08/29/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Feb 2008
This is a paper about how achieving realistic beliefs and having a reality-oriented attitude is not just important for true happiness, but also somewhat conceptually necessary. Author argues against two skeptical arguments, one being a common-sense view that 'sometimes it's better not-to-know than to-know' and the other is the social-science work by Shelly Taylor and Jonathon Brown on how mild illusions about one's worth and abilities are important for true happiness.
Author first argues that true happiness is a combination of subjective happiness and objective worth. First Abraham Maslow claim that realistic people tend to integrate the 'pleasure principle' with the 'reality principle' to better attain virtues such as unselfishness, caring, etc. Carl Rogers claims that a fully functioning person is honest with herself and honest in how she presents herself to others. (pg85-6) Author describes how Aristotle put as a requisite to happiness practical wisdom, which entails a high degree of self- and other-knowledge and the disposition to act on such wisdom. Author proposes the combination of subjective welfare and objective worth (like virtues) as true happiness. Author also claims that we consider it valuable to be in touch with reality, using rejection of the experience machine as a case in point (pg87-88).
Importantly, author claims realism as 'conceptually necessary' for a life of objective worth:
1) A component to true happiness is to live truly objectively worthwhile lives
2) We cannot know whether we live truly objectively worthwhile lives if we are deluded
3) We cannot know if we have true happiness if we are deluded
What 'realism/being realistic' entails:
'reality-oriented and informed about the important facts of your own life and human life in general, and disposed to act accordingly' (pg89)
The first challenge is from the common-sense notion that sometimes it is better not-t0-know than to-know. The realist is going to be interested in discovering things that might be better-off being left alone. Author argues that the opposite of realist is the self-deceived, and that they are more 'likely to skin their shines on the rough edges of reality' than the realist. (pg90) Author does claim, however that it is possible that learning a fact that adds to your subjective displeasure can actually be good for you, too. Only in the following circumstances:
1) You are aware of some habitual/characteristic negligence
2) Knowledge of x (subjectively unhappy thing) is related to this negligence
3) You use knowledge of x to fix this negligence
Author claims that this is good for you because it will help avoid future tragedies (and also makes you objectively worth more). (pg91)
Author concedes that there is some knowledge that isn't conducive to happiness, and acknowledges that subjective welfare and objective worth may conflict, making happiness difficult to attain. (pg91-2)
More effort and time in the essay is focused on the scientific challenge by Taylor and Brown. Their articles suggest that mild positive illusions about self-worth, abilities, and subjective welfare are conducive for well-being. Also, those under these mild positive illusions tend to be more open, caring, creative, imaginative, ready to grow, etc., therefore it is also conducive to objective worth. Taylor & Brown consider the realists to be a somewhat depressive bunch (pg92) (Downbeat), and the Upbeat to have unrealistic optimism about self-evaluations, abilities, and subjective welfare. Author attacks the empirical work and the conclusions drawn from it.
II2- Taylor & Brown use college students' self-reports (perhaps college students are a bad sample?) and report that 60% say they are happier than average-- logically impossible. Author points out that only 20% have to be wrong-- the others could just be realistic. Author claims that most people are overly optimistic in some areas of life, pessimistic in others, realistic in others. (pg96) Author also disputes that there is a correlation between a positive illusion and subjective happiness. Taylor & Brown assume that most people are happy, but author argues there are relative degrees and that this is a bad assumption. The other evidence comes from comparisons to the Downbeat. Author also employs the critical work of Colvin and Block. Author argues that if there are no depressive realists (Downbeats), then there is no comparison to Upbeats, leaving untouched the issue of being a realist. (pg97-8)
II3- Author argues we can't trust self-reports of happiness from Upbeats. A self-reporting Upbeat will give a higher rating on a happiness scale, but author argues that such a person only has the illusion of happiness, not genuine subjective happiness. (pg98-9) More importantly, author claims this is not causal to having other Upbeat qualities (illusion of greater control, greater abilities, ) but conceptually connected-- the Upbeat will have an illusion of all of these things, as well as the illusion of being happier (pg99). [This argument relies on subjective happiness being an achievement rather than a state, it relies on the illusion of happiness being different from actually being happy.]
II4-II5- Author takes on the Taylor & Brown view that Upbeats are more likely to live objectively worthwhile lives because they are more likely to be engaged, grow, be creative, etc. (pg100) Author grants (for the sake of argument) that there are true depressed realists (Downbeats). If this is so, then there are three options: (pg101)
1) Downbeats see reality truly as bad
2) Downbeats aren't realistic enough to see what is good
3) There are no true Downbeats, just depressives
In this case, only 1) could be construed against realism, but author instead blames reality, not realism. (pg101) Author argues from common sense that those who see their own shortcomings are more apt to grow and change and be open to new ideas or people, in other words, not Upbeats but realists. (pg 101-2) Author also draws an important distinction between ignorant realists and Upbeats. (pg102)
II6- Author takes on the other studies made by Taylor & Brown, that of the optimism of HIV-positive gay men. (pg103-5)
II7- Author gives the example of a well-adjusted realist Catherine Royce, who is afflicted with ALS and is both subjectively happy and reports being objective worthy as a counterexample.
