control...' where authors lay out a strong case for the unintelligiblity of synchronic actional self-control. One of Mele's arguments was that it was very difficult to formulate exactly what the 'truism' of intentional aciton is: is it really that 'whenever people do something intentionall, they want to do that thing more than they want to do anything else the believe they can do at that time'? Mele argued against it, using the example of non-conflicting desires being mixed together into one action but at least some component desires perhaps not being intrinsically stronger than other desires that weren't being acted upon (e.g. drinking tea while reading article A, even though drinking tea was less strong than the desire to read article B). Authors re-write this counterexample to say that really, one doesn't have the desire to drink tea, read article A, or read article B, but instead to read A & drink tea, read B & drink tea, read A, or read B, or drink tea. Thus the truism is preserved. (pg125)
The next thing authors do is take up the case Mele describes about trying to use a second-order desire to reduce the strength of your first order desire as a case of synchronic actional self-control. (pg126) Authors argue that what happens here is either a case of losing control (e.g. eating a sweet while reducing the desire's strength) or diachronic self-control (e.g. eventually reducing the strength of your desire for sweets so that, eventually, you won't eat them). (pg126-7) And diachronic self-control can be actional and isn't a contradiction of the truism. The authors generalized that all synchronic self-control is non-actional. 'They are non-actional because there is no suitable strongest desire to cause an exercise of actional synchronic self-control'. (pg128)
The last part of the paper deals with the logical possibility of actional synchronic self-control. The possibility for such an action, authors claim, lies in the fact that the connection between desires and actions is a causal connection that happens over time, and it might be possible for a stronger cause-effect event to take place in between an earlier cause and its characteristic effect. (e.g., you desire sweets but before it causes you to take action to eat one, an faster desire for health intervenes and causes you to refrain.) Authors reply by further discussing what a desire-cause must do: not only must it initiate the action-effect, but if the action takes place over time (as most do), then the desire also has to sustain the action. (pg129) Authors consider this mechanic to set up a dilemma: either you prepare to defend yourself from your desire for sweets, or as soon as the desire for sweets arises, your previous desire can't 'causally sustain' itself. (pg130) Either the self-control is diachronic, or it isn't self-control. Authors comment that if you agree that thoughts last longer than 'an instant', you might have to believe that actional synchronic self-control is logically impossible.
Analysis Vol 57 No 2 April 1997
This is a reply to Mele's previous article 'Underestimating self-control...' where authors lay out a strong case for the unintelligiblity of synchronic actional self-control. One of Mele's arguments was that it was very difficult to formulate exactly what the 'truism' of intentional aciton is: is it really that 'whenever people do something intentionall, they want to do that thing more than they want to do anything else the believe they can do at that time'? Mele argued against it, using the example of non-conflicting desires being mixed together into one action but at least some component desires perhaps not being intrinsically stronger than other desires that weren't being acted upon (e.g. drinking tea while reading article A, even though drinking tea was less strong than the desire to read article B). Authors re-write this counterexample to say that really, one doesn't have the desire to drink tea, read article A, or read article B, but instead to read A & drink tea, read B & drink tea, read A, or read B, or drink tea. Thus the truism is preserved. (pg125)
The next thing authors do is take up the case Mele describes about trying to use a second-order desire to reduce the strength of your first order desire as a case of synchronic actional self-control. (pg126) Authors argue that what happens here is either a case of losing control (e.g. eating a sweet while reducing the desire's strength) or diachronic self-control (e.g. eventually reducing the strength of your desire for sweets so that, eventually, you won't eat them). (pg126-7) And diachronic self-control can be actional and isn't a contradiction of the truism. The authors generalized that all synchronic self-control is non-actional. 'They are non-actional because there is no suitable strongest desire to cause an exercise of actional synchronic self-control'. (pg128)
The last part of the paper deals with the logical possibility of actional synchronic self-control. The possibility for such an action, authors claim, lies in the fact that the connection between desires and actions is a causal connection that happens over time, and it might be possible for a stronger cause-effect event to take place in between an earlier cause and its characteristic effect. (e.g., you desire sweets but before it causes you to take action to eat one, an faster desire for health intervenes and causes you to refrain.) Authors reply by further discussing what a desire-cause must do: not only must it initiate the action-effect, but if the action takes place over time (as most do), then the desire also has to sustain the action. (pg129) Authors consider this mechanic to set up a dilemma: either you prepare to defend yourself from your desire for sweets, or as soon as the desire for sweets arises, your previous desire can't 'causally sustain' itself. (pg130) Either the self-control is diachronic, or it isn't self-control. Authors comment that if you agree that thoughts last longer than 'an instant', you might have to believe that actional synchronic self-control is logically impossible.
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