12/19/2008
Edition with Introduction by John E Smith
The selections from chapter 2 and is about the problem of the composition and identity of a community. Author first seeks to establish that there are genuine creations of a community that reflect intelligence but cannot be reduced to the creations of any of the individuals, e.g. customs, language, religion. Author claims that the appropriate unit here is that of the community, which will have psychological laws (and deserving of certain moral treatment) all of its own. In chapter 9 author lays out the objections to this view, that of the many composing the one, and specifically how there are three parts of an individual that seem un-malleable: (VII)
1) we have an intimate connection to our own feelings and not to those of others
2) we have an intimate connection to our own thoughts and not to those of others
3) our deeds are done individually, by my own will for which I am only responsible
Author believes this final feature is the one of the most moral significance and complicates it by suggesting there are times when, in the throes of a mob or collective, you do something that didn't originate from your own considered judgment but instead from group 'ethical pluralism'. Author discusses how James was forced to concede that there were times when individuals became part of a larger collective, yet author doesn't believe that James had found the appropriate identifying conditions. (VIII-IX) The aspect of a group that makes it a community is an analog to the aspect of a present human organism that makes it a self: a sense of history and self-conscious placement within that history. (X-XI) The individual interprets its history and projects its future, just as it places itself within a history that it shares with the community's history. Author calls this a 'community of memory'.
Chapter 13 deals with interpretation, starting with a 'community of interpretation' in the sciences. Before a particular scientists' work is adopted into the general consensus of knowledge, it must be accepted by the scientific community in general, specifically they must understand and interpret what data she used and how her conclusions relate to the rest of scientific knowledge. This is a 'triadic' process (II-VI) where the individual scientist relates her concepts about the world to others, who then relate their concepts to her concepts and then to the world-- a method of interpretation. Author uses the example of two men in a row boat: neither can confirm the others' peculiar perspective, so therefore the real properties real row boat is a matter of interpreting their different perceptions in a communal space about the real row boat. (V)
The second part of the chapter seeks to underwrite the how necessary is the existence of the community of interpretation. Author does this by making it requisite for the existence of the real world. There are two general theses in metaphysics, author calls them 'the idea of present experience and the idea of the goal of experience' (XII). This is a version of a becoming/being or appearance/Reality distinction. The goal of metaphysics is to interpret these thesis into a working model: to interpret. Yet interpretation takes a communal nature, especially when 'no man should be a judge in his own case' especially when there is a social, communal interest in the outcome. (III-IV) Thus the interpretation of the real world and a community of interpretation are intricately related and as sure as we are there is a real world, we also presuppose a community of interpretation.
12/12/08
Davidson, Donald - Interpretation: Hard In Theory, Easy In Practice
12/12/2008
Paper given in 1998
The paper tries to establish the mutual dependence of language and thought, more aptly conceptualization. When comparing with a form of conceptual atomism (Fodor), author distinguishes between having a concept which is 'simply to discriminate objects or properties of one sort or another' and 'plac[ing] objects in[to] a category' (pg2), the latter being the approach he prefers. To place something into a category is to 'opine that it belongs there, and opnions are prone to error, they are true or false, and they are in part identified by their relations to other judgments' (pg2)
The paper wanders through the typical problems of interpreting another's propositional content from their speech.(pg3-4) With the example of a non-human animal that is able to discriminate between colors, author want to know how we can eliminate the possiblity that it 'isn't the activation of certain rods and cones in his eyes, or the firing of certain optic nerves...' instead of color. If we can't distinguish between the various possible causes for the parrot (Alex's) response, then we can't determine the content of the answer. But if we cannot attribute content to Alex, then we can't attribute thought, since there is no thought without content. (pg4-5)
Interestingly, in this paper Davidson retracts his Swampman argument, claming that 'science fiction stories that imagine thigs that never happen provide poor testing ground for our intuitions concerning concepts like the concept of a person' (pg6)
Author tours through a brief history of the various realist and nominalist positions from Plato to Quine, then concludes that there is a difference between 'showing, by one's behavior, that one merely responds to perceptual similarities, and that one has a criterion for grouping things found perceptually similar.' (pg10) To have a concept 'is to be able to judge, that is, believe, that something falls under the concept. Having a concept is like knowing what a predicate means... in other words, no concepts without propositional contents'. (pg10-11)
So how do we attribute these to people or non-human animals? We can know that propositional attitudes like belief are also related to intentions, perceptions, memories, desires, hopes, etc (pg11), so finding any will give us reason to assume the rest (pg11). Author briefly sketches his triangulation argument, that we're given reason to attribute conceptualization when we encounter not just animals that perceive (pg12) but also ones that recognize when they make mistakes, that is, can distinguish between objective conditions and their categorizations. Not only this, but 'it seems likely that a mind cannot accpt the idea of error without some notion of how error is to be explained. We know of no way all this can be shared by creatures except through the use of language' (pg13). Language and thought become interdependent, with true conceptualization arising 'only in a social setting, and in that setting conceptualization and thought emerge accompanied by the development of language' (pg14).
