10/31/2008
This paper starts with a discussion of the classical Humean description of action, as being a belief and a desire put together in a particular causal way to produce an action. Author argues that there is actually another piece to this story, that the agent so doing is instrumentally rational. So, put this way we have:
a desire for an end + a means-ends belief + instrumental rationality = an action
Roughly, this corresponds to Hempel's deductivist claim about what schema action needs to conform to: (pg90)
1- Actor was in situation of type C
2- A was a rational agent
3- In a type C situation, any rational agent will do X
Conclusion: A does X
Author quotes Hempel, who defends this schema. (pg91-2) The instrumental rationality isn't just having the capacity, it's exercising it. (pg94-5)
This approach was criticized by Davidson, who claimed that instrumental rationality is the background assumption of action, not a peculiar constitutive element. (pg96-8) Author responds to this point by discussing a problem that Davidson himself had: that of 'wayward internal causation' (pg100-1). This is where the appropriate belief and desire are formed but something else ends up causing the intended action. The consensus on a fix of this is to use modal propositions about how the agent would have behaved under slight variations in the situation. Author argues this already imports elements of very local instrumental rationality. (pg101-2)
Author wants to expand this local rationality to mean a larger kind of rationality altogether (pg102). For this author uses a thought experiment of a John, who has a desire to be healthy and believes that flexing his bicep will do so, but so will flexing his triceps.(pg102-8) Good instrumental rationality should assign equal preference for either action if both are equally salubrious, lesser if one is lesser, etc.
The second part of the paper considers how rationality might play a non-constitutive part in action, namely playing a part in forming beliefs and forming desires. (pg110-120) Here there can be rational ways to form means-ends beliefs, and less rational ways. But what of desires? Surely a Humean will deny rational ways to form desires. Author here tries to convince us that we can appeal to reason about what we should desire in a non-instrumental way (pg116-121), perhaps showing that some situations are 'reason-giving'. The schema would go as follows:
1- A was in situation of type E
2- A was a rational subject
3- In a situation of type E and rational agent will desire the end that Q
Conclusion: A rationally desired the end that Q
10/23/08
Fish, Stanley - Buttons and Bows
10/24/2008
New York Times, October 12, 2008
An article in the secular media about a few examples of teachers in public schools and publicly funded educational institutions being restricted by the administration from wearing buttons that endorse candidates. Author describes the potential US Constitutional issues here regarding free speech, refers to the supreme court case of Tinker v Des Moines where a test is given about restrictions on free speech: does it 'materially disrupt the work and discipline of the school'? In many cases of students' speech, the answer is no. Author argues that the teacher's displaying his/her views may alter the way a student studies, writes papers, etc. Author argues that teachers aren't restricted from wearing buttons outside of the classroom, just inside where they prime duties are to teach, not to proselytize.
New York Times, October 12, 2008
An article in the secular media about a few examples of teachers in public schools and publicly funded educational institutions being restricted by the administration from wearing buttons that endorse candidates. Author describes the potential US Constitutional issues here regarding free speech, refers to the supreme court case of Tinker v Des Moines where a test is given about restrictions on free speech: does it 'materially disrupt the work and discipline of the school'? In many cases of students' speech, the answer is no. Author argues that the teacher's displaying his/her views may alter the way a student studies, writes papers, etc. Author argues that teachers aren't restricted from wearing buttons outside of the classroom, just inside where they prime duties are to teach, not to proselytize.
10/17/08
Nichols, Shaun & Knobe, Joshua - Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuition
10/17/2008
Nous, vol 41 number 4 2007
This paper explores how affect plays a role in evaluating moral responsibility. Here the debate is framed in a way to shed some light on an age-old debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism in moral theory. Compatibilism is the theory that moral agency is compatible with a deterministic universe. Incompatibilism is the opposite: moral agency doesn't wholly apply if we live in a deterministic universe. Philosophers have relied on different bits of psychological and anecdotal evidence for claiming that people are either largely compatibilists or largely incompatibilists.
