05/30/2008
The Innate Mind Vol 3, ch 2 Oxford Press 2007 Carruthers, Laurence, Stich, eds.
This is an extended reply to an objection, leveled recently about the concept of innateness, that it is hopelessly confused, confounding, and that it should be jettisoned in the realm of cognitive science (Griffiths). Author replies that this argument is inconclusive and proposes conditions for innateness that author claims avoids these objections. First, the objection:
The challenge is to the concept of innate, what the author labels 'INNATE'. The challenge is that INNATE confounds many independent properties into one concept. These independent properties are 'empirically dissociable' (pg19), but the concept INNATE confounds these properties together, thereby confusing the concept itself. (pg19) The different 'i-properties' are, e.g., as follows: (pg18-9)
1. Having an adaptive evolutionary explanation
2. Being insensitive to external variation
3. Being present at birth/inborn
4. Being universal, either pancultural or monomorphic (same trait accross cultures)
5. Not being acquired by learning
Author doesn't deny that these i-properties, or at least many of them, are commonly associated with INNATE, that they are empirically dissociable, and that much discussion these days is confused. Author first distinguishes between a confused concept and word ambiguity (pg20). Word ambiguity is just people using a word in different contexts and referring to different things. Concept confusion is that disparate things are grouped together into one. (pg21) Further, author argues that the confusion found in INNATE must be constitutive of the concept, not simply that it's associated with this or that property. (pg21-2) Author suggests (but does not endorse) a possible response to Griffiths: INNATE is a natural kind that is the causal origin of many of the properties associated with it. It isn't necessary that all the properties come out in all cases-- we should just expect a 'cluster of symptoms' (pg23-4
Author gives his analysis of INNATE as a 'Psychological Primitive', something that:
a) is posited by some correct psychological theory
b) is given to no correct psychological explanation of it's acquisition (in principle, not just currently)
c) is acquired by the normal course of development of the organism in question
(pg25)
With this analysis, author discusses the virtues of this as the basis for the concept INNATE. (pg27-8)
1) It is wholly consistent with the 'Interactionist Thesis', roughly, that development comes from both nature and nurture, while some of the i-properties imply that they come just from nature
2) It makes clearer much of the discussion in cognitive science today
3) It gives cognitive science something useful to do with the concept INNATE
Author then reviews the various i-properties and how most of them, with the exception of the property of being unlearned, are neither necessary nor sufficient for innateness. However, many of them bear a positive evidentiary relation (raise the probability of something being innate) to innateness. (pg28-31)
The last section deals with why, in cognitive science today, debates on innateness seems to be so confused. Author blames ambiguity, fallacious argumentation, and incomplete science (failure of convergence). Another peril is folk-psychology, the 'sink-hole' that it is easy even for scientists to fall into. (pg34-5) Lastly, author discusses a problem with his analysis of INNATE. The problem is that different frameworks of learning/acquisition may show different behaviors/traits to be innate. This is because of the void-filling nature of the concept. Thus author argues that we must simultaneously pursue the two questions:
-What innate structures are there?- and -what is the best theory of cognition?-
5/23/08
Cresswell, Max - Abstract Entities in the Causal Order
05/23/2008
This is a paper discussing some attempts to argue against the existence, or at least our knowledge of, abstract entities. Author unlocks a short logical argument and shows that it has concealed metaphysical premises that need further argumentation. The argument in question goes as follows:
(1) We can only have knowledge of things which are part of the causal order
(2) Abstract entities are not part of the causal order
(3) We cannot have knowledge of abstract entities
The first section of the paper discusses the proposition as an abstract entity. The knowledge relation holds between a person and a proposition due, some platonist might say, it's part in the causal order. But the existence of a proposition isn't in the causal order-- it's truth or falsity is. Hence there is some equivocation in 'part of the causal order' in (2) (pg2).
To counter this, you might want to make explicit a metaphysical assumption (6): No entity whose existence is logically necessary (a proposition) can stand to any other entity in any contingent (e.g. true or false) relation. (pg3). Author reveals this as a metaphysical premise that needs argumentation. Perhaps, instead of arguing for (6), we'd care to reduce the abstract object 'a proposition' to concrete facts, which would mean we'd have to claim that when such a reduction is possible, propositions don't exist. The problem here is that there can be mutual reduction-- propositions in terms of facts, facts in terms of propositions. This leads to a discussion of possible world theories (pg3-4) where Lewis (concrete objects making abstract objects true) is compared to Plantinga, who uses abstract entities (haecceities) to make concrete facts true.
The second part of the paper discusses abstract propositional knowledge like 'p or ~p'. Here you don't have to know anything about the causal order to know that this is true (pg5). Author explores how to incorporate numbers (abstract entities) into propositions that are quasi-mathematical (pg6-7), or to work with mathematical statements with no empirical content. Author wants to separate our ability to 'access a special class of entities which are not part of the causal order' from empistemological problems of how we are able to do math in the first place. (pg9)
This is a paper discussing some attempts to argue against the existence, or at least our knowledge of, abstract entities. Author unlocks a short logical argument and shows that it has concealed metaphysical premises that need further argumentation. The argument in question goes as follows:
(1) We can only have knowledge of things which are part of the causal order
(2) Abstract entities are not part of the causal order
(3) We cannot have knowledge of abstract entities
The first section of the paper discusses the proposition as an abstract entity. The knowledge relation holds between a person and a proposition due, some platonist might say, it's part in the causal order. But the existence of a proposition isn't in the causal order-- it's truth or falsity is. Hence there is some equivocation in 'part of the causal order' in (2) (pg2).