Paper given in 1998
The paper tries to establish the mutual dependence of language and thought, more aptly conceptualization. When comparing with a form of conceptual atomism (Fodor), author distinguishes between having a concept which is 'simply to discriminate objects or properties of one sort or another' and 'plac[ing] objects in[to] a category' (pg2), the latter being the approach he prefers. To place something into a category is to 'opine that it belongs there, and opnions are prone to error, they are true or false, and they are in part identified by their relations to other judgments' (pg2)
The paper wanders through the typical problems of interpreting another's propositional content from their speech.(pg3-4) With the example of a non-human animal that is able to discriminate between colors, author want to know how we can eliminate the possiblity that it 'isn't the activation of certain rods and cones in his eyes, or the firing of certain optic nerves...' instead of color. If we can't distinguish between the various possible causes for the parrot (Alex's) response, then we can't determine the content of the answer. But if we cannot attribute content to Alex, then we can't attribute thought, since there is no thought without content. (pg4-5)
Interestingly, in this paper Davidson retracts his Swampman argument, claming that 'science fiction stories that imagine thigs that never happen provide poor testing ground for our intuitions concerning concepts like the concept of a person' (pg6)
Author tours through a brief history of the various realist and nominalist positions from Plato to Quine, then concludes that there is a difference between 'showing, by one's behavior, that one merely responds to perceptual similarities, and that one has a criterion for grouping things found perceptually similar.' (pg10) To have a concept 'is to be able to judge, that is, believe, that something falls under the concept. Having a concept is like knowing what a predicate means... in other words, no concepts without propositional contents'. (pg10-11)
So how do we attribute these to people or non-human animals? We can know that propositional attitudes like belief are also related to intentions, perceptions, memories, desires, hopes, etc (pg11), so finding any will give us reason to assume the rest (pg11). Author briefly sketches his triangulation argument, that we're given reason to attribute conceptualization when we encounter not just animals that perceive (pg12) but also ones that recognize when they make mistakes, that is, can distinguish between objective conditions and their categorizations. Not only this, but 'it seems likely that a mind cannot accpt the idea of error without some notion of how error is to be explained. We know of no way all this can be shared by creatures except through the use of language' (pg13). Language and thought become interdependent, with true conceptualization arising 'only in a social setting, and in that setting conceptualization and thought emerge accompanied by the development of language' (pg14).
12/5/08
Davidson, Donald - Mental Events
12/05/2008
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 11 Clarendon Press 1980
In this essay author lays out the support for the theory of anamalous monism, which is needed because he wants to make the following triad consistent:
1) At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.
2) Where there is causality, there is a description of deterministic lawfulness.
3) There are no strict deterministic laws that predict or explain mental events.