The paper seeks to show that in some contexts people come out as incompatibilists, yet in others they are strongly compatibilist. The difference comes out instead when affective responses are elicited in a description of a hypothetical where subjects have to assign moral responsibility. At times when the description is largely abstract and a deterministic world is posited, people reply with incompatibilist-type responses, largely alleviating moral responsibility. When a more concrete situation is described, using names and giving an identifying story to the moral hypothetical, people assign moral agency (or moral blame) and become compatibilists. (pg664-671) This effect becomes less pronounced as concrete hypotheticals become more terse and resemble short abstract hypotheticals. (pg670) Also of note is that people are more apt to give harsher punishments once the transgressor has been identified, rather than prior to that identification. (pg665)
Authors propose 3 distinct theories that could account for this phenomenon. (pg671-5) They are as follows:
Performance Error Model: affective responses distort people's judgments, making them unable to apply their theory of moral responsibility. Thus people are largely incompatibilists but readily assign moral responsibility when they have an affective response to a hypothetical. This has an affinity with people willing to hold people more responsible when they are experiencing even unrelated negative emotions.
Affective Competence Model: employing affective responses about moral situations is the core method by which moral judgments are reached, thus the abstract hypotheticals are problematic, not the concrete ones. Hence people are fundamentally compatibilist.
Concrete Competence Model: it is concreteness, not affect, that is the primary difference here; abstract hypotheticals fail to adequately signal the subject (or a special 'moral module' inside the subject) for a moral judgment, while concrete hypotheticals do.
Authors consider that hybrid answers are also possible, but they advocate one in particular: 'Affect serves both as part of the fundamental competence underlying responsibility judgments and as a factor that can sometimes lead to performance errors.' (pg674) Authors then try to show some other evidence that might eliminate one of the models, and possibly support their own hybrid theory.
The evidence offered (pg675-7) now dealt with two concrete hypotheticals, one 'high-affect' about rape and the other 'low-affect' about tax evasion. This experiement attempted to control for concreteness. The results were that people were compatibilists about rape but incompatibilists about tax evasion. The Affective Competence model might have a hard time accounting for the difference that is also revealed between a deterministic condition and a indeterministic-free-will condition.(pg676-7)
Lastly, authors examine how their findings might change the way philosophers view people's intuitions about (in)compatibilism. (pg677-680)
Nous, vol 41 number 4 2007
This paper explores how affect plays a role in evaluating moral responsibility. Here the debate is framed in a way to shed some light on an age-old debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism in moral theory. Compatibilism is the theory that moral agency is compatible with a deterministic universe. Incompatibilism is the opposite: moral agency doesn't wholly apply if we live in a deterministic universe. Philosophers have relied on different bits of psychological and anecdotal evidence for claiming that people are either largely compatibilists or largely incompatibilists.
The paper seeks to show that in some contexts people come out as incompatibilists, yet in others they are strongly compatibilist. The difference comes out instead when affective responses are elicited in a description of a hypothetical where subjects have to assign moral responsibility. At times when the description is largely abstract and a deterministic world is posited, people reply with incompatibilist-type responses, largely alleviating moral responsibility. When a more concrete situation is described, using names and giving an identifying story to the moral hypothetical, people assign moral agency (or moral blame) and become compatibilists. (pg664-671) This effect becomes less pronounced as concrete hypotheticals become more terse and resemble short abstract hypotheticals. (pg670) Also of note is that people are more apt to give harsher punishments once the transgressor has been identified, rather than prior to that identification. (pg665)
Authors propose 3 distinct theories that could account for this phenomenon. (pg671-5) They are as follows:
Performance Error Model: affective responses distort people's judgments, making them unable to apply their theory of moral responsibility. Thus people are largely incompatibilists but readily assign moral responsibility when they have an affective response to a hypothetical. This has an affinity with people willing to hold people more responsible when they are experiencing even unrelated negative emotions.