8/15/08
Crane, Tim - Fraught with Ought
08/15/2008
London Review of Books, June 19 2008
This is a review of two books collecting the works of Wilfrid Sellars. Author describes the three main points to Sellars' systematic philosophy. The first is that science is the descriptor of reality. The problem with this claim is that we don't live in the world described by science; we live in a world of a manifest image. Instead of denying this is a problem, Sellars confronted it with his second main point: the meaning of a word can be expressed by what correct inferences you can make in its usage. Author contrasts this with Frege, who considered meaning to be referring a property to an object.
The final discussion by the author is Sellars' work on qualia, or 'the myth of the given', which highlights his third main point: 'all awareness is a linguistic affair', including inner thoughts being construed instead as inner speech. Author is unconvinced on this point, since Sellars seems to embrace an emergent feature of our brains.
London Review of Books, June 19 2008
This is a review of two books collecting the works of Wilfrid Sellars. Author describes the three main points to Sellars' systematic philosophy. The first is that science is the descriptor of reality. The problem with this claim is that we don't live in the world described by science; we live in a world of a manifest image. Instead of denying this is a problem, Sellars confronted it with his second main point: the meaning of a word can be expressed by what correct inferences you can make in its usage. Author contrasts this with Frege, who considered meaning to be referring a property to an object.
The final discussion by the author is Sellars' work on qualia, or 'the myth of the given', which highlights his third main point: 'all awareness is a linguistic affair', including inner thoughts being construed instead as inner speech. Author is unconvinced on this point, since Sellars seems to embrace an emergent feature of our brains.
8/1/08
Chomsky, Noam - We Own The World
08/01/2008
Information Clearing House.info Zmedia Institute Talk, June 2007
This is a relatively informal discussion from author that was originally a talk given. The paper has one crucial argument: debate and policy decisions in the US are made once specific assumptions have already been made, one of which is that the United States of America owns the world.
Author starts with a discussion about the mid-term elections and how the debate about 'Iranian interference' went, suggested that the sub-text or assumption behind both sides of the debate was that we own Iraq. Author looks back to the Vietnam war and analyzes the debates and memoirs in light of the bombing campaigns that took place in the North and South and interpreted them using the assumption that we owned Vietnam.
Author then posits that the US isn't a functioning democracy, at least in foreign policy. E.g. 2/3 of Americans want an end to the Cuba embargo, a majority want an Iraq pullout, but it doesn't happen. The way to fix countries like Iraq, Iran is to make them more democratic. That is the way to fix America too, ironically.
Author then discusses how this assumption is even in the 'liberal' media like NPR, where the discussion of the missile defense system-- a system that is more geared to make first strikes without retaliations rather than to defend against first strikes-- assumes that installing it is legitimate, since 'we own the world'.
The final discussion is about history, where the author recounts the series of Iran, Iraq, Russian, Chinese-US relations. Author interprets US actions as unilateral and self-excluding-- meaning that we expect other countries to play by the rules, but not the US.
Author finally remarks that eduction in elite institutions might be part of the blindspot that many elites have with unpopular ideas.
Information Clearing House.info Zmedia Institute Talk, June 2007
This is a relatively informal discussion from author that was originally a talk given. The paper has one crucial argument: debate and policy decisions in the US are made once specific assumptions have already been made, one of which is that the United States of America owns the world.
Author starts with a discussion about the mid-term elections and how the debate about 'Iranian interference' went, suggested that the sub-text or assumption behind both sides of the debate was that we own Iraq. Author looks back to the Vietnam war and analyzes the debates and memoirs in light of the bombing campaigns that took place in the North and South and interpreted them using the assumption that we owned Vietnam.
Author then posits that the US isn't a functioning democracy, at least in foreign policy. E.g. 2/3 of Americans want an end to the Cuba embargo, a majority want an Iraq pullout, but it doesn't happen. The way to fix countries like Iraq, Iran is to make them more democratic. That is the way to fix America too, ironically.
Author then discusses how this assumption is even in the 'liberal' media like NPR, where the discussion of the missile defense system-- a system that is more geared to make first strikes without retaliations rather than to defend against first strikes-- assumes that installing it is legitimate, since 'we own the world'.
The final discussion is about history, where the author recounts the series of Iran, Iraq, Russian, Chinese-US relations. Author interprets US actions as unilateral and self-excluding-- meaning that we expect other countries to play by the rules, but not the US.
Author finally remarks that eduction in elite institutions might be part of the blindspot that many elites have with unpopular ideas.
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