To counter this, you might want to make explicit a metaphysical assumption (6): No entity whose existence is logically necessary (a proposition) can stand to any other entity in any contingent (e.g. true or false) relation. (pg3). Author reveals this as a metaphysical premise that needs argumentation. Perhaps, instead of arguing for (6), we'd care to reduce the abstract object 'a proposition' to concrete facts, which would mean we'd have to claim that when such a reduction is possible, propositions don't exist. The problem here is that there can be mutual reduction-- propositions in terms of facts, facts in terms of propositions. This leads to a discussion of possible world theories (pg3-4) where Lewis (concrete objects making abstract objects true) is compared to Plantinga, who uses abstract entities (haecceities) to make concrete facts true.
The second part of the paper discusses abstract propositional knowledge like 'p or ~p'. Here you don't have to know anything about the causal order to know that this is true (pg5). Author explores how to incorporate numbers (abstract entities) into propositions that are quasi-mathematical (pg6-7), or to work with mathematical statements with no empirical content. Author wants to separate our ability to 'access a special class of entities which are not part of the causal order' from empistemological problems of how we are able to do math in the first place. (pg9)
5/9/08
Taylor, Charles - The Culture of Modernity
05/09/2008
Sources of Self, Harvard Press 1989 Ch 17
In this chapter author explores the rise of the valuation of sentiment by both philosophers and the public at large in the 18th century England, France and other developing countries like Germany and America. Author first recaps what he recently finished discussing (in previous chapters?) about the rise in interest in economic productivity as a method for accruing honor or respect, as compared to the more aristocratic ideals of winning military victories.
Author first discusses the rise in the modern novel, which turned away from epic archetypes and more toward the 'portrayal of the particular'. In conjuring the particular, the story became about a particular person and their particular life, including their emotions. This captured the imagination of the public, who felt gripped by their imagination of these sentiments. (pg294-6) What also changed was what author calls 'time-consciousness' (pg287-8); because stories were more particular, this de-emphasized the archetypal, 'ontic-logos' method of story-telling, where the universe is portrayed as working in thematic ways at all times. Time was now seen to be more like space, homogenous and empty. Lastly, this shift began to portray life as a narration, not just of outer accomplishments but of inner space. (pg289)
The next shift is the growth in marriage and family life as based on affection. This starts with larger demands on the family unit, therefore a call for more voluntary entrance to such an structure. This stood in contrast to a patriarchal model. But author argues that all this was fueled by placing greater weight in the feeling of love, especially naturalizing it as a right (pg 290). This seems to be coupled with placing greater importance on children, and childhood as distinct from being an adult. As such, it follows that raising children is a special act, requiring special work- from the family. Private rooms began to be incorporated in home construction. Author argues that the entire family life began to shift into somewhere to take solace from a hard world, rather than something to have while you participate in the world. (pg292-3)
Another change was he rise of the English garden, and 'country living' in general. What was important here wasn't the appreciation of balance, reason, or simplicity in nature, but instead what sentiments were brought out in being out in 'natural' surroundings. (pg297) English gardens were designed to look unkept, or rather not organized by a human hand. Neo-classicism fought directly against this (pg299).
Lastly, author discusses how the religions began to move away from theology and more toward conviction and devotion-- sentiments.
Sources of Self, Harvard Press 1989 Ch 17
In this chapter author explores the rise of the valuation of sentiment by both philosophers and the public at large in the 18th century England, France and other developing countries like Germany and America. Author first recaps what he recently finished discussing (in previous chapters?) about the rise in interest in economic productivity as a method for accruing honor or respect, as compared to the more aristocratic ideals of winning military victories.
Author first discusses the rise in the modern novel, which turned away from epic archetypes and more toward the 'portrayal of the particular'. In conjuring the particular, the story became about a particular person and their particular life, including their emotions. This captured the imagination of the public, who felt gripped by their imagination of these sentiments. (pg294-6) What also changed was what author calls 'time-consciousness' (pg287-8); because stories were more particular, this de-emphasized the archetypal, 'ontic-logos' method of story-telling, where the universe is portrayed as working in thematic ways at all times. Time was now seen to be more like space, homogenous and empty. Lastly, this shift began to portray life as a narration, not just of outer accomplishments but of inner space. (pg289)
The next shift is the growth in marriage and family life as based on affection. This starts with larger demands on the family unit, therefore a call for more voluntary entrance to such an structure. This stood in contrast to a patriarchal model. But author argues that all this was fueled by placing greater weight in the feeling of love, especially naturalizing it as a right (pg 290). This seems to be coupled with placing greater importance on children, and childhood as distinct from being an adult. As such, it follows that raising children is a special act, requiring special work- from the family. Private rooms began to be incorporated in home construction. Author argues that the entire family life began to shift into somewhere to take solace from a hard world, rather than something to have while you participate in the world. (pg292-3)
Another change was he rise of the English garden, and 'country living' in general. What was important here wasn't the appreciation of balance, reason, or simplicity in nature, but instead what sentiments were brought out in being out in 'natural' surroundings. (pg297) English gardens were designed to look unkept, or rather not organized by a human hand. Neo-classicism fought directly against this (pg299).
Lastly, author discusses how the religions began to move away from theology and more toward conviction and devotion-- sentiments.
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