Affective Competence Model: employing affective responses about moral situations is the core method by which moral judgments are reached, thus the abstract hypotheticals are problematic, not the concrete ones. Hence people are fundamentally compatibilist.
Concrete Competence Model: it is concreteness, not affect, that is the primary difference here; abstract hypotheticals fail to adequately signal the subject (or a special 'moral module' inside the subject) for a moral judgment, while concrete hypotheticals do.
Authors consider that hybrid answers are also possible, but they advocate one in particular: 'Affect serves both as part of the fundamental competence underlying responsibility judgments and as a factor that can sometimes lead to performance errors.' (pg674) Authors then try to show some other evidence that might eliminate one of the models, and possibly support their own hybrid theory.
The evidence offered (pg675-7) now dealt with two concrete hypotheticals, one 'high-affect' about rape and the other 'low-affect' about tax evasion. This experiement attempted to control for concreteness. The results were that people were compatibilists about rape but incompatibilists about tax evasion. The Affective Competence model might have a hard time accounting for the difference that is also revealed between a deterministic condition and a indeterministic-free-will condition.(pg676-7)
Lastly, authors examine how their findings might change the way philosophers view people's intuitions about (in)compatibilism. (pg677-680)
10/10/08
Munzer, Stephen - From Innocense to Purity of Heart-- and Back Again
10/10/2008
unpublished paper
This paper is mostly an exploration of what innocence means, how it can be lost, and then what would have to happen for it to be regained, or perhaps just surpassed. Author begins by giving 5 different accounts of innocence:
1. Lack of knowledge of evil
2. Absence of sin or moral wrongdoing
3. Lack of awareness of moral complexity
4. Lack of an experience of moral difficulty/intimate encounter with evil
5. Lack of a capacity to do harm, as of knowledge, intention or will
Author points out that 5. is not a metaphysical or logical inability to harm, but instead some sort of agency inability. This raises the possibility of 'purity of heart', meaning an intentional incapacity to do wrong.
Author discusses how the loss of the various types of innocence might occur, and then proceeds to discuss two examples, that of jealousy and ambition. Author claims it might be possible to become ambitious or jealous and then, after concerted effort and time, extinguish those intentions to regain innocence. Yet the objection to this isn't that innocence is regained but instead some higher level of moral maturity is reached. Author then discusses his replies, perhaps that the objection is too cognitive and that, intellectually-- sure-- there is a difference, but the two situations might be morally similar.
The objection, however, brings up the possibility of a morally superior state after the loss of innocence and the extinction of the evil that caused such a loss. Author mentions how baptism might play into this as a sense of renewal, though it does not return innocence. Lastly, author discusses purity of heart in the bible.
unpublished paper
This paper is mostly an exploration of what innocence means, how it can be lost, and then what would have to happen for it to be regained, or perhaps just surpassed. Author begins by giving 5 different accounts of innocence:
1. Lack of knowledge of evil
2. Absence of sin or moral wrongdoing
3. Lack of awareness of moral complexity
4. Lack of an experience of moral difficulty/intimate encounter with evil
5. Lack of a capacity to do harm, as of knowledge, intention or will
Author points out that 5. is not a metaphysical or logical inability to harm, but instead some sort of agency inability. This raises the possibility of 'purity of heart', meaning an intentional incapacity to do wrong.
Author discusses how the loss of the various types of innocence might occur, and then proceeds to discuss two examples, that of jealousy and ambition. Author claims it might be possible to become ambitious or jealous and then, after concerted effort and time, extinguish those intentions to regain innocence. Yet the objection to this isn't that innocence is regained but instead some higher level of moral maturity is reached. Author then discusses his replies, perhaps that the objection is too cognitive and that, intellectually-- sure-- there is a difference, but the two situations might be morally similar.