These seem inconsistent and all plausible. The first part of the paper deals with giving a view of physicalism that is consistent with 3. Author lays out an identity theory where mental events are identical to physical ones, and events are tokens 'unrepeatable, dated individuals'. (pg209) There is some difficulty with including bona fide mental events among all the physical ones. (pg210-12) Author proposes to consider intentionality as the criterion. (pg211) The downside of this approach is that it denies there are 'strict laws connecting the mental and the physical', a kind-kind identity (pg212-13). The different kinds of of monism and dualism are described, with author taking anamalous monism and briefly describing it.
The second part of the paper defends the downside of the theory that there are no strict psychophysical laws. This seems to be a case of philosophy encroaching on science, which author wants to deny. (pg216-219) Author uses an analogy of how using behaviorism in trying to define belief has failed us, and that a more general point is that the holism in interpretation of the mental is what restricts the possibility of psychophysical laws. Author also delves into the grue / bleen problem. Author lays out a distinction between homonomic and heteronomic generalizations, heteronomic being ones that, in order to describe the lawfulness of a generalization, needs to shift between vocabularies. (pg219) Author discusses the problem of 'longer-than': it is only a problem until there are a whole 'set of axioms, laws or postulates', e.g., the idea of rigid, macroscopic objects that 'longer-than' is a part of, that underwrite lawlike statements of the physical sciences. (pg221) The ideal in the physical sciences is to have a homonomic set of descriptions, yet much of it is still heteronomic, especially all the areas that link the mental to the physical. (pg221-2) 'There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence' (pg222).
The last part of the paper proves the identity of the mental to the physical, or at least those mental events that cause physical ones and vice versa. Mental events that enter into causal relations with physical ones must be subject to physical law (of causation), thus have a physical description, hence is physical. (pg224) Note that this only works for mental events that interact with physical ones via causation.
Essays on Actions and Events, Ch 11 Clarendon Press 1980
In this essay author lays out the support for the theory of anamalous monism, which is needed because he wants to make the following triad consistent:
1) At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.
2) Where there is causality, there is a description of deterministic lawfulness.
3) There are no strict deterministic laws that predict or explain mental events.
These seem inconsistent and all plausible. The first part of the paper deals with giving a view of physicalism that is consistent with 3. Author lays out an identity theory where mental events are identical to physical ones, and events are tokens 'unrepeatable, dated individuals'. (pg209) There is some difficulty with including bona fide mental events among all the physical ones. (pg210-12) Author proposes to consider intentionality as the criterion. (pg211) The downside of this approach is that it denies there are 'strict laws connecting the mental and the physical', a kind-kind identity (pg212-13). The different kinds of of monism and dualism are described, with author taking anamalous monism and briefly describing it.
The second part of the paper defends the downside of the theory that there are no strict psychophysical laws. This seems to be a case of philosophy encroaching on science, which author wants to deny. (pg216-219) Author uses an analogy of how using behaviorism in trying to define belief has failed us, and that a more general point is that the holism in interpretation of the mental is what restricts the possibility of psychophysical laws. Author also delves into the grue / bleen problem. Author lays out a distinction between homonomic and heteronomic generalizations, heteronomic being ones that, in order to describe the lawfulness of a generalization, needs to shift between vocabularies. (pg219) Author discusses the problem of 'longer-than': it is only a problem until there are a whole 'set of axioms, laws or postulates', e.g., the idea of rigid, macroscopic objects that 'longer-than' is a part of, that underwrite lawlike statements of the physical sciences. (pg221) The ideal in the physical sciences is to have a homonomic set of descriptions, yet much of it is still heteronomic, especially all the areas that link the mental to the physical. (pg221-2) 'There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence' (pg222).
The last part of the paper proves the identity of the mental to the physical, or at least those mental events that cause physical ones and vice versa. Mental events that enter into causal relations with physical ones must be subject to physical law (of causation), thus have a physical description, hence is physical. (pg224) Note that this only works for mental events that interact with physical ones via causation.
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