The objection, however, brings up the possibility of a morally superior state after the loss of innocence and the extinction of the evil that caused such a loss. Author mentions how baptism might play into this as a sense of renewal, though it does not return innocence. Lastly, author discusses purity of heart in the bible.
10/3/08
Mitchell, Susan - Integrating Knowledge: Complexity, Science and Policy Chapter 2
10/03/2008
Unpublished Manuscript
This chapter mainly deals with the problem of reduction of complex systems. Author argues for a language that 'tracks the diversity' in holistic behavior versus behavior of the parts. There are many kinds of reduction, from Kim's ontological reductionism to epistemic and methodological reduction. Author takes the position that a reduction that entails 'a "nothing more than" account' will miss 'important features' of the behavior of complex systems. It is 'too meager a conceptual framework'. [This appears to be a stance against epistemic reduction.]
Author first discusses how materialism gives prima facie reasons for ontological reduction. However 'reductionism actually makes a stronger claim, namely that there is some basic level of description that corresponds to the basic fundamental level of matter'. Mill and CD Broad took up some of Aristotle's discussion on "emergence" and put forward an epistemic account of non-reducibility e.g. wetness of water. Once most of these examples were shown to actually be reducible, it seemed reductionism had no barriers. Emergence again appeared in the 1970s when discussing neurological complexity. It is in this context that Kim makes the strong case for ontological reductionism.
Author discusses Kim's reductionism and points out the bold assumption he makes: that 'every material object has a unique complete microstructural description'. Author believes this condition won't be satisfied with type-instantiation (multiple realizeability) rather than token-instantiation. Further, to believe that our descriptions of the world can be unified into one language mistakenly believes that our language can successfully map onto reality perfectly in every case, avoiding e.g. bad grammars and generalities.
Author's most lengthy response is as follows: complex systems aren't all just aggregations of simple parts. There are feedback systems, chaotic systems, 'non-linear' dynamics, etc. that are missed on 'any other account of reduction'. Author describes the flight of groups of starling birds and of foraging bees in a colony. One of the issues here is predictability: an account of the individual bird or bee will not predict how the group behaves.
Unpublished Manuscript
This chapter mainly deals with the problem of reduction of complex systems. Author argues for a language that 'tracks the diversity' in holistic behavior versus behavior of the parts. There are many kinds of reduction, from Kim's ontological reductionism to epistemic and methodological reduction. Author takes the position that a reduction that entails 'a "nothing more than" account' will miss 'important features' of the behavior of complex systems. It is 'too meager a conceptual framework'. [This appears to be a stance against epistemic reduction.]
Author first discusses how materialism gives prima facie reasons for ontological reduction. However 'reductionism actually makes a stronger claim, namely that there is some basic level of description that corresponds to the basic fundamental level of matter'. Mill and CD Broad took up some of Aristotle's discussion on "emergence" and put forward an epistemic account of non-reducibility e.g. wetness of water. Once most of these examples were shown to actually be reducible, it seemed reductionism had no barriers. Emergence again appeared in the 1970s when discussing neurological complexity. It is in this context that Kim makes the strong case for ontological reductionism.
Author discusses Kim's reductionism and points out the bold assumption he makes: that 'every material object has a unique complete microstructural description'. Author believes this condition won't be satisfied with type-instantiation (multiple realizeability) rather than token-instantiation. Further, to believe that our descriptions of the world can be unified into one language mistakenly believes that our language can successfully map onto reality perfectly in every case, avoiding e.g. bad grammars and generalities.
Author's most lengthy response is as follows: complex systems aren't all just aggregations of simple parts. There are feedback systems, chaotic systems, 'non-linear' dynamics, etc. that are missed on 'any other account of reduction'. Author describes the flight of groups of starling birds and of foraging bees in a colony. One of the issues here is predictability: an account of the individual bird or bee will not predict how the group behaves.
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